Personnel Issues - Presented by William Allan Kritsonis, PhD The Region 6 Texas National Association for Multicultural Education honors Dr. William Allan Kritsonis as a Professor, Scholar, and Pioneer Publisher for Distinguished Service to Multicultural Research Publishing. The ceremony was on the campus at Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas

2. A principal was reassigned to the maintenance department. She
was told that she would be a facilitator for staff development of the
nonprofessional staff. The superintendent gave her a memo
stating the reason for reassignment and told her that she could file
a grievance. The principal filed a grievance and a lawsuit.
Who is right?

3. I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS:
 Several teachers of the Wilmer-Hutchins Independent School District filed this
class action to restrain the district from deducting from their monthly pay, and from
the pay of other teachers, amounts claimed by the district as overpayments for
previous years.
 A temporary injunction was denied, and the teachers perfected this appeal. We
granted temporary relief pending the appeal, and we now reverse the trial court's
order and grant the temporary injunction sought.
 The facts are undisputed except in one particular, which we find to be immaterial.
After the close of the 1981-82 academic year, the district determined that it had
used an erroneous method of computing the sick leave allowed to its teachers.
From its records, the accuracy of which is disputed, the district determined the
amount of overpayments and sent notices to the affected teachers inviting them to
attend a "workshop" at a specified time and place in order to examine the records
and present any records of their own.

4. II. Reasons for the Reassignment:
1. Failure to maintain an effective working relationship with FBISD
administrators/colleagues.
2. Failure to cooperate with and to timely prepare documents needed in
connection with a special education matter.
3. Failure to follow established policies and procedures.
4. Insubordination.
5. In addition, the notice informed Finch she could present any concerns
she had regarding the reassignment through the FBISD grievance
process. Finch's salary remained unchanged.

5. III. Actions Taken By Both Parties:
A. Finch filed a grievance. In April, Hooper conducted a Level III grievance hearing,
with Finch represented by counsel. Following an adverse result, Finch appealed
the Level III grievance hearing to the FBISD board of trustees. The board held an
evidentiary hearing, referred to as a Level IV grievance hearing, in May, with both
sides represented by counsel. The board ultimately took no action on Finch's
grievance, which effectively upheld the Level III decision. Finch resigned from
FBISD in July.

6. III. Actions Taken By Both Parties:
B. Finch sued the Superintendents and FBISD in federal court, bringing:
(1) A procedural due process claim alleging that Finch was entitled to, but did not
receive, a pre-termination hearing.
(2) A substantive due process claim.
(3) First Amendment claims based on Finch's speech regarding the “School Within a
School” proposal and her associations with members of the school board.
(4) claims under the Texas Constitution that track her First Amendment claims.
(5) A state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(6) A state law claim for breach of contract.

7. III. Actions Taken By Both Parties:
C. The Superintendents moved for summary judgment predicated on qualified
immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding Finch was given virtually no
prior notice of the reassignment and finding a genuine issue of fact over whether
Finch's reassignment was a demotion. The Superintendents appealed.

8. IV. Conclusion:
 For the reasons stated, we REVERSE IN PART the order of the district court
denying summary judgment and hold that the Superintendents are entitled to
qualified immunity from Finch's constitutional claims. We DISMISS the appeal as
it relates to the issue of professional immunity from the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.
 Finch's motion to file a sur-reply is GRANTED; the Superintendents' motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED.

9. The court held that the dispute over the previous year’s
overpayments was unrelated to and could not generate deductions
from teacher paychecks. The current salaries were amounts lawfully
due, reasoned the court, and were not subject to the proposed
unilateral deductions by the district.

10. I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS:
 Several teachers of the Wilmer-Hutchins Independent School District filed this
class action to restrain the district from deducting from their monthly pay, and from
the pay of other teachers, amounts claimed by the district as overpayments for
previous years.
 A temporary injunction was denied, and the teachers perfected this appeal. We
granted temporary relief pending the appeal, and we now reverse the trial court's
order and grant the temporary injunction sought.
 The facts are undisputed except in one particular, which we find to be immaterial.
After the close of the 1981-82 academic year, the district determined that it had
used an erroneous method of computing the sick leave allowed to its teachers.
From its records, the accuracy of which is disputed, the district determined the
amount of overpayments and sent notices to the affected teachers inviting them to
attend a "workshop" at a specified time and place in order to examine the records
and present any records of their own.

11. III. Actions Taken By Both Parties:
 Only two teachers appeared, one of whom obtained a satisfactory adjustment. The
district then announced its intention to make the deduction from the teachers'
paychecks during the remainder of the 1982-1983 academic year. This suit ensued
on behalf of all teachers affected by the deductions. The judge issued a temporary
restraining order, which was continued from time to time, but after a hearing he
denied the temporary injunction.
 The district contends that the trial court's order should be affirmed because the
teachers failed to show that they will suffer irreparable harm for which they have no
adequate remedy at law. It suggests that the teachers would be adequately
protected and the propriety of the deductions and accuracy of the records could be
better determined in a suit against the district for the salaries withheld.
 We conclude that the remedy suggested is not adequate. Since current
wages are presumably necessary for subsistence, the process of litigating
a claim for debt to final judgment cannot be considered sufficiently prompt
for adequate redress

12. III. Actions Taken By Both Parties:
 The district also contends that the injunction was properly denied because the
teachers failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with school authorities at
the local or state level. Thus, it argues that failure of the teachers to appear at the
"workshop" to examine the district's records.
 The district contends that since it has a duty to recover public funds paid out under
a mistake of fact, it may resort to self-help by deducting the overpayments from
current salaries due.
 By such action the district is treating current salaries as already paid to the extent
of the previous overpayments, contrary to the common-law rule that mutual debts
do not extinguish each other in the absence of agreement or judicial action sent
their own bars them from the relief sought.

13. III. Conclusion:
 The order of the trial court is reversed and judgment is rendered that a
temporary injunction be issued, pending final disposition of this suit,
restraining the district from withholding from current salaries to its
teachers any amounts claimed as overpayment of salaries for the
academic year 1981-82 and prior years. The ancillary temporary injunction
granted by this court is continued in force until the issuance of the court's
mandate or the filing of an application for writ of error.

14. I. Facts and Proceedings:
A. A teacher admitted that for two months she had not been
teaching phonics for two months, required by the district.
B. Teacher rated below expectations, in four domains.
C. Her appeal to TEA- She argued since the law requires each domain to be rated
independently, it was improper for the principal to rely on a single factor to reduce her
rating in four domains.
II. Conclusion:
A. The commissioner did not agree with this line of reasoning.
B. PDAS requires that a teacher to be identified as a “Teacher in need of assistance.” If
the teacher is evaluated as unsatisfactory in one or more domains.
C. If not designated, the supervisor and teacher must develop an intervention plan.
D. Teacher can be non-renewed without all this taking place.

15. I. Facts and Proceedings:
A. The commissioner concluded that a librarian is not a classroom
teacher.
B. Not entitled to PDAS process.
II. Conclusion:
If the district chooses to evaluate the librarians in some other manner, it may do
so.

16. I. Facts and Proceedings:
A. Commissioner did not have the jurisdiction to hear the appeal of a man who
was reassigned from head coach/athletic director to P.E. teacher.
B. There was a written contract.
C. Man’s salary remained the same after reassignment. He claimed his loss of
status would make it hard for him to find a job coaching in the future.
II. Conclusion:
A. Court disagreed
B. Allegations of speculative future loss are not enough to give the
commissioner jurisdiction over such a case.

17. I. Facts and Proceedings:
A. The S.E. school board set salaries July 10.
B. Teachers were locked in their contracts July 1.
C. New salaries schedule lowered their salaries of some teachers.
II. Conclusion:
District was obligated to compensate the teachers pursuant to the previous
years salary schedule.