2. PHILIPPINE NAVAL
MODERNIZATION
Current State and Continuing Challenges
Rommel C. Banlaoi
Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR)
2

3. Philippine Naval Modernization: Current State and Continuing Challenges
By Rommel C. Banlaoi
Copyright@ 2012
by Professor Rommel C. Banlaoi
All rights reserved.
Except for brief quotations for scholarly purposes, no part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recordings and/or otherwise without the prior
written permission of the author. You may reach the author at rbanlaoi@pipvtr.com.
Published by
Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR)
Quezon City, Philippines
Recommended Bibliographic Entry:
Rommel C. Banlaoi, Philippine Naval Modernization: Current State and Continuing
Challenges (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism
Research, 2012).
*This monograph is a revised, updated and expanded version of a paper presented at the
international conference on “Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia: Nature, Causes and
Consequences” organized by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Marina
Mandarin Hotel, Singapore on 26-27 January 2011. Comments are welcomed.
3

4. PHILIPPINE NAVAL MODERNISATION
Current State and Continuing Challenges
ROMMEL C. BANLAOI
ABSTRACT
As a maritime nation of around 95 million people and an archipelagic state of
1,707 islands, not to mention the contested islands in the South China Sea, there is no
doubt that the Philippine Navy (PN) has an essential role to play in the country’s
security.
However, from the finest naval forces in Asia in the 1960s, PN has become one
of the most ill-equipped navies in the world at present despite the recent acquisition of
second-hand Hamilton Class Cutters from the United States. In fact, PN is the only one
in the region without a missile capability. Though PN has a Naval Modernization
Program to upgrade its present capabilities, current threat perceptions, inter-service
rivalry, resource constraints, difficult procurement system and lack of social
acceptability have stunted the growth of naval forces in the Philippines.
This paper aims to describe the nature, causes and consequences of naval
modernization in the Philippines. This study contends that the success of PN
modernization depends largely on threat perceptions of current decision-makers,
effective mobilization of necessary financial resources, resolution of inter-service
rivalry, efficient procurement system and strong social acceptability .
4

5. INTRODUCTION
Since the formulation of Thayer Mahan’s concept of sea power1 and the
development of Julian Stafford Corbett’s principles of maritime strategy,2 sovereign
states have regarded the strengthening of their navies as a vital source of national
greatness and a credible instrument of national power. Informed by the realist theory of
international relations, most, if not all, of the developed countries have, in fact, invested
their strategic resources on the development of their navies for world expansion, power
projection and global power balancing.3 Even developing countries are now involved in
various levels of naval modernization for sovereignty protection and nation-building
purposes.4 With the proliferation of various transnational security threats operating in
the maritime domain5 and the growing relevance of the sea not only for international
commerce and navigation but also as a supplier of important natural resources such as
oil, gas and other marine products, sea power development6 and naval transformation7
have become aspirations and essential components of maritime security strategy of
various nations. 8
1 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (London: Metheun & Co,
1965). First published in 1890.
2Julian Stafford Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, Classics of
Seapower Series, 1988). Also see Julian Stafford Corbett, Naval and Military Essays. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1914). reissued by Cambridge University Press, 2009.
3 Lawrence W. Prabhakar, Joshua H. HO and Sam Bateman (eds), The Evolving Maritime Balance of
Power in the Asia Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea (Singapore: World
Scientific, 2006).
4 For a good reference on the role of the navy in nation-building, see David Stevens and John Reeve (eds),
The Navy and the Nation (New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 2005).
5 See Caroline Ziemke-Dickens and Julian Droogan (eds), Asian Transnational Security Challenges:
Emerging Trends, Regional Visions (Sydney: Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research and the
Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 2010) and David Fouse (ed), Issues for
Engagement: Asian Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center
for Security Studies, 2010).
6 On sea power development, see Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty First Century (London
and New York: Taylor and Francis, 2009).
7 On Naval transformation, see Geoffrey Till, Naval Transformation, Ground Forces, and the
Expeditionary Impulse: The Sea-Basing Debate (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006).
8For more details on the many ramifications of these issues, see Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and
Peter Lehr (Eds), Llyod’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (London and New York: CRC Press Taylor
and Francis Group, 2009), Chong Guan Kwa, John Kristen Skogan (eds), Maritime Security in Southeast
Asian (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), and Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond (eds), The
Best of Times and The Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific (Singapore: World
Scientific and Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005).
5

6. In short, many countries are now positioning their navies as part of their national
security strategy that aims to effectively address current and emerging security
challenges in the maritime world. 9
However, the Philippines, which is considered as an archipelagic state and a
maritime nation, 10 is regrettably possessing a very small, ill-equipped, and truly modest,
if not obsolete, navy in Asia. The Philippines’ current naval capability is arguably not
commensurate with the archipelagic and maritime character of the country. From one
of the world’s finest naval forces in the 1950s, and considered to be the best in
Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, the Philippine Navy (PN) has enormously
deteriorated into one of the world’s weakest in terms of equipment and naval assets.11
At present, PN is lagging very far behind its neighbours in maritime Southeast Asia and
has become ridiculously a butt of joke among navies in the region.12 A senior naval
officer regrets that PN is really lagging both in quality and quantity among other navies
in the Asia Pacific region.13
Despite this discomforting reality, PN continues to have a very strong
commitment and determination to upgrade its present naval capability not only to
revive its past glory but more importantly to carry out its inherent function as the
“Guardian of the Philippine seas” and “Protector of Philippine sovereignty”. Towards
this end, PN has crafted the Philippine Naval Modernization Program (PNMP) pursuant
to the implementation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program
(AFPMP).14
With the current threats and emerging challenges emanating from the Philippine
maritime domain, PN also formulated in 2006 the Strategic Sail Plan 2020 to provide a
roadmap of naval transformation and development and thereby make PN a significant
symbol of national pride and effective instrument of national power. PN even prepared
the 15-Year Strategic Development Plan completed in 1999 and the 15-year Equipment
9 See Jack McCaffrie (ed), Positioning Navies for the Future (Sydney: Halstead Press and Sea Power
Centre-Australia, 2006).
10 For a useful reference on this topic, See Mary Ann Palma, “The Philippines as an Archipelagic and a
Maritime Nation: Interests, Challenges and Perspectives”, RSIS Working Paper, No. 182 (21 July 2009).
11 Sam Bateman, “'Naval Balance in Southeast Asia - Search for Stability ', Jane's Defence Weekly (11 May
2005).
12 See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: IISS, 2010);
Geoffrey Till, Emrys Chew and Joshua Ho (eds), Globalization and Defence in the Asia Pacific: Arms
Across Asia (New York and London: Routledge, 2009); Andrew Tan, “Force Modernization Trends in
Southeast Asia{, IDSS Working Paper, No. 59 (2004); and, Bates Gill and J.N. Mak (eds), Arms,
Transparency and Security in South-East Asia (Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute 1997).
13 Jose Renan Suarez, :Towards a Navy of Substance: A Modernization Program”, Navy Digest, Vol. 3,
No. 1 (January-June 2003), p. 32.
14 The AFPMDP was enacted by the Philippine Congress in 1995.
6

7. Acquisition Plan drafted in 2005, among other modernization plans, to realize its long-
term vision and fulfil its current missions.
In other words, PN is not short of plans and programs to modernize its naval
forces. In fact, the Philippines has the most systematic, elaborate and legally mandated
naval modernization programs in Southeast Asia. Yet, PN is still one of the most ill-
quipped navies in Asia. PN lacks the adequate capacity to effectively promote maritime
security in the world’s second largest archipelago. While there is no doubt that the
Philippines has vigorously pursued naval modernization programs since 1995 to ensure
the country from various maritime threats and defend its maritime territories, several
domestic challenges obstruct the effective implementation of these programs.
This monograph describes the nature and causes of naval modernization in the
Philippines and examines its unintended consequences for regional security. It also
identifies some factors that pose domestic challenges to the realization of PN
modernization.
7

8. BRIEF BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATE
OF THE PHILIPPINE NAVY
PN traces its “glorious” naval tradition from the pre-colonial times. On the basis
of this notion, PN propagates and even romanticizes the idea that the “story of the
Philippine Navy is, in a sense therefore, the story of the [Filipino] nation itself.”15 But
based on historical facts, the current navy actually evolved from the Philippine Naval
Patrol created in 1947, less than a year after the granting of Philippine independence on
12 June 1946. It was only in 1951 when PN received its present name.
In the 1950s, the Philippines was the only country in Southeast Asia with an
operational navy composed of all naval and marine forces, combat vessels, auxiliary
craft, naval aircraft, shore installations, and other supporting units.16 Because of its
erstwhile capabilities, PN became the role model of its Asian neighbours. Armed with a
credible and reliable navy assisted by its security ally, the United States, pursuant to
Mutual Defence Act of 1954, the Philippines courageously participated during the
height of the Korean War. By the 1960s, the Philippines received the very rare accolades
of its Southeast Asian neighbours as the “best equipped navy” in the region. In fact, PN
proudly writes in its official history that during the 1960s, PN was the envy of the
region.17 Indonesia even requested PN to share its best practices in organizing a navy.
Malaysia and Thailand used PN as the benchmark in the development of their respective
navies. Brunei and Singapore accorded PN with highest respect. PN also participated in
a peacekeeping mission in the Vietnam War and played a constructive role during the
Cambodian crisis. During those glorious years, PN excelled on anti-submarine warfare
and amphibious operations, which became one of the sources of the country’s national
pride in the international community.18
However, PN capabilities rapidly deteriorated in the 1970s because of many
interrelated factors. But one of the major reasons identified was the country’s heavy
dependence on American security umbrella for its own external defence at the height of
the cold war and this made the Philippines complacent in developing its capabilities for
15Headquarters Philippine Navy, “A Comprehensive History of the Philippine Navy” at
http://www.navy.mil.ph/history.htm <accessed on 1 December 2010>.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. For a discussion on the glorious days of the Philippine Navy, see Regino Giagonia, The Philippine
Navy (1898-1996) (Manila: Headquarters of the Philippine Navy, 1997).
18 For an excellent discussion on the exemplary practices of the Philippine Navy on naval operation, see
Office of the Assistant Naval Staff for Operations, N3, Lessons from Naval Battles and Operations in the
Philippines for PN Doctrines and Development I(Manila: Headquarters Philippine Navy, undated).
8

9. autonomous defence.19 The country’s strong preoccupation on internal security
campaigns against local communist and Muslim separatist insurgencies also led to the
government’s utter neglect of the Navy because the bulk military resources and defence
spending went to the Philippine Army (PA), which is leading the ground operations
against internal threats.20 As a result, PN faced the grim realities of rapidly ageing
ships, patrol vessels and other naval equipments in the 1980s. The withdrawal of
American forces from Subic in the 1990s due to the termination of the Military Bases
Agreement (MBA) in 1991 enormously diminished US military assistance to the
Philippines. This made the “once-strong” and “once-special” Philippine-American
security relations essentially moribund.21 The fading of Philippine-American security
relations in the post-bases era severely aggravated the deterioration of PN until it
became practically crippled at the turn of the 21st century due to obsolescence of its
floating assets and non-sustenance of genuine replacement parts for ships, machinery,
electronic communications, and fire control systems.22
As an example of an apparent corrosion of Philippine naval capabilities, PN’s
Cannon Class escort destroyer PF 11, locally known as BRP (Boat of the Republic of the
Philippines) Rajah Humabon (BRP-RH), was the state-of-art patrol frigate during
World War II. The BRP- RH’s sister ships in the United States were all commissioned
in 1943 and already in display in US naval museums. But the BRP-RH served PN in
various naval exercises in the region.23 In fact, the BRP-RH also served as PN’s largest
asset and symbolized the country’s Flagship.
Aside from BRP-RH, PN still impressively operates some World War II vintage
ships such as BRP Rizal and BRP Quezon, which were originally used as minesweeping
flotillas of the US in the early 1940s. Travelling the average speed of 20 knots, both are
still being used to patrol the nine facilities of the Philippines in the South China Sea.
Furthermore, PN continues to use 8 out of 60 Patrol Craft Escorts (PCEs) built for the
US Navy during World War II as anti-submarine convoy escorts. PN possesses Patrol
19 For excellent discussions on the Philippines’ dependency on American security umbrella during this
period, see Stephen R. Shalom, The United States and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism
(Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1986); Ed Garcia and Francisco Nemenzo, The Sovereign Quest:
Freedom from Foreign Military Bases (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1988); and Patricia Ann
Paez, The Bases Factor: The Realpolitik of RP-US Relations (Manila: Center for Strategic and
International Studies of the Philippines, 1985).
20 For a recent study on these twin-insurgencies, see Soliman M. Santos and Paz Verdades M. Santos, et
al, Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva:
Small Arms Survey, 2010).
21 Richard Fisher, “Rebuilding the US-Philippine Alliance,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No.
1255 (22 February 199).
22 Fancis Malahay, “The Need for the Inclusion of Submarines in the AFP Modernization Program to
Enhance the Navy Capability” (MA Thesis: National Defence College of the Philippines, 2004), p. 18.
23 “The Technology of the Philippine Navy” at http://technogra.ph/2008/02/29/the-technology-of-the-
philippine-navy/ <accessed on 3 December 2010>.
9

10. Ships 19, 20, 22 and 23 that were once part of the South Vietnamese fleet that escaped
during the fall of Saigon government in 1975 and eventually sold to the Philippine
government.24 Based on its current inventories, PN vintage naval assets include the
following:
1 Rajah Humabon Light Frigate
3 Jacinto Class Corvettes
1 Cyclone Class
2 Quezon Class Corvettes
6 Miguel Malvar Class Corvettes
2 Aguinaldo Class Large Patrol Craft
3 Kagitingan Class Patrol Craft
6 Tomas Batillo Class (PKM 200) Patrol Craft
12 Conrado Yap Class (SK) Patrol Craft
2 Point Class Cutters
24 Jose Andrada Class Patrol Craft
6 LSTs (Landing Ship Tanks)
2 LSVs (Logistic Support Vessels)
7 LCUs (Landing Craft Utilities)
1 Repair LST (Landing Ship Tank) Hull
6 Armored Troop Carriers
6 LCM (Landing Craft Mechanized) Mk8
11 LCM Mk6
2 AFDL (Auxiliary Floating Dry Docks) (AFDL 40 No Longer In Use)
1 Floating Dry Docks25
Most of the PN assets (see Table 1 for more details) are considered obsolete.
Though half of these outdated assets are still “service capable”, the rest really need
desperate repair if not total replacement or final decommissioning. Based on most
recent reports, of the 53 ships in the PN inventory of naval assets, only 25 are
considered operational. 26 Out of its 32 small crafts, only 23 are operational while only
four of its ten Navy auxiliary ships are operational. 27 On 10 December 2010, PN
announced the final decommissioning of three World War II vintage patrol crafts, which
will be sold as scrap metal to the highest bidder.28
Thus, when the Philippine Congress passed the AFPMP in 1995, PN immediately
formed the Naval Modernization Office (NMO), which became the symbol of PN
aspiration for naval modernization. The NMO prepared Philippine Navy Modernization
24 P. Ervin A. Mundo, “A Multi-Purpose Vessel for the Philippine Navy: Options and Prospects”, Office of
Strategic and Special Studies Digest (4th Quarter 2008), p. 18.
25 “Philippine Navy” at http://www.hueybravo.net/Philippine%20Navy%20Main.htm <accessed on 8
December 2010>.
26 Alexis Romero, “Navy decommissions 3 WW II patrol boats”, Philippine Star (10 December 2010).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
10

11. Program in August 1995, the 15-Year Strategic Development Plan completed in 1999,
and the 15-year Equipment Acquisition Plan prepared in 2005. These Plans aim to
purchase new naval assets and to upgrade existing ones in order to catch-up with the
current phase of naval developments in the region.
Table 1
INVENTORY OF EXISTING NAVAL ASSETS OF THE PHILIPPINES
FRIGATES  Datu Kalantiaw (USN Cannon  BRP Rajah Humabon (PF-11)
Class) (ex-USN USS Atherton DE-169)
CORVETTES  Jacinto Class (RN Peacock o BRP Magat Salamat (PS-
Class) 20) (ex-USN USS Geyety
o BRP Emilio Jacinto (PS-35) AM-239)
(ex-RN HMS Peacock o BRP Sultan Kudarat (PS-
P239) 22) (ex-USN USS PCE-895
o BRP Apolinario / USS Crestview E-PCE-
Mabini (PS-36) (ex-RN 895) 1975
HMS Plover P240) o BRP Datu Marikudo (PS-
o BRP Artemio Ricarte (PS- 23) (ex-USN USS PCE(R)-
37) (ex-RN HMS Starling 853)
P241) o BRP Cebu (PS-28) (ex-USN
 Rizal Class (USN Auk Class) USS PCE-881)
o BRP Quezon (PS-70) (ex- o BRP Negros
USN USS Vigilance AM- Occidental (PS-29) (ex-
324) USN USS PCE-884)
o BRP Rizal (PS-74) (ex-USN o BRP Pangasinan (PS-31)
USS Murrelet AM-372) (ex-USN USS PCE-891)
 Miguel Malvar Class (USN 1948
Admirable / PCE Class) o BRP Iloilo (PS-32) (ex-USN
o BRP Miguel Malvar (PS- USS PCE-897) 1948
19) (ex-USN USS PCE(R)
852 / USS Brattleboro E-
PCE(R)-852)
PATROL CRAFTS  USS Cyclone, now BRP o BRP Alfredo Peckson (PG-
Mariano Alvarez (USN 372)
Cyclone Class) o BRP Simeon Castro (PG-
o BRP Mariano Alvarez (PS- 374)
38) (ex-USN USS Cyclone o BRP Carlos Albert (PG-375)
PC-1) o BRP Heracleo Alano (PG-
 Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo Class 376)
o BRP Gen. Emilio o BRP Juan Magluyan (PG
Aguinaldo (PG-140) 392), a Jose Andrada class
o BRP Gen. Antonio patrol boat
Luna (PG-141) o BRP Liberato Picar (PG-
 Kagitingan Class 377)
o BRP Bagong Lakas (PG- o BRP Hilario Ruiz (PG-378)
102) o BRP Rafael Pargas (PG-
o BRP Bagong Silang (PG- 379)
104) o BRP Estor Reinoso (PG-
 Tomas Batillo Class (ROKN 380)
Chamsuri PKM Class) o BRP Dioscoro Papa (PG-
o BRP Tomas Batillo (PG- 381)
110) o BRP Ismael Lomibao (PG-
o BRP Boni Serrano (PG-111) 383)
o BRP Bienvenido o BRP Leovigildo
Salting (PG-112) Gantioqui (PG-384)
o BRP Salvador Abcede (PG- o BRP Federico Martir (PG-
11

12. 114) 385)
o BRP Ramon Aguirre (PG- o BRP Filipino Flojo (PG-
115) 386)
o BRP Nicolas Mahusay (PG- o BRP Anastacio
116) Cacayorin (PG-387)
o BRP Dionisio Ojeda (PG- o BRP Manuel Gomez (PG-
117)] 388)
o BRP Emilio Liwanag (PG- o BRP Teotimo
118) (ex-ROKN PKM223) Figoracion (PG-389)
 Conrado Yap Class o BRP Jose Loor Sr. (PG-
o BRP Jose Artiaga (PG-844) 390)
o BRP Leopoldo Regis (PG- o BRP Juan Magluyan (PG-
387), 392)
o BRP Apollo Tiano (PG- o BRP Florencio Inigo (PG-
851) 393)
o BRP Sulpicio o BRP Felix Apolinario (PG-
Fernandez (PG-853) 395)
 BRP Jose Andrada (PG-370)  Ex-Point Class Cutters
o BRP Enrique Jurado (PG- (USCG)
371) o BRP Alberto
Navarette (PG-394)(ex-
USCGC Point Evans)
o BRP Abraham Campo (PG-
396)(ex-USCGC Point
Doran)
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS  ex-WW2 LST 512-1152 Class o BRP Benguet (LT-507)
o BRP Zamboanga del o BRP Kalinga Apayao (LT-
Sur (LT-86) 516)
o BRP South Cotabato (LT-  Bacolod City Class
87) (Modified Frank Besson
o BRP Laguna (LT-501) Class LSV)
o BRP Lanao del Norte(LT- o BRP Bacolod City (LC-550)
504) o BRP Dagupan City (LC-
551)
AUXILLIARY SHIPS  BRP Pag-asa (AT-25) (Formerly,  BRP Lake Buluan (AW-33)
BRP Ang Pangulo) (Presidential  BRP Lake Paoay (AW-34)
Yacht)  BRP Lake Taal (AF-72)
 BRP Subanon (AT-291)  BRP Lake Buhi (AF-78)
 BRP Bagobo (AT-293)
 BRP Mangyan (AS-71)
MINOR NAVAL  29 US Swift Class Patrol Boats  3 Multi-purpose Attack Crafts
ASSETS
Source: Public Affairs Office, Headquarters of the Philippine Navy, Navy Journal Yearend
Edition (Manila: The Philippine Navy, 2009). Also listed in Wikipedia, “Philippine Navy”.
Based on the AFPMDP, PN has to implement within the 15-year time frame the
Capability, Materiel, and Technology Development (CMTD) project under the two sub-
programs of the entire military modernization scheme. With the CMTD, equipment
acquisition projects were lined up for PN to boost its naval defence power. Under the
CMTD, PN was mandated to acquire necessary naval assets listed in Table 2 within the
15 years mandate of the AFPMP. The implementation of CMTD should have started in
1997. But the Asian financial crisis of that year aborted all military acquisition
programs not only of the Philippines but also of the entire region.
12

13. From its list of naval acquisition, PN only intends to develop a Navy with inshore
territorial defence capability and does not intend to develop a Navy with a blue water
capability. Unlike some of its neighbours in Southeast Asia, the Philippines does not
even have a plan to acquire a submarine, which is a source of regional anxieties at
present.
Table 2
PHILIPPINE NAVY CAPABILITY, MATERIEL, AND TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT ACQUISITION UNDER THE AFP MODERNIZATION
PROGRAM
TYPE SUB-PROGRAM I SUB-PROGRAM II
Corvette 3 3
Patrol Craft 18 6
Patrol Boat 10 6
Offshore Patrol Vessel 7 5
Mine Warfare Vessel 1 3
Frigate 3
Source: Department of National Defence, In Defence of the Philippines: 1998 Defence Policy Paper
(Quezon City: Department of National Defence, 1998).
At present, PN still struggles with enormous challenges of naval modernization.29
While PN has present defence capabilities against surface and ground targets, it,
however, has limited capabilities against air targets.30 Its existing naval aircrafts can
only conduct very limited reconnaissance and transport operations. While its naval
firepower is considered sufficient for International Security Operations (ISO), PN’s
capabilities for Territorial Defence Operations (TDO) are still considered meagre and
insufficient, if not totally miserable.31 PN laments:
For external defence, the Navy is significantly constrained against
air, surface and sub-surface threats. It cannot assure real-time reliable and
secure communications. Electronic warfare capabilities are wanting in
many aspects. There are serious deficiencies in the quantity and more so
the quality of platforms and equipment. There are no resources for long
range detection, surveillance, reconnaissance and deployment. The
capability to utilize the neutralize mines still needs to be developed. The
automation necessary to engage high-speed and low observable craft and
weapons has not been put in place. The organization is not equipped for
conventional naval warfare and needs to significantly build up its
29 Philippine Navy, The Philippine Navy Modernization Program (Manila: Headquarters Philippine
Navy, 1995).
30 Headquarters Philippine Navy, Naval Modernization Guide (Manila: Headquarters Philippine Navy,
2008), p. 28.
31 Ibid., p. 29.
13

14. capabilities. With meagre self-defence means, PN ships are vulnerable to
better-armed platforms.32
As a glaring proof of PN’s limited capability, it only has 32 active vessels to patrol
36,000 nautical miles of Philippine waters.33 Given this situation, PN does not have the
required capability to defend Philippine claims in the disputed islands, islets, reefs and
shoals in the South China Sea. According to a high ranking naval officer, “It is ironic
that for a country surrounded by waters, the Philippines has the worst equipped navy in
the world.” 34 With this condition, another PN officer commented, “should the Chinese
or Vietnamese naval forces seize the Spratly Islands, the PN ships may not even reach
the scene of battle in the South China Sea. They can fire their missiles even before we
can see them on radar and we may never know what hit us”.35
The limited external defence capabilities of PN can also be discerned from the
size of its naval personnel. Out of an estimated 120,00036 personnel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), only 20,000 to 30,000personnel belong to PN. 37 The
Philippine Army has the largest personnel of around 60,000 to 70,000 while the
Philippine Air Force (PAF) has the smallest personnel of 15,000 to 20,000 (Figure 1). 38
Other sources, however, indicate that PN has a total of only 20,733 personnel broken
down as follows:
1,888 Officers including 400 Marines
17,342 Enlisted Personnel including 7,700 Marines
1,503 Civilian Employees
20,733 TOTAL39
32 Ibid.
33 Abigail Kwok, “Navy Optimistic Modernization Will Finally Push Through”, Philippine Daily Inquirer
(28 July 2010).
34 Cited in Alberto Araojo, “Towards a Responsive Education and Skills Training Program in Preparation
for PN Modernization” (Commandant’s Paper: AFP Joint Command and Staff College, 10 January 2001).
Also see Manuel de Leon, “The Philippine Navy Fleet Modernization” (MA Thesis: National Defence
College of the Philippines, 1992).
35 Ibid.
36 There is an estimate that the AFP has a total strength of 130,000. See “Military: The Philippines”, at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/phillipines/intro.htm <accessed on 7 December 2010>
37 But the website of the Philippine Navy states that it only has 21,957 personnel composed of sailors,
marines and civilian employees. See Philippine Navy website at http://www.navy.mil.ph/about.htm.
According to Naval intelligence, PN has no more than 22,000 personnel. Other sources indicate that PN
has a total strength of 24,000.
38 Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 1 December 2010.
Also see Armed Forces of the Philippines, Facebook at http://www.facebook.com/pages/Armed-Forces-
of-the-Philippines/111440715551567 <accessed on 1 December 2010).
39 “Philippine Navy” at http://www.hueybravo.net/Philippine%20Navy%20Main.htm <accessed on 8
December 2010>.
14

15. Figure 1
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF PN AGAINST AFP
Philippine
Air
Force
15,000-­‐20,000
Philippine
Philippine
13%
Army
Navy
65,000
to
20,000
to
70,000
30,000
57%
30%
Sources: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 1 December
2010. Armed Forces of the Philippines, Facebook at http://www.facebook.com/pages/Armed-Forces-of-
the-Philippines/111440715551567.
Despite its small number relative to the gargantuan tasks it has to perform, PN
has recently adopted a very ambitious operational concept that seeks to establish “naval
prominence in all mission areas”.40 Though this concept can generate some false hopes
and failed expectations in the Service, it is from this operational concept that the PN
inspires its personnel to perform three major roles that reveal the comprehensive
function of the naval service in the 21st century: military, constabulary and diplomatic,
to wit:
Military Role is the essence of any military institution such as the Navy.
In PN context, this role is generally viewed to defend the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of the Philippines. This is sustained through
fleet-marine operations employing the use of forces to launch from the sea
to enable application of military capabilities and sustained units in the sea.
This role does not only to maintain naval prominence with the country’s
maritime jurisdiction but may also reinforce claims in disputed territories
and contested waters.
40 The Philippine Navy, “An Operational Concept: Naval Prominence in all Mission Areas” (Maritime
Stakeholder’s Summit, 18-19 May 2009).
15

16. Constabulary Role meanwhile refers to preserving the internal peace
and unity of the Philippine archipelago. The task involves inter-agency
operations and collaborative efforts with other maritime enforcement
agencies such as the Philippine Coast Guard, Maritime Industry
Authorities, The PNP-Maritime Group and Bureau of Fisheries.
Diplomatic Role can be viewed in terms of contribution of PN to
regional peace and stability as well as prevention of inter-state conflicts.
In this regard, PN conducts a wide range of military and non-military
activities designed to promote peace and security and enhance security
cooperation in the region. These activities ensure peaceful purposes and
aim for cooperation rather than dispute.41
These aforementioned roles have complex interlocking functions to perform the
following interrelated tasks that are arguably easier said than done considering the
current PN resources: internal security, territorial defence, disaster response and relief
operations, support to national development, international defence and security
engagement and international humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations
(see Figure 2). It is expected, however, that the adoption of this new operational
concept will put PN in “a better position to define how it intends to conduct its mandate,
program its resources for better service delivery, and formulate our future assets
acquisitions to match with emerging strategic realities.”42 It can be discerned from this
operational concept that the main crux of naval modernization in the Philippines is to
create an inshore territorial defence navy that can secure the Philippine archipelago
from internal threats and external challenges.43
Notwithstanding the grandiose intention of this operational concept, it is sad to
stress that PN does not have enough wherewithal at present to fully implement it. PN
admits that its weapons systems and resources are not sufficient to enable the Service in
effectively confronting current and emerging threats to Philippine maritime security.
PN discloses that while it has short to medium range anti surface capabilities, it has a
very limited short range capabilities and does not even have long range anti-air
competences.44 PN expresses grief that it does not have any anti-submarine, electronic
warfare and mine warfare capabilities. Adding insult to injury is the inconvenient truth
41 Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Operations, N3, Compilation of Operational Policies,
Procedures and Guidelines. 2009 (Manila: Headquarters Philippine Navy, 2009). Also see “Draft PN
Strategic Sail Plan 2020” (Manila: Headquarters Philippine Navy, 2010).
42 Vice Admiral Ferdinand S. Golez, “State of the Navy Address”, Navy Journal, Vol, XVI, Issue No. III
(May 2009), p. 18.
43 The author is grateful to CDR Rommel Ong of the Philippine Navy for stressing this point.
44 “A Strategy for Naval Defence and Modernization” in Headquarters Philippine Navy, Naval
Modernization Guide, p. 3.
16

17. that the Philippines is the only Navy in Southeast Asia without a much-needed missile
capability.45
Brunei and Singapore, two smallest countries in the region in terms of land area
and population, have better equipped navies than PN.46 To adapt to the many security
challenges of the 21st century, naval developments in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and
Vietnam are in fact growing much faster than the Philippines.47 It is essential to take
into account, however, that naval developments in Southeast Asia are very modest and
“considerably less ambitious” compared to the more developed states like Australia,
China, India, Japan, and South Korea.48 These advance states are now involved in a sea
power development that has tremendous implications for the evolving maritime balance
of power in the Asia Pacific.49
In other words, while PN has sufficient capabilities for ISO, it does not have the
necessary capabilities for TDO compared with its neighbours in the region. Even its
capabilities to maintain presence in key maritime points of the archipelago are truly
wanting. Existing PN ships that are tasked to undertake effective patrols and efficient
blockades in the EEZ only have 40-mile radius coverage as against the 200-mile EEZ
that they need to protect and defend.50 Its ill-equipped coastal patrol and anti-
infiltration ships only have two-day endurance and 20-mile radius coverage, which is
not enough given the country’s archipelagic features.51
Though PN has the present capabilities to undertake efficient amphibious
landing, reliable electronic intelligence missions, and small but credible special naval
operations,52 it does not have deterrent naval power against unwanted activities
happening around Philippine territorial waters, particularly in Sulu Sea of the Southern
Philippines where all sorts of maritime crimes occur.53 Thus, naval modernization
45 Ibid.
46 For more discussion, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, ,“Military Developments and Relations in Southeast Asia”
(Paper presented at the East Asia Security Outlook Conference organized by Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Ministry of Defence, Brunei Darussalam on 7 January 2010).
47 See Tim Huxley, “Southeast Asia’s Navy in the 21st Century: Adapting to New Challenges” in Andrew
Forbes (ed), Sea Power: Challenges Old and New (Sydney: Halstead Press, 2007), pp. 259-270.
48 Ibid.
49 Lawrence W. Prabhakar, Joshua H. HO and Sam Bateman (eds), The Evolving Maritime Balance of
Power in the Asia Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea (Singapore: World
Scientific, 2006).
50 Malahay, p. 75.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 For more discussions, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Political Stability in the Southern Philippines: Threats
of Insurgency, Internal Conflicts and Key Players” (Paper delivered at the International Workshop on
Security and Stability in the Southern Philippines: Implications for Australia and the Region held at the
University of Wollongong, Australia on 28-29 September 2010).
17

18. continues to be a strong aspiration in the Philippines being a maritime nation and an
archipelagic state.
Figure 2
ROLES OF THE PHILIPPINE NAVY
Source: The Philippine Navy, “An Operational Concept: Naval Prominence in all Mission Areas”
(Maritime Stakeholder’s Summit, 18-19 May 2009).
18

19. NATURE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
PHILIPPINE NAVAL MODERNIZATION
Philippine naval modernization program is guided by the over-all objectives of the
AFP Modernization Program, which intends to “make the AFP a worthy player in any
regional or international security arrangement.”54 Specifically, the AFP Modernization
Program aims to pursue the following:
1. To develop the AFP’s capability to uphold the sovereignty of and territorial
integrity of the Republic and to secure the national territory from all forms of
intrusion and encroachment;
2. To develop the AFP’s capability to assist civilian agencies in the preservation of
the national patrimony, including the country’s living and non-living marine,
submarine, mineral, forest and other natural resources located within its
territory and its Exclusive Economic Zone;
3. To enhance the AFP’s capability to fulfill its mandate to protect the Filipino
people not only from armed threats but the ill effects of life-threatening and
destructive consequences of natural and man-made disasters and calamities,
including typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, major accidents in far-
flung or inaccessible terrain or at sea from all forms of ecological damage;
4. To improve the AFP’s capability to assist other agencies in the enforcement of
domestic and foreign policies as well as international covenants against piracy,
white slavery, smuggling, drug trafficking, hijacking of aircraft and sea craft and
the transport of toxic and other ecologically-harmful substance taking place in
or through Philippine territory;
5. To enhance the AFP’s capability to assist the Philippine National Police in law
enforcement and internal security operations;
6. To enhance the AFP’s capability to fulfill the country’s international
commitments; and
7. To develop the AFP’s capability to support national development.55
54Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Modernization Program, “Program
Overview” at
http://www.afpmodernization.mil.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19&Itemid=27
<accessed on 26 December 2010>.
55 Ibid.
19

20. PN modernization efforts are also based on the premise that PN shall be at the
forefront of external defence and the bastion in the promotion of Philippine maritime
security. Naval modernization, therefore, may be viewed as the cornerstone of
Philippine force modernization. As maritime nation of 95 million Filipinos and
archipelagic state of 7,107 islands, not to mention the contested islands in the South
China, PN contends that the country needs to rely on a credible navy that is mandated to
provide naval defence of the country and assure maritime security of the Filipino nation.
Modernizing the naval force is therefore imperative in the realization of the overall goals
of national security. PN modernization also supports the latest National Military
Strategy of the Philippines, which endeavours to accomplish the following military
objectives:
1. Decisively defeat all armed internal security threats;
2. Maintain territorial integrity and defend the national territory;
3. Protect the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ);
4. Contribute to regional peace and stability; and,
5. Support and assist lead government agencies within the AFP’s capabilities
As directed by national authorities in the following areas: conduct of
Socio-politico-economic development programs; respond to national
emergencies; enforcement of national laws.56
From these military objectives, PN identifies its three primary missions: 1)
ensuring territorial integrity, 2) protection of the EEZ, and 3) contribution to regional
peace and stability. These three primary missions are consistent with PN operational
concept that pursues naval modernization with the main intent of establishing an
inshore territorial defence navy. The PN also takes cognizance of its supporting role in
ISO, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and in the enforcement of
Philippine national laws.57
The nature and philosophy of the present efforts to modernize PN are best
articulated in PNMP. PN regards the PNMP as part of the overall process of naval
transformation and development, to wit:
The Philippine Naval Modernization Program (PNMP) is a
transformative endeavour that would enable the Navy to effectively
perform its mandate of defending the national territory, protecting the
nation’s maritime interests and of maintaining a regime of law and order
within the extensive maritime jurisdiction of the country. It aims to
56General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines. The National Military Strategy (Quezon City:
Armed Forces of the Philippines, 07 January 2002). This document is currently being amended to suit
the current situation.
57 Headquarters Philippine Navy, The Philippine Navy Fifteen-Year Equipment Acquisition Plan
(Updated Manuscript, 28 April 2009).
20

21. develop capabilities in the command and control of forces, collaborative
operations with other Services, the detection, tracking and neutralization
of threats, the surveillance of the maritime zone and the deployment of
mobile forces all over the archipelago.58
The most recent effort to modernize PN is embodied in the Strategic Sail Plan
2020 (SSP 2020), which expresses the most current aspiration of PN “to restore its
former glory and surpass it in the near future.”59 Initially drafted in 2006, the SSP 2020
provides the roadmap of PN for capability development and naval modernization. It
adopts the overarching philosophy of “performing while transforming” as it attempts to
make PN strong and credible Philippine naval force of the future. Its main vision is to
make PN “a credible Navy that our maritime nation can be proud of” by 2020.60
One important innovation of SSP 2020 is the creation of the Centre for Naval
Leadership and Excellence, which is considered to be the first of its kind in the whole
AFP. The main purpose of the Centre is “to oversee, ensure and sustain the proper
implementation and cascading of the Sail Plan as well facilitate its review and
enhancement.” Specifically, the Centre is mandated to perform the following
functions:
1. Oversee the implementation of the PN Strategic Sail Plan 2020.
2. Organize/facilitate forums, seminars and other leadership related activities
by inviting experts, leaders and exemplary individuals from within and
outside the organization who can share their personal experience in
leadership and best practices in their organizations.
3. Assess the effects of PN leadership and governance programs and activities to
PN personnel.
4. Develop new leadership modules and programs that can be taught to PN
personnel.
5. Coordinate with HPN Staff the consolidation and dissemination of
Command thrusts, plans and programs to PN units.
6. Facilitate for the establishment of networks from PN external stakeholders
and ensure their involvement in PN initiatives.61
The Centre is also serving as the main mouthpiece of the PN in developing,
propagating and enriching the concept of SSP 2020. One of the major advocacies of the
Centre that is considered part and parcel of naval modernization is the adoption of a
Capability-Based Planning (CBP) Framework as an alternative to Threat-Based
58 “Navy Modernization Project Management Team and Its Membership: Making Naval Dreams a
Reality” in Naval Modernization Guide, p. 54.
59 Headquarters Philippine Navy, “Philippine Navy Strategic Sail Plan 2020” (Presentation delivered at
the Maritime Stakeholders’ Summit held at the AFP Commissioned Officer’s Club, 18 May 2009).
60 Ibid.
61 “Philippine Navy Strategic Sail Plan 2020” (Draft Manuscript, October 2010), pp. 6-7.
21

22. Planning (TBP) Framework. CBP focuses more “on delivering capabilities to address
wide range of threats rather than delivering the capability to defeat a specific threat.”
Thus, the CBP embedded in the SSP 2020 conveys the benign intention of PN in its
modernization efforts.
22

23. CAUSES OF
PHILIPPINE NAVAL MODERNIZATION
Philippine naval modernization may be considered part of the regional trend of
maritime capacity building in the Asia Pacific region.62 Domestically, the main causes of
Philippine naval modernization are based on what the PN describes as the “Imperatives
of Naval Defence”, which aims to address the following interrelated maritime security
concerns: territorial sovereignty, protection of the marine resources, external security
threats, maritime crimes, and maritime terrorism:63
Territorial Sovereignty
Naval modernization aims to defend territorial sovereignty of the Philippine
Republic. This includes the protection Philippine territorial waters, EEZ and claimed
islands, islets and shoals in the South China Sea. The protection of Philippine territorial
sovereignty is embodied in the concept of Territorial Defence, which, in the words of
former Navy Flag Officer in Command (FOIC), simply means that “not one of our
island territories shall never again be occupied by foreign forces.”64 Based on the
Defence Planning Guidance 2011-2016 issued by the DND, “With the anticipated
winding down of internal security concerns … capability development for territorial
defence shall become the main priority over the course of the 2011-2016 medium term
period.” (Underscoring mine)65 The passing into law on 10 March 2009 of the Republic
Act (RA) 9522, otherwise known as the New Philippine Baselines Law, reaffirms the
Philippines’ commitment to defend its territorial waters, including its extended
continental shelf, economic zones and an area of the contested Spratly archipelago
known in the country as the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG).66
To carry out the task of territorial defence, enhancing the capability of PN is
therefore essential, which specifically means the strengthening of the Philippine Fleet
Marine Team. According to the Commander of the Western Command of the AFP, “the
force of choice for external defence is the Fleet Marine because it is highly mobile and
62 See Andrew Forbes (ed), Maritime Capacity Building in the Asia Pacific Region (Canberra: Sea Power
Centre, 2010).
63 “The Imperatives of Naval Defence” in Headquarters Philippine Navy, Naval Modernization Guide, p.
2.
64 Vice Admiral Ferdinand S. Golez, “State of the Navy Address”, Navy Journal, Vol, XVI, Issue No. III
(May 2009), p. 18.
65 Department of National Defence, Defence Planning Guidance, 2011 – 2016 (Quezon City: Office of the
Secretary of National Defence, 2010).
66For a complete electronic copy of the New Philippine Baselines Law or Republic Act 9922, see
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9522_2009.html.
23

24. can easily adapt to both land and sea environment.”67 The Western Command of the
AFP has the primary mission to defend Philippine territories in the disputed islands in
the South China Sea. Regrettably, PN only deploys 55 naval personnel in the nine
occupied features of the Philippines in the South China Sea.
Protection of the Marine Resources
As an archipelago, the Philippines is very rich in marine resources considering
that 64 out of its 79 provinces have coastal domains. It means that 80% of Philippine
provinces are coastal. Out of 1,502 municipalities, 832 are considered coastal towns
representing 55% of total Philippine municipalities. In other words, 60% of total
Philippine population of around 95 million live in coastal areas. The Philippines has a
total coastline of 36,289 km, which is one of the world’s largest. The country also has
27,000 sq km of coral reef system with rich marine biodiversity. As such, the Philippines
belongs to the 10th top marine capture producing country and 10th top aquaculture
producer in the world.68 Indeed, the Philippines is a maritime nation endowed with
natural resources that emanate from the maritime domain.
However, its rich maritime resources are at risk because of unsustainable fishing
practices and destructive economic activities in the maritime areas. Naval
modernization intends to build the needed capacity of PN to conserve and protect its
rich maritime resources surrounding the Philippine archipelago. Because many
Filipinos get their livelihoods from the sea, the protection of the marine resources is
important for the survival of Filipino nation.
External Security Threats
The Philippines does not see any current threat of external aggression from its
neighbours, particularly in Southeast Asia. There is a wide perception in the Philippines
that the region is generally more peaceful and stable than at any time since the end of
the cold war.69 The Philippine government accepts the view that the norm of
cooperation fostered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made
intra-regional sources of inter-state conflicts at its manageable level, thus far.70 The
defence establishment even regards the adoption of an ASEAN security community
67 Tessa Jamandre, “China builds lighthouse on PHL-claimed territory in Spratlys”, 8 December 2010 at
http://verafiles.org/main/focus/china-builds-lighthouse-on-phl-claimed-territory-in-spratlys/ <accessed
on 8 December 2010.
68This data is from Atty Rodel Cruz, President of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Forum and former
Undersecretary of National Defence in the Philippines.
69 For the author’s elaboration on this issue, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, Current and Emerging Security
Environment in Southeast Asia: A Regional Security Appraisal for Philippine Defence, Security and
Foreign Policy (Manila: Yuchengco Center, 2010).
70 Ibid., p. 84.
24

25. (ASC) as a reinforcement of the pacific settlement of disputes in Southeast Asia. 71 With
the ASC, the likelihood of inter-state wars in the region is said to be diminished.
But PN asserts that it has to build naval capabilities to confront transnational
security threats emanating from the Philippine maritime domain. The AFP even
supports naval modernization in order to deter potential external security threats from
its neighbours, particularly those with territorial disputes with the country.72 The
Philippines still has unresolved territorial issues with Malaysia over Sabah. The
Philippines also has territorial claims in the contested islands, islets, reefs and shoals in
the South China Sea involving claimants from Brunei, China, Malaysia, Taiwan and
Vietnam. The Sabah Conflict and the South China Sea Disputes are two major external
security concerns that may have bearing on Philippine naval modernization efforts.
Thus, the Philippine military argues that though external security threats
emanating from unresolved territorial disputes over Sabah and contested features in the
South China Sea are “less immediate” at present, the AFP “continuously seeks to
develop its capacities for territorial defence to be fully capable of undertaking unilateral
defensive operations should external armed aggression happen.”73 This military policy
declaration currently shapes the direction of naval modernization in the Philippines.
Another important issue that might be considered as an external security threat
to the Philippines as an archipelago is the intrusion of foreign vessels in its territorial
waters and archipelagic sea-lanes. PN has recorded an annual average of 155 foreign
vessels intruding into the Philippine waters. The top-five foreign vessels that have
frequently intruded the Philippine waters are from China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan
and Vietnam.74 Naval modernization aims to enhance the capability of PN to deter and
prevent the intrusion of foreign vessels in Philippine waters that are considered to be
one of the busiest sea lanes in Southeast Asia (Figure 3).
PN is therefore developing an “Active Archipelagic Defence Strategy” (AADS),
which is a naval strategy “that sets out the means and ways on how the PN intends to
evolve its current navy into the Navy of the future” that can effectively address external
71This view is expressed in a working paper prepared in 2004 by the Department of National Defence. See
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy and Special Concerns, The Emerging Security Environment to
2022 (Quezon City: Department of National Defence, 14 April 2004).
72Armed Forces of the Philippines, The Strategic Direction of the AFP International Military Affairs
(Quezon City: AFP Headquarters, 2008), pp. 7-10.
73 Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Internal Peace and Security Plan: Bayanihan
(Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2010), p. 13.
74 Headquarters Philippine Navy, The Philippine Navy Fifteen-Year Equipment Acquisition Plan
(Updated Manuscript, 28 April 2009), p. 13.
25

26. security challenges to Philippine security.75 The AADS also intends to rationalize “the
future development of the PN force structure and its most effective employment
founded on the need to attain Naval Dominance in future battle space.”76 The
development of AADS is an integral aspect of naval modernization program that aims to
enhance PN defensive capacity to confront external security threats.
Figure 3
PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES
Source: Philippine Navy, 2010.
Maritime Crimes
As maritime nation, the Philippines is vulnerable to various maritime crimes
such as piracy, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal arms trade among others.
Maritime crimes are considered non-traditional security threats in the Philippines being
75 The Philippine Navy, “Active Archipelagic Defence Strategy: Strategizing the Future of the Philippine
Navy” (Presented at the Philippine Navy Seminar-Workshop on Formulating an Active Archipelagic
Defence Strategy
At the PN Headquarters, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City on 13-14 May 2009).
76 Ibid.
26

27. used to justify naval modernization.77 Maritime crimes are high in Sulu and Celebes
seas, which are porous and ungoverned triborder sea areas between the littoral states of
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.78 The Philippines intends to build naval
capabilities to address these problems and help promote good order at sea in Southeast
Asia.79
PN regards the development of a strong navy as vital for the promotion of
Philippine maritime security against various crimes at sea. Specifically, PN pursues
naval modernization to protect the Philippines’ archipelagic sea-lanes and uphold
Philippine sovereignty of its archipelagic waters against maritime crimes.80
One effort towards this end is the creation of Coast Watch South (CWS) which is
an operational response to combat maritime crimes and other maritime security
challenges occurring in the waters of the Southern Philippines, particularly in the Sulu-
Sulawesi (Celebes) Seas.81 Currently based in Zamboanga City under the operational
command of the Naval Forces Western Mindanao, CWS aims to uphold inter-agency
coordination and whole-of-government approach in promoting maritime security.
Currently being led and funded by PN, the creation of CWS is deemed consistent with
naval modernization in the Philippines as it is a purely PN initiative at present.82 PN
intends to make CWS as a template for National Coast Watch System in the
Philippines.83 It is also designed to establish and enhance maritime security
cooperation with Malaysia and Indonesia to combat not only maritime crimes in the
littoral states but also maritime terrorism.
77 For the authors detailed discussions on maritime crimes affecting Philippine security, see Rommel C.
Banlaoi, “Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asian Maritime Domain: Implications for the
Indian Ocean” in VR Raghavan and W Lawrence S. Prabhakar (eds), Maritime Security in the Indian
Ocean Region: Critical Issues in Debate (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Limited,
2008), pp. 239-262. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Security Threats in Post-911 Southeast Asia:
Regional Responses” in Burns, Bateman and Lehr (eds), Llyod’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security,
pp. 253-270.
78Ian See Ian Storey, “The Triborder Sea Area: Maritime Southeast Asia's Ungoverned Space”, Terrorism
Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 19 (24 October 2007).
79 Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho and Jane Chan, Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia (Singapore: RSIS Policy
Paper, April 2009).
80 See Eriberto Varona, “Designation of Archipelagic Sea Lanes: The Philippine Navy Perspective”, Ocean
Law and Policy Series, Volume I, No. 1 (January-June 1997), pp. 18-20. Also see Jay Batongbacal,
“Archipelagic Sea Lanes and Transit Passage Through Straits: Shared Responsibilities are Essential to
Implementation”, in Andrew Forbes (ed) The Strategic Importance of Seaborne Trade and Shipping
(Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 10, 2003), pp. 99-112.
81 Rodel Cruz, “Coast Watch South and Maritime Security in the Tri-Border Area” (Presented at the
International Forum on Asia Pacific Secruity organized by the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and
Terrorism Research, Dusit Thani Hotel, Manila, 29 October 2010).
82 The Philippine Navy, “Coast Watch South: Official Briefing” (Manila: Headquarters of the Philippine
Navy, 2010).
83 Ibid.
27

28. Maritime Terrorism
Since the bombing of MV Superferry 14 in Manila Bay on 27 February 2004, PN
has been upgrading its capability to combat maritime terrorism originating primarily
from the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which has been known to have established links with
Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.84 The Navy Sail Plan 2020 and the PN 15-Year
Equipment Acquisition Plan assert that thwarting maritime terrorism is one of PN
priorities for modernizing its naval force. PN even conducted the Visit, Board, Search
and Seizure (VBSS) capability drill on 13 March 2010 in Manila Bay to enhance
maritime boarding actions and tactics against maritime terrorism and other maritime
crimes.85 PN has also formed the Naval Special Operations Group (NAVSOG), which
enhanced and replaced the Special Warfare Action Group (SWAG). There is a need to
underscore that SWAG played a crucial role in the neutralization in 2002 of Abu Sabaya
(real name Aldam Tilao), a very notorious ASG commander responsible for a number of
kidnap-for-ransom activities in Mindanao.86 SWAG was renamed as NAVSOG to
enhance naval capabilities in countering maritime terrorism. NAVSOG is the Philippine
equivalent of the Navy Seals in the United States.
84 For the author’s elaboration on this topic, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of
Maritime Piracy and Terrorism” in Peter Lehr (ed), Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global
Terrorism (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 121-138. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi,
“Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat”, Naval War College Review, Volume 58,
No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 63-80.
85 “Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) Capability Demonstration”, The Philippine Navy Today at
http://navyspeak.blogspot.com/2010/03/lieutenant-colonel-edgard-arevalo-pnm.html <accessed on 18
December 2010>
86 For more discussions, see Ernesto De Leon, “The Fleet-Marine Teams on the Neutralization of Abu
Sabaya” in Lessons from Naval Batlles and Operations in the Philippines for PN Doctrines Development
(Manila: Headquarters of the Philippine Navy, undated), pp. 128-135.
28

29. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF PHILIPPINE NAVAL MODERNIZATION
ON REGIONAL SECURITY
Philippine naval modernization program has been viewed as part of the over-all
trends of military build-up occurring in the Asia Pacific region at the end of the cold
war.87 It is also considered as an indication of the prospects of Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) in Southeast Asia.88 Though military modernization does not equate with
military effectiveness, countries in Southeast Asia pursued force modernization for
various reasons and to varying degrees.89
One of the consequences of military modernization in Southeast Asia is a
perceived arms race in the region.90 The trend happened in the 1980s and early 1990s
when the region enjoyed relative economic prosperity. This got the attention of
international community to call for arms trade transparency in Southeast Asia.91 But
Southeast Asian countries reject the concept of arms race to describe military
modernization in the region. For them, force modernization is simply an attempt to
upgrade their obsolete military assets so they can effectively protect their sovereignty
and enhance military capacities to deal with non-traditional security challenges in the
era of globalization. While their relative economic prosperity may have encouraged
them to pursue military modernization, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, in fact, delayed
all force modernization efforts in Southeast Asia.
The Philippines is one of the countries that were greatly affected by the financial
crisis. Though other countries already recovered from the crisis, the Philippines has yet
to recover to finance its naval modernization programs.
Nonetheless, PN is geared to receive modest funding for naval modernization
through the AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund (AFPMATF). PN expects an amount of
P134.5 billion to be used for a period of 20 years. This amount intends to implement PN
equipment acquisition program focusing on the purchase of surface warfare, anti-
87 Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia Pacific Region”, International
Security, Volume 18, Number 3 (Winter 1993/1994).
88 J.D. Kenneth Boutin, “Prospects for a revolution in military affairs in Southeast Asia”, RSIS
Commentaries, No. 3 (November 2001).
89 Andrew Tan, “Force Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia”, IDSS Working Paper, No. 59 (January
2004).
90 Amitav Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994).
91 Edward J. Laurance, “A Conceptual Framework for Arms Trade Transparency in South-East Asia” in
Gill and Mak, Arms, Transparency and Security in South-East Asia, pp. 10-24.
29

30. submarine, coastal patrol, sealift, amphibious, naval air, search and rescue, mine
countermeasure operations and command and control, and support systems, upgrading
and refurbishing of a number of ships, aircraft, amphibious vehicles, and equipment of
the naval shipyard.92
As an unintended consequence of the PN Modernization Program, there is a
perceived, if not real, heightening of security dilemma in Southeast Asia. Security
dilemma exists when the military preparations of one state create an un-resolvable
uncertainty in the mind of another state as to whether those preparations are for
“defensive” or “offensive” purposes.93 With the concept of security dilemma associated
with naval modernization trends, countries in Southeast Asia are trapped in a “guessing
game” situation where decision makers try to speculate on other countries’ strategic
intention whether the said intention is benign or malign. States perceptions of security
dilemma create a paradox in which states believe that their security requires the
insecurity of others.94
This difficult situation occurs because of the anarchic nature of international
system where there is the absence of an overarching authority that can regulate the
behaviour of sovereign states. In an anarchic international environment, states
constantly compete with one another to protect their sovereignty and to pursue their
national interests.95 Though the state of anarchy can also encourage states to cooperate
by building international regimes or constructing international norms, mutual
suspicions continue to describe the reality of international politics.
In Southeast Asia, mutual suspicions among states continue to exist because of
still unresolved bilateral territorial disputes.96 Though Southeast Asian states have the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to provide various mechanisms for the
peaceful settlement of regional disputes, particularly in the context of an ASEAN
security community, each of them is still informed by the realist view of international
relations where autonomous defence is considered to be necessary for each state to fend
for its own security. Thus, security dilemma is a regional tragedy because war can occur
92 Headquarters Philippine Navy, The Philippine Navy Fifteen-Year Equipment Acquisition Plan
(Updated Manuscript, 28 April 2009), p. 1.
93Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, “The Security Dilemma” in John Baylis and N.J. Rennger (eds),
Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in Changing World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992),
pp. 29-60.
94Jack Snyder, “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and
Janice Gross (eds), Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1985), p.
155.
95For a concept of anarchy, see Robert C. Art and Robert Jervis, International Politics: Enduring
Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 4th edition (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1996), pp.
1-148.
96 See Narayanan Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in the Post-Cold War ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).
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31. between and among states though none of them truly desire such an outcome.97
Because each state is mandated to promote its own national interests and purse
autonomous defence, security uncertainties pervade in the region. These security
anxieties exacerbate the security dilemma associated with naval modernization.
It has to be noted, however, that since 2001, defence spending in some Southeast
Asian countries has been increasing. Southeast Asian claimants became more serious in
their programs to upgrade their naval capabilities, particularly in the context of growing
regional maritime security concerns,98 renewed security tensions in the South China
Sea99 and rapid development of China’s naval power.100 Malaysia, for example,
acquired in October 2009 a Scorpene Class submarine to bolster its capability to guard
its waters. Vietnam, on the other hand, ordered in 2007 two Gepard Class frigates from
Russia. Vietnam also explored the procurement of six Kilo Class submarines from
Russia to increase its maritime capabilities. Indonesia also planned to construct 12
additional submarines by 2024 and considering the Chanbogo Class submarines from
South Korea or Kilo Class submarines from Russia. While Thailand acknowledged the
deterrent value of acquiring submarines and expressed no plan to acquire submarines
arguing that “deploying a submarine would heighten tensions” with neighbours,101 it is
currently, however, considering acquiring one.
Though still financially challenged to acquire modern naval ships, the Philippines
acquired in May 2009 three multi-purpose attack crafts to be deployed in the waters of
Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi.102 As part of Philippine naval modernization project, the
Department of National Defence (DND) also ordered in May 2010 to rush the
acquisition of two multi-role vessels from either Singapore and South Korea.103 PN
underscores, however, that its recent acquisitions are meant to ameliorate the security
dilemma by increasing Philippine naval capacity to promote maritime security
cooperation in Southeast Asian rather than compete with its neighbours.
97The concept of security dilemma as a tragedy was popularized by Herbert Butterfield. See Herbert
Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), pp. 6-20.
98 Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan (eds), Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (New York and
London: Routledge, 2007).
99 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Renewed Tensions and Maritime Security Dilemma in the South China Sea”
(Delivered at the National Defense University of Taiwan on 15 April 2010 and at the International
Maritime Security Forum at Keelung, Taiwan on 16 April 2010).
100 See Zhang Wennu, “Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices”, China Security (Summer 2006), pp. 17-
31. Also see Ronald O Rourke, China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities –
Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report for Congress, 19 November 2008).
101 National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2010 (Tokyo: The Japan Times,
2010).
102 AFP Modernization Office, “Multi-Purpose Attack Crafts” (3 July 2009) at
http://www.afpmodernization.mil.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1:mpac&catid=
1:latest-news&Itemid=50 <accessed on 26 December 2010>
103 “DND rushing acquisition of Navy vessels”, The Philippine Star (16 May 2010).
31