1. Preparing For The Worst – The SecureMetro
Project: Outcomes and Recommendations
Antonio de Santiago Laporte
Industrial Technical Engineer
Madrid Metro
&
Conor O’Neill
Rail Vehicles Group Manager
NewRail – SecureMetro Project

2. Mitigating the Effects of Firebomb and
Blast Attacks on Metro Systems.
Conor O’Neill (NewRail)
&
Antonio De Santiago (Metro de Madrid)
Rail & Public Transport Safety & Security
Mar 2014 - London
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3. Preparing For The Worst – The
SecureMetro Project: Outcomes and
Recommendations
Antonio de Santiago Laporte
Industrial Technical Engineer
Madrid Metro
&
Conor O’Neill
Rail Vehicles Group Manager
NewRail – SecureMetro Project
3

4. PROJECT DETAILS
 3½ year EU project – Jan 2010 to Jun 2013
 11 partners in 4 countries
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5. PROJECT PARTNERS
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6. PROJECT AIMS
 To increase metro vehicle resilience to terrorist bomb
blast through selection of vehicle materials and
structural design.
 To increase security against a firebomb attack through
design of fire barriers and fire suppression technology.
 To increase the resilience of vehicles to blasts in order to
speed up recovery following attack to return to normal
operation.
 To reduce the attractiveness of metro systems as a
target for attack by reducing deaths and injuries and
increased resilience.
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7. THREATS
 Review of previous blast and incendiary attacks on metro systems.
 833 terrorist attacks identified.
1960 -2010
1960-2010
Bombing
57%
Hijacking
Kidnapping
0%
0%
Other
5%
Logistic Activity
0%
Sabotage
20%
Barricade
0%
Arson
5%
Threat
5%
Armed AttackUnconventional
7%
1%
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8. THREATS
2000 - 2010
Bombing
58%
Hijacking
0%
Kidnapping
0%
Other
4%
Logistic Activity
0%
Barricade
0%
Arson
6%
Armed Attack
6%
Unconventional
0%
Threat
3%
Sabotage
23%
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9. THREAT SUMMARY
 Primary Threat: Bombing
– 70% of all fatalities
– 77% of all injuries
 Fire Attacks
– Low frequency.
– High impact.
 Attacks on vehicles more lethal than infrastructure.
– 73% of fatalities were onboard the vehicle.
– 90% of metro vehicle fatalities were onboard the vehicle.
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10. THREATS – UNDERGROUND SYSTEMS
 Subway systems.
Total Attacks
Attacks on Vehicles
% of Total
Fatalities on Vehicles
Injuries on Vehicles
Subway
82
29
35%
90%
67%
Subway EU
35
11
31%
100%
92%
 Future Threats.
Question posed
Highest ranking response
Most severe threat
Explosive device
Most probable threat
Explosive device
Most vulnerable target
Multi-modal terminals
Primary aim of attack
Loss of life
Device type
Improvised explosive device
Attack type
Multiple targets
 Analysis of potential future threats, risks and potential trends.
 Threat and attack scenarios to provide design approach.
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11. SCENARIO DEFINITION
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12. SCENARIO DEFINITION
 Finite element modelling and simulation of blast conditions.
 Study of blast mechanics related to rail metro vehicles and systems.
 Small/large scale blast testing (correlation) components and vehicle.
 Evaluation of range of potential vehicle design improvements.
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13. BLAST TESTING
 Panel tests June 2012:
–
–
–
–
–
Driver cabin panels.
Carriage wall panels.
Floor and ceiling panels.
Windows (glazing).
Material assessment tests (32 individual materials tested).
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14. BLAST TESTING
 Full-scale test Aug 2012:
 Decommissioned Metro de Madrid vehicle.
 Tested at HSL (UK) for NewRail.
 Evaluation of structural and equipment response.
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15.  Delivery of metro!
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16. AREAS OF INTEREST – Reduce Damage and Injury





Glass fragmentation
Door retention
Structural deformation
Equipment retention
Vehicle derailment





Interior components (floor/roof)
Critical system protection
Driver Protection
Evacuation & egress
Recovery (injured & system)
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18. BLAST TESTING
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19. KEY SYSTEMS
 Lighting:
– Assess situation. Seek egress. Communication. Guidance.
 Driver:
– Knowledgeable person. Relay updates & commands. Focal point.
 Radio communications:
– Co-ordinate evacuation. Link to outside world.
 Door systems:
–
Operational post incident. Escape means. Useable if unpowered.
Access for emergency response crew.
 Surveillance data backup:
–
Forensic data. Understanding of events leading up to blast.
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20. DEMONSTRATOR VEHICLE
 A blast resilient demonstrator:
–
–
–
–
14m vehicle.
Driver’s bulkhead.
Open-ended design.
Passengers doors incorporated.
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21. 



Modified glazing (jointing and glazing films).
Tethering technology.
Evaluation of seat orientation.
Bulkhead reinforcement
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23. DEMONSTRATOR VEHICLE
 Reduction in glazing debris.
 Reduction in debris in gangway.
 Tethering held dislodged panels.
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24. RESEARCH OUTPUT
 Appraisal of State-of-Art design practices (techniques).
 Specification of the desired vehicle performance.
 Design specification for blast and firebomb mitigation.
 Recommendations for future international standards.
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25. THANK YOU!
SecureMetro is a European
Commission funded FP7 project
GA# 234148
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