Juice Jacking 101 covers the hisotry behind why and what we learned from building malicious cell phone charging kiosks (and then setting them up at various hacker conferences)
21. Don't get jacked.
● USB cable neutering (removing data pin)
● Powering off the device
22. Don't get jacked.
● USB cable neutering (removing data pin)
● Powering off the device
● Confirmation required for mounting/debug
access
23. Don't get jacked.
● USB cable neutering (removing data pin)
● Powering off the device
● Confirmation required for mounting/debug
access
● Bring a backup battery!
24. Don't get jacked.
● USB cable neutering (removing data pin)
● Powering off the device
● Confirmation required for mounting/debug
access
● Bring a backup battery!
● Bring your own charger; only plug into wall
sockets (110v AC).
25. Don't get jacked.
● USB cable neutering (removing data pin)
● Powering off the device
● Confirmation required for mounting/debug
access
● Bring a backup battery!
● Bring your own charger; only plug into wall
sockets (110v AC).
26. My 0.02
● For business it's a matter of policy.
● For users it's a matter of not forgetting.
● Remember your charger or backup power
source/battery.
● The iPhone is a serious concern.
27. Devices
Android
Majority of roms ship with the “ask before mounting” option.
– This differs from rom to rom (check your device.)
OS designed with strict security permissions on applications and filesystem.
Battery accessible, you can bring another battery or replace the stock battery.
Unique risks:
– Android debugger
– Rooted phones
28. Devices
iPhone
● Design for usability first
● Auto-sync
● No confirmation to mount
● No battery replacements
● Proprietary connector
● Strict after-market control
30. Roll your own kiosk
● Push malware to phones
● Pull data from phones
● Foot traffic monitoring (device ID)
● People tracking (device ID)
31. Attack Existing Kiosks
● Complicated PIN/Video systems likely means a
CPU is in the box
● USB interface
● Discrete attack (just plugging in your phone!)
● Requires a detailed knowledge of the Kiosk
32. Beyond the Kiosk
● Forget everything about the Kiosk.
● Transfer the attacks to a Laptop/PC.
● Use infected phones to spread Malware.
● Everyone brings their phones to work, plenty of
those people will 'charge' at their desk.
33. Summary
● The core threat isn't the kiosk, it is:
– A design that chose usability over security.
– Data transfer and charging happen on the same port.
34. Summary
● The core threat isn't the kiosk, it is:
– A design that chose usability over security.
– Data transfer and charging happen on the same port.
● The complexity goes beyond the Kiosk.
– Malware infecting PCs/Laptops used to infect phones.
– Phones used to infect PCs/Laptops and Kiosks.
35. Summary
● The core threat isn't the kiosk, it is:
– A design that chose usability over security.
– Data transfer and charging happen on the same port.
● The complexity goes beyond the Kiosk.
– Malware infecting PCs/Laptops used to infect phones.
– Phones used to infect PCs/Laptops and Kiosks.
● It isn't just phone malware.
– Monitoring/Tracking people based on USB device ID
– Stolen personal information, Blackmail, etc...
36. Thank You!
● Wall of Sheep
● Iggy, Riverside and Cedoxx
● Toorcon
● Irvine Underground
Contact Information: Robert Rowley, Robert@RobRowley.com
Notas do Editor
Id4con Drunken idea … really. Design and team came together @ ID4Con. Let's build a fake cell charging kiosk
ID4CON 2011 Put together in the following weeks (July 4 th → Defcon August 7 th )
Both have security concerns
You are right to think “who the hell would plug into this PoS?” we were too...
So ugly, who would plug in to it?
The “other” charge station, and guiding people along “Burn” phones Reality, noone attacked the kiosk, people still trusted it. And preferred it to the pay kiosk that was at the hotel Reactions: From distrusting, to not caring, to changing corporate policy.