Colonel Scott Benedict reviews the new Marine Crisis Response Force at an event at the Atlantic Council.

1. SPMAGTF-CR
Information Brief
Colonel S.F. Benedict, USMC
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The overall classification of this briefing is: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2. UNCLASSIFIED
SPMAGTF-CR is a Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Each MAGTF has four
Basic Elements
Command
Element
(CE)
Ground
Combat
Element
Aviation
Combat
Element
Logistics
Combat
Element
(GCE)
(ACE)
(LCE)
Marine
Expeditionary Unit
Special Purpose
MAGTF
Crisis Response
&
Non-Standard
Missions
(MEU) ~2,500
Forward Presence
& Crisis Response
With Amphibious
Ready Group
Marine
Expeditionary
Brigade
(MEB) ~15K
Swiftly Defeat the
Enemy
Marine
Expeditionary
Force
(MEF) ~30-90K
Decisively
Defeat
MAGTFs are scalable and/or tailored combined-arms Task Forces for any contingency
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3. UNCLASSIFIED
Mission is Crisis Response
SPMAGTF-CR is one of the forwarddeployed crisis response options
the U.S. Marine Corps offers
AFRICOM/EUCOM AOR.
• Along with the ARG/MEU, FAST, BSRF,
SPMAGTF-AF and other episodic
rotational forces, as well as MSAU
To differentiate between similar
capabilities of forward deployed
USMC CR forces it is useful to
think in the following terms:
 Permissive to Uncertain and NO
vertical lift required: MSAU, FAST,
SPMAGTF-CR, ARG/MEU
 Permissive to Uncertain and vertical
lift required: SPMAGTF-CR, ARG/MEU
 Hostile: ARG/MEU, MEB
•
•
Trained and certified to a range of capabilities including: Embassy reinforcement, Tactical
Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP), Support to non-combatant evacuation operations
(NEO), and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
Also capable of being the lead element to a larger fly-in echelon (MEU/ MEB/ JTF)
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4. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
SPMAGTF-CR Uniqueness
SPMAGTF-CR provides a self command
and controlled, self deployable, and
highly mobile maritime force that helps
mitigate the gap in the Mediterranean
or Gulf of Guinea left by the absence of
the MEU due to a lack of amphibious
shipping.
It is considered a Rapid Response Force
by CCDRs.
CR does not replace an ARG/MEU and
lacks the combat power, medical, and
logistical sustainment an ARG/MEU
provides. However, it complements
ARG/MEU capabilities at the lower end
of the ROMO.
SPMAGTF-CR’s marriage of the V-22 and KC-130J organic
airlift and small task organized ground combat elements
combine to create an extremely agile force
SPMAGTF-CR fills a critical deterrent / force of choice role due to its high mobility,
self deploy capability, ability to self sustain, and vertical lift capability – unique
among crisis response forces in theaters where no ARG/MEU is available
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5. UNCLASSIFIED
Operating Area Time / Space
Problem Framing
•It is approximately the same flight time from Moron to Gulf of Guinea as a TRANSLANT
from Camp Lejeune NC to Moron Spain.
•It is approximately the same flight time from Moron Spain to Camp Lemmonier Djibouti
as a flight from Anchorage to Miami. Entebbe is 800 NM further.
MORON
NASSIG
CLNC
Niamey
•It is approximately the same flight
time from Moron to NASSIG as a
flight from New York to New Orleans.
•The continent of Africa can fit 3.7
times the contiguous land mass of
the United States within its shores
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6. UNCLASSIFIED
Operations Execution
Directed to forward stage
in NASSIG three times ISO
North African unrest
 May-July
 September
 October
Conducted Multiple Bi-lateral
Training Events and Exercises in
Spain and France
Souda Bay
Moron
Dakar,
Senegal
Conducted Marine Integration
Exercises and Rehearsals
Sigonella
Niamey
CLDJ
Accra,
Ghana
Flew 1570 NM to Senegal ISO TSC
event and Engagement
Conducted multiple
Key Leader
Engagements with
Partner Nations, High
Risk Embassies, and
Cooperative Security
Location Country
Teams
Deployed 3400 NM to Djibouti
Djibouti and additional to
and additional 800 NM 800
NM to Uganda ISO South
Uganda ISO South Sudan
Sudan unrest and US
unrest and partial partial US
Embassy withdrawal
 December-Present
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7. UNCLASSIFIED
New Normal
New Normal Implementation
 Whole of government strategy
 DoS commitment to early identification of
security requirements
–

Increased DoD commitment as a stakeholder
in USG facility and personnel security abroad
–

Implementation of Trip Wires and security coordination
Prevent, Deter, Defeat by offering an array of security
augmentation
AFRICOM TTX Aug13
New Normal Is….
New Normal Is Not….
• Embassy
Reinforcement
• Focus on Deterrence
• Host Nation Training
• Scalable / Tailor-able
Support
• Chief of Mission
Influences
•
•
•
•
•
A Forcible Entry
NEO
Unilaterally DOD
CT Operations
Only a Kinetic
Reaction
Lessons Learned from South Sudan EMB JUBA
During NN crisis, need to determine what the US
government’s endstate is, and then:



How is the endstate reached?
Who will determine when endstate is being met?
How much risk are we willing to take to reach the
endstate?
 Who determines the limits of risk (DoD, DoS) we are
willing to take to reach the endstate?
 What are the limits of the resources (DoD, DoS, IC,
etc.) we are willing to use to reach that endstate and
or to mitigate risk?
 Who will determine those resource limits?
Within NN construct, as conditions normalize, we must be as aggressive reconstituting rapid response
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forces as we were deploying them or we will end up with our highest capabilities tied down indefinitely