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South Africa, BRICS and the South African
Development Partnership Agency: redefining
Canada's development assistance to Africa
through triangular cooperation
Hany Besada & Evren Tok
To cite this article: Hany Besada & Evren Tok (2015) South Africa, BRICS and the South
African Development Partnership Agency: redefining Canada's development assistance to
Africa through triangular cooperation, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 21:3, 272-285, DOI:
10.1080/11926422.2015.1074927
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2015.1074927
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2. South Africa, BRICS and the South African Development
Partnership Agency: redefining Canada’s development assistance
to Africa through triangular cooperation
Hany Besadaa,b∗
and Evren Tokc∗∗
a
African Minerals Development Centre, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; b
Center for
Governance, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada; c
Public Policy in Islam Program, Hamad
Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar
Keywords: South Africa; BRICS; Canada; SADPA; development assistance
Introduction
South Africa’s prominence and global visibility have been rising as a consequence of its contri-
butions to United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conferences, membership in the Group of
Twenty (G20), and, most recently, membership in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa). This article approaches South Africa’s global rise from a Canadian per-
spective by focusing on the implications of BRICS membership and establishment of the South
African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). As the second largest African economy and
an important provider of aid on the continent, South Africa’s establishment of SADPA deserves
an assessment of what the new agency can learn from the experiences of donors and development
partners, especially in light of the forthcoming post-2015 development agenda. As Vickers (2012)
explains, the administration of President Jacob Zuma has been leveraging South Africa’s donor–
partnership position, which involves the eventual establishment of SADPA and a Partnership
Fund for Development. In the context of a shifting global economic order, this paper argues
that the Canadian government can provide knowledge, expertise and best practices according
to the triangular cooperation model, a relatively new mechanism of development assistance
that could improve development effectiveness in line with the post-2015 development agenda.
At a time when Canada’s international development agenda appears to be at a crossroads, this
would be a proactive step for Canada to reposition its development assistance beyond traditional
measures and positively reassert its presence on the continent. Canada stands to benefit from a
developed Africa, with accompanying strong business and resource markets, and Foreign
# 2015 NPSIA
∗
Hany Besada is a regional advisor for the African Minerals Development Centre, a member and senior
fellow of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, a research professor at the University of
Ottawa and Carleton University, a project investigator for the National Priority Research Program (ID#6-
12725-160), Qatar Foundation and a PhD candidate at the University of Warwick. Email: hgbesada@
gmail.com
∗∗
Evren Tok is an assistant professor at Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Public Policy in Islam Program, and
Co-Lead Project Investigator, National Priority Research Program (ID#6-12725-160), Qatar Foundation.
Email: etok@qfis.edu.qa
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 2015
Vol. 21, No. 3, 272–285, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2015.1074927
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3. Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD) could use the opportunity to improve policy
coherence in line with the forthcoming post-2015 development agenda.
This article is organized into four sections. The first focuses on South Africa’s participation in
the BRICS in light of critical concerns for the African continent and its role as a regional devel-
opment partner. The second section delves into the establishment of SADPA and its practical par-
ameters, effectively acting as a primer for DFATD officials. The following section outlines
Canada’s role in supporting the new agency according to the triangular cooperation model.
The final section provides an overview and concludes.
South Africa’s participation in BRICS and role as regional development partner
South Africa was granted an invitation to join the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) group1
in December 2010 by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Yang Jiechi.
South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mshabane
made the announcement of South Africa’s official participation in the BRIC after 10 months
of lobbying by Zuma, who marketed South Africa as a gateway to Africa. The third BRIC
summit in April 2011 heralded the transformation of BRIC into BRICS. According to the
South African government, participation in the group provides economic benefits, such as
increased trade and investment opportunities, as well as political benefits, including increased
voice in the international sphere (Government of South Africa 2012). As South African Trade
and Industry Minister Rob Davies indicated, “Our membership in BRICS gives us huge oppor-
tunities to develop different patterns of trade relationships. We’ll seek to build relationships
among ourselves” (quoted in Brand 2011).
As Alden and Schoeman (2013) argue, South Africa shares the broad aspirations and objec-
tives of the other BRICS countries, and positions itself as a leader of the African continent. The
argument that South Africa represents the continent and its interests is partly supported by South
Africa’s recent policies and statements in various forums, such as its calling for the lowering of
trade barriers for African countries at the World Trade Organization. Nevertheless, South
Africa does not and cannot represent the continent’s interests all of the time, especially if
those interests have a detrimental impact on its own foreign policy objectives and economic
and security concerns (van den Bosch 2011).
While South Africa has often been regarded as a representative of the continent in the group,
some analysts maintain that the benefits to the region accrued from the country’s membership in
BRICS will only be marginal. This membership could increase the diversity of investments,
expand markets for African industry and boost tourism from countries other than those of
Western Europe; however, it may not generate the widespread infrastructural investment and
economic growth that many governments project (van den Bosch 2011). Further, membership
may actually continue to reinforce a pattern of resource extraction by the wealthier BRICS
countries.
There is a concern that partnering with BRICS investors could prove detrimental to African
countries as such partnership facilitates further capital encroachment by South Africa’s corpor-
ations in the region (van den Bosch 2011). South Africa’s move to join the group sparked fears of
neo-colonialism on the continent. Increased market access for the BRICS in Africa could stunt
the economic growth of countries that have yet to develop industrial bases. BRICS activity
runs the risk of entrenching asymmetrical patterns of trade, specifically keeping economies in
the region dependent on commodity exports (van den Bosch 2011). For some analysts, entrance
into BRICS will allow South Africa to positively contribute to key global governance and democ-
racy issues. It will allow the country to demonstrate leadership on issues such as conflict resol-
ution, security and post-conflict reconstruction and development (Makgetlaneng 2011).
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4. Purportedly, South Africa’s membership provides geographic representation for Africa both
within BRICS and in international forums, with the group speaking widely on behalf of emerging
economies and the developing world, and contributing to further balancing of global governance.
The cohesiveness of the BRICS, however, is a cause for concern. Their political and economic
objectives and international alliances2
could conflict. There are prospects for friction when it
comes to foreign policy objectives with other BRICS countries. Many argue that there is little,
in terms of political and economic objectives, that binds these countries together in the first
place, discussions on the New Development Bank aside. Moreover, only three of the five
members are democracies, which may create conflict or controversy in terms of political priori-
ties. South Africa’s ability to fully participate in BRICS could be constrained by its relative dearth
of diplomatic resources.
The rise of the BRICS countries signifies a shift away from the traditional North–South
development binary and ideological divides. However, this is not to discount the many years
of development history, experience and success of both developed and developing countries
that are informing the formulation of the post-2015 development agenda. What is increasingly
clear is that in order for global development to be holistic, governments need to start assessing
how experts, ideas and information from both the developed and the developing world can
equally contribute to common development goals in the post-2015 period. There are evidently
numerous positive and negative connotations associated with the rising power and influence of
the BRICS counties, but South Africa’s desire to facilitate African development through SADPA
could forge a responsible path forward if it receives proper support. The establishment of
SADPA provides Canada with an opportunity to positively reestablish its standing and political
and economic engagements in Africa following government cutbacks to the aid and foreign
affairs budgets since the 1990s, particularly under the Conservative government of Prime Min-
ister Stephen Harper since Canada’s failure to secure a temporary seat on the UN Security
Council in 2010, attributed to, among other things, the loss of support across Africa following
the removal of funds out of eight of the continent’s poorest countries (Saunders 2010). Canada
and South Africa’s long history as significant political and commercial partners; common values
in the post-apartheid era, particularly equality, democracy, peace, security and prosperity; and
shared interest in multilateralism (Government of Canada 2014) could serve as the foundation
of a robust development partnership between the countries, whereby Canada can provide devel-
opment assistance in the form of knowledge, expertise and best practices and, in turn, econ-
omically benefit from strengthened and stable emerging markets in Africa and, following the
country’s decision not to run for a UN Security Council seat in 2014, politically benefit
from an improved standing with Africa’s 54 countries that may lead to a temporary seat in
2018.
Establishment of SADPA
Part of how the BRICS are reducing their dependency on the developed world is through the
establishment of their own aid agencies. India tried and failed to launch a development
agency, Russia is a re-emerging donor and has publicly talked about creating one, Brazil recently
successfully created the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and South Africa will continue to
engage in public debate on the bill that will operationalize SADPA. Some South African analysts
expect the agency to build better connections on the continent and facilitate a more proactive
South African presence that is more responsive to both the needs of other African countries
and the market-centered commercial interests of South Africa (Vickers 2012, p. 549). SADPA
will likely coordinate South Africa’s outgoing aid – an anticipated 0.2 to 0.5 per cent of its
gross domestic product (GDP) – while the National Treasury will maintain its responsibility
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5. for incoming Official Development Aid (ODA) (Amos 2010, Ramachandran and Walz 2011).
This arrangement would put South Africa’s development assistance – as a percentage of GDP
– higher than that of most developed countries.
Of all the BRICS countries, China is perceived to be the largest provider of foreign aid by far,
despite not publishing official statistics. In 2009, China gave anywhere from US $1.5 billion to
US $25 billion, primarily in the area of economic infrastructure. The higher estimate would
make China the world’s second largest donor. BRICS countries other than China have only pro-
vided foreign aidsince2004, but theyarenowall importantemerging donors (Walz and Ramachan-
dran 2011, p. 7). Unlike Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries, foreign aid from the BRICS group is less transparent and more difficult to measure –
measurement depends largely on how aid is defined. For example, South Africa has consistently
provided various types of support to African countries since its emergence as a constitutional
democracy, with an upper estimate of US$475 million in 2009; however, “an overall determination
of thefundsis . . . extremelydifficult to discern, assuch assistance is fragmented and is notseparated
from ordinary budget line items within each departmental vote” (Sidiropoulos 2012, p. 93).
South African development assistance to Africa has been varied and somewhat differs from
the traditional development models to which developed countries tend to adhere. First, the
Development Bank of Southern Africa provides non-concessional loans without conditionalities
to public institutions in South Africa and bordering countries in good financial standing. Second,
the South African government provides development assistance such as security aid, in line with
leadership in multilateral peacekeeping and peace-building operations throughout Africa. Third,
the government significantly engages in institutional capacity building during post-conflict
reconstruction, a major area of development focus for South Africa. Often these efforts
include the facilitation of fair and democratic elections and technical assistance for the elected
governments. Fourth, the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) was established with a broad
mandate to be used to fund development partnerships throughout Africa, particularly those on
humanitarian and disaster relief, democracy and good governance, and technical cooperation
(Besharati 2013, p. 17–20).
The decentralized nature of South Africa’s current development partnerships present chal-
lenges for transparency and accountability. The government’s development activities are con-
ducted through a variety of departments that do not always share information with each other
– not least to avoid bureaucratic delays. The National Treasury has developed a reporting mech-
anism – the Development Cooperation Management and Information System – that falls short
in accurately providing the information meant to strengthen development transparency and
accountability (Besharati 2013, p. 15–16).
For this reason, SADPA’s primary role will be that of a central coordinator for the various
government departments engaging in development assistance. The agency will replace the exist-
ing ARF and fall under the portfolio of the Department of International Relations and
Cooperation (DIRCO; Tapula et al. 2011). It is unlikely that SADPA will have its own develop-
ment projects. Rather, it will manage the existing system of decentralized implementation of
departments’ projects. Ultimately, there are a myriad of ways that the new agency can enhance
the current state of affairs for outgoing development assistance, which reflect its aid scope:
SADPA can act as an information database for outgoing development assistance in all its
forms, provide direction for all departments in relating their development projects with the stra-
tegic objectives of the South African government, engage in quality assurance as well as monitor-
ing and evaluation of development projects, promote knowledge and best practices for public
servants and the departments to which they belong, and lobby for financial and human resources
to be spent on development partnerships (Besharati 2013, pp. 45–46).
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal/La politique e´trange`re du Canada 275
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6. It is important to understand that while SADPA will coordinate South Africa’s foreign assist-
ance, it will not be a typical aid agency like the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID), the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) or the
former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The word partnership in its name
speaks volumes. Originally, the agency was to be called the South African International Develop-
ment Agency, but this proposal generated significant debate and controversy within the South
African government. DIRCO was concerned about the negative connotation that “aid” has
across Africa and wanted to dissociate South Africa from traditional donors (Grimm 2011).
These concerns won out and the name SADPA was eventually selected. For this reason, it is
unsurprising that SADPA is focused more on development partnerships than on simply distribut-
ing funds. This orientation has been discussed by other emerging donors as well.
The ARF currently has financial assets worth approximately R600–R800 million (US$70–94
million), which will be extended to SADPA once it is operationalized. Like the ARF, SADPA will
have a rolling budget so that if funds are not spent entirely in one year, they will be transferred to
the next with no penalty to its budget. Three other governments have committed to match
SADPA’s start-up budget, which would give the agency an initial start-up fund of R3–R4
billion (US$350–470 million). Such funding would make South Africa’s foreign aid worth as
high as 0.11 per cent of its GDP.
In 2006, South Africa’s development assistance totaled between US$363 million and US$475
million – approximately 0.18 per cent of GDP (Braude et al. 2008, p. 3). Its development assist-
ance is devoted nearly entirely to sub-Saharan Africa, but more specifically to the proximate
region of southern Africa. In 2004, Southern African Development Community member states
were the recipients of 96 per cent of South Africa’s aid (Braude et al. 2008, p. 16). This trend
is unlikely to change as the country “aspires to be a logistical and financial hub for the entire con-
tinent” (Besharati 2013, p. 12).
In addition to the financial assets of the ARF that will be ceded to SADPA, all outgoing devel-
opment assistance and cooperation funds are expected to be drawn from the SADPA Fund, which
is to be overseen by a board of trustees comprising 11 members from various governmental
departments, including DIRCO and the National Treasury (DIRCO 2011). The board will also
approve the work plan developed by SADPA management and determine the investment
policy of the fund. The minister of international relations and cooperation, responsible for
DIRCO, will direct SADPA and the SADPA Fund, under the authority of the head of the
agency – the accounting officer of SADPA. The preliminary director of SADPA is Shoayb
Casoo, who will be charged with developing SADPA’s policy and operations framework as well
as the systems and tools for the agency’s programs and projects. Casoo worked within DIRCO
for a number of years and was recently the head of the Mediterranean Europe Unit and minister
plenipotentiary at the South African Embassy in France.
The decision to create SADPA was announced by Nkoana-Mashabane in April 2010. The
vision of SADPA is “to develop partnerships that drive innovation around development
cooperation in Africa and developing countries to create self-sufficient societies” (Casoo 2011).
The agency will promote both South–South cooperation and the Millennium Development
Goals – and, by extension, the post-2015 development agenda, which will be finalized in Septem-
ber 2015 – in its work. It was supposed to be operationalized by April 2012, but has been subject
to continual delays. Hypotheses for the setback include that SADPA “does not appear to be an
immediate priority” for the Zuma administration (Grimm 2011, p. 4). Keeping the African
National Congress, the governing social democratic political party, together and addressing
mass unemployment have appeared to take precedence over its launch, but institutional rivalries
and political sensitivities have indeed played roles in the setback. Notably, South African
276 H. Besada and E. Tok
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7. Parliament rejected a draft bill on SADPA because of a request for amendments, specifically on
National Treasury concurrence (Besharati 2013, p. 35).
The role that development cooperation plays in South Africa’s strategic foreign policy is
debated. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the core tenet of South African foreign policy has
been “the promotion of development and stability in Africa” (GHSi 2012). This policy is
anchored in the issue of Africa’s vast mineral wealth, which is sought after by companies and gov-
ernments worldwide. In its white paper on foreign policy, the South African government noted
the importance of Africa’s resources being developed by African companies and governments
instead of foreign interests (Government of South Africa 2011). DIRCO advocates that SADPA
continue to use South Africa’s development assistance as a tool of foreign policy, namely for
the economic development of the African continent, by engaging other countries to ensure
that they are open to South African business and investment (Tapula et al. 2011). Much like
China’s approach to development, SADPA will assume that what is good for South African
business will translate to benefits for the local population, whether it is in South Africa,
Namibia, Mozambique or elsewhere. Nevertheless, critics argue that South Africa’s development
activities fail to align with its foreign policy objectives.
Beyond ethical obligations and international security concerns, South Africa’s role in peace-
keeping and peace-building operations in Africa is largely meant to ultimately foster stable
environments that enable private investment. In post-conflict African countries, investors
develop confidence in markets that could not function during times of instability. Within
South Africa, businesses benefit from a decrease in uncertainties arising from elevated
numbers of migrants and refugees entering the country, such as poverty and unemployment,
pressure on public services and crime (Besharati 2013, p. 25). Yet, relative to international com-
petitors, South African businesses are not reaping the commercial rewards. For example, South
Africa contributed significantly to peacekeeping and capacity-building operations in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, but it was unable to strike a deal with the Congolese government on
large mining contracts. Rather, China was able to broker a deal for copper and cobalt mining in
the country (Besharati 2013, p. 25).
South Africa is facing increasing competition across the African continent from traditional
donors, such as the United States and United Kingdom, and emerging donors, such as fellow
BRICS members China and India, new donors including South Korea, Turkey and the Gulf
States, and large philanthropic organizations. In effect, South Africa’s role in South–South
cooperation, which confers benefits to South African businesses, in Africa may become increas-
ingly marginalized. To address these challenges, the Zuma administration needs a foreign part-
nership strategy strengthened by comparative advantage. Ultimately, its relatively smaller
human and financial resource base makes investing in international alliances and development
partnerships an important factor in achieving its ambitious foreign policy and commercial objec-
tives (O’Riordan 2013, p. 3). South Africa can capitalize on the newly gained legitimacy conferred
by membership in the BRICS and leverage triangular cooperation with traditional donors and
multilateral organizations, such as the OECD.
By managing its international and especially regional relationships, South Africa can
strengthen its capacity to engage in development partnerships and South–South cooperation
as well as the trust of current and potential recipient countries. For example, South Africa’s
regional economic dominance can foster resentment from neighbors that may be reluctant to
cooperate with a so-called regional hegemon, which would temper the legitimacy gained from
BRICS membership. Its direct neighbors worry that their markets will not realize beneficial syner-
gies given an overly dominant economy (Besharati 2013, p. 23). Such suspicions are powerful
obstacles to overcome, but multilateralism can create opportunities for strategic engagements
and build trust. South Africa’s active participation in BRICS, UN and African Union summits
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal/La politique e´trange`re du Canada 277
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8. exemplifies how South Africa utilizes multilateral forums to strengthen capacity and cooperation,
but DIRCO officials will have to go further once SADPA is operationalized, with bilateral devel-
opment partnerships and aid effectiveness likely to become priorities in South African foreign
policy.
The emergence of the need for SADPA serves as an indicator that highlights a gap that South
Africa’s development agendas have to date failed to successfully address. Therefore, it is important
that the new agency and successive agendas get it right from the start by learning from the past
experiences of not only South Africa’s peers but also experienced traditional donors. Whether the
expertise, knowledge and best practices shared are useful in the particular context of South Africa
is less important than the opportunity to talk in formal and informal settings, which can lead to
changes in image perceptions, new ideas about institutional frameworks and specific projects, and
collaboration on larger initiatives – all fundamental to partnerships. Lessons from the implemen-
tation of the Millennium Development Goals, which will likely inform the formulation of the
post-2015 development agenda, are particularly valuable going forward.
A comprehensive analysis of the likely mandate and proposed roles of SADPA indicates that
in order to ensure its effective establishment, what is needed at the initial stage of establishment
are expertise, knowledge and best practices on not only development efforts but also policy coher-
ence. As mentioned, SADPA runs the risk of operating in a similar manner to South Africa’s pre-
vious development assistance arrangements that were characterized by little accountability and
transparency. Canada, a traditional donor with a robust institutional framework, could
provide a great deal of expertise, knowledge and best practices that strengthen SADPA by imple-
menting the checks and balances that it needs to successfully coordinate operations in an evi-
dently politicized domestic context. Canadian political objectives on economic prosperity
would be well served by a Canadian–South African partnership that improves the reception of
Canadian foreign policy by African countries and emerging economies, such as the BRICS
countries and other emerging donors.
Triangular cooperation by Canada and South Africa: the past and future
Given its common values with South Africa and shared interest in multilateralism, Canada could
play an advisory role during SADPA’s initial stage, if welcomed. South Africa wants to build
SADPA as an agency that focuses on partnerships, so it follows that traditional donors could
support SADPA at its outset. While the development philosophies of emerging donors often
differ from those of OECD countries, there is still a place for traditional donors to assist in
SADPA’s establishment and evolution, especially as partnerships mature. There is some evidence
that by joining the BRICS grouping, a largely economic cooperation, South Africa is reinforcing
neo-liberalism in Africa, with trade and investment being the priority and social and environ-
mental protection remaining a distant concern (Besada and Tok 2014). Traditional donors,
including Canada, and emerging donors, such as those from the BRICS, all have an interest in
economic prosperity, but the former, with their established records on good governance as
well as social and environmental protection, are well positioned to offer expertise, knowledge
and best practices on institutional checks and balances that can help in particular development
efforts, particularly on the social and environmental pillars that are expected to undergird the
post-2015 development agenda. Leading proposals for the agenda, such as those by the High-
Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2013) and the Open Working Group on
the Sustainable Development Goals (2014), highlight strengthening the means of implementation
and revitalizing the global partnership for development.
Since the end of apartheid, which Canada played a leading role in the international campaign,
Canada and South Africa have enjoyed strong diplomatic relations. The two countries have
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9. engaged in a multitude of multilateral issues, including the creation of the World Trade Organ-
ization. Canada and South Africa have also partnered on bilateral issues, such as mining, culture
and environment. The Government of Canada (2014) outlines a history of bilateral relations,
trade and development assistance, with highlights including the two countries holding annual
bilateral consultations on foreign policy, trade and development issues, and DFATD’s current
programming goals being to “help enhance public sector capacity, including accountability,
transparency and citizenship engagement, to meet the needs of South Africans and to contribute
to regional prosperity.” With Canada already having established a political and commercial part-
nership with South Africa, the establishment of SADPA is an opportunity to focus on governance,
specifically institutional capacity building that focuses on implementation of development pro-
jects and programs, in line with a third partner, ideally a multilateral organization that specializes
in the subject.
Historically, Canada has played a particularly significant role in helping to strengthen South
Africa’s democratic and institutional governance, but progress over time has yielded diminishing
returns. Canada’s Program on Governance, launched in 1993, helped facilitate South Africa’s
transition to democracy in the early 1990s by strengthening the country’s capacity to govern
itself. The program then worked with South Africa’s leaders to build the basic systems of govern-
ment (Proctor and Sims 2000, p. 160). The broader goal today remains the same as when the
program began – to help South Africa build its governance capacity. The results of the
program highlight some of the governmental expertise, knowledge and best practices that
Canada has been able to share with the South African government, but diminishing returns
suggest that value for money is also decreasing. Partnership with a local organization could cat-
alyze innovation on means of implementation and improve results in public service delivery, not
only for South Africa but for DFATD as well.
South Africa’s Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA), the
South African public-sector training academy that changed its name to the National School of
Government in December 2014, ran the five-year Regional Capacity Building (RCB) project –
from 2008 until 2013 – that focused on building public-sector capacities in post-conflict
countries (Carbonnier 2012, p. 96). It was an organic South–South development partnership
whereby South Africa utilized its existing relationships with Rwanda, Burundi and Southern
Sudan to develop a joint plan that aligned with their strategic priorities. Such engagement
reinforced trust among the four parties and maintained ownership for the beneficiaries –
Rwanda, Burundi and Southern Sudan – over the development project. Once a plan was
decided, PALAMA approached CIDA for funding, which agreed on a budget of US$10.5
million and effectively paved the way for the implementation of the triangular partnership
(Muthayan and Pangech 2009).
Traditional mechanisms of development assistance appear to be giving way to new models
that are being adapted according to countries’ evolving needs, with the triangular cooperation
model recently gaining some traction. The United Nations Economic and Social Council
(UNESCO) outlines an older definition of triangular development cooperation as follows: “Tri-
angular development cooperation has been interpreted as OECD/DAC [Development Assistance
Committee] donors or multilateral institutions providing development assistance to Southern
governments to execute projects/programmes with the aim of assisting other developing
countries” (UNESCO 2008, p. 3). Deborah Farias (2015, p. 1), noting that by 2011 two-thirds
of OECD countries had engaged in a triangular cooperation project, yet the model is “still under-
studied,” outlined the model more concretely: “it involves three actors: usually a developed
country (or international organization – IO) partnering up with a ‘pivot’ developing country
in order to aid a developing country.”
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal/La politique e´trange`re du Canada 279
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10. For the RCB project, then, PALAMA was the implementing agency in the “pivot” country of
South Africa that worked in partnership with management development institutes (MDIs) from
Rwanda, Burundi and Southern Sudan – the Rwanda Institute for Administration and Manage-
ment (RIAM), E´cole National d’Administration (ENA) and Southern Sudan Capacity Building
Unit (CBU), respectively. It was jointly agreed that the four areas of learning would be project
management, human resource management, financial management, and monitoring and evalu-
ation. By improving the capacities of the lead trainers of the respective MDIs in the three bene-
ficiary countries, PALAMA reinforced the sustainability of the project after its completion
(Muthayan and Pangech 2009). Implementation included methods such as: participatory
approaches on aligning practices and project accountability; a “comprehensive learning cycle
approach” that involves “the indigenization of training and capacity building through South–
South teams of experts working in partnership on developing policy, guidelines, models and
systems for every aspect of the training cycle”; a “learning by doing approach” that incorporated
capacity building into each step of the project; the inclusion of the cross-cutting issues of gender,
disability, HIV/AIDS and the environment; the indigenization of the project, which included
making programs relevant to context by taking into account country strategies, policies and leg-
islative frameworks, the usage and development of local expertise as far as possible, employment
of curricula based on case studies that are relevant to both country and specific sectors, and
encouragement of a high level of stakeholder buy-in; and the convening of donor forums,
annual meetings of donors in a particular country aimed to improve harmonization and align-
ment and avoid duplication and waste of resources (Task Team on South-South Cooperation
2010).
Regarding outcomes, RCB Project Leader Saloshini Muthayan (2010) understood that the
project harnessed the comparative strengths of South–South partnerships, specifically that
“they give expression to existing networks, and to regional policies, agreements, and programs,”
with the RCB project’s particular strength being “that the partnerships are based on mutual trust,
respect, accountability, sharing of information, and equal relations,” relating these factors to
increased empowerment: “independent of donor involvement, the partners jointly defined pro-
blems related to governance and service delivery, conducted needs analyses, and developed an
effective program of interventions.” He specifically complimented CIDA for being “highly sup-
portive of the project’s organic development through strong South–South relations; and its pres-
ence at planning sessions as an unobtrusive participant has bolstered trust among the donor,
PALAMA, and the country MDIs.” Still, challenges include sustaining the commitments of key
stakeholders involved in political and institutional support, as well as maintaining the continued
involvement of project champions and project managers, given that day-to-day managers are
critical to high-quality deliverables.
An assessment by Professor Anne Mc Lennan (2015), on behalf of PALAMA, argued that the
project “is evidence of how effective South–South collaboration can be supported by committed
and flexible North–South cooperation,” with South–South cooperation being based on mutual
support and there being strong fits into country priorities, while the relationship between CIDA
and PALAMA enabled innovation and learning. PALAMA found CIDA to be very flexible by
allowing for the alignment of the project to be implemented under South Africa’s legal frame-
work; however, MDIs perceived that PALAMA “holds the purse as implementing agency” and
that the operational budgets should have been divided equally between them. Overall lessons
learned included the importance of understanding country and institutional contexts, building
partnerships with stakeholders, and the process of leading, planning, reviewing and acting. Mc
Lennan delineated three policy implications: South–South cooperation builds capacity only if
it is based on equal participation and empowered control, with leadership being critical; capacity
development leads to development “only when it is institutionalised – that is, changes power
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11. relations and creates new norms and practices – to produce new behaviours”; and development
effectiveness is about “making things work to the benefits.”
Canada and South Africa could view the RCB project as an exemplary case study for future
development projects and programs. First, the project – notably, ownership throughout the
various stages for Rwanda, Burundi and Southern Sudan – is commensurate with the current
debate over aid effectiveness, which has been ongoing since the Monterrey Consensus in 2002.
The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness focused on making development more sustain-
able, the 2008 Accra Accord was negotiated to implement the Paris Declaration and secure greater
involvement of the South, and the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-oper-
ation document outlined shifting from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness and South–
South cooperation (DBSA 2012, p. 6). South Africa is one of the strongest advocates for the
implementation of the Paris Declaration (Government of Canada 2015), which is a good
signal for the African continent.
Second, the RCB project demonstrates how states and institutions can establish and reinforce
trust among one another. Ongoing interaction and cooperation among all stakeholders as equal
partners fostered learning and working relationships for future professional collaboration.
Muthayan noted that “the key to success of this project has been relationship building” (Task
Team on South–South Cooperation 2010). From South Africa’s perspective, projects such as
the RCB can facilitate the regional relationships that it desires – especially when facing increased
competition from other donors. These relationships can also address the reluctance of some
African countries to consider development cooperation with the so-called regional hegemon,
South Africa.
Third, the triangular development cooperation model used in this case exemplifies the benefit
that equal partnerships have in maximizing efficiency through comparative advantage. As a local
organization based in a country with a shared development experience and similar economic con-
ditions, PALAMA was able to transfer technical expertise and knowledge to RIAM, ENA and CBU
in such a way that lessons could be adapted to the beneficiary countries’ local needs (Fordelone
2011, p. 8). Crucially, CIDA supported the project beyond financing by providing information on
financial and reporting regulations, sharing expertise when requested, and allowing South Africa
and the three beneficiaries to control the project’s direction (Task Team on South-South
Cooperation 2010). Ultimately, each partner was able to contribute to the RCB project by
using his or her corresponding area of expertise.
The successes of this project provides a reason for Canada and other donors to consider enga-
ging in triangular development cooperation projects and programs in the future. There are often
opportunities for donors to build on existing South–South bilateral partnerships and expand
them according to the triangular development cooperation model. Dialogue between donors
and pivotal countries such as South Africa will help identify potential collaboration avenues (For-
delone 2011, p. 9). Once operationalized, SADPA and DIRCO officials can play an important role
in streamlining partnership processes. During the RCB project, donor funds were sent to the
National Treasury, which then channeled them to PALAMA. Since SADPA is expected to
handle outgoing development funds, the National Treasury and SADPA will have to clarify
responsibilities in funding processes during future instances of triangular development
cooperation.
Going forward, DFATD can draw on Canadian expertise to assist South Africa with its new
agency. Although it was amalgamated with Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada to
form DFATD, CIDA existed for more than 40 years, so there are plenty of experiences and
best practices to draw upon within and outside government. For instance, DFATD is currently
playing a similar role in China – it does not provide aid to the Chinese government, but
instead delivers technical expertise to Chinese agencies responsible for the country’s
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12. development, environment and human rights policies (Government of Canada 2012). DFATD’s
time and resources should be focused on what South Africa desires from Canada, not on how
DFATD believes SADPA must be run. For this reason, it can be beneficial for DFATD to build
on existing South–South bilateral development partnerships akin to the PALAMA case.
DFATD is currently not in a position to provide additional funding beyond standing obligations
and commitments, in light of recent budget cuts. DFATD does not have the same large budgetary
space as other countries’ agencies and development departments, such as USAID or DFID. Given
this context, DFATD’s greatest asset that it can provide to SADPA is advice, knowledge and best
practices. With limited resources and activities by other donors, however, a major challenge for
DFATD will be international visibility within Africa and among the BRICS. A proposal for
Canada to adopt a triangular cooperation approach to another BRICS country, Brazil, and
work together as “co-donors” (Farias 2015) is an innovative approach to the model that addresses
the issues of both resources and visibility. There are evidently various applications of the triangu-
lar cooperation models that should certainly be explored.
Providing SADPA with technical expertise can take a number of different forms. DFATD staff
could work with their counterparts in SADPA to provide short- and long-term training in a
number of different areas, which would be of long-term benefit to a nascent agency. In the
context of SADPA and public institutions more generally, effective capacity building means to
“train the locals rather than fly in experts” (Collier 2007, p. 112). This, of course, is relevant
to DFATD, which should ultimately be focused on long-term independence and sustainability.
SADPA can benefit from Canadian expertise, but it cannot rely upon it. Building capacity
means that SADPA staff will be trained and educated to maintain SADPA as effectively and effi-
ciently as possible in the domains of human resource management with an emphasis on inter-
national anti-corruption standards, financial management and process streamlining, and
especially monitoring and evaluation. The latter is an area in which DFATD could carve its
niche, following achievements in improved public-sector performance management through
the widely adapted Canada’s Management Accountability Framework, the development of the
only accredited gender mainstreaming training program for South African public servants and
training on the development of anti-corruption policies and strategies (see Government of
Canada 2015). Developing monitoring and evaluation processes that are specifically attuned to
SADPA’s partnership initiatives could be the most beneficial factor at the agency’s initial stage
that would be able to help it establish legitimacy within Africa and beyond. A formal evaluation
of the PALAMA case in line with African Union and New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD) commitments could be an informative point de de´part.
There is currently no official announcement from the Canadian government on DFATD’s
engagement with SADPA’s establishment, but it appears that cooperation with South Africa
has been considered. The South African High Commission (2011) in Ottawa mentions on its
website that “South Africa has explored avenues for cooperation in capacity-building around
SADPA through a continued engagement with DFATD.” Whether or not this exploration will
lead to a concrete partnership between the two countries remains to be seen. At the very least,
it shows that the South African government thinks highly of Canada’s capability for capacity
building. The setback in the establishment of SADPA is most likely the reason that the Canadian
government has not publicly outlined options for cooperation and partnership. The Canadian
government, given the ongoing consolidation of DFATD, could renew exploration in line with
the finalization of the post-2015 development agenda, particularly goals, targets and indicators
on the means of implementation and global partnership for development, to avoid potential
obstacles, such as the different development philosophies of emerging donors, in boosting sus-
tainable development and its standing in Africa.
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13. Conclusion
An analysis of the application of the triangular cooperation model in the case of South Africa and
SADPA indicates that there is an opportunity for Canada to redefine its development agenda in
the context of a shifting global economic order. DFATD being the first to extend the offer of pro-
viding expertise, knowledge and best practices to SADPA could create the precedent of a partner-
ship with a traditional donor characterized by open dialogue and trust, which could serve as a key
factor in the post-2015 period, when a reinvigorated global partnership is needed to realize mean-
ingful sustainable development outcomes. Despite the divisive politics between many countries at
varying levels of economic development, these countries often advocate for similar principles and
values in development cooperation, such as inclusiveness, transparency and accountability.
Making SADPA not only a reality but a successful reality would go far in accelerating economic
development and eventually bridging the political divides that hold Africa back.
There is little doubt about South Africa’s emergence on the global stage, both economically
and politically. South Africa’s membership in the BRICS not only reflects its emerging power but
also gives the country a greater degree of influence, one that is unique among African countries,
that is on the cusp of being translated into regional benefits with the expected establishment of
SADPA. This article has analyzed South Africa’s participation in the BRICS and its recent – and
related – emergence as a development partner in Africa, highlighting the challenges of being a
recipient of development assistance while attempting to establish yourself as an emerging
donor. With a focus on partnerships instead of solely the distribution of aid, SADPA would
differ from established traditional donors, but institutional capacity would curtail what the fled-
ging agency would be able to do. To support sustainable development in line with the post-2015
development agenda and improve Canada’s standing in Africa in anticipation of running for a
seat on the UN Security Council in 2018, DFATD can provide SADPA with expertise, knowledge
and best practices on institutional resilience and monitoring and evaluation. The PALAMA case
and triangular development cooperation more generally are important models for Canada and
South Africa to consider for future regional development projects and programs. The successful
establishment of SADPA, with its focus on partnerships, would be an important catalyst for
South–South cooperation and the economic growth of African countries, perhaps one day chan-
ging what it means to be a gateway to Africa.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank and acknowledge Tamara Scott, NSI, and Jason McFarlane, NSI Research
Assistant, for their contributions to and assistance on the article.
Notes
1. The objectives of the BRIC group are to strengthen South–South relations, create a platform for dia-
logue and cooperation, and advance restructuring of global governance institutions to more fairly
and equitably represent the needs of emerging economies. The relatively informal group did not formal-
ize laws or policies or establish a secretariat.
2. Qobo and Soko (2011) identify several conflicting policies and interests among BRICS countries: econ-
omic competition between China and India, China’s campaign against India’s bid for permanent mem-
bership in the UN Security Council, China’s historical alliance with Pakistan, and unresolved border
disputes between China and India.
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