1. Gregory of Nyssa: Grace, the Pursuit of Perfection and Self
Transformation
By Scott W. Hodgman
I. Introduction
In this essay, I wish to reflect systematically on Christian spirituality using the categories
of grace and freedom. Further, this reflection will examine how grace and freedom form a unity
of power and will in human nature over and against it’s normally divided self. I will argue that
this integrated self constitutes the transcendent Otherness of Christian spirituality when it
achieves its end: the restoration of its likeness to God through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit.
However, Christian spirituality is a broad term. For this reason this essay requires qualifications
if it is to achieve its end; thus, I will limit my treatment of Christian spirituality to that articulated
by Saint Gregory of Nyssa. Moreover, I intend to use Saint Augustine’s notion of grace as a
contrast to Gregory so that his fascinating thought comes more clearly to the surface. First, I will
develop Gregory’s definition of Christian spirituality (Section III). This definition provides a
backdrop to my examination of his thoughts on grace, specifically as the starting point of
Christian spirituality. Following this, I will detail how grace is understood to operate in a person’s
life such that the life affected becomes decisively an expression of Christian spirituality (Section
IV). Finally, I will examine divine unity as Gregory understands it and use this as the referent for
the transcendent Otherness for which Christian spirituality hopes (Section V). But, before this I
will position this study in relation to Saint Augustine whose thought overshadows Western
theological reflection (Section II). This value lays less in the opposition of an “Eastern” and
“Western” patristic theologian, one against the other; this value lies in the fact that these
theologians are loved and often claimed by contemporary Eastern and Western theological
traditions. In this way, the juxtaposition of Gregory and Augustine presents a unique opportunity
in comparison that furthers this systematic reflection on Christian spirituality.
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2. II. Augustine and a Theology of Grace
At this point a brief outline of Augustine’s notion of grace and its relationship to the life of
the Christian is beneficial as a contrast to Gregory’s spirituality. Augustine, a younger
contemporary of Gregory, was instrumental in the Latin speaking Christian West in defining an
idea of grace and its effect on Christian spirituality. More importantly, Augustine’s thought in this
area—his theology of grace—significantly informs Western theological traditions and provides a
foil for Gregory’s own thought. Augustine’s model in On Grace and Free Will can be summed up
as follows: grace brings faith and faith leads to good works. Salvation then follows upon the life
of faith and good works where God’s grace alone is responsible for good works. Specific to the1
interests of this essay, in Chapter XXXIII, Augustine sums up grace as the starting point with:
Forasmuch as in the beginning He works in us that we may have
the will, and in perfecting works with us when we have the
will….He operates, therefore, without us, in order that we may will;
but when we will, and so will that we may act, He co-operates with
us. We can, however, ourselves do nothing to effect good works of
piety without Him either working that we may will, or co-working
when we will.2
In this brief passage, Augustine emphasizes that grace predicates the performance of every
good act. Further, Augustine insists that it is grace entirely. It is grace in the beginning, it is
grace assisting in between, and it is grace at the end delivering eternal life. God gratuitously
bestows grace on whom God wills. Nothing done by humanity can prompt God to bestow this
grace. There is human free will, but it is entirely in God’s hands co-operating with God’s grace.
As contemporaries of each other, Gregory and Augustine were surprisingly similar in
their models of the Christian life, grace, and free will. It is because they are similar that their
differences are significant. At this point, Augustine’s views on original sin draws our attention. In
Granted, this characterization is a simplification of Augustine’s complex theology of grace; however, this1
is not necessarily a reductionistic move. There is development over time in Augustine’s thought and
theology of grace, e.g., the change in emphasis from On the Spirit and the Letter to the paradigm
Augustine expounds in On Grace and Free Will. However, his theology of grace matures into a stable
paradigm reflected by his later writings. This paradigm follows On Grace and Free Will’s formula that
grace brings faith, and faith brings salvation and good works are the actualization of grace in the
Christian’s life.
Augustine, On Grace and Free Will, vol. 5, Nicene and Post Nicene Father, Series 1 (New York:2
Christian Literature Publishing, 1886), 458.
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3. his Confessions, he makes clear just how powerless humanity is without grace. In his own
words, “I was held fast, not in fetters clamped upon me by another but my own will….The
enemy held my will in his power and from it he had made a chain and shackled me.”3
Augustine’s will, by his own account, was ineffectual and powerless and this is the effect of
original sin on all humanity. Compare to Anthony Meredith’s observation on the Cappadocian
Fathers:
Although Gregory believes that the effects of the primal sin were
serious in terms of loss of bodily integrity and mental clarity,
nevertheless he takes a less dark view of the human condition
than does St Augustine. The aim of the Christian life is moral
perfection [ontological transformation], considered above all as
likeness to God, who, as in The Life of Moses, is himself regarded
not simply as virtuous but as virtue.4
While we will have further cause to return to this quotation, for now it is important to note the
difference in opinion regarding the effect the fall had on humanity. In Augustine’s thought,
humans are totally and completely corrupted; their nature is fallen and this substantially is
original sin. In Gregory’s thought, the primal fall while marring human nature does not penetrate
its essence—an essence that bears the image of God. This image may be darkened but it is still
there, and the integrity of the living image plays an important role for Gregory. Having sketched
Augustine’s model, I now turn to Gregory’s definition of the Christian life and his use of grace as
its starting point.
III. Gregory on the Christian Pursuit of Perfection
Gregory’s basic definition of the Christian life is the pursuit of perfection in virtue.5
Unpacking this definition begins with understanding Gregory’s meaning behind “pursuit.” Pursuit
is an important word in his definition, for Gregory sees Christian spirituality progressing ever
forward with no end. Gregory justifies this continuous progression in the first instance by quoting
the apostle Paul. He notes that Paul, great in understanding as he was, never ceased straining
Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1961), 164.3
Anthony Meredith, The Cappadocians (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995; reprint,4
Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2000), 81(page citations are to the reprint edition).
Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, trans. Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett Ferguson (New York:5
Paulist Press, 1978), 27.
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4. toward those things that are still to come. Paul was ever running the course of virtue in
Gregory’s mind. Gregory characteristically employs two means for elucidating this point:6
supporting his thought with scripture as well as using his Platonic heritage as a secondary
means for elucidating his point. In this instance he notes that the opposite of something is7
usually found at the boundary where one thing ends and another begins. In this conception,
opposite of good is where good ends and evil begins, as life is limited by death and light by
darkness. This way of thinking, applied to the idea of continuous progression produced in
Gregory the notion, “stopping in the race of virtue marks the beginning of the race of evil,” and8
the antithesis of the Christian spirituality.
Next let us consider Gregory’s conception of perfection. Perfection is the pursuit of the
Good as opposed to evil. Simply put, the aim of the Christian spirituality is to become like God,
according to Gregory. For Gregory, pursuit of the likeness of God is scripturally commanded:9
“Therefore be perfect, just as your heavenly father is perfect” (Mathew 5:48). This likening to
God, in Gregory’s thought, is the pursuit of the ultimate Good over the lesser goods of this
world. It was the pursuit of Beauty itself, over what is beautiful. Here, we see Gregory anchoring
his reasoning in Platonic thought—the pursuit of Beauty itself is the pursuit of God. But Gregory
also sees God as infinite. God’s divine and infinite nature sets the terms for Christian spirituality
with its theme of continuous progression as well. There being no boundary to God, no limit or
point where God ends, there can be neither boundary nor end to the pursuit of God. Yet this is
no Stoic philosophy, for Gregory argues that, though the goal might be unattainable it is
nonetheless good to strive for those things which were good by nature. “Even if men of
Ibid, 30.6
Gregory employs philosophy and the sciences contemporaneous with his time to articulate some sort of7
understanding of God, God’s relation to the world, and of his activity within the world and within humanity.
Gregory’s employment of philosophical categories in the service of biblical exegesis—perfected in the
contemplative experience of God and consequently expressed in apophatic language such as seeing in
the dark or grasping the ungraspable—is a characteristic feature of his theology that requires constant
attention. Otherwise, the reader can easily fall into the pseudo-disjunction theology versus spirituality and
claim Gregory’s thought is nothing other than intellectual acrobatics lacking a firm foundation in the bible;
or dismiss Gregory as a Christian theologian eliding the question of who is this God because Gregory
employs philosophical concepts in a daring and speculative way.
Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, 30.8
Anthony Meredith, The Cappadocians, 82.9
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5. understanding were not able to attain to everything, by attaining even a part they could yet
attain a great deal.”10
The third component in Gregory’s conception of Christian spirituality is virtue. The word
virtue occurs about a hundred times in Gregory’s main work on the Christian life, the Life of
Moses. In the Life of Moses, Gregory expresses the Christian aim as the pursuit of the likeness
of God, and for Gregory this is achieved by the virtuous life. Gregory is convinced that11
Christian excellence is ethical as well as mystical, active as well as contemplative, more
progression than achievement. It requires constantly straining forward toward an ever receding
goal. In this way, moral progress, which in Gregory’s thought is both “preparation for and a12
response to enlightenment, can never be arrested.” Ethical living (purification) and spiritual13
knowing (illumination), especially as a faith response, define Christian spirituality. Spiritual
knowledge is a product of grace and synergy—a result of spiritual progression. In Gregory’s
thought, constant pursuit in faith defines the Christian just as much as the knowledge bestowed
by such a pursuit. “The aim of Christian spirituality is moral perfection that entails ontological
transformation, and considered above all as likeness to God, who…is himself regarded not
simply as virtuous but as virtue.” Because God is both knowledge and virtue the Christian life14
must participate in God and for Gregory this is the perfect life in virtue. Moral, contemplative,
and ascetic living are all deeply interrelated in Gregory’s thought on Christian spirituality. The15
Christian life is precisely the pursuit of perfection; with perfection radically redefined as a
constant growth in goodness. Now the question arises, what precipitated this in the first place?
How could something so great be achieved among humanity tainted by the primal fall? We now
turn to grace in Gregory’s thought to answer this question.
Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, 31.10
Anthony Meredith, The Cappadocians, 60.11
Ibid, 69.12
Ibid, 75.13
Ibid, 81.14
Ibid, 61.15
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6. IV. Grace as the Starting Point
Gregory, like Augustine, envisioned grace filling a person’s life. This grace then
transforms that life into a Christian life and its lifelong pursuit of perfection in virtue. To
understand the role of grace and its effect on humanity, it is first necessary to trace a series of
ideas Gregory offers about humanity. Gregory’s first conception was that humanity has an
inherent tendency to rise towards God and perfection. But humanity can not rise unassisted
even though this natural tendency to do so exists. He accounts for this inability to rise with the
effect of the primal fall. This effect, in essence, dooms humanity’s noetic mind with a grasping
nature that binds it to the sensible world. Instead of contemplating God as is its natural
inclination, it desires sensible objects and pleasures over the Good. For Gregory, overcoming
the noetic mind’s grasping nature is the starting point of Christian spirituality. This precisely
defines the purpose of grace according to him. Grace converts the noetic mind from grasping
sensible objects; and, in its freedom the noetic mind then takes flight in its natural ascent to
God. Therefore grace is the first component of Christian spirituality even though the inclination
to God is pre-existent in humanity.
Gregory conceives then that an inherent tendency to rise towards God abides in
humanity and Martin Laird traces this in his book, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith:
“Given appropriate ascetic training, there is in the mind an upward orientation, a dynamic
capacity to ascend.” Freed from its involvement in the senses, it would seek out something16
“other” to contemplate and grasp. In fact, Laird’s survey indicates that the impulse to grasp hold
of objects is an inherent function of the noetic mind and something natural to humanity, in
Gregory’s thought. In its highest form this grasping nature seeks after God, while in its baser
form it seeks the pleasures of the world. So, for Gregory, the human impulses or passions are
not to be extinguished but purified so that the natural tendency to ascend is given wings to fly.17
Further understanding of this natural tendency to ascend is found in Anthony Meredith’s book,
The Cappadocians. Here he notes that underlying and enabling humanity’s upward movement
Martin Laird, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 43.16
Ibid, 59.17
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7. is the desire to behold ultimate beauty. Gregory assumes desire is at the root of human craving
for God. Further, for Gregory the power and tendency of the created spirit to mount upwards to18
its creator and source derives from the fact that it was created by God, like God and for God.19
This sentiment is echoed by Augustine’s Confessions, “You have made us for Yourself, and our
hearts are restless until they rest in you.” Nonetheless, Augustine considers most desires20
carnal and worldly as his Confessions attest. “For my will was perverse, and lust had grown
from it, and when I gave in to lust habit was born, and when I did not resist habit it became a
necessity.” This characterizes rather strikingly Augustine’s view on human desire and will.21
Original sin debases will so that lust is its only desire, and this lust necessitates carnal
indulgence and worldly depravation. Even so, Augustine maintains some sense of human desire
for God (as a function of grace) in tension with the depravity he attributes to human will and this
corresponds, albeit dimly, with Gregory’s vision of desire.
But this should not be confused with grace, for although Gregory agreed with Augustine
in that, “to those who think that the grace which he commends and faith in Christ receives, is
nature, the same language is with the same degree of truth applicable: if righteousness comes
from nature, then Christ is dead in vain.” The tendency to ascend, Gregory asserts, constitutes22
human nature and not a supernatural grace of God. Here we find a contrast with Augustine who
believed the Christian will and its movement towards good is a result of God’s operation through
supernatural grace. “He operates, therefore, without us, in order that we may will.” When23
compared to Gregory’s notion of an inherent tendency to rise we see some of the tension
between Eastern and Western Christian theological traditions, especially as this tendency wells
up within human nature. Gregory is clear, though, that this tendency in human nature is because
God fashions humanity in the image and likeness of God. Consequently, this creates an
Anthony Meredith, The Cappadocians, 55.18
Ibid, 56.19
Augustine, Confessions, 21.20
Ibid, 164.21
Augustine, On Grace and Free Will, 454.22
Ibid, 458.23
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8. interesting correspondence between an Augustinian theology of grace and a Gregorian theology
of desire where both assert ultimately God as the efficient and final cause in human volition.
However, this correspondence still contains a strong dissimilarity in that Augustine locates this in
supernatural grace. Gregory envisions freedom caused not by supernatural grace but God’s
creative work. Meredith observes that Gregory believes the effects of the primal fall were
serious in terms of loss of bodily integrity and mental clarity; but Gregory took a less dark view
of the human condition than Augustine. In some ways, this might suggest a reason for this24
difference in view. Meredith further notes in support of this:
However unlike the primal man the present human race may
seem, and therefore however unlike God, the image is never fully
or completely destroyed [for Gregory]. This is partly because
Gregory thinks the passions do not deeply touch the essence of
the soul, but partly because he came to see that the root of the
image of God in us was not so much in the intellectual powers
possessed by us as in the freedom of will.25
The second concept forming Gregory’s model is that the noetic mind cannot rise
unassisted even though there was a natural tendency in it to do so. Returning to Laird’s
assessment of Gregory, he notes that the noetic mind has the capacity to ascend in a natural
way from the sensible world towards the intelligible order, an order that Gregory considers to be
a higher level of existence, and eventually to God as the ultimate end. But it cannot do so of its
own accord, even though it functions best at this elevated level, functioning above the
distracting influences of the sensible world. Without assistance, humanity possesses a “thick26
mind,” bound to look down to the pleasures of the flesh just as cattle look down to their pasture;
both see their hunger’s satisfaction in this way. And if humanity, unassisted, is not being27
compared to cattle with their “thick mind,” then Gregory compares them to a stream flowing in
every direction. This analogy he labels the “dispersed mind.” His comparison ran thus, a stream
meandering through many differing branches does not have the same force as one channeled
Anthony Meredith, The Cappadocians, 81.24
Ibid, 56.25
Martin Laird, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith, 44.26
Ibid, 35.27
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9. into a single course. Channeled in this way, the stream is harnessed to potent effect. Likewise
the noetic mind unassisted would disperse itself among what brought it transitory pleasure,
retaining no power for the journey to the ultimate Good. There are other images of the noetic28
mind as a description of humanity’s condition but the message is clear. Set against its natural
tendency to rise, lesser states mire humanity unless some assistance is given to overcome
these thick, dispersed, distracted and wandering mental states.
This brings us to Gregory’s cause for humanity’s darkened state, the primal fall. The
inability of humanity to rise above this world and find perfection in virtue derives from the noetic
mind’s grasping nature and bondage to the sensible world. The primal fall affects this
oppression upon humanity. It turns the noetic mind towards the world, sensible objects, and
pursuit of pleasures, i.e. away from God. Not only did the primal fall turn the noetic mind
towards the world, it created a state of bondage for humanity. This echoes again Augustine’s
thought that human nature, which is lost through Adam, is recovered through something other
than itself. Though, Augustine draws this effect out to a greater degree.29
Knowing the problem, Gregory concludes the noetic mind’s grasping nature has to be
overcome. Overcoming this grasping nature sets it free to rise as it should. Towards this end, he
sees grace as the instrument of freedom. Grace, in Gregory’s thought, converts the noetic mind
from grasping sensible objects to rising in its natural capacity towards God.
The mind flows in every direction like gushing water, and the love
due to God is dispersed among other things. One is alienated
from God and unable to use reason properly, notably from
distinguishing a beautiful thing from Beauty itself. The mind must
be converted from all this, which is precisely, according to
Gregory, one of the implications of receiving baptism.30
It is important to realize that the noetic mind is responsive to grace and grace alone as a
remedy for its fallen condition. Gregory is absolutely clear on that just as Augustine is in On
Grace and Free Will. The effect of grace is, among other things, “putting to death” the noetic
Ibid, 36.28
Augustine, On Grace and Free Will, 455.29
Martin Laird, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith, 58.30
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10. mind’s tendency to grab in a snatching, ravishing sort of way. Grace, says Gregory, focuses on31
this aspect precisely because of the noetic mind’s responsiveness to it, especially in the
guidance of scripture and baptism. Through such assistance, the noetic mind and hence
humanity rises up in Christian excellence, enters into the presence of God, but without grasping
God in an act of comprehension. Grace, then, frees the noetic mind from enslavement that32
undisciplined passion exerts over humanity. With this enslavement ended, the noetic mind33
ascends on high allowing humanity to embark upon the pursuit of perfection in virtue, participate
in God, and ultimately arrive at its end.
V. Unity of Self as the Perfect Life
Gregory offers numerous images for the perfection of the Christian life. Here, our
intention is to examine the one that likens humanity to God through an undivided self. This also
serves as a contrast to Gregory’s metaphors of a thick and dispersed noetic mind in the fallen
state. First, though, we require a small detour into Gregory’s mirror metaphor for the noetic mind
to fully grasp how the likeness of Divine unity impresses human nature. Gregory’s mirror
metaphor describes the image of God in human nature; and, more specifically, how the noetic
mind operates as the image of God in human nature and this is a crucial point of contact with
Augustine. Within the image, the question is what are the likenesses between God and
humanity? Also, what are the differences between God and humanity? Gregory’s mirror
metaphor is the key to unlocking this mystery. When a person looks in the mirror, he or she sees
an image of his or herself. Is the mirror reflection exact? No, in some ways the image in the
mirror is like the actual subject, and in other ways the image is dissimilar to the actual subject.
Between God and humanity, then, the mirror image discloses how humanity is like God
and how humanity is different from God. Further, in this mirror image those attributes that
indicate likeness can be lost resulting in no discernible similarity between God and humanity.
The image is still there but it is so distorted and tarnished the similarity between the Divine and
Ibid, 46.31
Ibid, 56.32
Ibid, 47.33
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11. human nature is seemingly lost. The image never goes away, but it can be hard to discern the
likeness if the mirror is askance, corroded, dirty, etc. On the one hand, this is why Gregory
describes certain characteristics as those which form the likeness of God in human nature: the
virtues. These are the “things” that set the mirror right and purify its surface so the image can
shine forth with clarity; and, in so doing, all that is like between God and humanity pours forth
into Creation. On the other hand, Gregory also describes attributes that are telling of the
likeness in the image: unity of self. When the mirror is set right these attributes operate clearly
and purposefully to shape human nature as the incarnate likeness of God in Creation.34
Michel Rene Barnes notes in his work on Gregory that an ineffective will or a divided self
characterizes humanity in its fallen condition. Barnes aptly characterizes Gregory’s35
understanding of human nature as “the experience of a consciousness divided against itself,
that is, the experience of a divided will.” Often, conflicting desires plague human nature and36
this leaves it ineffective and disempowered. This conflicted human nature subsisting in a person
manifests as a divided self in his or her concrete existence. Also, human nature lacks the
integrity to follow through on what it wills even when its desire is simple. Here again, the person
manifests a self unable to attain its goal because of its divisive human nature. According to
Barnes, Gregory contrasts this divided self with the perfect existence evinced in the Trinity: “The
will does not fail to decide for the good, and having decided, the will has the integrity and
strength to will the good it has decided for.” When, through the perfect life in virtue, humanity37
attains a likeness to God this perfect existence marks human nature indelibly. In fact, this unity
of self is nothing other than a statement of divine Otherness for which the Christian life hopes.
See for instance Gregory’s On Infants Early Death, vol. 5, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second34
Series (New York: Cosimo, 2007). In this treatise Gregory beautifully expounds this theme, “When God
had brought all things else upon the scene of life, man was exhibited upon the earth, a mixture from
Divine sources, the Godlike intellectual essence being in him united with the several portions of earthly
elements contributed towards his formation, and that he was fashioned by his Maker to be the incarnate
likeness of Divine transcendent power” (375).
Michel Rene Barnes, “Divine Unity and the Divided Self: Gregory of Nyssa’ Trinitarian Theology in its35
Psychological Context” in Re-thinking Gregory of Nyssa, ed. Sarah Coakley (Malden: Blackwell
Publishing, 2003), 57.
Ibid, 49.36
Ibid, 57.37
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12. Gregory’s Trinitarian treatise On Not Three Gods offers two trinitarian images that will help us
understand what this might look like in humanity.
In On Not Three Gods, Gregory argues that the Godhead issues forth as a power from
the Holy Trinity. That is, in the Godhead “power is a unity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.” He38
goes onto clarify this understanding as, “It issues from the Father, as from a spring. It is
actualized by the Son; and its grace is perfected by the power of the Holy Spirit.” Further, “No39
activity is distinguished among the persons, as if it were brought to completion individually by
each of them or separately apart from their joint supervision.” Power gives rise to action; and,40
correspondingly, in humanity this power that gives rise to action comprises our human nature.
Integrity, then, is power and activity united in such a way that the will to act arises, is actualized
and brought to completion without conflict or divisiveness. God and the economy of salvation
witness this preeminently; and, thereby, Gregory brings his point home descriptively through the
economy of salvation.
Gregory notes that the dynamics of salvation exemplify God’s unity and simplicity. That
salvation is brought by the Son affected through the Holy Spirit is evident. Further, salvation is
inconceivable apart from the Father who sent the Son and the Spirit. Yet, observes Gregory,
“Scripture does not call them three Saviours.” Here, Gregory draws out from the cornerstone41
of faith, namely God’s economy of salvation that Father, Son, and Spirit act as one to affect
humanity’s salvation. That they share the same nature or a Divine unity needs no further proof.
If Father, Son, and Spirit are united in power and activity, then, says Gregory, they are united in
nature and are not three gods. This brief exposition of Gregory’s argument for divine unity
provides us insight into what unity of self might look like in human nature. In all God’s
operations, there is never a moment of divided nature or will. “The integrity and effectiveness of
Gregory of Nyssa, On Not Three Gods in Christology of the Later Fathers, ed. Edward R. Hardy, The38
Library of Christian Classics: Ichthus Edition (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), 263.
Ibid, 263.39
Ibid.40
Ibid, 264.41
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13. the [Divine] wills…stands in direct contrast to the state of our human wills.” For the vast42
majority of humanity mired in its fallen state this is precisely the situation. However, when the
noetic mind images God and in that image there is a likeness within which it participates then
human nature realizes a unity of self. This unity of self affects just as God affects human
salvation—in freedom and love.
The noetic mind is the instrument through which materiality moulds human nature or the
image of God moulds and directs human nature. Gregory informs us that, “The mind, as being
in the image of the most beautiful, itself also remains in beauty and goodness so long as it
partakes as far as possible in its likeness to the archetype [the most beautiful and supreme
good that is the Divinity Itself]; but if it were at all to depart from this it is deprived of that beauty
in which it was.” This passage frames two very important concepts and, by consequence, an43
important question. First, the noetic mind images God and in that image there is a likeness
within which it participates if the noetic mind so chooses. Second, within the image of God and
the archetypal likeness it communicates the noetic mind can choose not to participate. In so
doing, “The mind, setting the idea of good like a mirror behind the back, turns of the incident
rays of the effulgence of the good, and it receives into itself the impress of the shapelessness of
matter.” This shapelessness destroys the beauty of human nature “with which it is adorned44
through the mind.” This establishes contrasting potentials whereby human nature either45
spiritually actualizes itself or falls into moral degradation. The former potential communicates
true beauty (this is a spiritual beauty as opposed to a physical beauty) proportionally through all
of human nature. This includes the material part of human nature in so far as it derives its46
being from God through the image contained within the mirror of the noetic mind. The latter
potential is the genesis of evil for Gregory.
Michel Rene Barnes, “Divine Unity and Divided Self,” 58.42
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man, vol. 5, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Second Series43
(New York: Cosimo, 2007), 401.
Ibid.44
Ibid.45
Ibid.46
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14. The noetic mind having lost its blessed simplicity communicates this throughout human
nature; and, human nature mirroring this loss becomes dispersed and disorganized. What is47
beautiful and good withdraws as the passionate impulses replace virtue.
So man seems to me to bear a double likeness to opposite things
—being moulded in the Divine element of his mind to the Divine
beauty, but bearing, in the passionate impulses that arise in him, a
likeness to the brute nature; while often even his reason is
rendered brutish, and obscures the better element by the worse
through its inclination and disposition towards what is irrational; for
whenever a man drags down his mental energy to these
affections, and forces his reason to become the servant of his
passions, there takes place a sort of conversion of the good stamp
in him into the irrational image, his whole nature being traced
anew after that design, as his reason, so to say, cultivates the
beginnings of his passions, and gradually multiplies them.48
Given Gregory’s understanding of human nature’s mutability, clearly we must ask ourselves how
does goodness and beauty absent themselves from the noetic mind? Gregory informs us that
the noetic mind can just as easily follow the senses as follow God (XIV.1). In this case, the
noetic mind serves the senses and sensual pleasures wherein passionate impulses arise.
These passionate impulses obscure or tarnish the image of God so that the likeness is no
longer discernible. In humanity’s embodied life, this absence of the likeness manifests as a
slavish disposition, bondage to the passionate impulses, and servile homage to pleasures of the
senses to name a few. This state Gregory characterizes as the “dispersed mind” or the “thick49
mind,” that is, a divided self. This, then, contrasts the fallen state of humanity with the Trinity and
the perfect life in virtue.
VI. Conclusion
In this essay, then, we have seen how Saint Gregory of Nyssa describes Christian
spirituality. We were able to draw this description forward through the lens of grace and freedom
such that three things were accomplished. First, we were able to reflect critically and
systematically on Christian spirituality in the thought of Gregory. Effectively, this treatment made
Ibid.47
Ibid, 408.48
Ibid, 402.49
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15. explicit what is usually implicit in theology, namely spirituality. Second, we were able to see how
grace and freedom integrates human nature over and against a divided self that normally
characterizes humanity. Finally, this essay illuminates the place of grace in Christian spirituality
according to Gregory. Consequently, grace takes its rightful place in the process of conversion
and sanctification. When we consider the modern caricatures often projected onto the Church
Fathers the importance of this last point is apparent. Take for example Hilda Graef’s introduction
to her translation of Gregory’s commentary on the Lord’s Prayer and the Beatitudes.
There is, nevertheless, one feature in both the treatises, which
may perhaps shock the modern reader. It is the seeming
assumption that it is entirely in the power of man to reach the goal
of perfection. Gregory argues repeatedly that the mercy of God
will show to man is entirely dependent on the mercy man shows to
his fellows; there is no mention of grace, which first enables man
to show mercy at all. This is, indeed a defect of almost all Greek
theology. But in reading these fathers we have always to
remember that neither Augustine nor Pelagius had argued this
subject when they wrote, and that, generally, the question of grace
never arose in the East, because no particular heresy on this
matter had been propounded there. Moreover, it is undeniable that
Greek ascetical teaching was greatly indebted to Stoic philosophy,
and that the emphasis on human effort learned in this school was
not always fully balanced by the corresponding stress on Divine
grace that should have been learned from St. Paul.50
To speak of a defect in Gregory’s thought or a lack of emphasis on grace is to grossly miss the
mark when reading him. What we have is grace operating in different capacities. This is, instead
of a supernatural grace erupting into human nature, we might say that grace operates
supernaturally in the sacraments and from there transforms human nature. Thus, grace plays a
prominent role in Gregory’s theology just as it does Augustine’s. This, then, is a case where the
distinction “Eastern” theologian versus “Western” theologian falls apart. The Greek Fathers, if
Gregory is representative of them, are just as concerned with grace as the Latin Fathers.
In systematic theology spirituality is ever present. In fact, the two are not different but
comprise the Christian life that is involved in reflection on who God is as well as experiencing
that selfsame God. Thankfully, recent scholarship’s attempts to overturn this paradigm are
bearing fruit. This essay sought to work within this paradigm. In so doing, we see how grace is
Hilda C. Graef, introduction to The Lord’s Prayer and The Beatitudes, by Saint Gregory of Nyssa50
(Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1954), 19.
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16. the first cause in Augustine’s model as it was in Gregory’s; however, these causes are
functionally different. For Augustine grace is the cause of love of God; for Gregory this love is
inherent in humanity. For Augustine grace lifts the soul out of its depraved state; for Gregory
grace assists the noetic mind in leaving the dispersed state. Similar as their use of grace is as
first cause, they differ in their functional definition. Knowing this, it becomes clear how grace is
the first principle of Christian spirituality for Gregory, even though the inclination to God is pre-
existent in humanity. Gregory, then, grounds Christian spirituality on two pillars:
The two pillars, therefore of Gregory’s position are human faith
and God’s infinity….For Gregory faith is not a preliminary state,
but the mental and spiritual condition of being perpetually open to
and dependent upon the divine self-disclosure [grace]. Without
faith [and therefore grace which is the cause of faith], for him,
knowledge of and about God is impossible.51
Without grace, to convert the noetic mind, to free humanity of its grasping nature, the Christian
life is impossible. Better said no life is Christian without first feeling the affects of grace,
according to Gregory. Moreover, without God’s grace or the pursuit of the perfect life in virtue a
person is doomed to exist with a divided self in bondage to the material world. Laird notes in
Gregory’s thought, “In proportion to the greatness of what is desired, [mind] must be lifted up.”52
For something as great as God, the noetic mind requires God itself in the form of grace;
otherwise the heights to which its innate desire wishes to ascend can never be scaled. No other
thing, in Gregory’s thought, lifts the noetic mind and humanity with it so high.
Anthony Meredith, The Cappadocians, 67.51
Martin Laird, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith, 41.52
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