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Security Challenges in VoIP

         Tom Gilis – Security Consultant




                    Thursday, March 26, 2009
Agenda

 Introduction

 Segregation of Voice and Data

 VoIP security threats

 Conclusion




2   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Agenda

 Introduction

 Segregation of Voice and Data

 VoIP security threats

 Conclusion




3   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Who am I and what am I doing here ?
Tom Gilis
     Security Consultant with Dimension Data
     Penetration tests infrastructures and applications
     Risk analysis


Purpose
     Create awareness around VoIP security
     Identify security risks and weaknesses
     Evaluate protection mechanisms


 4    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009              26 March 2009
Do we need more security with VoIP?
PBX
    More difficult to access
    Required specialized knowledge



                                              VoIP
                                                Uses an existing network (and its flaws)
                                                Increase in potential attackers
                                                Offers more services



5    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                                         26 March 2009
VoIP Networks today




6   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Agenda

 Introduction

 Segregation of Voice and Data

 VoIP security threats

 Conclusion




7   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Network segregation
Separate voice and data network
     Improve security
     Easier management
     Quality of service


                         Physical                 Virtual

                         • Expensive              • Cheaper
                         • New infrastructure     • Uses current infrastructure
                         • Difficult deployment   • Easier deployment




 8    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                                      26 March 2009
You probably already use …
Virtual Local Access Networks
     Group devices together in one segment
     Separate Voice and Data network
     VLAN Trunking


Automatic VLAN configuration
     I.          DHCP Options
     II.         Proprietary protocols (LLDP)
     III.        …




 9        © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Automatic VLAN configuration

                                    Easy = YES , Security = NO !
Security tool: VoIPHopper




(voiphopper.sourceforge.net)
10   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                        26 March 2009
Add authentication layer...
802.1X standard
     Authentication and authorization
     Username/password or certificates
     Compatible with VLAN Trunking
     Requires:
       Phone and switch support
       Authentication server
       User administration




11    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Good effort but …
Off-line brute force/dictionary attack tool




(xtest.sourceforge.net)

12   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Conclusion segregation
     Recommended
     − Quality of service
     − First security barrier

     Hard to properly protect
     Not always possible




     Segregation alone is NOT enough!


13    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Agenda

 Introduction

 Segregation of Voice and Data

 VoIP security threats

 Conclusion




14   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Information Security – CIA Triad

                                              Confidentiality




                                               Information
                                                 Security



                  Availability                                  Integrity



15   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                                 26 March 2009
Information Security in VoIP


             Confidentiality                                 Quality of
                                                              Service




                                              Information
                                               Security in
                                                  VoIP




                  Availability                               Integrity

                                                                          C   I    A       Q
16   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                                       26 March 2009
VoIP Call setup




17   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
VoIP Security threats
     Unauthorized access


     Interruption-of-service


     Eavesdropping


     Registration and Media manipulation


     Social threats
18   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Unauthorized access
Gaining unauthorized access to a VoIP system or component
using one of the remote services.
Administrative services (Telnet, HTTP(S), TFTP, …)
     − Attacks: Password sniffing, Brute force attack, Exploits, …
     − Goal: Change configuration, abuse telephone network …
     − Protection:
           System hardening (Vendor patches, ACL’s, …)
           Good password policy




                                                                     C   I    A       Q
19    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                                 26 March 2009
Unauthorized access - TFTP bruteforce




                  Brutefile.txt




Source: hackingvoip.com
 20   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Unauthorized access - TFTP bruteforce




                  Brutefile.txt




Source: hackingvoip.com
 21   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Unauthorized access – VoIP Server




22   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Interruption-of-service
Disrupting the VoIP service by attacking an essential part of the
voice network.
     Network
     − Denial-of-service
     − SYN-flooding
     − ARP spoofing

     Service
     − DNS
     − DHCP

     Application
     − SIP flooding attack
     − RTP/RTCP injections


23    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                 26 March 2009
Interruption-of-service – Network
Disrupting the VoIP service by attacking network components
Denial-of-service attacks
     − Attacks: DDoS, Ping of Death, ICMP Flooding, SYN Flooding…
     − Goal: Bring down an essential part of the VoIP network (routers, VoIP
      gateways, telephones, …), create delay, jitter or packets drops…
     − Protection:
           Firewall
           Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS)




                                                                          A       Q
24    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                             26 March 2009
Interruption-of-service – Services
Disrupting proper VoIP communication by attacking an essential
service
DNS/DHCP/…
     − Attacks: Rogue DHCP server, DNS Cache poisoning, …
     − Goal: Re-route traffic to another compromised host, block new systems
      from accessing the network
     − Protection (Network level):
           Rogue DHCP server detection
           Intrusion Prevention Systems




                                                                        A
25    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                           26 March 2009
Interruption-of-service – Application
Disrupting proper communication by targeting a VoIP control or
signaling protocols’ security weaknesses or risks
SIP/H323/RTCP/…
     − Attacks: SIP INVITE flooding, SIP/RTCP or malformed packet
      injection,…
     − Goal: Flooding SIP proxy, terminating or disturbing calls through
      injection of malicious messages, delay, jitter, packet drops, …
     − Protection:
           Enforce authentication for all packets (preferably mutual)
           Firewall or IPS with VoIP capabilities



                                                                            A       Q
26    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                               26 March 2009
SiVuS – VoIP Vulnerability Scanner




27   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Eavesdropping
Listening in on private communications between two or more
VoIP devices.
RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol)
     − Attacks: MAC spoofing, WiFi hacking, ARP spoofing, MITM, …
     − Goal: Gain access to the media stream
     − Protection:
           Network hardening
           Encryption
             – Protocol encryption SRTP, ZRTP

               –   (D)TLS, IPSec tunnels



                                                              C
28    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                        26 March 2009
ARP Spoof – Man-in-the-middle
Man-in-the-middle attack




29   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Eavesdropping - Wireshark




30   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Registration manipulation
Manipulating or inserting registration packets in order to redirect
or hijack sessions
Signalling protocols (SIP, H323)
     − Attacks: Registration removal, hijacking or addition
     − Goal: Masquerading, eavesdropping, …
     − Protection:
           Require authentication for all packets
           Enforce decent password policy




                                                              C   I
31    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                          26 March 2009
SiVuS – Password Bruteforcing




     Attacks SIP authentication
     Works both online as offline
      Numeric passwords up to 10 chars  +/- 8 min

32   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009          26 March 2009
Media manipulation
Manipulation of the media stream exchanged between two
clients
RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol)
     − Attacks: RTP injection
     − Goal: Change or add certain voice messages in a conversion
     − Protection:
           Network hardening
           Protocol encryption SRTP, ZRTP
           (D)TLS, IPSec tunnels




                                                               C    I
33    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                            26 March 2009
Social threat – VoIP Spam (SPIT)
Abusing public VoIP service providers or hacked VoIP solutions
to get commercial messages to the different users
     Direct access to target user
     Low costs
     Hard to protect against


Not popular now but what about in the future?
     Interconnections through SIP trunks
     More VoIP end-to-end
     Easier access

34    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009              26 March 2009
Social threat – VISHING
Social engineering attacks in order to entice users to call a
specific number and give out confidential information




35   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                     26 March 2009
Agenda

 Introduction

 Segregation of Voice and Data

 VoIP security threats

 Conclusion




36   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Information Security in VoIP
Confidentiality & Integrity
• Use encryption where possible
      − Application layer:
            SRTP, ZRTP, S/MIME in SIP
      − Transport/Network Layer:
            (D)TLS, IPSec
• Authentication
      − Preferably mutual
      − Strong passwords

• Keep your software up-to-date


 37    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Information Security in VoIP
Availability and Quality-of-Service
• Network hardening
• Security devices
     − Firewall
     − Intrusion Prevention System

• Redundancy
     − Fail-over
     − UPS

• Logging and monitoring


38    © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009   26 March 2009
Conclusion – Security threats

                                          YES, secure VoIP exists !

                                        Costs VS Security
     Added infrastructure:
         Better               and faster hardware
         PKI           environment, RADIUS server, …
     Maintenance
     Installation




39   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                           26 March 2009
Recommendations
 Design and implement a secure network environment

 Use encryption where possible

 Assure availability through proper redundancy – e.g. Network
infrastructure, UPS, …

 Good password management

 Don’t use soft-phones

 Protect your wireless clients with proper protection

 Penetration tests and security audits


40   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009               26 March 2009
Questions and Answers




                                              Thank you !



41   © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009                 26 March 2009

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Security Challenges In VoIP

  • 1. Security Challenges in VoIP Tom Gilis – Security Consultant Thursday, March 26, 2009
  • 2. Agenda  Introduction  Segregation of Voice and Data  VoIP security threats  Conclusion 2 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 3. Agenda  Introduction  Segregation of Voice and Data  VoIP security threats  Conclusion 3 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 4. Who am I and what am I doing here ? Tom Gilis Security Consultant with Dimension Data Penetration tests infrastructures and applications Risk analysis Purpose Create awareness around VoIP security Identify security risks and weaknesses Evaluate protection mechanisms 4 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 5. Do we need more security with VoIP? PBX More difficult to access Required specialized knowledge VoIP Uses an existing network (and its flaws) Increase in potential attackers Offers more services 5 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 6. VoIP Networks today 6 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 7. Agenda  Introduction  Segregation of Voice and Data  VoIP security threats  Conclusion 7 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 8. Network segregation Separate voice and data network Improve security Easier management Quality of service Physical Virtual • Expensive • Cheaper • New infrastructure • Uses current infrastructure • Difficult deployment • Easier deployment 8 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 9. You probably already use … Virtual Local Access Networks Group devices together in one segment Separate Voice and Data network VLAN Trunking Automatic VLAN configuration I. DHCP Options II. Proprietary protocols (LLDP) III. … 9 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 10. Automatic VLAN configuration Easy = YES , Security = NO ! Security tool: VoIPHopper (voiphopper.sourceforge.net) 10 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 11. Add authentication layer... 802.1X standard Authentication and authorization Username/password or certificates Compatible with VLAN Trunking Requires: Phone and switch support Authentication server User administration 11 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 12. Good effort but … Off-line brute force/dictionary attack tool (xtest.sourceforge.net) 12 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 13. Conclusion segregation Recommended − Quality of service − First security barrier Hard to properly protect Not always possible Segregation alone is NOT enough! 13 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 14. Agenda  Introduction  Segregation of Voice and Data  VoIP security threats  Conclusion 14 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 15. Information Security – CIA Triad Confidentiality Information Security Availability Integrity 15 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 16. Information Security in VoIP Confidentiality Quality of Service Information Security in VoIP Availability Integrity C I A Q 16 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 17. VoIP Call setup 17 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 18. VoIP Security threats Unauthorized access Interruption-of-service Eavesdropping Registration and Media manipulation Social threats 18 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 19. Unauthorized access Gaining unauthorized access to a VoIP system or component using one of the remote services. Administrative services (Telnet, HTTP(S), TFTP, …) − Attacks: Password sniffing, Brute force attack, Exploits, … − Goal: Change configuration, abuse telephone network … − Protection:  System hardening (Vendor patches, ACL’s, …)  Good password policy C I A Q 19 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 20. Unauthorized access - TFTP bruteforce Brutefile.txt Source: hackingvoip.com 20 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 21. Unauthorized access - TFTP bruteforce Brutefile.txt Source: hackingvoip.com 21 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 22. Unauthorized access – VoIP Server 22 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 23. Interruption-of-service Disrupting the VoIP service by attacking an essential part of the voice network. Network − Denial-of-service − SYN-flooding − ARP spoofing Service − DNS − DHCP Application − SIP flooding attack − RTP/RTCP injections 23 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 24. Interruption-of-service – Network Disrupting the VoIP service by attacking network components Denial-of-service attacks − Attacks: DDoS, Ping of Death, ICMP Flooding, SYN Flooding… − Goal: Bring down an essential part of the VoIP network (routers, VoIP gateways, telephones, …), create delay, jitter or packets drops… − Protection:  Firewall  Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) A Q 24 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 25. Interruption-of-service – Services Disrupting proper VoIP communication by attacking an essential service DNS/DHCP/… − Attacks: Rogue DHCP server, DNS Cache poisoning, … − Goal: Re-route traffic to another compromised host, block new systems from accessing the network − Protection (Network level):  Rogue DHCP server detection  Intrusion Prevention Systems A 25 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 26. Interruption-of-service – Application Disrupting proper communication by targeting a VoIP control or signaling protocols’ security weaknesses or risks SIP/H323/RTCP/… − Attacks: SIP INVITE flooding, SIP/RTCP or malformed packet injection,… − Goal: Flooding SIP proxy, terminating or disturbing calls through injection of malicious messages, delay, jitter, packet drops, … − Protection:  Enforce authentication for all packets (preferably mutual)  Firewall or IPS with VoIP capabilities A Q 26 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 27. SiVuS – VoIP Vulnerability Scanner 27 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 28. Eavesdropping Listening in on private communications between two or more VoIP devices. RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol) − Attacks: MAC spoofing, WiFi hacking, ARP spoofing, MITM, … − Goal: Gain access to the media stream − Protection:  Network hardening  Encryption – Protocol encryption SRTP, ZRTP – (D)TLS, IPSec tunnels C 28 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 29. ARP Spoof – Man-in-the-middle Man-in-the-middle attack 29 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 30. Eavesdropping - Wireshark 30 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 31. Registration manipulation Manipulating or inserting registration packets in order to redirect or hijack sessions Signalling protocols (SIP, H323) − Attacks: Registration removal, hijacking or addition − Goal: Masquerading, eavesdropping, … − Protection:  Require authentication for all packets  Enforce decent password policy C I 31 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 32. SiVuS – Password Bruteforcing Attacks SIP authentication Works both online as offline Numeric passwords up to 10 chars  +/- 8 min 32 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 33. Media manipulation Manipulation of the media stream exchanged between two clients RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol) − Attacks: RTP injection − Goal: Change or add certain voice messages in a conversion − Protection:  Network hardening  Protocol encryption SRTP, ZRTP  (D)TLS, IPSec tunnels C I 33 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 34. Social threat – VoIP Spam (SPIT) Abusing public VoIP service providers or hacked VoIP solutions to get commercial messages to the different users Direct access to target user Low costs Hard to protect against Not popular now but what about in the future? Interconnections through SIP trunks More VoIP end-to-end Easier access 34 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 35. Social threat – VISHING Social engineering attacks in order to entice users to call a specific number and give out confidential information 35 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 36. Agenda  Introduction  Segregation of Voice and Data  VoIP security threats  Conclusion 36 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 37. Information Security in VoIP Confidentiality & Integrity • Use encryption where possible − Application layer:  SRTP, ZRTP, S/MIME in SIP − Transport/Network Layer:  (D)TLS, IPSec • Authentication − Preferably mutual − Strong passwords • Keep your software up-to-date 37 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 38. Information Security in VoIP Availability and Quality-of-Service • Network hardening • Security devices − Firewall − Intrusion Prevention System • Redundancy − Fail-over − UPS • Logging and monitoring 38 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 39. Conclusion – Security threats YES, secure VoIP exists ! Costs VS Security Added infrastructure: Better and faster hardware PKI environment, RADIUS server, … Maintenance Installation 39 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 40. Recommendations  Design and implement a secure network environment  Use encryption where possible  Assure availability through proper redundancy – e.g. Network infrastructure, UPS, …  Good password management  Don’t use soft-phones  Protect your wireless clients with proper protection  Penetration tests and security audits 40 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009
  • 41. Questions and Answers Thank you ! 41 © Copyright Dimension Data 2000 - 2009 26 March 2009