2. NATO SCHOOL POLARIS
Special Issue October 2007
2
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POLARIS STAFF
Commandant:
COL James Tabak, USA AF
Dean of Academics:
LTC Gerald Conrad, CAN AF
Editors:
Liliana Serban, ROU Civ
Caterina Pino, ITA Civ
Phillip Cornell, USA Civ
Disclaimer: The NATO School (NSO) is not responsible for the factual validity of the articles covered in
POLARIS. The opinions and analyses expressed in POLARIS are those of the individual authors. Publication
of articles does not constitute approval or endorsement by the NSO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the
Partnership for Peace Program, member states, or partner governments. The NSO respects individual
opinions and protects academic freedom.
3. NATO SCHOOL POLARIS
Special Issue October 2007
3
Editorial
The aim of POLARIS, the NATO School’s
occasional paper series, is to highlight issues
of wider importance to the Alliance both
operational and strategic. In this month’s issue
Stephen Conrad examines one of NATO’s
most nascent and important relationships –
that with China.
By developing its ties with China, NATO is truly
stretching across the globe to engage what
some analysts would warn is a strategic
competitor. But others would point to the
enormous scope for cooperation between the
primary security alliance of the West and the
fastest-growing power in Asia.
Which is it then? Potential competitor or
potential partner? Rapidly militarizing
expansionist power, or rapidly integrating and
peaceful economic co-actor? Do new Chinese
force-projection capabilities signal a move to
challenge the West globally, or to contribute to
global security within cooperative frameworks?
And should the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization be seen as a rival to NATO
reminiscent of the Warsaw Pact, or as a
regional cooperation group with limited security
ambitions?
The answer is likely all of these and none - first
because China’s strategies seem to eschew
such blunt definitions, and second because
those strategies themselves are notoriously
opaque.
Conrad’s analysis pushes into the fog of
Chinese strategy, and describes an emerging
power whose rhetoric and actions are those of
a state bursting into the globalized era.
NATO meanwhile is itself an entity confronting
globalization and fluidity. Redefining its
mandate, its geographical bounds, its
functional role – indeed itself – the Alliance has
been discovering the necessity of global
partnerships. Its push to create a formal
framework to bring in Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and New Zealand failed at the 2006
Riga Summit, but the move brought an
organisation founded in contradistinction to
communism perhaps uncomfortably close to
Beijing.
Fears of encirclement might be justified.
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
troops patrol on China’s western border and
NATO partners lie to the north, east, and
south. Together with a rapidly growing Chinese
military budget, the outcome could look
confrontational and bleak.
Conrad’s conclusions are refreshingly
optimistic however, and point to the many
areas where cooperation is possible and
indeed already a reality. In that light, China’s
growing capabilities, and also NATO’s
expanding Asian partnerships, are welcome
signs of global security cooperation based in
practical competence.
Whether those conclusions prove well founded
or otherwise, I am sure the following piece will
offer enticing food for thought at a moment
when this important relationship is proving
increasingly relevant.
Phillip Cornell
Senior Fellow, NATO School
and October 2007 POLARIS Editor
4. NATO SCHOOL POLARIS
Special Issue October 2007
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NATO and China: An Emerging
Relationship
In the past decade NATO has gone far
beyond the area of operations set out in its
original mandate. Through expansion to 26
states, and the inception of “out of area”
missions such as ISAF in Afghanistan and
disaster relief in Pakistan, it has been
suggested that “with little fanfare – and even
less notice – the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has gone global”1
. The concept
of extra-European contacts is not new - since
1994 a plethora of non-European countries
have collaborated through NATO frameworks
such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and the
Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). Countries even
farther afield are participating alongside NATO
politically or on the ground, if bilaterally and
outside of specific frameworks. Australia, New
Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan
are linked to NATO through their relations with
NATO members, and to various degrees,
through direct dialogue with the NATO
secretariat.2
With increased contacts in the
Asia Pacific region, NATO has arrived at the
door of an upcoming world power - China. As
contact between them manifests around the
world, the effects should be of concern to all
involved.
This paper will seek to provide an
analysis of that contact and its implications by
examining the strategic trajectory of China, as
well as NATO’s own aims and dynamics. The
hope is to provide a clearer picture of the
common future for the two entities, and identify
potential pit falls.
1. Globalized Strategies I: China
1.1. Extending Military Reach
China is growing at an astonishing
pace, both economically and militarily. On a
worldwide scale it ranks second in
conventional arms imports, and first in arms
production employment. China’s publicly
disclosed military budget stands at $45 billion,
and Beijing reports an annual increase of 17.9
percent. But the official budget is in all
likelihood inaccurately low. American
intelligence has pegged the true amount within
1
Daalder, Ivo and Goldgeier, James. “Global NATO”
Foreign Affairs Vol 85 #5 , p. 105
2
Nazemroaya, Mahdi Darius "Global Military Alliance:
Encircling Russia and China" Global Research May 10
th
2007
an estimated range of $85-115 billion.3
These
figures put Chinese military spending behind
only American expenditure even by
conservative estimates, and the funding
acceleration is a testament to China’s desire to
increase but also diversify its military might. 4
Indeed, more telling of this expansion
is where the money is going. Unsurprisingly
given tensions in the Taiwan Straits, China has
“developed and tested offensive missiles,
upgrading and deploying 900 mobile units.”5
But other upgrades include purchasing more
missile destroyers from Russia, building and
testing second generation Jin-class long-range
missile submarines, acquiring new sea to air
missiles, deploying F10 multi-role fighter units,
producing multi-role F11A aircraft, improving
and testing attack helicopters, improving and
increasing deployments of Surface-to-Air
Missile (SAM) missile batteries, and
purchasing more artillery pieces, Armoured
Personnel Carrier (APC)’s and Amphibious
Assault Vehicle (AAV)’s.6
It is revealing however that most of the
Chinese budget increase is going to naval
expansion. Those acquisitions support two
pillars of Chinese strategy as outlined by the
US Department of Defense: the old desire to
reclaim Taiwan, but also a more contemporary
focus on regional contingencies, such as
conflicts that disrupt oil flow.7
An emphasis on
force projection at distance reinforces China’s
increasingly global presence and underscores
its evolving strategy away from a singular focus
on Taiwan and the immediate neighbourhood.
1.2. Developing Global Relationships
China’s economic rise and more global
presence are not necessarily indicative of
confrontation, however. Beijing is also seeking
to enhance links with the various nations which
comprise NATO and its partners, including
active relations with the European Union (EU)
and security cooperation with its Central Asian
neighbours.
3
Department of Defense “Annual Report to Congress:
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, p.
25
4
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil_exp_dol_fig-
military-expenditures-dollar-figure
5
Supra note 3, p. 3
6
Ibid , p. 3-5
7
Department of Defense “Annual Report to Congress:
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007”,
and Dickie and Fidler, “Dragon Fleet” Financial Times,
June 12 2007
5. NATO SCHOOL POLARIS
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1.2.1 China and the European Union
The EU is a preferred East-West
economic link for China partly because it
sidesteps direct engagement with Washington.
China has used its partnership with the
EU to chase two notable security pursuits -
lifting a longstanding arms embargo and
promoting the ‘one China’ policy. It nearly
succeeded in achieving the former in 2005,
due largely to French and German support. In
the end, wider EU uncertainty and strong
opposition from the United States grounded the
lift. EU states ultimately predicated a policy
shift on improving the “atmosphere for lift,
[including] making progress on China’s human
rights situation; working to improve cross-strait
relations; and by improving the transparency of
its military expenditure”.8
With regard to the ‘one China’ policy,
the EU relationship has borne more fruit for
Beijing. It successfully persuaded France to
block an arms delivery to Taiwan, and in
barring the Taiwanese president from visiting
the European Parliament in 2003.9
European proponents of a stronger
China relationship cite its growing economic
importance and global presence. Wise
commentators urge caution though, particularly
given China’s aims, ambition, strategy and
structure. Jonathan Holsag states that
“Europe’s soft hearted attempt to create a like-
minded partner turns out to be unsuccessful”,
and suggests that although economic change
is moving in the right direction, the EU is
patently over-optimistic with regard to China’s
democratic and human rights progresses.10
1.2.1. The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization
For its part, China has been nurturing
its own flagship international grouping, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
The SCO is currently undergoing a “building
phase”, eschewing expansion while accepting
observer nations such as Iran. The SCO’s
purpose, according to Chinese and Russian
officials, is to promote economic and collective
security. However the group also declared that
8
Commision of the European Communities
“Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament EU-China: Closer partners,
growing responsibilities ” 2007
9
Holsag, Jonathan “The European Union and China: The
Great Disillusion”, European Foreign Affairs Review 11; p.
555-580
10
Holsag, Jonathan “The European Union and China: The
Great Disillusion”, European Foreign Affairs Review 11; p.
555-580
different models of social development should
not be exported or used as a pretext to
interfere in the internal affairs of other
countries. The statements were widely
interpreted to mean, ‘We don’t want your
democracy here’.11
While such rhetoric would seem
incompatible with NATO values, the Alliance
appears unconcerned. Secretary General Jaap
de Hoop Scheffer declared; “We have made
clear that we see no conflict or competition
between our Partners' cooperation with NATO
and their membership in the SCO.”12
Despite NATO’s downplay, the SCO
undoubtedly presents at least the potential for
rivalry. The group’s first military exercises,
“Peace Mission 2007”, took place in Russia in
August, and were used as a venue for
Moscow’s announcement that it would
reinstate Cold War-style bomber patrols.
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang praised the
SCO talks surrounding the exercises for
upgrading Sino-Russian strategic cooperation.
And a flurry of media reports, including one
penned by the vice president of the Chinese
Institute of Contemporary International
Relations, spoke of a “rekindled Cold War
mentality” and equated NATO expansion with
American hegemony.13
In the end, the SCO is
in its infancy and Sino-Russian interests which
drive the organisation are far from aligned. But
its growing importance highlights the new
relevance of alternative multilateral security
frameworks to NATO.
1.3. Opaque Intentions
Chinese officials have perhaps
unsurprisingly denounced more accusatory
Western analyses, especially regarding its
military expenditure boost and claims of
insufficient budgetary transparency. Referring
to the annual “China Report”, China’s Foreign
Minister stated that “The report of the USA
Department of Defence continues to spread
myth of the ‘China threat’ by exaggerating
China’s military strength and expenses out of
ulterior motives. It is a grave violation of the
norms governing international relations and
brutal interference in China’s internal affairs.”14
And to allay such criticisms Beijing has
11
Petrou, Michael “Is this a rival to NATO?” Maclean's,
Vol. 119, Iss. 31; p. 33
12
,Zhang Niansheng, ”“NATO not pushing into Asia-Pacific
region: Interview” Peoples Daily China, November 27 2006
13
Mengzi, Fu. “ “ China Daily
14
“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Remarks on
the USA DoD Report on Chinese Military Power” 28 May
2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of
China
6. NATO SCHOOL POLARIS
Special Issue October 2007
6
released a series of Defence White Papers in
recent years outlining its military policies and
budget.
But China’s attempts to improve
transparency still omit significant elements,
according to the China Report. Particularly, it
“does not publish an equivalent to the US
National Military Strategy. Outside observers
therefore have few direct insights into the
leadership’s thinking.”15
The implication is that
such strategic secrecy is part of a purposeful
misinformation strategy. Indeed, the idea is
openly espoused in Deng Xiaoping’s 24
character strategy. “Observe calmly; secure
our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our
capacities and bide our time; be good at
maintaining a low profile; and never claim
leadership.”16
Deng’s famous words are
considered to be guiding elements of China’s
modernization; as such they still constitute core
principles in China which presumably pervade
strategic policy.17
In addition to intentional secrecy,
China applies supposedly ‘core’ foreign policy
values inconsistently. That of non-interference
is a classic example; “No country is entitled to
impose its own will upon others, or maintain its
security and development at the price of the
interests of others.”18
While Chinese officials
use the concept to reject external meddling,
they appear to ignore it abroad (particularly
with regard to Japanese education policy). 19
But mixed messages, misinformation,
and secrecy in Chinese policy cannot
necessarily be construed as intentional
strategy. In some cases the government is
simply unaware of goings on within its own
branches. When an American spy plane was
captured in 2001, “Military authorities on
Hainan Island, where the EP-3 was forced to
land, did not provide full or accurate details of
the incident to Beijing - especially not to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”20
More recently,
following the test firing of an anti satellite
15
Supra note 3 page 11
16
Supra note 3 page 7
17
Wacker, Gudrun. “China’s Grand Strategy” China’s Rise:
The Return of Geopolitics? SWP-Berlin, February 2006
http://www.boell.de/downloads_uk/chinas_grand_strategy.
pdf
18
China White Paper: China’s peaceful development road,
Sect V, Information Office of the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, 12 December 2005
19
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t143120.htm
“It is an interference of China's internal affairs and we are
resolutely opposed to it.” Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s
press conference on July 13 2004, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Peoples Republic of China, Zhang Qiyue
20
Kleiber, Martin and Gill, Bates “China's Space Odyssey:
What the Antisatellite Test Reveals About Decision-Making
in Beijing” Foreign Affairs Vol. 86, Iss. 3; pg. 2
missile, “officials from the United States and
around the world concluded that the leaders of
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not
been informed of - much less consulted about -
it in advance.”21
Bates Gill and Martin Kleiber
attribute such incidents to China’s particular
political culture. “Chinese bureaucrats tend to
hoard information to ensure that rivals cannot
manipulate it to their advantage. Although this
dynamic is found in all bureaucracies, the
current Chinese system takes it to an extreme.”
22
Whether the causes are strategic,
structural, cultural, or bureaucratic, China has
proven itself to be often unpredictable and
contradictory - two dangerous qualities in the
contemporary global context. As stated in the
May 2007 China Report, “this lack of
transparency in China's military affairs will
naturally and understandably prompt
international responses that hedge against the
unknown.” Another product is the wide variety
of external strategic evaluations which impedes
international unity of approach. When the EU
was debating lifting the arms embargo, a
stunned Washington objected immediately and
threatened to curb the “transfer of advanced
national defence technologies to EU
members.”23
Such public intra-Alliance conflict
demonstrates a level of disunity which can
seriously undermine any combined security
approach to China.
2. Globalized Strategies II: NATO
NATO’s contemporary strategy, as
outlined in its 1999 Strategic Concept, is rooted
in a recognition of the changed ‘threats cape’ in
the post-Cold War world. Its survival is a
testament to its adaptability in today’s altered
and more fluid strategic environment.
2.1. Wider Mandate
The changing mandate of NATO is
central to its current trajectory. It has altered
the space considered “mission viable”,
expanding beyond its own Euro-Atlantic
borders, and also branched out into other
functional areas. Specifically, “NATO has
already broadened its vision of cooperation
with countries both inside and outside of
Europe and modified its Strategic Concept in
such a way as to include issues other than
21
ibid
22
ibid
23
USA thwarts EU lifting arms ban on China Updated:
October 18 2004 China Daily
7. NATO SCHOOL POLARIS
Special Issue October 2007
7
simply military affairs.”24
In practical terms, the
Alliance has conducted relief operations in
Southeast Asia, Pakistan, and the Gulf Coast,
in addition to mission support in Darfur and its
main stabilisation operation in Afghanistan.
Indeed, NATO today considers itself
an alliance to deal with global security threats
to its member nations. As de Hoop Scheffer
has stated, “Today’s security threats are global
in nature. Hence a narrow, regional approach
will not do.”25
2.3. Partnerships
An expanding mandate has naturally
been complimented with growing partnerships
through NATO’s various frameworks and
bilateral relationships.
However the nature and intensity of
those partnerships was a hotly contested topic
at the last NATO summit in Riga. Washington
was pushing its proposal for a global
partnership scheme that would have placed
such countries as Japan, Australia, and South
Korea into an official framework with NATO.
The idea was rejected at the summit, due
largely to French, German, and even outside
Russian opposition. Moscow’s concern
stemmed from traditional encirclement fears,
and Germany is traditionally reluctant to
militarize global issues. But France was most
vocal, expressing concern that the American
influence in NATO is too large, and opposition
to a global role in which NATO establishes
special partnerships with Australia, New
Zealand, Japan and other countries. Paris
worried that NATO's global ambition,
particularly in East Asia, could produce friction
with China.26
The Secretary General also
voiced opinions against the initiative, stating
that “…these threats do not require NATO to
become the world's policeman.”27
In the end
member nations agreed to “fully develop the
political and practical potential of NATO’s
cooperation programmes” including “its
relations with contact countries, in accordance
with the decisions of our Istanbul summit.”28
Translation: stay the course on ‘small-P’
partnerships.
France’s comments demonstrate the
role of the ‘China factor’ in the partnership
24
Zhang, Zuqian “Bejing Calling” NATO Review, Issue 3
25
Global NATO? Remarks by Secretary General, Jaap the
Hoop Scheffer, Speech 29 October 2004
26
Nye, Joseph “NATO after Riga” Taipei Times, 12
December 2006
27
“On road to Riga, NATO leader rejects idea of making
Alliance global” Inside the Pentagon Vol. 22 No. 45
28
Riga Summit Declaration, 29 2006
scheme’s rejection. While China has not
publicly taken a position against NATO-Asia
Pacific relations of late, it has in the past been
extremely critical of a NATO presence in the
region. NATO’s Secretary General was
reacting to such fears in the run-up to Riga,
when he stated that “NATO is not pushing into
Asia or the Pacific region… The Alliance very
much welcomes [regional partnerships], just as
it would welcome closer contacts with China.”29
3. Thawing China-NATO Relations
Distrust between the entities should
not come as a surprise. What existed of China-
NATO relations in the past was often abysmal.
The key contemporary aggravate was NATO’s
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
during the 1999 Kosovo campaign. Resolute
government denunciations and large scale
protests at the United States Embassy in
Beijing demonstrated the intensity of China’s
outrage over the issue.30
“Purposeful
targeting” remains China’s preferred
explanation, as a Foreign Ministry
spokesperson recently confirmed at a press
conference. “The conclusion was already
drawn eight years ago. We have been very
clear about our position on this issue. The so-
called ‘accident’ theory is untenable and
unacceptable.”31
Rhetoric at the time even
declared that the government would “wage a
forceful and resolute struggle against the acts
of infringements on China’s sovereignty
perpetrated by the USA-led NATO.”32
Suspicion over the Belgrade bombing
was driven by a wider and established distrust
of NATO’s purpose. According to a NATO
Parliamentary Assembly (PA) report, “The
Chinese once saw NATO as an aggressive
and dangerous power. NATO enlargement was
understood as part of a global American
containment strategy.”33
Today concerns about NATO persist
among Chinese analysts, but their expression
is notably tempered. During a NATO PA visit
“one Chinese professor suggested that there
29
Supra note 12
30
MacKinnon, Rebecca “Up to 20,000 Chinese protest
Embassy bombing” CNN May 9 1999
31
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular
Press Conference on 29 May 2007, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Peoples Republic of China
32
Jiaxuan, Tang “China’s Diplomatic Policy and Foreign
Relations” Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People’s Republic
of China, 24 November 2003
33
NATO PA, Summary of the meeting of the economics
and Security committee 28 May 2005
8. NATO SCHOOL POLARIS
Special Issue October 2007
8
were many views, but that, in general terms,
China had some concerns about NATO's
presence in Central Asia.”34
Chinese state
media euphemistically claim only that “Chinese
readers are… concerned about NATO's
involvement in [the] Asia and Pacific region.”35
Such commentary is a far cry from the harsh
criticism levelled against NATO in the past, and
even these tempered concerns hint at a
palpable improvement in perceptions.
More importantly, official positions
have also warmed. In response to a question
on Japan-NATO relations, a Chinese official
stated, “I am not in a position to comment on
the exchanges between Japan and NATO. But
we hope the relevant exchanges are conducive
to regional peace and stability.”36
And more
recently another official stated that, “Under the
current new circumstances, we stand ready to
work with NATO on the basis of equality and
mutual respect and maintain our contact and
enhance our exchanges with NATO. It would
be helpful in enhancing our mutual
understanding and for the peace and stability
in the region and the world at large.”37
For the most part, such “work with
NATO” has amounted to Chinese cooperation
on a dialogue basis only, but the engagement
is significant. Chinese and NATO officials have
participated jointly in a wide variety of each
other’s events, conferences, and seminars.
This is in addition to a flurry of comments
between NATO and Chinese officials, and
statements on either side expressing a strong
willingness for further co-operation. And in
June, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for
Political Affairs was welcomed in Beijing for the
first high-level direct talks.
The thaw in China-NATO relations is
the result of several factors. For one, China
has modernized its foreign policy in line with its
integration into the global economy, including
stepped-up engagement with international
organizations and regional bodies. Leadership
changes also brought in a younger generation
of Chinese government officials generally more
keen to engage the West constructively. And
from its side, NATO’s history of the past
34
NATO Parliamentary association “23-27 October 2006 –
Visit to Beijing and Ningxia Hui autonomos region, Peoples
Republic of China by the Sub-committee on Transatlantic
Economic Relations
35
Supra note 12
36
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao's Regular
Press Conference on 16 January 2007, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for the People’s Republic of China
37
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular
Press Conference on 24 May 2007, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for the People’s Republic of China
decade has brought about internal shifts, and
schisms within the West over issues like Iraq
have helped to debunk the view that NATO is a
tool for American hegemony.
4. China-NATO possible futures
While significant sources of potential
friction remain in the NATO-China dialogue,
areas of aligned interests and increasing room
for cooperation suggest that efforts toward
partnership will outweigh such detractions.
4.1. Global Events: Pushing Together,
Pulling Apart
4.1.1. Darfur
Darfur poses one ongoing point of
friction. While NATO assists the African Union/
United Nations (AU/UN) peacekeeping and
stabilization force there, China is actively
supporting through arms sales and financial
transfers a government in Khartoum complicit
in the atrocities in western Sudan. It is
estimated that China supplies nearly all the
AK-47’s used in Darfur.38
In addition to small
arms, “China has sold Sudan $100 million
worth of Shenyang fighter planes, including 12
supersonic F-7 jets.”39
That China is courting
Khartoum for its oil while the West condemns
the government’s actions in Darfur is a clear
case of conflicting interests which undermine
NATO efforts.
4.1.2. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Another friction point is over possible
contention between NATO and the China-led
SCO. Some analysts have already begun to
question the SCO and its possibility to become
a “rival NATO”, with such commentary
multiplying since the military exercises in
August.40
While the SCO does not currently
constitute much of a power bloc, the
convergence of China, Russia, and Iran (as an
observer) brings together major international
players with high growth in terms of both
economic and military capacities. The potential
for rivalry is reinforced by the recent national
policies of all three – individually each has a
strained relationship with the West. Collectively
those strains could well be more difficult to
38
Kristof, Nicholas D. “A Choice For Darfur; [Op-Ed]” New
York Times, 25 May 2007
39
The Statesman (India), India loses out to China in arms
sales, 5 November 2006
40
Supra note 11
9. NATO SCHOOL POLARIS
Special Issue October 2007
9
overcome, and the SCO’s prophesized rivalry
could prove self-fulfilling if it becomes a
magnet for those harbouring gripes with the
West.
4.1.3. Afghanistan
Elsewhere though, events point to the
potential for concrete cooperation. China,
which shares a small border with the Afghani
province of Badakhshan, is implementing
initiatives to improve infrastructure there. The
province currently relies on income derived
from its poppy crop. While poppy eradication is
not the responsibility of ISAF, diversifying the
economy away from narcotics is one of the
elements of NATO reconstruction efforts.
China is also concerned about poppy
production, with an official statement declaring
that “China is also willing to offer anti-drug law-
enforcement training for neighbouring
countries.”41
Badakhshan represents a major area
of potential co-operation between NATO and
China, with benefits for both. While Chinese
support to building roads and bridges is likely
driven by the intent to access the province’s
mineral reserves of lapis lazuli, ruby, and
emerald, diversifying the economy and
improving infrastructure helps to achieve the
regional stability sought by both China and
NATO. Cooperation in the region should start
with security; with ISAF accommodating
China’s rebuilding efforts by providing the
necessary protection for Chinese personnel.42
4.1.4. Terrorism
Indeed China and NATO have shared
interests in combating sources of transnational
instability the world over. Within its own
borders China has always kept a watchful eye
(and sometimes suppressive hand) on its own
Muslim minority, fearing the emergence of
Islamist and separatist ideologies. As terrorism
rose to the top of the Western agenda after 11
September 2001, what was once decried as
Chinese repression became a source of anti-
terrorism cooperation with the West. This
includes the United States State Department’s
classification of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic
Movement (a separatist group in Xinjiang
province) as a terrorist organization.43
Such
declarations led to further co-operation - the
41
“China promises further international cooperation on
drug control” Peoples Daily, 26 May 2007
42
“Unknown Militants attack Chinese construction camp in
Afghanistan” Xinhua net 12 May 2006
43
Supra note 22
FBI works with Chinese public security officials
to track the role of such groups in China’s
northwest in terrorist activities and their
possible links with al Qaeda.44
Eager to assert internal control while
improving ties with the West, senior officials in
Beijing boast that “China is putting anti-
terrorism at the top of its agenda to ensure
national and social public security.”45
With this
increased awareness of threats “China would
be better off integrating itself into the
international security system in such a way that
it comes to enjoy common security together
with other members of the international
community.”46
While such examples of anti-terror
cooperation are primarily with Washington on a
bilateral basis, terrorism (particularly in the
vicinity of Afghanistan) remains a problem with
which all NATO allies must grapple.
4.2. A Co-operative Future
Given current trends, NATO and China
are likely to see a greater convergence of
goals over time and an expanded remit for
cooperation. Although the possibility remains
for a classic realist great-power confrontation
(particularly over the dangerous issue of
Taiwan), it becomes ever slimmer as economic
forces and unconventional security threats
gather strength.
Those convergent economic and
security interests have helped to foster
improved political relations in recent years,
adding to the cost of a potential military
confrontation. Indeed China has worked hard
to improve its image globally. And unlike during
the days of Tiananmen, that image now has an
economic impact which goes far beyond
damaged sensibilities. As much as
confrontation could impact negatively,
international security cooperation in fact
reinforces China’s image as a reliable partner.
One analyst assesses that over the past
several years, China’s “international image has
clearly improved as the country has committed
more resources to international security.”47
With that in mind, it is unlikely that China will
take drastic moves to confront the West.
44
Xuequan, Mu “FBI hails U.S. – China terrorism co-op”,
Xinhua net, 13 June 2007
45
Xiaodan, Du “China holds anti-terrorist exercise for 2008
Olympics” CCTV 20 June 2007
46
Supra note 22
47
Supra note 22
10. NATO SCHOOL POLARIS
Special Issue October 2007
10
Economic interests also nurture the
Chinese interest in global stability. One
Chinese official has admitted that “unless the
world as a whole enjoys peace, stability and
prosperity, China cannot, for example, expect
to meet the ambitious targets of its economic
development programme.”48
Beijing is thus
increasingly compelled to join international
efforts to mitigate instability – for example by
committing to UN peacekeeping efforts in
greater numbers than ever before. To the
extent that cooperation with NATO helps to
achieve those aims (for instance through
dialogue or by enabling better joint operation),
China will in the future be more prepared to
engage with the organisation.
4.2.1. Overcoming Differences
In Sudan, China is supporting
Khartoum in order to guarantee access to
energy resources. China has broadly worked to
shield Sudan from attempts by the international
community to pressure it through sanctions,
and was sympathetic to Khartoum’s efforts to
keep a UN peacekeeping force out (prompting
some Western calls to boycott the 2008
Olympics). In the end however, the negotiated
26,000 troop “hybrid” AU-UN force is symbolic
of overlapping interest – and indeed China has
pledged to send its own troops to support the
mission. Such pragmatism should be a model
for future areas of friction.
China’s military expansion is not in
itself an impediment to strong strategic
cooperation with the West and particularly
NATO. Indeed, the reverse could be true.
Enhancing Chinese capabilities at a time when
it seeks to become more involved in
international stabilisation efforts could facilitate
burden-sharing to a new degree. China’s minor
‘reconstruction’ role in Afghanistan, and
participation in various UN missions, could
herald a new era of Chinese contribution to
stabilization, reconstruction, and peacekeeping
efforts.
48
Supra note 22
As China begins to take an active role
even further into the realm of international
affairs, it too will continue to change. Greater
international engagement will raise the return
on transparency across the board, and
encourage the kind of global security
cooperation which NATO increasingly
represents.
5. Conclusion
To ensure the continuation of such
trends, the key for NATO is to recognise that
the emergence of non-traditional transnational
threats puts every country, regardless of
governing ideology, in a position to contribute
to mitigating shared threats. China’s
capabilities enhancements certainly merit close
monitoring, but developing China as a capable
partner rather than upcoming adversary is
widely beneficial. The key for China is realising
that NATO is an organisation it can work with
and which is open to genuine cooperation - not
some American Trojan horse. More and more,
cooperation serves Chinese interests;
particularly as economic integration brings
them increasingly into line with those of the
West.
If NATO and China can build on recent
work and develop a more cooperative and
mutually positive relationship including formal
ties, it could see benefits for the organisation,
for Western countries, for China, and indeed
for the entire global security environment.
