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How to dominate a country




   An analysis to the Portuguese
internet exposition to cyber-attacks
WHAT are you ?
We are:
• Security Researchers
• Security enthusiasts
• Students, corporate sheep (read: auditors),
  programmers, pentesters

We are not   :
• Lulzsec
• Anonymous
• Hacking group
• And no we wont help you hack you girlfriends
  facebook!
Who are you ?
• Tiago Henriques                        • Tiago Martins
    • Team founder @ PTCoreSec               • Team vice-founder @ PTCoreSec
    • Pentester/Researcher @ 7Elements       • Researcher
    • @Balgan                                • @Gank_101




                                         • Jean Figueiredo
• Filipe Reis                                • Network security researcher @
    • Programmer @ PTCoreSec                    PTCoreSec
    • Intern @ Layer8                        • Netsec admin @ Tecnocom
    • @fjdreis                               • @klinzter
Who are you ? @balgan

• Tiago Henriques
• 24
• BSc Software Engineering – University of Brighton
• MSc by Research Computer Security and Forensics – University of Bedfordshire
• Started a PhD but decided to drop out and go work in the industry...
• CEH
• CHFI
• Team founder @ PTCoreSec
• Currently a Pentester/Researcher @ 7Elements
• @Balgan
Who are you ?
Topics
We are NOT

RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ILLEGAL
ACTS OR ACTIONS PRACTICED BY
YOU OR ANYONE THAT LEARNS
SOMETHING FROM TODAY’S
PRESENTATION.
Causing Chaos.
Q:If you guys were an attacker that was
out to cause real damage or get
profit, how would you go on about it ?
A:This is what we would do, control as
many machines in that country,
penetrate critical systems and get as
much intel/info as possible.
Causing Chaos.
And that’s what we are gonna talk about
today!
How it all got started

We’re hackers! We love knowing how to break things and
how others would go on about breaking things!

The difference between us and others is simple:

• We want to break things legally and find a way to fix
  things.
• We want to learn about new things and help people.
PORT SCANNING….
How it all got started
We saw some talks that really inspired us given by two great
people
    HD Moore                                 Fyodor
However…
We also ran into a bit of a problem…


Portscanning might or might not be illegal in Portugal!

No one is actually sure, and we talked with multiple people:
   • Police
   • Sysadmins
   • Researchers
   • Security professionals
What to do ?
• So, if you can’t port scan, how do u find out what ur
  enemies attack surface is ?

• How do u know out if the entire infrastructure u rely on
  everyday is vulnerable or safe?

• Security by obscurity? Right that works well….
What to do ?

• We went and did the portscans, on passive mode, no system
  was penetrated in any way what so ever.

• We did it slowly, and with plenty of time between scans as
  to not cause any DoS issues.
Port scanning

• Tools of the trade:
   • Nmap
   • Wkhtmltoimage
   • Python
   • Scapy
   • Linux
   • NodeJS
   • MongoDB
   • C
   • Redbull + Lots of nights awake +
     Frustration
Port scanning - Process

1. Get Portugal CIDRs


2. Decide on a set of services you consider important


3. Check which ips have those ports open
                                               Actual scanning.
4. Check versions running of those services
Port scanning - Process
 1. Get Portugal’s CIDRs
There are two places where you can get these:


   • http://software77.net/geo-ip/


   • ftp://ftp.ripe.net/pub/stats/ripencc/delegated-ripencc-latest
      2.80.0.0/14           62.48.192.0/18       81.90.48.0/20
      5.43.0.0/18           62.169.64.0/18       81.92.192.0/20
      5.44.192.0/20         62.249.0.0/19        81.92.208.0/20
      5.158.0.0/18          77.54.0.0/16         81.193.0.0/16
      5.159.216.0/21        77.91.200.0/21       82.102.0.0/18
      5.172.144.0/21        78.29.128.0/18       82.154.0.0/15
      31.22.128.0/17        78.130.0.0/17        83.132.0.0/16
      37.28.192.0/18        78.137.192.0/18      83.144.128.0/18
      37.189.0.0/16         79.168.0.0/15        83.174.0.0/18
      46.50.0.0/17          80.172.0.0/16        83.223.160.0/19
      46.182.32.0/21        80.243.80.0/20       83.240.128.0/17
      46.189.128.0/17       81.20.240.0/20       84.18.224.0/19
      62.28.0.0/16          81.84.0.0/16         84.23.192.0/19
      62.48.128.0/18        81.90.48.0/20        84.90.0.0/15
Port scanning - Process
2. Decide on a set of services you consider important
      Port                                  11    1900UDP   UPNP
ID    Number   TCP/UDP   Service            12    2869TCP   UPNP
  1          80TCP       http               13    5353UDP   MDNS
  2         443TCP       https              14     137TCP   Netbios
  3        8080TCP       http alternative   15      25TCP   SMTP
  4          21TCP       FTP                16     110TCP   POP3
  5          22TCP       SSH                17     143TCP   IMAP
  6          23TCP       Telnet             18    3306TCP   Mysql
  7          53UDP       DNS                19    5900TCP   VNC Server
  8         445TCP       Samba              20   17185UDP   VoIP
  9         139TCP       Samba              21    3389TCP   Rdesktop
 10         161UDP       SNMP               22    8082TCP   TR 069
Port scanning - Process
3. Check which ip’s have those port’s open


4. Check versions running of those services




                 This is where it get’s tricky!
Port scanning - Process
• Portugal on the internet….

                               5,822,240 allocated ip’s




                               Dynamic ips




                               GPRS
Port scanning - Process
• So as we mentioned, we devided the actual scanning into two
  parts! And you might be wondering why…
  Common nmap scan for TCP


nmap -iL ipswithftp -oA port21-FTP-with-Services -sS -sV -p21-T5 -PN

  The problem of this, is that DNS resolution and –sV (Service detection) are very slow.

  So how do we solve this problem? We obviously want the domains the ips are
  associated with, and the versions of the services running.
Port scanning - Process
• Do the fast things on the 6 mil ips and then do the slow stuff
  merely on the ips that are running the service we want to
  analyse.       • nmap -iL CIDRSPT.txt -oA port21-FTP -
                   sS -p21 -T5 -PN --host-timeout 1501 –
                   min-hostgroup 400 --min-parallelism
                   10 -n
• Then we will have the list of ips that have FTP running on port
  21 on 3 files:
           • Port21-FTP.xml
           • Port21-FTP.gnmap
           • Port21-FTP.nmap
• Extract ips from gnmap:
       cat port21-FTP.gnmap | grep -w "21/open" | awk '{print $2}' >
      IPSWITHFTP.TXT
Port scanning - Process
• Do the show things only the ips that have our service running.

    • nmap -iL IPSWITHFTP.txt -oA port21-FTP-FINAL -sV -p21 -T5
      -PN --host-timeout 1501 –min-hostgroup 400 --min-
      parallelism 10
• Then we will have the list of ips that have FTP running on port
  21 AND the version of those services on 3 files:
         • Port21-FTP-FINAL.xml
         • Port21-FTP-FINAL.gnmap
         • Port21-FTP-FINAL.nmap
Port scanning - Process
• However…we still have UDP… and let me tell u….
Port scanning - Process
Nmap also has a UDP mode… -sU however it doesn’t work very
well without -sV (read: its shit!), when testing it on our lab we
noticed that most of the times nmap wasn’t able to detect if
there was a service running or not.

The reason for this is: “UDP scanning is slow as open/filtered
ports typically don't respond so nmap has to time out and then
retransmit whilst closed ports will send a ICMP port
unreachable error, which systems typically rate limit.”

When we started, it took us around 4 Weeks to scan UDP on
the entire country on 1 port….
Port scanning - Process
                Solution ?

             SCAPY!
Server


Client




Service running on
port:11111
Port scanning - Process
Result of that script ?
On lab testing….
Port scanning - Process
Result of that script ?
On internet testing….
Port scanning - Process
When we started, it took us around +4 Weeks to scan UDP on the entire country on 1
port using NMap…. -We took this as a baseline first run to improve…

Our second run, we used python+scapy and it went down!!
1 week – well not bad for a second run, but 1 week for a port ?

Our third run, we used python+multithreading fu + scapy + blackmamba – 3 days –
and this was the best we brought it down to without bringing in the big guns (read:
“asking HD Moore for help”)

                                     Forth run – C




           Yup entire .pt (1 port ) scanned in 4 minutes and 45 seconds.
Port scanning - Process
So... At this point we can do UDP in 5 minutes. As you can guess... We now love UDP
scanning again...

Our next objective became to speed up our TCP scanning. For you to understand
what we did you need first to understand how nmap works:
       25000



       20000



       15000

                                                                       Time

       10000                                                           Packets per second Nmap



        5000



           0
               1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Port scanning - Process
What we did, is write our own TCP scanner. And the result is the following:


         25000




         20000




         15000
                                                                         Time


                                                                         Packets per second
         10000                                                           PTCoreSecTCP




          5000




             0
                 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Port scanning - End


So we had our kick ass
friends, send us our kick ass
raw results… now what do
we do with them ?
Port scanning - End
Terminals are fun, BUT we want an easier
way to look at our data…

So…. We wrote a tool:

PTCoreSec Command Center!
First version
Second version
Third version
Fourth version – Current Stable
Fifth version – Currently Under development
Port scanning - Demo

 DEMO TIME!
Port scanning – The project

While we were preparing for
codebits…

We received something in
the mail….
Port scanning – The project
         Raspi
Port scanning – The project

And it got us thinking…
Port scanning, doesn’t
require a great CPU, nor
a huge amount of ram…
Port scanning – The project


So we decided to create a
distributed port scanning
project…
Port scanning – The project
    We grabbed the


And added a custom set of
scripts to it…
Port scanning – The project
Port scanning – How does it work?

       Step 1 – PTCoreSec admins request a job
       (scan) on the backend.

       Step 2 – Server side checks current
       number of live raspi minions.

       Step 3 – Server divides de CIDRS by the
       different clients and sends them over.

       Step 4 – Clients (minions) do the scans
       and XMLRPC send them back to the
       server.

       Step 5 – Server imports these scans into
       the MongoDB backend.
Part 2
Business



When a client asks for a pentest
We present them with these
Business
Business
Business
Business
And that’s all really neat and
pretty, however there are 2 problems
with that! These guys don’t give a
f***.



     Management              Blackhats
Management
Cares about:
               • Money
               • Money
               • Money

Does:
               • Will lie for PCI DSS/ISO27001/{Compliance}
                                                              This gives us, security
               • Approves every single thing even if it
                                                              peeps, headaches!
                 doesn’t match security department goals
                 but gets them moneys.
I ask onLY ONE thing of u
Leave your whitehats at home, and
SHODAN


SHODAN is a search engine that lets you find specific computers
(routers, servers, etc.) using a variety of filters. Some have also described it as
a public port scan directory or a search engine of banners.




  Another way of putting it would be:
Is the


Of these
Now combine this:



   With these:
And you get a lot of these
Also if you do anything ilegal and
get caught, you’ll get one of these:
SHODAN

Now its when u ask
Shodan


http://www.shodanhq.com/
SHODAN
Accessing that website will give u a bar, where you can type queries
and obtain results.

Your queries, can ask for PORTS, Countries, strings contained in the
banners, and all sorts of other things




Following is a sample set of queries that can lead to some interesting
results:
SHODAN QUERIES

•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=cisco-IOS
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=IIS+4.0
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Xerver
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Fuji+xerox
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=JetDirect
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Netgear
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=%22Anonymous+access+allowed%22
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Golden+FTP+Server
SHODAN QUERIES + combined country?
           Awesome!


        Saturday, 9th
        of June 2012
SHODAN QUERIES + combined country
      Port: 3306 country:PT
SHODAN QUERIES + combined country?
           Awesome!


        Wednesday, 6
        th of June
        2012
SHODAN QUERIES + combined country
        BigIP country:PT
SHODAN QUERIES + combined country?
           Awesome!


        Tuesday, Marc
        h 13, 2012
SHODAN QUERIES + combined country
  port:3389 -allowed country:PT
SHODAN QUERIES + combined country?
           Awesome!
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
                SAP Web Application Server (ICM)


     Worldwide




     Portugal
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
                SAP NetWeaver Application Server


     Worldwide




     Portugal
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
                SAP Web Application Server


     Worldwide




     Portugal
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
                 SAP J2EE Engine


     Worldwide




     Portugal
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
                 port:23 country:PT


     Worldwide




     Portugal
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
          port:23 country:PT




                               Username:admin
                               Password:smcadmin
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
          port:23 list of built-in commands
        Worldwide




   Not a big number, however just telnet in and you get shell…
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
                 port:161 country:PT


     Worldwide




     Portugal
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
        What sort of info do I get with SNMP ?

•   Windows RUNNING PROCESSES 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.2
•   Windows INSTALLED SOFTWARE 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.6.3.1.2
•   Windows SYSTEM INFO 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1
•   Windows HOSTNAME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5
•   Windows DOMAIN 1.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.4.1
•   Windows UPTIME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.3
•   Windows USERS 1.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.25
•   Windows SHARES 1.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.27
•   Windows DISKS 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.2.3.1.3
•   Windows SERVICES 1.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.3.1.1
•   Windows LISTENING TCP PORTS 1.3.6.1.2.1.6.13.1.3.0.0.0.0
•   Windows LISTENING UDP PORTS 1.3.6.1.2.1.7.5.1.2.0.0.0.0
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
        What sort of info do I get with SNMP ?

•   Linux RUNNING PROCESSES 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.2
•   Linux SYSTEM INFO 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1
•   Linux HOSTNAME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5
•   Linux UPTIME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.3
•   Linux MOUNTPOINTS 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.2.3.1.3
•   Linux RUNNING SOFTWARE PATHS 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.4
•   Linux LISTENING UDP PORTS 1.3.6.1.2.1.7.5.1.2.0.0.0.0
•   Linux LISTENING TCP PORTS 1.3.6.1.2.1.6.13.1.3.0.0.0.0
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
        What sort of info do I get with SNMP ?
•   Cisco LAST TERMINAL USERS 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.43.1.1.6.1.8
•   Cisco INTERFACES 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.2
•   Cisco SYSTEM INFO 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1
•   Cisco HOSTNAME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5
•   Cisco SNMPcommunities 1.3.6.1.6.3.12.1.3.1.4
•   Cisco UPTIME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.3
•   Cisco IP ADDRESSES 1.3.6.1.2.1.4.20.1.1
•   Cisco INTERFACE DESCRIPTIONS 1.3.6.1.2.1.31.1.1.1.18
•   Cisco HARDWARE 1.3.6.1.2.1.47.1.1.1.1.2
•   Cisco TACACS SERVER 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.2.1.5
•   Cisco LOGMESSAGES 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.41.1.2.3.1.5
•   Cisco PROCESSES 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.109.1.2.1.1.2
•   Cisco SNMP TRAP SERVER 1.3.6.1.6.3.12.1.2.1.7
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
                 cisco country:PT


     Worldwide




     Portugal
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
          cisco country:PT
Cisco
Cisco – GRE TUNNELING
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
                 port:1900 country:PT



     Worldwide




     Portugal
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS

      So, What is UPNP?
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
     So, What uses UPNP?
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
            Hackz
UPNP January 29th 2013!!!!
UPNP 2013




15.000+ devices replied to UPNP in
     January 2013 in Portugal
Projecto Portugal Seguro - PTCoresec
• 29 Janeiro 2013 – released a study which showed
  new flaws on UPNP and numbers on the devices
  replying to UPNP.

• PTCoreSec under the scope of project Portugal
  Seguro proceeded to help ISP’s with this problem

• We sent an email to all isp’s that resulted in the
  following
Projecto Portugal Seguro
Projecto Portugal Seguro
• Resultado
  – Some ISP’s we noticed changes in order of 80% in
    the number of ips that stopped responding to
    UPNP in less then 1 week.
  – Quicker and faster response contacts so that we
    can improve even further on this in case of next
    event.
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
            Hackz
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS



       UPNP zomg time
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS

UPNP Remote command execution
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
     Oh and by the way…
SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS

Another funny thing about UPNP, is
that you can get the MAC ADDR and
SSID its using

And then….
SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES
                            SCADA
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=PLC
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=allen+bradley
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=fanuc
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Rockwell
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Cimplicity
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Omron
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Novatech
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Citect
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=RTU
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Modbus+Bridge
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=modicon
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=bacnet
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=telemetry+gateway
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=SIMATIC
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=hmi
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=siemens+-...er+-Subscriber
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=scada+RTS
•   http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=SCHNEIDER
SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES
          PORTUGAL?
            SCADA
SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES
        SCADA Portugal
SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES
          SCADA Portugal
SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES
          SCADA Portugal
SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES
          SCADA Portugal
SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES
Cameras…. Simply connected online and without
authentication…
A little tip…
If you want to quickly check for
stuff (web related) that has no
authentication, use NMAP!
A little tip…
First, let’s get wkhtmltoimage:

wget http://wkhtmltopdf.googlecode.com/files/wkhtmltoimage-0.11.0_rc1-static-
i386.tar.bz2
tar -jxvf wkhtmltoimage-0.11.0_rc1-static-i386.tar.bz2
cp wkhtmltoimage-i386 /usr/local/bin/

Next, let’s get and install the Nmap module:
git clone git://github.com/SpiderLabs/Nmap-Tools.git
cd Nmap-Tools/NSE/
cp http-screenshot.nse /usr/local/share/nmap/scripts/
nmap --script-updatedb
A little tip…


Then, do your shodan search and use:



This automatically exports a list of ips
u can import into nmap
A little tip…
Then…
A little tip…
And nmap, will automatically take
screen shots of the first pages that
appear and store them, then u just
need to look at those!
To end…
Open
ports!
SCARY SHIT!




DEFACE 1 SCARY?


    NO!
SCARY
       SHIT!




DEFACE 2 SCARY?


Well… disturbing, scary? Not so much!
SCARY SHIT!
SCARY SHIT!
SCARY SHIT!
Shodan – the bad part

• Imports nmap scans from their servers
  on a rotational basis, so its not always
  100% updated! Confirmed this by
  correlating some of the shodan results
  with our personal results!

• For example on mysql servers, Shodan
  would find 785, where our results
  showed 3000+
Shodan – the good part


• Good querying system

• If port scanning is illegal in your
  country, you’re out of trouble if
  u use shodan, because ur just
  querying data acquired by them.
Resources

       http://secanalysis.com/interesting-shodan-searches/

   blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/06/using-nmap-to-screenshot-web-
                          services.html

 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPgZU7ZNIjQ - Defcon 18 2010
         SHODAN for Penetration Testers Michael Schearer

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tg9ZAvynjdk – HD Moore –
                      Empirical Exploitation
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b-uPh99whw4 – HD Moore – Wild
                              West
Requests




https://www.facebook.com/ptcoresec
Invite




http://www.securitybsides.com/w/page/61778144/BSidesLisbon
Challenge

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Enei

  • 1. How to dominate a country An analysis to the Portuguese internet exposition to cyber-attacks
  • 2. WHAT are you ? We are: • Security Researchers • Security enthusiasts • Students, corporate sheep (read: auditors), programmers, pentesters We are not : • Lulzsec • Anonymous • Hacking group • And no we wont help you hack you girlfriends facebook!
  • 3. Who are you ? • Tiago Henriques • Tiago Martins • Team founder @ PTCoreSec • Team vice-founder @ PTCoreSec • Pentester/Researcher @ 7Elements • Researcher • @Balgan • @Gank_101 • Jean Figueiredo • Filipe Reis • Network security researcher @ • Programmer @ PTCoreSec PTCoreSec • Intern @ Layer8 • Netsec admin @ Tecnocom • @fjdreis • @klinzter
  • 4. Who are you ? @balgan • Tiago Henriques • 24 • BSc Software Engineering – University of Brighton • MSc by Research Computer Security and Forensics – University of Bedfordshire • Started a PhD but decided to drop out and go work in the industry... • CEH • CHFI • Team founder @ PTCoreSec • Currently a Pentester/Researcher @ 7Elements • @Balgan
  • 7. We are NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ILLEGAL ACTS OR ACTIONS PRACTICED BY YOU OR ANYONE THAT LEARNS SOMETHING FROM TODAY’S PRESENTATION.
  • 8. Causing Chaos. Q:If you guys were an attacker that was out to cause real damage or get profit, how would you go on about it ? A:This is what we would do, control as many machines in that country, penetrate critical systems and get as much intel/info as possible.
  • 9. Causing Chaos. And that’s what we are gonna talk about today!
  • 10. How it all got started We’re hackers! We love knowing how to break things and how others would go on about breaking things! The difference between us and others is simple: • We want to break things legally and find a way to fix things. • We want to learn about new things and help people.
  • 12. How it all got started We saw some talks that really inspired us given by two great people HD Moore Fyodor
  • 13. However… We also ran into a bit of a problem… Portscanning might or might not be illegal in Portugal! No one is actually sure, and we talked with multiple people: • Police • Sysadmins • Researchers • Security professionals
  • 14. What to do ? • So, if you can’t port scan, how do u find out what ur enemies attack surface is ? • How do u know out if the entire infrastructure u rely on everyday is vulnerable or safe? • Security by obscurity? Right that works well….
  • 15. What to do ? • We went and did the portscans, on passive mode, no system was penetrated in any way what so ever. • We did it slowly, and with plenty of time between scans as to not cause any DoS issues.
  • 16. Port scanning • Tools of the trade: • Nmap • Wkhtmltoimage • Python • Scapy • Linux • NodeJS • MongoDB • C • Redbull + Lots of nights awake + Frustration
  • 17. Port scanning - Process 1. Get Portugal CIDRs 2. Decide on a set of services you consider important 3. Check which ips have those ports open Actual scanning. 4. Check versions running of those services
  • 18. Port scanning - Process 1. Get Portugal’s CIDRs There are two places where you can get these: • http://software77.net/geo-ip/ • ftp://ftp.ripe.net/pub/stats/ripencc/delegated-ripencc-latest 2.80.0.0/14 62.48.192.0/18 81.90.48.0/20 5.43.0.0/18 62.169.64.0/18 81.92.192.0/20 5.44.192.0/20 62.249.0.0/19 81.92.208.0/20 5.158.0.0/18 77.54.0.0/16 81.193.0.0/16 5.159.216.0/21 77.91.200.0/21 82.102.0.0/18 5.172.144.0/21 78.29.128.0/18 82.154.0.0/15 31.22.128.0/17 78.130.0.0/17 83.132.0.0/16 37.28.192.0/18 78.137.192.0/18 83.144.128.0/18 37.189.0.0/16 79.168.0.0/15 83.174.0.0/18 46.50.0.0/17 80.172.0.0/16 83.223.160.0/19 46.182.32.0/21 80.243.80.0/20 83.240.128.0/17 46.189.128.0/17 81.20.240.0/20 84.18.224.0/19 62.28.0.0/16 81.84.0.0/16 84.23.192.0/19 62.48.128.0/18 81.90.48.0/20 84.90.0.0/15
  • 19. Port scanning - Process 2. Decide on a set of services you consider important Port 11 1900UDP UPNP ID Number TCP/UDP Service 12 2869TCP UPNP 1 80TCP http 13 5353UDP MDNS 2 443TCP https 14 137TCP Netbios 3 8080TCP http alternative 15 25TCP SMTP 4 21TCP FTP 16 110TCP POP3 5 22TCP SSH 17 143TCP IMAP 6 23TCP Telnet 18 3306TCP Mysql 7 53UDP DNS 19 5900TCP VNC Server 8 445TCP Samba 20 17185UDP VoIP 9 139TCP Samba 21 3389TCP Rdesktop 10 161UDP SNMP 22 8082TCP TR 069
  • 20. Port scanning - Process 3. Check which ip’s have those port’s open 4. Check versions running of those services This is where it get’s tricky!
  • 21. Port scanning - Process • Portugal on the internet…. 5,822,240 allocated ip’s Dynamic ips GPRS
  • 22. Port scanning - Process • So as we mentioned, we devided the actual scanning into two parts! And you might be wondering why… Common nmap scan for TCP nmap -iL ipswithftp -oA port21-FTP-with-Services -sS -sV -p21-T5 -PN The problem of this, is that DNS resolution and –sV (Service detection) are very slow. So how do we solve this problem? We obviously want the domains the ips are associated with, and the versions of the services running.
  • 23. Port scanning - Process • Do the fast things on the 6 mil ips and then do the slow stuff merely on the ips that are running the service we want to analyse. • nmap -iL CIDRSPT.txt -oA port21-FTP - sS -p21 -T5 -PN --host-timeout 1501 – min-hostgroup 400 --min-parallelism 10 -n • Then we will have the list of ips that have FTP running on port 21 on 3 files: • Port21-FTP.xml • Port21-FTP.gnmap • Port21-FTP.nmap • Extract ips from gnmap: cat port21-FTP.gnmap | grep -w "21/open" | awk '{print $2}' > IPSWITHFTP.TXT
  • 24. Port scanning - Process • Do the show things only the ips that have our service running. • nmap -iL IPSWITHFTP.txt -oA port21-FTP-FINAL -sV -p21 -T5 -PN --host-timeout 1501 –min-hostgroup 400 --min- parallelism 10 • Then we will have the list of ips that have FTP running on port 21 AND the version of those services on 3 files: • Port21-FTP-FINAL.xml • Port21-FTP-FINAL.gnmap • Port21-FTP-FINAL.nmap
  • 25. Port scanning - Process • However…we still have UDP… and let me tell u….
  • 26. Port scanning - Process Nmap also has a UDP mode… -sU however it doesn’t work very well without -sV (read: its shit!), when testing it on our lab we noticed that most of the times nmap wasn’t able to detect if there was a service running or not. The reason for this is: “UDP scanning is slow as open/filtered ports typically don't respond so nmap has to time out and then retransmit whilst closed ports will send a ICMP port unreachable error, which systems typically rate limit.” When we started, it took us around 4 Weeks to scan UDP on the entire country on 1 port….
  • 27. Port scanning - Process Solution ? SCAPY! Server Client Service running on port:11111
  • 28. Port scanning - Process Result of that script ? On lab testing….
  • 29. Port scanning - Process Result of that script ? On internet testing….
  • 30. Port scanning - Process When we started, it took us around +4 Weeks to scan UDP on the entire country on 1 port using NMap…. -We took this as a baseline first run to improve… Our second run, we used python+scapy and it went down!! 1 week – well not bad for a second run, but 1 week for a port ? Our third run, we used python+multithreading fu + scapy + blackmamba – 3 days – and this was the best we brought it down to without bringing in the big guns (read: “asking HD Moore for help”) Forth run – C Yup entire .pt (1 port ) scanned in 4 minutes and 45 seconds.
  • 31. Port scanning - Process So... At this point we can do UDP in 5 minutes. As you can guess... We now love UDP scanning again... Our next objective became to speed up our TCP scanning. For you to understand what we did you need first to understand how nmap works: 25000 20000 15000 Time 10000 Packets per second Nmap 5000 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
  • 32. Port scanning - Process What we did, is write our own TCP scanner. And the result is the following: 25000 20000 15000 Time Packets per second 10000 PTCoreSecTCP 5000 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
  • 33. Port scanning - End So we had our kick ass friends, send us our kick ass raw results… now what do we do with them ?
  • 34. Port scanning - End Terminals are fun, BUT we want an easier way to look at our data… So…. We wrote a tool: PTCoreSec Command Center!
  • 38. Fourth version – Current Stable
  • 39. Fifth version – Currently Under development
  • 40. Port scanning - Demo DEMO TIME!
  • 41. Port scanning – The project While we were preparing for codebits… We received something in the mail….
  • 42. Port scanning – The project Raspi
  • 43. Port scanning – The project And it got us thinking… Port scanning, doesn’t require a great CPU, nor a huge amount of ram…
  • 44. Port scanning – The project So we decided to create a distributed port scanning project…
  • 45. Port scanning – The project We grabbed the And added a custom set of scripts to it…
  • 46. Port scanning – The project
  • 47. Port scanning – How does it work? Step 1 – PTCoreSec admins request a job (scan) on the backend. Step 2 – Server side checks current number of live raspi minions. Step 3 – Server divides de CIDRS by the different clients and sends them over. Step 4 – Clients (minions) do the scans and XMLRPC send them back to the server. Step 5 – Server imports these scans into the MongoDB backend.
  • 49. Business When a client asks for a pentest We present them with these
  • 53. Business And that’s all really neat and pretty, however there are 2 problems with that! These guys don’t give a f***. Management Blackhats
  • 54. Management Cares about: • Money • Money • Money Does: • Will lie for PCI DSS/ISO27001/{Compliance} This gives us, security • Approves every single thing even if it peeps, headaches! doesn’t match security department goals but gets them moneys.
  • 55. I ask onLY ONE thing of u Leave your whitehats at home, and
  • 56. SHODAN SHODAN is a search engine that lets you find specific computers (routers, servers, etc.) using a variety of filters. Some have also described it as a public port scan directory or a search engine of banners. Another way of putting it would be:
  • 58. Now combine this: With these:
  • 59. And you get a lot of these
  • 60. Also if you do anything ilegal and get caught, you’ll get one of these:
  • 63. SHODAN Accessing that website will give u a bar, where you can type queries and obtain results. Your queries, can ask for PORTS, Countries, strings contained in the banners, and all sorts of other things Following is a sample set of queries that can lead to some interesting results:
  • 64. SHODAN QUERIES • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=cisco-IOS • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=IIS+4.0 • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Xerver • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Fuji+xerox • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=JetDirect • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Netgear • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=%22Anonymous+access+allowed%22 • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Golden+FTP+Server
  • 65. SHODAN QUERIES + combined country? Awesome! Saturday, 9th of June 2012
  • 66. SHODAN QUERIES + combined country Port: 3306 country:PT
  • 67. SHODAN QUERIES + combined country? Awesome! Wednesday, 6 th of June 2012
  • 68. SHODAN QUERIES + combined country BigIP country:PT
  • 69. SHODAN QUERIES + combined country? Awesome! Tuesday, Marc h 13, 2012
  • 70. SHODAN QUERIES + combined country port:3389 -allowed country:PT
  • 71. SHODAN QUERIES + combined country? Awesome!
  • 72. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS SAP Web Application Server (ICM) Worldwide Portugal
  • 73. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS SAP NetWeaver Application Server Worldwide Portugal
  • 74. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS SAP Web Application Server Worldwide Portugal
  • 75. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS SAP J2EE Engine Worldwide Portugal
  • 76. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
  • 77. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS port:23 country:PT Worldwide Portugal
  • 78. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS port:23 country:PT Username:admin Password:smcadmin
  • 79. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS port:23 list of built-in commands Worldwide Not a big number, however just telnet in and you get shell…
  • 80. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS port:161 country:PT Worldwide Portugal
  • 81. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS What sort of info do I get with SNMP ? • Windows RUNNING PROCESSES 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.2 • Windows INSTALLED SOFTWARE 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.6.3.1.2 • Windows SYSTEM INFO 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1 • Windows HOSTNAME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5 • Windows DOMAIN 1.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.4.1 • Windows UPTIME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.3 • Windows USERS 1.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.25 • Windows SHARES 1.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.27 • Windows DISKS 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.2.3.1.3 • Windows SERVICES 1.3.6.1.4.1.77.1.2.3.1.1 • Windows LISTENING TCP PORTS 1.3.6.1.2.1.6.13.1.3.0.0.0.0 • Windows LISTENING UDP PORTS 1.3.6.1.2.1.7.5.1.2.0.0.0.0
  • 82. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS What sort of info do I get with SNMP ? • Linux RUNNING PROCESSES 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.2 • Linux SYSTEM INFO 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1 • Linux HOSTNAME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5 • Linux UPTIME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.3 • Linux MOUNTPOINTS 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.2.3.1.3 • Linux RUNNING SOFTWARE PATHS 1.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.4 • Linux LISTENING UDP PORTS 1.3.6.1.2.1.7.5.1.2.0.0.0.0 • Linux LISTENING TCP PORTS 1.3.6.1.2.1.6.13.1.3.0.0.0.0
  • 83. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS What sort of info do I get with SNMP ? • Cisco LAST TERMINAL USERS 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.43.1.1.6.1.8 • Cisco INTERFACES 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.2 • Cisco SYSTEM INFO 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1 • Cisco HOSTNAME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5 • Cisco SNMPcommunities 1.3.6.1.6.3.12.1.3.1.4 • Cisco UPTIME 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.3 • Cisco IP ADDRESSES 1.3.6.1.2.1.4.20.1.1 • Cisco INTERFACE DESCRIPTIONS 1.3.6.1.2.1.31.1.1.1.18 • Cisco HARDWARE 1.3.6.1.2.1.47.1.1.1.1.2 • Cisco TACACS SERVER 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.2.1.5 • Cisco LOGMESSAGES 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.41.1.2.3.1.5 • Cisco PROCESSES 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.109.1.2.1.1.2 • Cisco SNMP TRAP SERVER 1.3.6.1.6.3.12.1.2.1.7
  • 84. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS
  • 85. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS cisco country:PT Worldwide Portugal
  • 86. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS cisco country:PT
  • 87. Cisco
  • 88. Cisco – GRE TUNNELING
  • 89. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS port:1900 country:PT Worldwide Portugal
  • 90. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS So, What is UPNP?
  • 91. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS So, What uses UPNP?
  • 92. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS Hackz
  • 93. UPNP January 29th 2013!!!!
  • 94. UPNP 2013 15.000+ devices replied to UPNP in January 2013 in Portugal
  • 95. Projecto Portugal Seguro - PTCoresec • 29 Janeiro 2013 – released a study which showed new flaws on UPNP and numbers on the devices replying to UPNP. • PTCoreSec under the scope of project Portugal Seguro proceeded to help ISP’s with this problem • We sent an email to all isp’s that resulted in the following
  • 97. Projecto Portugal Seguro • Resultado – Some ISP’s we noticed changes in order of 80% in the number of ips that stopped responding to UPNP in less then 1 week. – Quicker and faster response contacts so that we can improve even further on this in case of next event.
  • 98. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS Hackz
  • 99. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS UPNP zomg time
  • 100. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS UPNP Remote command execution
  • 101. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS Oh and by the way…
  • 102. SHODAN QUERIES OF AWESOMENESS Another funny thing about UPNP, is that you can get the MAC ADDR and SSID its using And then….
  • 103. SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES SCADA • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=PLC • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=allen+bradley • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=fanuc • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Rockwell • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Cimplicity • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Omron • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Novatech • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Citect • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=RTU • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Modbus+Bridge • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=modicon • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=bacnet • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=telemetry+gateway • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=SIMATIC • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=hmi • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=siemens+-...er+-Subscriber • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=scada+RTS • http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=SCHNEIDER
  • 104. SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES PORTUGAL? SCADA
  • 105. SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES SCADA Portugal
  • 106. SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES SCADA Portugal
  • 107. SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES SCADA Portugal
  • 108. SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES SCADA Portugal
  • 109. SHODAN (MORE INTERESTING) QUERIES Cameras…. Simply connected online and without authentication…
  • 110. A little tip… If you want to quickly check for stuff (web related) that has no authentication, use NMAP!
  • 111. A little tip… First, let’s get wkhtmltoimage: wget http://wkhtmltopdf.googlecode.com/files/wkhtmltoimage-0.11.0_rc1-static- i386.tar.bz2 tar -jxvf wkhtmltoimage-0.11.0_rc1-static-i386.tar.bz2 cp wkhtmltoimage-i386 /usr/local/bin/ Next, let’s get and install the Nmap module: git clone git://github.com/SpiderLabs/Nmap-Tools.git cd Nmap-Tools/NSE/ cp http-screenshot.nse /usr/local/share/nmap/scripts/ nmap --script-updatedb
  • 112. A little tip… Then, do your shodan search and use: This automatically exports a list of ips u can import into nmap
  • 114. A little tip… And nmap, will automatically take screen shots of the first pages that appear and store them, then u just need to look at those!
  • 117. SCARY SHIT! DEFACE 1 SCARY? NO!
  • 118. SCARY SHIT! DEFACE 2 SCARY? Well… disturbing, scary? Not so much!
  • 122. Shodan – the bad part • Imports nmap scans from their servers on a rotational basis, so its not always 100% updated! Confirmed this by correlating some of the shodan results with our personal results! • For example on mysql servers, Shodan would find 785, where our results showed 3000+
  • 123. Shodan – the good part • Good querying system • If port scanning is illegal in your country, you’re out of trouble if u use shodan, because ur just querying data acquired by them.
  • 124. Resources http://secanalysis.com/interesting-shodan-searches/ blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/06/using-nmap-to-screenshot-web- services.html http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPgZU7ZNIjQ - Defcon 18 2010 SHODAN for Penetration Testers Michael Schearer http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tg9ZAvynjdk – HD Moore – Empirical Exploitation http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b-uPh99whw4 – HD Moore – Wild West

Notas do Editor

  1. Image source:http://us.123rf.com/400wm/400/400/cla78/cla781008/cla78100800263/7655075-an-old-grunge-flag-of-portugal-state.jpg
  2. Everyonehad a different set ofopinions.
  3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_through_obscurity
  4. Explain passive mode VS active. Vuln testing vsportscanning
  5. Althoughnothuge, itsstillnearly 6milipaddrs
  6. -iL – file withips-ao saved output-sSSYN Stealth Scan-sVServiceDetection-p21 port-T5 Supadupa ultra fast-PN dontping
  7. --host-timeout 1501 – waittheminimum time onhost-n don’t do DNS resolution--min-parallelism 10 - probes (instances)–min-hostgroup 400 - eachprobe does 400 hostsatthe time
  8. --host-timeout 1501 – waittheminimum time onhost-n don’t do DNS resolution--min-parallelism 10 - probes (instances)–min-hostgroup 400 - eachprobe does 400 hostsatthe time
  9. http://stackoverflow.com/questions/10531618/how-to-retrieve-both-tcp-and-udp-ports-with-nmap
  10. Servernetcatrunningudpport 11111Clientchecks for serviceonport 11111
  11. Source:http://blog.stalkr.net/2010/05/udp-scan-with-icmp-port-unreachable-and.html
  12. Source:http://blog.stalkr.net/2010/05/udp-scan-with-icmp-port-unreachable-and.html
  13. Lotsofwasted time....
  14. Explainreadingthereplystraightfromsnifferinsteadofwaiting.
  15. Imgsource:http://i.i.com.com/cnwk.1d/i/tim/2012/06/19/Raspberry_Pi_35332544_05_1.jpg
  16. Imgsource: http://elinux.org/R-Pi_Hub
  17. Imgsource: http://elinux.org/R-Pi_Hub
  18. http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Xerver (REF: http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/9718)http://www.shodanhq.com/?q=Golden+FTP+Server (REF: http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/10258)
  19. https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2012/06/11/scanning-for-vulnerable-f5-bigips-with-metasploithttps://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2012/06/25/press-f5-for-root-shell
  20. SAP applications, provide the capability to manage financial, asset, and cost accounting, production operations and materials, personnel, plants, and archived documents.
  21. SNMP
  22. Source:http://opasylum.net/WikiTreason/pentest/scanners/snmp/snmpenum/windows.txt
  23. Source:http://opasylum.net/WikiTreason/pentest/scanners/snmp/snmpenum/windows.txt
  24. Source:http://opasylum.net/WikiTreason/pentest/scanners/snmp/snmpenum/windows.txt
  25. SNMP
  26. SNMP
  27. SNMP
  28. SNMP
  29. SNMP
  30. UPNP
  31. UPNP
  32. Explain FIREWALL THINGIE
  33. UPNP
  34. UPNP
  35. UPNP
  36. UPNP
  37. UPNP
  38. UPNP
  39. UPNP
  40. UPNP
  41. Source:http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/06/using-nmap-to-screenshot-web-services.html
  42. Source:http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/06/using-nmap-to-screenshot-web-services.html
  43. Source:http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/06/using-nmap-to-screenshot-web-services.html
  44. Source:http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/06/using-nmap-to-screenshot-web-services.html
  45. SNMP
  46. SNMP
  47. SNMP
  48. SNMP
  49. SNMP
  50. SNMP
  51. SNMP