2. BIOGRAPHY
 LTCOL YASSINE, JOINED L.A.F 1983
 DEPUTY KLEIAAT AIR FORCE BASE CDR,AIR WING
COMMANDER,BASE S2 CHIEF.
 CURRENTLY CHIEF OF OPS SECTION IN THE A F HQ
 COURSES:
1- IRWAC 1985, FT RUCKER,AL
2-REFRESHER COURSE UH-1H, FT RUCKER, AL.1995
3-SQUADRON CDR COURSE,SYRIA, 1998
4-COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE, LEBANON, 2004
5-AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE, MAXWELL
A.F.B.USA 2006.

3. OVERVIEW
 BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT WITH “Fateh Al
Islam”.
 MISSIONS EXECUTED BY LAF DURING THE
CONFLICT.
 THE SITUATION BEFORE THE AIR ATTACK.
 THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF BOMBING
STUDIES.
 BOMBING EXECUTION.
 RISK MANAGEMENT MEASURES.
 STRATEGY OF EMPLOYMENT & MISSION
EVALUATION.

4. Fateh - Al - Islam

5.  In the 20 th of May 2007 a member of the terrorist
groups “Fateh Al Islam” attacked some Lebanese
army posts in the vicinity of camp Naher AL bared,
killing 20 troops and overtaking their posts.
 This group was lead by shaker al absy, reports
about their strength and connections and their
supporters were not definite. They were ruling the
camp by being the most powerful armed and
organized group there since 2006.

6. “NAHER EL 10 km Kleyaat Air force Base
Naher Al Bared Camp
BARED”
CAMP
90km
Beirut Air force Base

7.  Naher Al Bared is a one of the Palestinian
refugee camps of 40000 p situated in the
north of Lebanon, at 80 km north of Beirut
and at 12 Km from KLAYAAT AIR FORCE
BASE where most helicopter missions were
launched.

8. “NAHER EL BARED” CAMP
AREA = 2 km2
POPULATION= 40.000 H
2007

9.  Before the crisis the camp surface was less
than 2Km2.

10. “NAHER EL BARED” CAMP
OLD CAMP
NEW CAMP

11.  The Camp is divided into 2 parts: the old
part and the new one. The political
negotiation with the Palestinian authorities
between the 23rd and the 30th of May didn’t
reach a happy end. This negotiation was
aiming to hand over the terrorist members
who did the attack at the army posts and at
the same time to allow the civilian
evacuation from inside the camp.

12. AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES

13.  At the beginning of the conflict the LAF had
23 UH1H (50% were out of service due to
lack of spare parts), 2 of them were in
kleiaat and 4 raven R44 for training.

15.  One month earlier the LAF has received
from UAE 9 gazelles (French anti tank
helicopters unarmed, and 3 of them were
flyable due to spare parts lack and checks
required, and during the battle 0.5 caliber
machine guns were installed on 2 ships and
anti-tank hot missiles on the third.

16. MISSIONS EXECUTED DURING
THE CONFLICT & EXECUTION STRATEGIE
OBSERVATION MISSIONS

17.  Observation missions, started on the 20th of
may 2007.

18. MISSIONS EXECUTED DURING
THE CONFLICT & EXECUTION STRATEGY
TRANSPORT MISSIONS

19.  Escort missions, start with the conflict

20. Preparing jets & V.I.P TRANSPORT

21.  Even the R44 had participated in transport
and radio relay missions, and the air force
start to work on grounded jets

22. MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSIONS

23.  Medical evacuation missions: daily
missions, day and night, good to mention
here that the execution of these missions
while trying to preserve the concept of the
“golden hour” had kept the moral of our
friendly troops very high. (130 MEDEVAC,
23 NIGHTS)

24. MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSIONS

25. MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSIONS

26. AIR-GROUND ATTACKS

27.  The gazelle had participated in the combat
by the execution of some air attack missions
on special designated targets like anti-
aircraft machine guns, small artillery, fuel
tanks.

29.  The gazelles had also participated in search
missions for terrorist members in the
northern mountain surrounding the camp.

30. THE SITUATION BEFORE THE BOMBING
STAGE II
STAGE I

31.  The Lebanese armed Forces had initiated
different attacks on the camp, controlling
first the new part of the camp, and then the
east part of the old camp

32. THE FINAL AREA BEFORE THE BOMBING

33.  The remaining surface was of 200-250
meters length and 200 meters wide
approximately

35.  The remaining part of the camp is
considered to be the densest one and the
most dangerous

39.  On the other hand the tiny small streets
inside this area and the immense
destruction created a big obstacle for our
ground troop’s advance in the camp.

41.  Facing this situation it has become a priority
to find a solution out from anywhere .

43.  The concept was to find a way to use the 50-250-
400 Kg bombs and to drop them over the camp in
a proper way. These bombs were first design to be
used on the MIRAGE and HUNTRER fighters 30
years ago and actually were supposed to be
demolished
 The problem was to create an attachment
mechanism that allows a proper bomb release. A
quiet challenged task, because no body had ever
used a helicopter as a bomber before. .


44. THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF
BOMBING STUDIES.

45.  A BLUE team of experience pilots and
technicians and engineers had initiated a
different studies and research projects in
order to make this idea realistic.

46. THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF
BOMBING STUDIES.
ELECTRICAL VALVE
COMPRESSED AIR
HUNTER’S O2 BOTTELS
PRESSURED AIR
RELEASE PISTON
NAVY AXE
MISSILE ATTACHEMENT ARM GAZELLE
M113 ARMERD PLATE
BOMBE ATTACHEMENT HUNTER

47.  Thus, a helicopter bomber has been created
by using old fixed wing and helicopter and
navy vessels spare parts.

48. THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF
BOMBING STUDIES.

49.  Even new bombs had been fabricated by
the engineers

50. THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF
BOMBING STUDIES.

51. CENTER OF GRAVITY CALCULATION
WEIGHT MOMENT
A/C 5500 7953
- BOMB LATERAL ARM :
(96/2)+(50*0.394)=67.7 in CREW 600 356.8
CARGO 1060.72 1295.433
FUEL 1400 2131.5
TOTAL 8560.72 11736.73
WEIGHT MOMENT
BOMB 550 37235
- LATERAL CG = 37235/8560.72= 4.34 in
(LIMIT IS 5 IN)

52. 2- CENTER OF GRAVITY
CALCULATION
WEIGHT MOMENT WEIGHT MOMENT
A/C 5500 7953 A/C 5500 7953
CREW 600 356.8 CREW 600 356.8
CARGO 1628 1994.07 CARGO 1628 1994.07
FUEL 1400 2131.5 FUEL 480 629.5
FUEL QUANTITY WITH
max FW CG
CG=133.3 CG=132.2
CG LIMITE
(132.6/143.3) CG LIMITE (130/144)

53.  At the same time a series of studies had
been lunched concerning the CG calculation
and the GPS features characteristics

54. TRIAL PROCEDURES

55.  Trial time had begin using non explosives
external weights

56. TRIAL PROCEDURES

57. BOMB 250 KG

58. 400 KG

59. RELEASE POINT CALCULATION
Dx = Dv + GPS CORRECTION + SYSTEM CORRECTION
Dv : distance ( 633 meters)
GPS Corr : 1/4 second ( 10 meters) (delay)
SYS Corr : 1/5 second ( 7 meters)
5 kts A/S 100 feet
Alt/feet A/S Kts Dx Error Alt.Error Time
3000 90 650 35.1 m 6.9 13.6
1500 90 447.1 24.84 m 9.8 9.6
RELEASE POINT
PROJECTILE
Dx

60. TRIAL PROCEDURES
ACTUAL RELEASE POINT
GPS RELEASE POINT
THIS DELAY ID DUE TO:
- NUMBER OF SATELLITES CAPTURED
- GROUND SPEED
- ACTUAL (AGL) ALTITUDE

61.  At the same time finding a way to correctly
calculate, define and properly identify the
release point was a big concern, due to the
delay in the GPS reception and the delay in
the release system itself, bearing in mind
that the margin of error is so small due to
the small dimensions of the remaining area
to be bombed, and that even small error is
not allowed

62.  Several trying sorties had been executed
and the results were impressive, at the
same time sorties over the camp at low
level, day and nights set the field ready.
 Finally a mathematical procedure had been
reached and implemented.

63. 07-08-2007

64.  The trial had started on the 7th of August in
the Bekaa Valley in a fire field for heavy
arms

65. 09-08-2007

66.  Only Two days later we started bombing the
camp

67. 5 BUILDINGS
COMPLETELY
DESTROYED

68.  The efficiency and efficacy of the bombing
had been a dramatic surprise over the
terrorists whom they found themselves
forced to even try to escape from the camp
or to surrender. And that was achieved on
the 2nd of Sep 2007.

69. RISK MANAGEMENT MEASURES
 Target selection (starting with the one away
from our friendly troops.
 Protection measures taken from our ground
troops.
 Cease of our indirect fire over the camp .

70.  Measures taken to minimize collateral damage
and utmost safety for flights:
 This issue was one of our priority concerns.
Examples of measures taken:
 Target selection (starting with the ones away from
our front lines)
 Protection measures for our ground troops.
 Cease of friendly indirect fire during the bombing.
 A cover ship for rescue and assess the raid result

71. STRATEGY OF EMPLOYMENT &
MISSION’S EVALUATION.
 DIRECT COORDINATION.
 TIME OF BOMBING
 LIAISON OFFICERS..
 TARGET PRIORITY.
 DIRECT OBSERVATION.
 AERIAL PHOTOS .

72.  Strategy of employment & mission evaluation
 The bombing missions were executed with a direct
coordination with the ground troops through the presence
of an air force liaison officer in the front lines and in the
OR.
 Different timing was implemented for the bombing with
different gape of time between one mission and another.
 The targets had been chosen according to a certain priority
given by the mission commander officer starting with the
anti-aircraft weapons, fortification, fateh al Islam main
offices, water sources, fuel tanks, under ground shelters,
arriving to designated area to easy our friendly troops
advance.

73. MISSION EVALUATION

74. MISSION EVALUATION

75. MISSION EVALUATION
Axes of attack

76.  - Evaluation of the bombing mission was done on
aerial photos taken by helicopters due to the
absence of drones.
 - The air bombing contribute to victory on
terrorism.
 - It raises the morals of the ground troops after a
long time of exhaustion.
 - It opens the field for more inventions and tactics
with the fact that no other means were available.
 - winning the war on terrorism is possible when
determination and sacrifice and will are present
 - No area in Lebanon could be a blockade for
Lebanese security and law enforcement.

77. MISSION’S DETAILS 20/5 – 4/9
MISSION SORTIES DAY NIGHT
NUMBER HOURS HOURS
MEDEVAC 165 179,05 32,10
OBSERVATION 76 62,35 7,25
& PHOTO
BOMBING 98 41,55 4,35
ESCORT 13 22.4

79. Questions???