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Five Lessons Learned From Breaking Into A Casino
        Confessions of a Pentester & Other Stories
                                       Tom Eston
Agenda

• My Background

• Pentest Stories
   – The Energy Company
   – The Casino

• Top 5 Ways We Break In
   – What can you learn?


                             2
About Your Presenter
• Tom Eston

• Manager, SecureState Profiling & Penetration Team

• CISSP, GWAPT

• Physical/Network Penetration Testing, Web/Mobile Application
  Assessments, Social Engineering

• Penetration Testing Team Lead for a Fortune 500 Regional Bank

• Speaker at Black Hat USA, DEFCON, ShmooCon, SANS, OWASP AppSec

• Blogger (SpyLogic.net) and Podcaster (Security Justice, Social Media
  Security)
                                                                         3
Disclaimer: Don’t Try This At Home

• Hacking (breaking in) is illegal without permission!




                                                         4
Pentest Stories




                  5
The Energy Company
• High Security Facility
  – Barbed wire fence
  – Roving patrols
  – Guard station with camera coverage

• Objective: Breach the facility, gain access
  to the control station

• SecureState deployed two teams…


                                                6
The Energy Company
• Team A found an area not protected by security fence

• Team B gained access to the control facility through social
  engineering the gate guards

• Rendezvous with Team A at the control station (Administration
  Building)

• Gained access to shut down the entire facility (big red button),
  password written on wall

• Installed a Wireless Access Point that allowed remote connection
  into the network



                                                                     7
8
9
10
The Casino

• No “Ocean’s Eleven”
  required
• Casino’s have Hotels right?
• SecureState was able to
  hack the Casino Wireless
  Network…from the hotel!
• Weak Wireless Encryption
  + Poor Network                “Ocean’s Eleven”
                                ©2001 Warner Bros. Pictures. All Rights Reserved.
  Segmentation = $$$

                                                                           11
What could we do?
• While on the Gaming Network we had the ability to see all
  slot machines, including:

   – Payout information for each machine
   – Ability to manipulate odds, generate bogus/free plays and
     modify systems which generate revenue for the Casino

• Access to the internal security camera system
   – Ability to shut down and move cameras

• We were met by security when attempting to visit the Casino
  floor 



                                                                12
13
Top 5 Ways We Break In
  “Lessons Learned”




                         14
#5
       Poor Network Segmentation

• Many networks are still “flat”

• Poor ACLs

• Compromised systems can be used to “pivot” to
  segmented networks

• Example, host on a DMZ compromised. Pivot to
  internal network containing financial systems

                                                  15
#4
         Weak Wireless Encryption
• Some companies are still using WEP (sad but true)

• Some companies are using weak passphrases with
  WPA/WPA2 configurations

• Wireless clients can be misconfigured with WPA2
  Enterprise configurations

• Once the wireless network is accessed, we find poor
  network segmentation 

                                                        16
#3
               Social Engineering
• The “human layer” is always the weakest link
  in a security program

• Used to convince someone to do something
  they normally wouldn’t do

• Everyone wants to be helpful!

• Who would attack/scam us attitude
  “We would never fall for that…”

                                                 17
#2
  Unpatched/Misconfigured Systems
• Very common to still find systems without MS08-067
  (2008) critical Microsoft patch!

• Systems with ports and services that should be closed
  (RDP)

• Default Credentials
   – Apache Tomcat/JBoss

• Lack of minimum security baselines for systems
   – Still challenging for many companies

                                                          18
Happy Birthday MS08-067!




                           19
#1
                Weak Passwords
• Password1
  This meets Windows complexity requirements!

• Many use easy to guess dictionary words
  – Seasons of the year are quite popular “Summer12”
  – Anything based off of common names…

• Lack of user security awareness

• Easy targets: Citrix, RDP Servers, SSL VPN, Webmail


                                                        20
Questions?

• Visit http://www.securestate.com for more
  information on our services

• My Blog: http://SpyLogic.net
• Email: teston@securestate.com
• Twitter: @agent0x0




                                              21

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Five Lessons Learned From Breaking Into A Casino: Confessions of a Penetration Tester & Other Stories

  • 1. Five Lessons Learned From Breaking Into A Casino Confessions of a Pentester & Other Stories Tom Eston
  • 2. Agenda • My Background • Pentest Stories – The Energy Company – The Casino • Top 5 Ways We Break In – What can you learn? 2
  • 3. About Your Presenter • Tom Eston • Manager, SecureState Profiling & Penetration Team • CISSP, GWAPT • Physical/Network Penetration Testing, Web/Mobile Application Assessments, Social Engineering • Penetration Testing Team Lead for a Fortune 500 Regional Bank • Speaker at Black Hat USA, DEFCON, ShmooCon, SANS, OWASP AppSec • Blogger (SpyLogic.net) and Podcaster (Security Justice, Social Media Security) 3
  • 4. Disclaimer: Don’t Try This At Home • Hacking (breaking in) is illegal without permission! 4
  • 6. The Energy Company • High Security Facility – Barbed wire fence – Roving patrols – Guard station with camera coverage • Objective: Breach the facility, gain access to the control station • SecureState deployed two teams… 6
  • 7. The Energy Company • Team A found an area not protected by security fence • Team B gained access to the control facility through social engineering the gate guards • Rendezvous with Team A at the control station (Administration Building) • Gained access to shut down the entire facility (big red button), password written on wall • Installed a Wireless Access Point that allowed remote connection into the network 7
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  • 11. The Casino • No “Ocean’s Eleven” required • Casino’s have Hotels right? • SecureState was able to hack the Casino Wireless Network…from the hotel! • Weak Wireless Encryption + Poor Network “Ocean’s Eleven” ©2001 Warner Bros. Pictures. All Rights Reserved. Segmentation = $$$ 11
  • 12. What could we do? • While on the Gaming Network we had the ability to see all slot machines, including: – Payout information for each machine – Ability to manipulate odds, generate bogus/free plays and modify systems which generate revenue for the Casino • Access to the internal security camera system – Ability to shut down and move cameras • We were met by security when attempting to visit the Casino floor  12
  • 13. 13
  • 14. Top 5 Ways We Break In “Lessons Learned” 14
  • 15. #5 Poor Network Segmentation • Many networks are still “flat” • Poor ACLs • Compromised systems can be used to “pivot” to segmented networks • Example, host on a DMZ compromised. Pivot to internal network containing financial systems 15
  • 16. #4 Weak Wireless Encryption • Some companies are still using WEP (sad but true) • Some companies are using weak passphrases with WPA/WPA2 configurations • Wireless clients can be misconfigured with WPA2 Enterprise configurations • Once the wireless network is accessed, we find poor network segmentation  16
  • 17. #3 Social Engineering • The “human layer” is always the weakest link in a security program • Used to convince someone to do something they normally wouldn’t do • Everyone wants to be helpful! • Who would attack/scam us attitude “We would never fall for that…” 17
  • 18. #2 Unpatched/Misconfigured Systems • Very common to still find systems without MS08-067 (2008) critical Microsoft patch! • Systems with ports and services that should be closed (RDP) • Default Credentials – Apache Tomcat/JBoss • Lack of minimum security baselines for systems – Still challenging for many companies 18
  • 20. #1 Weak Passwords • Password1 This meets Windows complexity requirements! • Many use easy to guess dictionary words – Seasons of the year are quite popular “Summer12” – Anything based off of common names… • Lack of user security awareness • Easy targets: Citrix, RDP Servers, SSL VPN, Webmail 20
  • 21. Questions? • Visit http://www.securestate.com for more information on our services • My Blog: http://SpyLogic.net • Email: teston@securestate.com • Twitter: @agent0x0 21