1. THE FEATURES & MERITS OF PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENTS WITH
SERVICE CONTRACTS FROM THE VIEW POINT OF AN IOC
Valentine Ataka†
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……………………………………………………………………………….………….1
ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2
0.0 INTRODUCTION ..…………………………………………………………………………….………....2
1.0 KEY FEATURES OF PSCs AND SCs…………………………………….……………………….4
1.1 Production Sharing Contracts..…………………………………………….………….…..…………..4
1.2 The Service Contract …………………………………………………..………….………….……..…….7
2.0 COMPARING PSCs AND SCs ……………………………………………………......………...8
2.1 Similarities …………………………………..………………………………………………….……………....9
2.2 Differences ….………………………………………………………………………………….………..…….10
2.3 Merits & Demerits ….……..………………………………………....……………….…….…………...11
2.3.1 The Advantages of PSCs over SCs ………………………………………….………………. 11
2.3.2 Disadvantages of a PSC to an IOC ………………………………………..………………… 12
2.3.3 Advantages of the SC …………………………………………………………………….………….13
3.0 CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………….……………..….13
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………………………..……………..15
† The author is an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya and an LLM candidate in Oil and Gas Law (RGU 2013).
He is also the Executive Director of the African Centre for Rights and Governance.
0

2. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
E&P – Exploration and Production
HG - Host Government
IOC – International Oil Corporation
JMC- Joint Management Committee
MEO- minimum Expenditure Obligation
MWO- Minimum Work Obligation
NOC- National Oil Corporation
PSC - Production Sharing Contract
SC- Service Contract
TSC- Technical Service Contract
1

3. ABSTRACT
This paper is intended to guide the investment decision of IOCs in electing the
country in which to set up E&P operations on the basis of the country’s oil and gas
contractual regime; In particular when deciding whether to invest in a country with
a Production Sharing Contracts regime and/or another with Service Contracts
regime.
The paper starts with an introduction that presents a general conceptual
background to features of E&P Contracts i.e. the underlying interests of parties in
such contracts. This is necessary to help the company understand the reasoning
behind the HGs election of either of the two forms of contracting.
In part one, the paper embarks on a specific analysis of the key features of the two
forms of E&P contracting. The analysis will include expositions on the rationale for
the provisions that define the character of the two types of contracts and also give
illustrations from model contracts in use by various countries. Part two of the brief
will present a juxtaposition of the two forms of contracting with a view to
highlighting their similarities, differences and merits from the perspective of an
IOC. The brief will conclude with an opinion not only on which of the two forms of
contracting is more beneficial to an IOC, but also a proposal on a criterion for
arriving at that choice.
0.0 INTRODUCTION
The features of upstream oil and gas contracts are influenced by the underlying
interests of the Host Government (HG) and the Contractor (IOC).1 On the one hand
the HG is motivated primarily by the need to attract risk capital and modern E&P
technology and secure socio-economic national interest2. The IOC on the other
hand is driven by the desire to make a sufficient return on investment. The
provisions in an E&P contract, be it a PSC or a SC, are therefore a reflection of an
attempt to reconcile these competing interests.
1
King & Spalding „An Introduction to Upstream Government Petroleum Contracts: Their
Evolution and Current Use‟, OGEL, January 2005
http://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=1730 accessed on 14th February 2013
2
Jenik Radon, „The ABCs of Petroleum Contracts: License-Concession Agreements, Joint
Ventures, and Production-sharing Agreements‟ in Tsalik S & A. Schiffrin (eds) Covering Oil:
A Reporters Guide to Energy and Development’ (Open Society, 2005)
http://openoil.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Chapter-3-reading-material1.pdf pg 61-
99
2

4. 1.0 KEY FEATURES OF PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS (PSCs) AND
SERVICE CONTRACTS (Cs)
1.1 Production Sharing Contracts
A PSC can be widely defined as „a private3 contract between one or more IOC and a
NOC pursuant to legislation which vests a license or a general exclusive
authorisation in the NOC to explore for, exploit and produce hydrocarbons‟4
1.1.1 The key Features
Parties – the contract will often be entered into with the NOC or relevant Ministers
on behalf of the government. In the Ethiopian5 and Indian6 Model PSCs the contract
is executed by the Ministers in charge of Mines and Minister for Petroleum and
Natural Gas respectively. In Tanzania7, the Tanzanian Petroleum Development
Corporation is a party.
Term of Contract – the length of the period over which the contract is to subsist is
usually prescribed depending on the country and other factors affecting the speed
of E&P.8 The length of the term is therefore negotiable. Indeed the statutorily
drafted Model Contracts usually do not fix a term period. An example is the Kenyan
Model9 which provides as follows at Clause 2:-
3
There however remains a debate on whether a contract entered into by a government can
be termed „private‟
4
, Stephenson Harwood „Production Sharing Contracts: An Analysis of Comparative Practice
in Certain African Jurisdictions‟ (11th Oil and Gas, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development Trade and Finance Conference, Nairobi, 23 rd -25th May- 2007)
http://www.unctadxi.org/Sections/DITC/Finance_Energy/docs/11thAfrican/11thAfrican_Mar
c%20Hammerson.pdf accessed on 15th February 2013
5
Ethiopian Ministry of Mines, „Model Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement’,
http://www.mom.gov.et/upload/Model%20Petroleum%20Production%20Sharing%20Agrem
ent(MPPSA).pdf accessed on 22nd February 2013
6
Directorate General of Hydrocarbons, Government of India Production Sharing Contracts
http://petroleum.nic.in/nelp3.pdf accessed on 21st February 2013
Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, Model Production Sharing Agreement
7
(2008)
http://www.tpdc-tz.com/MPSA%20_2008.pdf accessed 20th February 2013
8
Harwood , (above n5)
9
National Oil Corporation of Kenya, Sample Production Sharing Contract
http://nationaloil.co.ke/upstream/?flag=upstream accessed on 1st February 2013
3

5. „The contractor is authorized to conduct exploration operations within the
contract area during an initial exploration period of [………….] contract years
from the effective date‟
Relinquishment
A relinquishment Clause obligates the IOC to release portions of the contractual
area in phases. It is a measure intended to promote speedy and efficient
exploration10. It is a clause that works in benefit of both parties11.
An example of a Relinquishment Clause is Clause 7 of the Kurdistan‟s Model PSC12
which provides as follows:
„The CONTRACTOR shall surrender portions of the Contract Area as follows:
(a) Twenty five percent 25% of the initial Contract Area, excluding any
Production Areas, at the end of the first sub-period of the Exploration
Period.
(b) An additional twenty five percent 25% of the initial Contract Area,
excluding any Production Areas, at the end of the second sub-period of
the Exploration Period.
(c) An additional 25% of the initial Contract Area, excluding any Production
Areas, at the end of the third sub-period of the Exploration Period.
(d) The entirety of the Contract Area, excluding any Production Areas, at the
end of the fourth sub-period of the Exploration Period (including any
extensions thereof‟.
National Interest provisions
Such provisions are aimed at enhancing and protecting national socio-economic well
being of the host country.13 They may require local content14, technology transfer15
or capacity building.16
9
Radon, (above n3)
10
Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN), Host Government Contract
Handbook For The International Petroleum Industry (AIPN, 1999) http://www.fmc-
law.com/upload/en/publications/2007/hgc_handbook_vol_11.pdf accessed on 20th February
2013
11
Ibid, pg 63
12
Kurdistan Regional Government, Model Production Sharing Contract For Exploration And
Production In Kurdistan (2007)
http://www.krg.org/uploads/documents/KRG%20Model%20PSC__2007_09_06_h14m3s46.
pdf
13
Harwood, (above n5)
4

6. Carry provision
This connotes the IOC bearing the contributory obligation of the HG towards the
production costs to be recovered as a cost17. However the NOC is under no
obligation to indemnify or reimburse the NOC in the event that there is no return on
production. This strict approach has been incorporated into the laws of some HGs
such as Tunisia.18However some countries such as India19 are more lenient and
permit apportionment of costs incurred by the IOC irrespective of discovery.
Cost recovery oil
This provision in a PSC enables the IOC to recover its costs from the resulting oil or
gas before the profit is shared out20. Recoverable costs are usually defined by the
Contract.
The Kurdistan Model provides for cost recovery at Article 25.3 in part as follows;
Subject to the provisions of the Accounting Procedure and this Contract, from
the outset of production in the Contract Area, the CONTRACTOR shall at any
time be entitled to recover any Petroleum Costs incurred under this
Contract…..
Profit Oil
This constitutes the return on exploration left after the IOC has recovered its costs.
It is usually shared between the parties on a „sliding scale: the host government‟s
allocation will rise with increased production or contractor‟s economic return‟21
14
See Article 23 of the Indian Model PSC, Directorate General of Hydrocarbons, Govt of
India Production Sharing Contracts http://petroleum.nic.in/nelp3.pdf accessed on 21st
February 2013
15
See Article 19 of the Tanzanian Model
16
See Clause 13 of the Kenyan Model PSC
17
Harwood (above n5)
18
Hydrocarbons Code under Law No. 99-93 (Tunisia) 2003, Translation
http://www.etap.com.tn/uploads/telechargement/code_hydrocarbures.pdf accessed 23rd
February 2013
Directorate General of Hydrocarbons, Government of India, (above n7)
19
20
Marcia Ashong, „Cost Recovery In Production Sharing Contracts: Opportunity For Striking
It Rich Or Just Another Risk Not Worth Bearing‟ (Dundee, CEPLMP, 2009)
21
Harwood (above n5)
5

7. An example is the Ethiopian Model22 which at Article 7.2.1 provides as follows:
The balance of Crude Oil remaining in any Calendar Year after deduction of
the royalty payments under Section 11.2 and after recoverable Petroleum
Operations Costs have been satisfied to the extent and in the manner
aforesaid in Section 7.1, shall be referred to as ʺProfit Oilʺ and shall be
shared, taken and disposed of between the Government and the Contractor
according to the following incremental scale
Minimum Work/Expenditure Obligation Clauses
Such clauses oblige the IOC to have completed a measure of operations (e.g.
number of wells sunk) or spent a stipulated sum on the operation over a prescribed
period.
For example Article 4(b) the Tanzanian Model23 provides as follows
“Description of Work: Undertake geological and Geophysical surveys
and related activities as deemed necessary by
the Company; shoot [_________] kms of
seismic; and drill [____] Exploration Wells.
Minimum Expenditure for
this period: US[______] million”
Joint Management Body
The PSC usually provides for the formation and composition of a semi-autonomous
body to manage the operations. The body usually referred to as the Joint
Management Committee (JMC) is made up of representatives seconded by the NOC
and the IOC. The crucial role of the JMC is to help resolve the potential competition
of interests between the HG and the IOC.
The Indian Model requires the constitution of a Management Committee24, the
Ethiopian Model provides for a Gas Development Advisory Committee25 while the
Kenyan Model provides for an Operating Committee.26
Ethiopian Ministry of Mines, (above n6)
22
23
Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, Model Production Sharing Agreement
(2008)
http://www.tpdc-tz.com/MPSA%20_2008.pdf accessed 20th February 2013
24
Article 6 of the Model
6

8. 1.2 The Service Contract (SC)
Junseog defines a SC as a contract where „a private company agrees to perform
certain specified services for the government ….in return for fixed payment….‟ 27
Depending on the nature and level of E&O work involved and the form of payment
SCs may be classified as28;
Buy-Back Service Contracts- the IOC has a priority to purchase a portion of the
resulting oil and a pre-agreed discounted rate
Technical Service Contracts, - the IOC is retained purely for its technical expertise
and technical resources
Pure Risk Service Contracts- IOC is retained to gather and provide information
necessary for development of the resources
1.2.1 The General Features of Service Contracts
The Role of the IOC is essentially to provide the HG and the NOC with services and
information to help the country develop its own oil resources e.g. the viability of a
given field.29 Once the existence of petroleum reserves is suspected, the company
is obligated to develop the reservoir. The IOC may also be engaged to provide
equipment and training employees to operate the petroleum facilities.
The IOC in this kind of arrangement has been described as a „contractor‟ or „hired
hand‟ working for „wages‟30
25
Clause 13.1.3 of the Model
26
Clause 4 of the Model
27
Yi Junseog, „Merits and Demerits of the Different types of Petroleum Contracts‟
www.knoc.co.kr/servlet/Download?num=6&fno=6. Accessed on 15th February 2013
28
Ernest E. Smith, John S. Dzienkowski, „A Fifty-Year Perspective of World Petroleum
Arrangements‟ [1989] 24 Texas International Law Journal 13
29
Ibid
30
Peter Cameron, „Managing the politics of oil reforms: Lessons from Iraq‟ (Keynote
Address at the Oil and Gas in Federal Systems, March 4 2010, Washington DC )
7

9. An example is the Iraqi Technical Service Contract in respect of the Rumaila Oil
Field. Article 2 is succinct on the role of the IOCs and the scope of the contract. It
states that
This Contract is a Technical Service Contract for the rehabilitation of improved
production and enhanced recovery of Petroleum from the Rumaila Oil Field in
31
accordance with the provisions herein
Risk Assumption: despite the company solely investing its own money in the
exploration it is entitled to no payment or compensation unless a viable find is
made32.
Ownership& Control: the government retains ownership of the resources and at the
end of the operations the ownership of the field and the assets therein are
transferred to the HG33. In some jurisdictions for example Iraq the HG takes over
control of the operations34.
Consideration: where the Company has made a successful find and production is
undertaken it is entitled to a taxable fixed fee for the service rendered. In cases of
buy-back service contracts, the IOC is given priority to buy the first tranche of
petroleum produced at a reduced rate35.
2.0 COMPARING PSCs AND SCs
In this part, the brief highlights the general similarities and differences between a
PSC and a SC. The comparison will also point out the advantages and
disadvantages of the two forms of contracting.
2.1 Similarities
The SC is often described as a form of PSC.36 This is informed by the fact that most
of the basic Sate-IOC features in a PSC are also found in a SC. Taking the example
of the draft Technical Service Contract (TSC) between the Iraqi Oil Marketing
31
Fuel on the Fire, Technical Service Contract For The Rumaila Oil Field Between South Oil
Company Of The Republic Of Iraq (SOC) And Bp Iraq NV And Petrochina Company Limited
And Oil Marketing Company Of the Republic Of Iraq (SOMO)
http://www.fuelonthefire.com/uploads/files/BP-CNPC-Rumaila-contract-8Oct09.pdf
32
Ernest E. Smith, John S. Dzienkowski, (above n29) pg 40
33
Frank C. Alexander, „Production Sharing Contracts and Other Host Government Contract‟
OGEL Vol. 3 - issue 1 March 2005
34
Ibid
35
Ernest E. Smith, John S. Dzienkowski, (above n29) pg 41
36
8

10. Company (SOMO) and BP Iraq (NV) et al37 as compared to the Kurdistan Model
Production Sharing Contract (PSC)38 it is apparent that the following provisions are
common to the two forms of contract.
In both, the NOC is a party representing the HG – in the TSC the NOC is SOMO
defined as „the Iraqi state entity‟ at Article 1.8 while in the PSC it is signed on
behalf of the government
Both contracts have relinquishment provisions –Article 5 in the TSC grants a within
six (6) Years relinquishment period from the approval date of the Enhanced
Redevelopment Plan, while Article 7 in the PSC grants a three phase relinquishment
of 25% threshold each.
In both, the term of the contract is stipulated – at Article 6 of the PSC grants a 7
year period broken down into two phases of 3 and 4 years respectively while under
Article 3 of the TSC the contract is to last 20 years.
Both contracts have provisions securing national interest- Article 23.1 of the PSC
requires the Contractor to give employment and training priority to Kurdistan and
Iraqi personnel to the extent that they have the qualifications. Article 26.1 of the
TSC on its part requires the Contractor and operator (to the maximum extent
possible), to employ, and require Sub-Contractors to employ, Iraqi nationals having
the requisite qualifications
Both contracts have Minimum work obligations – Article 10 of the PSC stipulates the
minimum expenditure sums in each sub-period. Similarly Article 6.2 of the TSC sets
a minimum sum of USD 300,000,000 which ought to have been spent in the course
of specified work obligation.
Diagram 1 below presents the converging features of PSCs and SCs (grey
area).
37
Technical Service Contract For The Rumaila Oil Field Between South Oil Company Of The
Republic Of Iraq (SOC) And Bp Iraq Nv And Petrochina Company Limited And Oil Marketing
Company Of the Republic Of Iraq (SOMO) http://www.fuelonthefire.com/uploads/files/BP-
CNPC-Rumaila-contract-8Oct09.pdf
38
Kurdistan Regional Government, (above n12)
9

11. Diagram 1 (By Author)
2.2 Differences
It is apparent from the illustrated Models above that the difference between a SC
and a PSC is mainly founded on
- ownership of the resulting oil resources,
- extent of HG control on the operations and
- the nature of remuneration of the IOC.
While in a PSC the IOC is more of a partner in the venture and shares in the
resulting oil as well as control of the operations, the HG through the NOC has
absolute ownership of the oil in a SC arrangement and has massive control over the
operations. Besides, in a SC regime, the IOC is more or of a service contractor
retained for its services and paid a fixed fee. In some cases the IOC‟s payment is in
the form of a priority to purchase the resulting oil at a discounted rate.
Remuneration is different in a PSC arrangement; the IOC is entitled to a share of
the Profit Oil
Another key feature that sets SCs apart is the level of risk assumed by the IOC. The
IOC is the sole bearer of the financial risk of the operation. In the event that no
viable deposit is established out of the exploration, the IOC will recover no costs. In
a PSC on the other hand the HG either contributes to the costs through its NOC or
by virtue of a „carrying clause‟ has the IOC bear its costs to be recovered as part of
cost oil.
10

12. While in a PSC arrangement the IOC pays royalties to the government in a service
contract, the IOC only pays income tax on the Fee if earned.
Table 1 below summarizes the key differences between a PSC and a SC
Nature Of Ownership Control of Role of Payment to Operation Payment
Contract of Operations IOC IOC Risks/Costs to HG
Resulting
Oil
Production HG & IOC HG & IOC Partner Share in the Shared or Royalties
Sharing resulting borne by &
Contracts profit oil IOC Income
(recoverable Tax
from HG)
Service HG HG Service Fixed Fee or Fully and Income
Contracts Contractor buy back solely borne Tax on
priority by IOC fees
Table 1 (By Author)
2.3 Merits and Demerits
From a perspective of an IOC seeking a viable and sustainable investment
framework, the PSC is supported by more merits making it the better option of the
two regimes. In this sub-part therefore the brief highlights the advantages that a
PSC has over the SC. For the benefit and awareness of NE however, the brief also
points out some of the known demerits of PSC and the few merits that the SC may
have.
2.3.1 The advantages of PSCs over SCs
- Under a PSC, the IOC has an enhanced control over the operation either
directly or through a joint operation body (e.g. committee) to which it has
representation as stipulated under the contract. This is likely to minimize
government interference and reduce conflicts in the parties‟ interest in the
operations. On the other hand in an SC arrangement the IOC has little or no
control over its own operation thereby jeopardizing its technical integrity.
- Whilst both regimes run a degree of risk since return is dependent on viable
discovery, in a PSC arrangement, the risk is shared between the IOC and the
11

13. HG. The HG may contribute directly to the venture or in the alternative; the
IOC may carry the costs and recover them from cost oil. This is a safer
investment than in a SC arrangement where the IOC bears all the risk with
no fall back for recovery in the event that the venture does not yield a profit.
- Payment to the IOC on the basis of its share in the profit oil under a PSC is a
more secure mode of payment compared to payment on the basis of a fixed
fee. Since the IOC has no say on the disposal of the resulting oil, if at the
time of production and sale, the market prices of oil are favourable, the HG
would unduly benefit at the expense of the IOC. In any event, buy back
incentive would only be beneficial if the market prices at the time of such
purchase are relatively high. Given the volatility of world petroleum prices,
this may not be a secure method of payment.39
- The fact that an IOC has a stake in the outcome of the PSC venture both in
recovery on cost oil and share on profit oil is itself an incentive for optimal
operations. Coupled with the liberty of control ensures that the IOC puts in
the best efforts to achieve success in the venture. This is likely to result in
better return. On the other hand the position of the IOC in SC as a mere
service contractor with no equity in the resulting oil is itself a disincentive to
innovation and optimal effort towards success of the operation.
- At the closure of the PSC term, the IOC may negotiate the terms of
reinvesting its operation assets in the Host State. This leverage lacks in a
typical service contract where the entire operation reverts to the HG at the
end of the contract term.
2.3.2 Disadvantages of a PSC to an IOC
Despite its strengths a PSC has a couple of demerits including
- The IOC is obligated not only to pay royalties but it is also subject to pay
income tax on its share of the profit oil. A SC on the other hand only obliges
the IOC to pay income tax on the fee earned.
- PSC are often viewed as unfavourable to the Host Governments in
comparison to the IOCs. This may pose a problem in the event of political
regime change whereby a new government may seek to alter what it deems
as unfair terms of contract. A PSC is therefore more vulnerable to political
instability.
39
Cameron, (above n30)
12

14. - Besides a PSC also shares a number of demerits with an SC. These include
the insistence by HGs on local content and the dependency on the viability of
the operation to set off costs
2.3.3 Advantages of a SC
Despite its many shortcomings as an investment option for an IOC, the SC regime
- Offers stability in the fixed service fee40.
- is beneficial for specialized IOCs with interest only in the service sector due
to its specificity
With such negative traits SCs have been unpopular with IOCs as reflected in recent
events in Iraq upon introduction of its TSCs. In 2009 it was reported that some oil
majors including Exxonmobil had rejected the Iraqi contract on Rumaila field due to
its stringent requirements.41 Only BP and China‟s CNPC accepted the contract; but
even so BP has been recently reported to be seeking an amendment of the
contract.42
3.0 CONCLUSION
From the issues highlighted above pertaining the features and merits of the two
forms of contracting, the following are apparent:
In making the decision on the more beneficial contracting regime, an IOC needs to
be aware that both contracts are used by HGs seeking to attract technology and
skill but lack the resources to carry out O&E operations. This explains the striking
similarity in several of their basic provisions. However, SCs are preferred by HGs
that are keen on asserting closer control of their resources and investment
activities43.
40
Helmut A Merklein, „Iraq Contract options‟ Middle East Economic Survey VOL. LII, No 10,
9-Mar-2009
41
BBC, „Oil companies reject Iraq's Terms‟ 3Oth June 2009
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8125731.stm accessed 19th February 2013
42
Financial Times, Guy Chazan London „BP Seeks Contract Revamp on Iraqi Oil Field‟
December 16th 2012
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a56efc2-478d-11e2-a899-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2MFaZWG00 accessed 19th February 2013
43
Michael Lickosky, „Contracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic
minerals industries‟
13

15. A SC is similar to a PSC in many ways especially on the common provisions such
as minimum work obligation, relinquishment and national interest protection among
others. However the administrative requirements under an SC widely distinguish it
from a PSC. Key among these is the extent of control of the operation, ownership of
the resulting oil and nature of payment to the IOC.
Be that as it may, by its very nature, the PSC appears to portend more benefit to
an IOC such as NE. Compared to an SC, the merits of a PSC outweighs its
demerits; at least from the perspective of an IOC. The demerits of the PSC and
merits of a SC, however few, have also been pointed out.
An IOC is therefore more likely to invest in a country with a PSC regime as it is
likely to benefit from
- An assurance of control in the operations
- An equitable share in the resulting oil
- A leverage to negotiate re-investment into the HG
- Security of return on investment from profit oil
- Less risk on investment
- Internal incentive for innovation due to less government interference
in operations
http://biblioteca.hegoa.ehu.es/system/ebooks/19067/original/Contracting_and_regulatory_i
ssues_oil-gas_metalic_minerals_industries.pdf?1349970112 accessed on 21st February 2013
14

16. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Statutes
Hydrocarbons Code under Law No. 99-93 (Tunisia) 2003, Translation
http://www.etap.com.tn/uploads/telechargement/code_hydrocarbures.pdf accessed
23rd February 2013
Petroleum (Exploration & production) Act Cap 308 (Kenya)
Books
AIPN, Host Government Contract Handbook For The International Petroleum
Industry (AIPN, 1999) http://www.fmc-
law.com/upload/en/publications/2007/hgc_handbook_vol_11.pdf
John S Lowe, Oil & Gas Law in a Nutshell (West Publishing, 1994)
Tsalik S & A. Schiffrin (eds) Covering Oil: A Reporters Guide to Energy and
Development’ (Open Society, 2005)
Governments Publications
Directorate General of Hydrocarbons, Government of India Production Sharing
Contracts http://petroleum.nic.in/nelp3.pdf
Ethiopian Ministry of Mines, „Model Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement’,
http://www.mom.gov.et/upload/Model%20Petroleum%20Production%20Sharing%
20Agrement(MPPSA).pdf
Kurdistan Regional Government, Model Production Sharing Contract For Exploration
And Production In Kurdistan (2007)
http://www.krg.org/uploads/documents/KRG%20Model%20PSC__2007_09_06_h1
4m3s46.pdf
National Oil Corporation of Kenya, Model Production Sharing Contract
http://nationaloil.co.ke/upstream/?flag=upstream
15

17. Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, Model Production Sharing
Agreement (2008)
http://www.tpdc-tz.com/MPSA%20_2008.pdf accessed 20th February 2013
Articles
Frank C. Alexander, „Production Sharing Contracts and Other Host Government
Contract‟ OGEL Vol. 3 - issue 1 March 2005
Helmut A Merklein, „Iraq Contract options‟ Middle East Economic Survey VOL. LII,
No 10, 9-Mar-2009
Jenik Radon, „The ABCs of Petroleum Contracts: License-Concession Agreements,
Joint Ventures, and Production-sharing Agreements‟ in Tsalik S & A. Schiffrin (eds)
Covering Oil: A Reporters Guide to Energy and Development’ (Open Society, 2005)
King & Spalding „An Introduction to Upstream Government Petroleum Contracts:
Their Evolution and Current Use‟, OGEL, January 2005
http://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=1730
Marcia Ashong, „Cost Recovery In Production Sharing Contracts: Opportunity For
Striking It Rich Or Just Another Risk Not Worth Bearing‟ (Dundee, CEPLMP, 2009)
Michael Lickosky, „Contracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic
minerals industries‟
http://biblioteca.hegoa.ehu.es/system/ebooks/19067/original/Contracting_and_reg
ulatory_issues_oil-gas_metalic_minerals_industries.pdf?1349970112
Yi Junseog, „Merits and Demerits of the Different types of Petroleum Contracts‟
www.knoc.co.kr/servlet/Download?num=6&fno=6.
16

18. Others
BBC, „Oil companies reject Iraq's Terms‟ 3Oth June 2009
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8125731.stm accessed 19th February 2013
Financial Times, Guy Chazan London „BP Seeks Contract Revamp on Iraqi Oil Field‟
December 16th 2012
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a56efc2-478d-11e2-a899-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2MFaZWG00
Fuel on the Fire, Technical Service Contract For The Rumaila Oil Field Between
South Oil Company Of The Republic Of Iraq (SOC) And Bp Iraq NV And Petrochina
Company Limited And Oil Marketing Company Of the Republic Of Iraq (SOMO)
http://www.fuelonthefire.com/uploads/files/BP-CNPC-Rumaila-contract-8Oct09.pdf
Peter Cameron, „Managing the politics of oil reforms: Lessons from Iraq‟ (Keynote
Address at the Oil and Gas in Federal Systems, March 4 2010, Washington DC )
Stephenson Harwood „Production Sharing Contracts: An Analysis of Comparative
Practice in Certain African Jurisdictions‟ (11th Oil and Gas, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development Trade and Finance Conference, Nairobi, 23rd
-25th May- 2007)
17