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The Real Cost of Software Remediation
           Dan Cornell
           CTO, Denim Group
           @danielcornell




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved
Agenda
 •     Introduction / Background
 •     An Innocent Question
 •     Finding a Structure for Remediation Projects
 •     Methodology
 •     Remediation Data
 •     Analysis and Recommendations
 •     Questions




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved    1
Introduction / Background
 • Me (Dan Cornell)
         – Founder and CTO of Denim Group
         – Software developer by background (Java, .NET, etc)
         – OWASP San Antonio, Global Membership Committee

 • Denim Group
         – Build software with special security, performance, reliability
           requirements (think “Rugged”)
         – Software security remediation
         – Help organizations deal with the risk associated with their software
                  • Code reviews and application assessments
                  • SDLC consulting
                  • Secure development training – instructor-led and eLearning

© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                2
Fixing a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability
 How long does it take?
 A)      9.6 minutes
 B)      16.2 minutes
 C)      84 minutes
 D)      It doesn’t matter
 E)      All of the above




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   3
Fixing a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability
 How long does it take?
 A)      9.6 minutes – Average fix time for stored XSS (no load)
 B)      16.2 minutes – Average fix time for reflected XSS (no load)
 C)      84 minutes – Average fix time for stored and reflected (loaded)
 D)      It doesn’t matter
 E)      All of the above




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                         4
Fixing a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability
 How long does it take?
 A)      9.6 minutes – Average fix time for stored XSS (no load)
 B)      16.2 minutes – Average fix time for reflected XSS (no load)
 C)      84 minutes – Average fix time for stored and reflected (loaded)
 D)      It doesn’t matter
 E) All of the above




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                         5
Remediation Worst Practices
 • When the security team:
         –     Demands a development team devote time and budget to remediation
         –     Provides them with no direction or support
         –     Has the development team attempt to make fixes on their own
         –     Complains when things don’t work out




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                6
Remediation Worst Practices
                                                     • Result: No new features
                                                       and half- or non-fixed
                                                       vulnerabilities

                                                     • Good luck getting your
                                                       next remediation project
                                                       approved




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                7
Finding a Structure for Remediation Projects
 • Desired outcome: predictable
   and effective remediation
   projects
         – Predictable: know how long
           they will take and how much
           they will cost
         – Effective: targeted
           vulnerabilities actually get fixed


 • A community of stakeholders
         – Security
         – Development
         – IT Audit / Compliance

© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   8
Remediation Projects
 • Inception
 • Planning
         –     Calculate Risk
         –     Agree on Fix and Confirmation Methods
         –     Determine Level of Effort
         –     Schedule
 • Execution
         –     Set up Development Environment
         –     Fix Vulnerabilities
         –     Confirm Fixes and Perform Functional Testing
         –     Deploy




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved            9
Remediation: How To Guide
                                                     • Describes methodology for
                                                       software security remediation
                                                       projects
                                                     • Includes tips and best practices
                                                     • Free online
                                                     denimgroup.com/howtoguide_download_register.html




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                                      10
That’s Great But…
 • How long will it actually take me to fix my vulnerabilities?

 • Software security remediation projects are software development
   projects
         – So estimate them as such


 • Best practices:
         – Bottom-up estimation
         – Cluster vulnerabilities where possible


 • It would be nice to have some data to use as a starting point…


© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                   11
Data!
 • Took data from 15 remediated
   applications
 • Two types of analysis:
         – Vulnerability-level (4
           applications)
         – Project-level (13 applications)
 • Data from Inception and
   Planning phases was too
   messy
 • Data from Execution phase was
   useable



© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   12
The Good (Why This Data Might Be Useful)
 • Some data is better than no data
         – As long as you understand potential areas of bias
         – Read “How to Measure Anything” by Douglas W. Hubbard


 • Had relatively large sample size for some vulnerability types




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                 13
The Bad (Some Potential Sources of Bias)
 • Relatively small sample size

 • Based on a single project type
         – Outsourced software security remediation projects


 • Data required cleanup and normalization

 • Vulnerability data centered around technical vulnerabilities
         – Most identified by automated static analysis




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                14
Vulnerability-Specific Data (20+ Sample Count)
Vulnerability Type                                   Sample Count Average Fix (minutes)
Dead Code (unused methods)                                    465                   2.6
Poor logging: system output stream                             83                   2.9
Poor Error Handling: Empty catch block                        180                   6.8
Lack of Authorization check                                    61                   6.9
Unsafe threading                                              301                   8.5
ASP.NET non-serializable object in session                     42                   9.3
XSS (stored)                                                 1023                   9.6
Null Dereference                                              157                  10.2
Missing Null Check                                             46                  15.7
XSS (reflected)                                                25                  16.2
Redundant null check                                           21                  17.1
SQL injection                                                  30                  97.5

© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                        15
Some Thoughts and Notes
 • Apparently deleting code and changing logging methods are easy

 • Cross-Site Scripting
         – Vulnerability count tracks with data from WhiteHat, Veracode, other sources
         – Harder to fix reflected XSS than stored XSS


 • Lack of Authorization Check
         – Fix consisted of copy/pasting file include into a number of files


 • SQL Injection
         – Surprisingly high
         – Reason: fixes were for more complicated SQL injection vulnerabilities


© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                       16
So If I Have 6 Stored XSS Vulnerabilities…


 … my remediation project should take about an hour, right?




                                                     But wait!


© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved               17
Remediation Is Not Just About Coding Fixes
 • This data is from one of four steps in one of three phases
         – “Fix Vulnerabilities” step in the “Execution” phase


 • What about Inception and Planning?
         – No great data available yet


 • What about the rest of Execution?
         –     Set up Development Environment
         –     Fix Vulnerabilities
         –     Confirm Fixes and Perform Functional Testing
         –     Deploy
         –     Overhead


© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved               18
Where Is Time Being Spent?
  70%
                                                                                                Indicates the weighted average
                                                                                                versus the average of
  60%                                                 59%                                       individual projects


  50%

                                                                           44%
                                                                                                                    42%
  40%                                                 37%


  30%                    31%                                                                                        28%
                                                      29%                  24%
                                                                                                                    24%
  20%                    17%
                                                                           20%
                                                      15%                                 15%
                         16%
  10%                                                                                                               9%
                                                                                          3%
                                                                                          2%
   0%                  0%                                                   0%
                                                                                           0%
             Setup Development             Fix Vulnerabilities   Confirm Fixes / QA   Deploy                  Overhead
                Environment



© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                                                               19
Some Thoughts and Notes
 • Setup Development Environment
         – Best case: existing development environment or VM
         – Worst case: Safari expedition to recreate environment setup because organization
           no longer had this knowledge
                  • Instructions on setting up a development environment were a deliverable



 • Fix Vulnerabilities
         – This is what people focus on but there is wide variation




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                            20
Some Thoughts and Notes (continued)
 • Confirm Fixes / QA
         – Sometimes this took more time than the actual fixes
         – Best case: Existing set of automated functional / regression tests


 • Deploy
         – Best case: use an existing planned release


 • Overhead
         – Surprisingly high in some cases




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                              21
Using the Data
 • I thought you said to estimate bottom-up?
         –     Yes. Do that
         –     Use the vulnerability data as a guide for estimation
         –     Use the project composition data for validation
         –     Use the lessons of the data to try and minimize required investment




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                   22
What Can I Do To Minimize Remediation Costs?



 Avoid introducing vulnerabilities into your software

         (you are all welcome for this piece of sage advice)




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved             23
What Can I Do To Minimize Remediation Costs?
 • Have ready access to
   development environments for
   the developers doing the
   remediation

 • Automated functional /
   regression testing helps speed
   security fixes

 • Use planned deployments when
   possible


© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   24
Which Vulnerabilities Get Fixed and When?
                                                     • Use your data-backed,
                                                       bottom-up WBS for risk
                                                       management and planning

                                                     • Serious vulnerabilities that
                                                       are easy to fix? Consider
                                                       an out-of-cycle release

                                                     • Otherwise leverage
                                                       planned releases

© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                    25
The Outlier
 • We remediated one vulnerability not included in the study that was
   more expensive to fix than all vulnerabilities in the study
         – Authentication issue in a connected system


 • Requirements and architecture vulnerability
         – Automated scanners – static or dynamic: powerless to find it


 • Should have / would have been caught by even a basic threat
   modeling or abuse case session




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                        26
So Where Does This Leave Us
 • Good:
         – We have a framework
         – We have some data
 • Less good:
         – The data comes with a number of caveats


 • Given a framework and some data you should be:
         – Better able to execute successful projects
         – Better able to estimate projects
         – Better able to minimize project costs




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved      27
Next Steps For Me
 • Release a more in-depth report

 • Include more data in the analysis

 • Perform deeper analysis
         –     Impact of size of project (hours)
         –     Impact of number of vulnerabilities remediated
         –     Impact of platform
         –     And so on…


 • Include data on logical vulnerabilities


© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved              28
Next Steps For You
 • Review your existing vulnerability data

 • Create a “back of the envelope” plan to address open vulnerabilities
         – Run different scenarios: “All critical and high” “All public-facing apps” and so on


 • Talk to developers
         – How do they set up development environments?
         – When do they do planned releases?


 • Fix some vulnerabilities!
         – Application-level vulnerabilities persist for a long time



© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                               29
Remediation Resource Center
                                                     • Resources for remediating
                                                       software security vulnerabilities
                                                         – Videos
                                                         – How-to Guide
                                                         – Blog posts


                                                     denimgroup.com/remediation




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved                                         30
Questions?
 Dan Cornell
 dan@denimgroup.com
 Twitter: @danielcornell

 www.denimgroup.com
 blog.denimgroup.com
 www.denimgroup.com/remediation
 (210) 572-4400




© Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved   31

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Dan Cornell - The Real Cost of Software Remediation

  • 1. The Real Cost of Software Remediation Dan Cornell CTO, Denim Group @danielcornell © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved
  • 2. Agenda • Introduction / Background • An Innocent Question • Finding a Structure for Remediation Projects • Methodology • Remediation Data • Analysis and Recommendations • Questions © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 1
  • 3. Introduction / Background • Me (Dan Cornell) – Founder and CTO of Denim Group – Software developer by background (Java, .NET, etc) – OWASP San Antonio, Global Membership Committee • Denim Group – Build software with special security, performance, reliability requirements (think “Rugged”) – Software security remediation – Help organizations deal with the risk associated with their software • Code reviews and application assessments • SDLC consulting • Secure development training – instructor-led and eLearning © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 2
  • 4. Fixing a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability How long does it take? A) 9.6 minutes B) 16.2 minutes C) 84 minutes D) It doesn’t matter E) All of the above © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 3
  • 5. Fixing a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability How long does it take? A) 9.6 minutes – Average fix time for stored XSS (no load) B) 16.2 minutes – Average fix time for reflected XSS (no load) C) 84 minutes – Average fix time for stored and reflected (loaded) D) It doesn’t matter E) All of the above © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 4
  • 6. Fixing a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability How long does it take? A) 9.6 minutes – Average fix time for stored XSS (no load) B) 16.2 minutes – Average fix time for reflected XSS (no load) C) 84 minutes – Average fix time for stored and reflected (loaded) D) It doesn’t matter E) All of the above © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 5
  • 7. Remediation Worst Practices • When the security team: – Demands a development team devote time and budget to remediation – Provides them with no direction or support – Has the development team attempt to make fixes on their own – Complains when things don’t work out © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 6
  • 8. Remediation Worst Practices • Result: No new features and half- or non-fixed vulnerabilities • Good luck getting your next remediation project approved © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 7
  • 9. Finding a Structure for Remediation Projects • Desired outcome: predictable and effective remediation projects – Predictable: know how long they will take and how much they will cost – Effective: targeted vulnerabilities actually get fixed • A community of stakeholders – Security – Development – IT Audit / Compliance © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 8
  • 10. Remediation Projects • Inception • Planning – Calculate Risk – Agree on Fix and Confirmation Methods – Determine Level of Effort – Schedule • Execution – Set up Development Environment – Fix Vulnerabilities – Confirm Fixes and Perform Functional Testing – Deploy © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 9
  • 11. Remediation: How To Guide • Describes methodology for software security remediation projects • Includes tips and best practices • Free online denimgroup.com/howtoguide_download_register.html © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 10
  • 12. That’s Great But… • How long will it actually take me to fix my vulnerabilities? • Software security remediation projects are software development projects – So estimate them as such • Best practices: – Bottom-up estimation – Cluster vulnerabilities where possible • It would be nice to have some data to use as a starting point… © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 11
  • 13. Data! • Took data from 15 remediated applications • Two types of analysis: – Vulnerability-level (4 applications) – Project-level (13 applications) • Data from Inception and Planning phases was too messy • Data from Execution phase was useable © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 12
  • 14. The Good (Why This Data Might Be Useful) • Some data is better than no data – As long as you understand potential areas of bias – Read “How to Measure Anything” by Douglas W. Hubbard • Had relatively large sample size for some vulnerability types © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 13
  • 15. The Bad (Some Potential Sources of Bias) • Relatively small sample size • Based on a single project type – Outsourced software security remediation projects • Data required cleanup and normalization • Vulnerability data centered around technical vulnerabilities – Most identified by automated static analysis © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 14
  • 16. Vulnerability-Specific Data (20+ Sample Count) Vulnerability Type Sample Count Average Fix (minutes) Dead Code (unused methods) 465 2.6 Poor logging: system output stream 83 2.9 Poor Error Handling: Empty catch block 180 6.8 Lack of Authorization check 61 6.9 Unsafe threading 301 8.5 ASP.NET non-serializable object in session 42 9.3 XSS (stored) 1023 9.6 Null Dereference 157 10.2 Missing Null Check 46 15.7 XSS (reflected) 25 16.2 Redundant null check 21 17.1 SQL injection 30 97.5 © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 15
  • 17. Some Thoughts and Notes • Apparently deleting code and changing logging methods are easy • Cross-Site Scripting – Vulnerability count tracks with data from WhiteHat, Veracode, other sources – Harder to fix reflected XSS than stored XSS • Lack of Authorization Check – Fix consisted of copy/pasting file include into a number of files • SQL Injection – Surprisingly high – Reason: fixes were for more complicated SQL injection vulnerabilities © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 16
  • 18. So If I Have 6 Stored XSS Vulnerabilities… … my remediation project should take about an hour, right? But wait! © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 17
  • 19. Remediation Is Not Just About Coding Fixes • This data is from one of four steps in one of three phases – “Fix Vulnerabilities” step in the “Execution” phase • What about Inception and Planning? – No great data available yet • What about the rest of Execution? – Set up Development Environment – Fix Vulnerabilities – Confirm Fixes and Perform Functional Testing – Deploy – Overhead © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 18
  • 20. Where Is Time Being Spent? 70% Indicates the weighted average versus the average of 60% 59% individual projects 50% 44% 42% 40% 37% 30% 31% 28% 29% 24% 24% 20% 17% 20% 15% 15% 16% 10% 9% 3% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% Setup Development Fix Vulnerabilities Confirm Fixes / QA Deploy Overhead Environment © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 19
  • 21. Some Thoughts and Notes • Setup Development Environment – Best case: existing development environment or VM – Worst case: Safari expedition to recreate environment setup because organization no longer had this knowledge • Instructions on setting up a development environment were a deliverable • Fix Vulnerabilities – This is what people focus on but there is wide variation © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 20
  • 22. Some Thoughts and Notes (continued) • Confirm Fixes / QA – Sometimes this took more time than the actual fixes – Best case: Existing set of automated functional / regression tests • Deploy – Best case: use an existing planned release • Overhead – Surprisingly high in some cases © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 21
  • 23. Using the Data • I thought you said to estimate bottom-up? – Yes. Do that – Use the vulnerability data as a guide for estimation – Use the project composition data for validation – Use the lessons of the data to try and minimize required investment © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 22
  • 24. What Can I Do To Minimize Remediation Costs? Avoid introducing vulnerabilities into your software (you are all welcome for this piece of sage advice) © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 23
  • 25. What Can I Do To Minimize Remediation Costs? • Have ready access to development environments for the developers doing the remediation • Automated functional / regression testing helps speed security fixes • Use planned deployments when possible © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 24
  • 26. Which Vulnerabilities Get Fixed and When? • Use your data-backed, bottom-up WBS for risk management and planning • Serious vulnerabilities that are easy to fix? Consider an out-of-cycle release • Otherwise leverage planned releases © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 25
  • 27. The Outlier • We remediated one vulnerability not included in the study that was more expensive to fix than all vulnerabilities in the study – Authentication issue in a connected system • Requirements and architecture vulnerability – Automated scanners – static or dynamic: powerless to find it • Should have / would have been caught by even a basic threat modeling or abuse case session © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 26
  • 28. So Where Does This Leave Us • Good: – We have a framework – We have some data • Less good: – The data comes with a number of caveats • Given a framework and some data you should be: – Better able to execute successful projects – Better able to estimate projects – Better able to minimize project costs © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 27
  • 29. Next Steps For Me • Release a more in-depth report • Include more data in the analysis • Perform deeper analysis – Impact of size of project (hours) – Impact of number of vulnerabilities remediated – Impact of platform – And so on… • Include data on logical vulnerabilities © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 28
  • 30. Next Steps For You • Review your existing vulnerability data • Create a “back of the envelope” plan to address open vulnerabilities – Run different scenarios: “All critical and high” “All public-facing apps” and so on • Talk to developers – How do they set up development environments? – When do they do planned releases? • Fix some vulnerabilities! – Application-level vulnerabilities persist for a long time © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 29
  • 31. Remediation Resource Center • Resources for remediating software security vulnerabilities – Videos – How-to Guide – Blog posts denimgroup.com/remediation © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 30
  • 32. Questions? Dan Cornell dan@denimgroup.com Twitter: @danielcornell www.denimgroup.com blog.denimgroup.com www.denimgroup.com/remediation (210) 572-4400 © Copyright 2011 Denim Group - All Rights Reserved 31