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Risk Centric Security, Inc.
 www.riskcentricsecurity.com
 Authorized reseller of ModelRisk from Vose Software

Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary .           Risk Analysis for the 21st Century®
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Patrick Florer has worked in information technology for
30 years. In addition, he worked a parallel track in
medical outcomes research, analysis, and the creation of
evidence-based guidelines for medical treatment. His
roles have included IT operations, programming, and
systems analysis. From 1986 until now, he has worked as
an independent consultant, helping customers with
strategic development, analytics, risk analysis, and
decision analysis. He is a cofounder of Risk Centric
Security and currently serves as Chief Technology Officer.

  Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary .
  Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
This webinar is about language and ideas.

   No one owns the definitions of words, but it is often
   useful to:

            Understand what we mean when we use certain
            words and express certain ideas

            Understand what others mean when they do the
            same


Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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When speaking with our customers, we recognized:

   Information Security Professionals are comfortable
   speaking the technical language of firewalls, logs,
   threats, vulnerabilities, and exploits.

   Business managers are comfortable speaking the
   language of return on investment, discounted cash
   flows, and risk as financial impact.

   Mutual misunderstanding can occur, and it is often a
   source of frustration for everyone.

Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
By learning to speak about risk in business terms,
   Information Security Professionals can reach out and
   bridge the language gap.

   The technical details of sql injection attacks may be
   important to you, but your business counterparts
   may not understand, and they usually don’t care.




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Instead of talking about threats, vulnerabilities, and
   controls, talk about risk in terms of financial impact.
   Tell the business people what a sql injection attack
   could cost.

   They will understand that!
   (They may not believe you, but they will understand
   what you are saying!)


Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Risk – What it is and what it isn’t
           Risk and Opportunity
           Possibility vs. probability
           Measurement
           Variability and Uncertainty
           Precision vs. accuracy
           Qualitative vs. quantitative methods
           The “not enough data” syndrome
           Monte Carlo simulation
           Modeling expert opinion and the PERT distribution



Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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From The American Heritage dictionary*:
       The possibility of suffering harm or loss; danger.
       A factor, thing, element, or course involving uncertain
         danger; a hazard.
       The danger or probability of loss to an insurer.
       The amount that an insurance company stands to lose.
       The variability of returns from an investment.
       The chance of nonpayment of a debt.
   *The  American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Copyright © 2006, 2000. Houghton
   Mifflin Company.




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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From ISO 31000:
   1.1 risk - effect of uncertainty on objectives
   NOTE 1 An effect is a deviation from the expected —positive and/or
   negative.
   NOTE 2 Objectives can have different aspects (such as financial, health and
   safety, and environmental goals) and can apply at different levels (such as
   strategic, organization-wide, project, product and process).
   NOTE 3 Risk is often characterized by reference to potential events
   (3.5.1.3) and consequences (3.6.1.3), or a combination of these.
   NOTE 4 Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the
   consequences of an event (including changes in circumstances) and the
   associated likelihood (3.6.1.1) of occurrence.

   NOTE 5 Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of information
   related to, understanding or knowledge of, an event, its consequence, or
   likelihood


 Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
 Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
In the USA, NIST, Special Publication 800-30 describes
     risk in the following way:

       Risk is:
           “the net mission impact considering the
           probability that a particular threat-source will
           exercise (accidentally trigger or intentionally
           exploit) a particular information system
           vulnerability, and the resulting impact if this
           should occur.”

Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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NIST (The National Institute of Standards and
   Technology), provides an additional definition of risk
   in Special Publication 800-39:
   Risk
        A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a
        potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the
        adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event
        occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence.

        Information system-related security risks are those risks that arise
        from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
        information or information systems and reflect the potential
        adverse impacts to organizational operations (including mission,
        functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals,
        other organizations, and the Nation.
  NIST, The National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special Publication 800-39, Appendix B, Page B-7.



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A probability that something will happen


   A probable impact if something does happen




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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The probability that something will happen to cause a
   negative impact in financial terms:

   For example, a 50% chance that it will cost 50 million
   dollars if our data are stolen.

   Another way to express this is to multiply the two
   numbers together and say that:

           Risk = 25 million dollars on an annualized basis


Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Threats and exploits are not risks.

            Threat agents are not risks.

            Vulnerabilities are not risks.

            Ineffective controls are not risks.

   Each of these elements factors into understanding
   risk, but none of them constitute risk.
Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
For our discussion today, Risk will be used to indicate
   loss or harm.
   Opportunity can be viewed as the positive aspect of
   Risk.
   The techniques that apply to Risk analysis can also be
   applied to Opportunity analysis.




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Let’s look at tossing a coin:
   What are the possibilities?
   What are the probabilities?
   Does knowing either help us predict what will happen
   when we toss the coin next time?




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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A possibility is something that is “capable of
  happening, existing, or being true without
  contradicting proven facts, laws, or circumstances
  known to be true. *”


  A probability is "the likelihood that a given event will
  occur.”*


  *All
     quotes from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Copyright © 2006,
  2000. Houghton Mifflin Company.

Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
In statistics, a probability is “a number expressing the
   likelihood that a specific event will occur, expressed as
   the ratio of the number of actual occurrences to the
   number of possible occurrences.“
   Probability is calculated after tossing the coin many
   times.
   Probability is always a number between 0 and 1,
   sometimes expressed as:




  *All   quotes from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Copyright © 2006, 2000. Houghton Mifflin Company.
Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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How can we use this in information security risk
   analysis?

   The fact that something can happen (possibility)
   doesn't tell us how likely it is to happen (probability),
   or how much impact it might have if it does happen
   (probability).

   Estimating these values helps us prioritize our
   activities in a rational way.

Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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What is a measurement?

       An observation that “ascertains the dimensions,
       quantity, or capacity of” an object or process”*

       A set of observations that reduce uncertainty where
       the result is expressed as a quantity**



       *TheAmerican Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Copyright © 2006, 2000. Houghton Mifflin
       Company
       ** Hubbard, Douglas W., “How to Measure Anything 2nd Edition”, John Wiley & Sons, New Jersey, 2010, p. 23


Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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What are the properties of a measurement?

       Validity – does the measurement actually do what
       you think it does?

       Reproducibility – when repeated, does the
       measurement give a consistent answer?

       Detail – does the measurement provide a useful
       level of detail?

Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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What are some sources of error in measurement?

       Random error – a function of the instrument

       Bias – a function of the measurement taker




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Why do we make measurements?
       Measurements are a way to collect data.

       Making measurements should be about reducing
       uncertainty.

       A measurement only has to be good enough for the
       decision at hand.

       Sometimes, you cannot get the data you think you
       need, so you have to use a proxy.
Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Variability and uncertainty are not the same thing,
   and it can be useful to be aware of the difference.
    “Variability is the effect of chance and is a function of
   the system. It is not reproducible through either
   study or further measurement, but may be reduced
   by changing the physical system” *

   In order to reduce variability in a system, you have to
   change the system.

   *David Vose, Risk Analysis, A Quantitative Guide, 3rd edition, 2008, pp. 47-48


Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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“Uncertainty is the assessor’s lack of knowledge (level
   of ignorance) about the parameters that characterize
   the physical system being modeled. It is sometimes
   reducible through further measurement or study, or
   by consulting more experts”

   Uncertainty is a normal characteristic of the
   assessor/measurer of an IT system. Lack of perfect
   certainty, and having to operate with less than
   perfect information is the norm here.

   In order to reduce uncertainty, you have to collect
   and analyze data.
   *David Vose, Risk Analysis, A Quantitative Guide, 3rd edition, 2008, pp. 47-48

Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Using a coin for an example:
    Imagine that you don’t know anything about the
    possible outcomes -
          Variability: heads or tails is a random event.
          Uncertainty: what is the probability of heads or
          tails?
          After a few trials, we begin to get an idea.
          After many trials, we have a better idea.
Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Precision is “the ability of a measurement to be
          consistently reproduced.”


          Accuracy is “the ability of a measurement to match
          the actual value of the quantity being measured.”



*All   quotes from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Copyright © 2006, 2000. Houghton
         Mifflin Company.


       Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
       Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Precision: a machine can produce the same part to
   within 1/1000th mm all day long. This is no
   guarantee that the part is the correct length,
   however.

   Accuracy: a machine can produce the same part to
   within +/- 2/1000th mm of the correct length.
   Although some parts are a bit shorter and some are a
   bit longer, every part is within spec.



Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Precision: 100.001, or 10.233%


   Accuracy: 100 or 10%, or 10.2%




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Prefer Accuracy to Precision.


   Precise Accuracy? – it would be nice!




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Qualitative methods:
       Categorical: green/yellow/red; male/female
       Nominal: male = 1/female = 2
       Ordinal: rank ordering – first/second/third; 0 – 5
       Interval: intervals are equal, but no zero point –
       temperature in Faherenheit
   Quantitative methods: real numbers (cardinal
   numbers, ratio scale).

   Most of the time, quantitative methods are easier.

Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Benefits of qualitative methods?

       They are useful in certain scenarios, and can be
       quick and good enough.

       Good for quick ordering/prioritization of options

       Be careful with aggregation – if done incorrectly, an
       erroneous picture will be presented


Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Benefits of Qualitative Methods
                                                From ISO 17999




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Problems with qualitative methods?

       No ability to compare between different qualitative
       scales
       Variability between assessors
       Inconsistency of a single assessor
       Arithmetic and statistical operations not possible
       Problems near the boundaries of categories
       Loss of information

Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
No ability to compare between different qualitative
       scales

                Red – Yellow – Green don’t mean the same thing in my
                method as they do in your method.

                0 – 5 on my scale doesn’t mean the same thing as 0 – 5
                on your scale.




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Variability between assessors

       Faced with the same set of facts, different assessors
       apply a scale differently.

       Two QSA’s apply the PCI standards differently.

       Two risk analysts classify risks differently – one says
       low, one say medium


Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Inconsistency of a single assessor

       Given the same set of facts, an assessor might make
       different assessments when the only difference is
       the passage of time.




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Difficulty with arithmetic and statistical operations
                                                From ISO 17999




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Difficulty with arithmetic and statistical operations
                                                From ISO 17999




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Difficulty with arithmetic and statistical operations
                                                From ISO 17999




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Difficulty with arithmetic and statistical operations

       Imagine if money worked this way:

       The value of a dollar would be relative to the
       purchase price of an item.

       The value of a dollar might vary from store to store.



Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Problems with aggregation and estimates near the
   boundaries of categories

       Assume that:

           Low = < 1M
           Medium = 1M – 5M
           High = >5M



Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
And assume that the following risks have been
       identified and put into categories:

           $100K, 500K, 800K: all in Low category

           $1M, 3M, 3M, 4M: all in Medium category




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
What happens when you aggregate based upon
       qualitative scales?
       What is the real difference between a very “high
       Low” and a very “low Medium”?
       How can we justify and defend category boundaries
       that are essentially arbitrary?




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Loss of information
       Most of the time, we get a number in mind.
       Then, we assign it to a category.
       Why not just keep the number?
       Or better yet, create a distribution around a range
       of estimates to better express our beliefs and
       confidence?


Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Benefits of quantitative methods?
     The numbers mean what they are (cardinality).
     Arithmetic and statistical methods are possible.
   Problems with quantitative methods?
      Data are required.
      Estimates are estimates – the future hasn’t
      happened yet.
   Formal training in calibration techniques is very
   helpful.
Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
They say: there isn’t enough “good” data, so you are
   just processing “garbage in and garbage out.”

   The reason we need data is to reduce uncertainty in
   decision-making.

   The decision we need to make will define the data we
   need – some decisions require very little data, others
   require quite a bit.


Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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A sample can be smaller than you think.


   Parametric vs. non-parametric methods


   Contact us for more information on these topics.



Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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We often hear that the data are poor –

   What does this mean?

   Data are just data – some data may be more
   interesting than other data – it depends on what you
   are doing.




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Dan Geer et al.:
       The Index of Cybersecurity
       (http://www.cybersecurityindex.org/)

       Prediction Market Project

   The Beewise Project
   (http://beewise.org/markets/metricon.ctrl)


Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Please refer to the slides at the end of this
   presentation.




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Monte Carlo simulation is a game changer for
   information security risk analysis.
   Less sophisticated methods use single-point
   estimates or even simple ranges of estimates:
           35%, or from 20% - 51%
   Monte Carlo methods sample thousands or tens of
   thousands of values, and provide a much clearer
   picture of the possible outcomes.


Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Minimum:
       What is the least or lowest (best or worst) numerical
       estimate that you believe to be reasonable? This will be the
       smallest number you come up with.

   Most Likely:
       What is the most likely or most probable numerical estimate
       in your opinion? This number must fall between the
       minimum and maximum. It may equal either the minimum
       or the maximum, but should not equal both




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Maximum:
       What is the greatest or highest (best or worst) numerical
       estimate that you believe to be reasonable?

       Note that “best” or “worst” case estimates could be either
       minimum or maximum values, depending upon the scenario.

       In a risk / loss exposure scenario, lower is better, so the
       minimum represents the lowest loss, or best outcome. The
       maximum represents the highest loss, or worst outcome.

       In a sales or opportunity scenario, it’s the reverse: lower is
       not better, so the minimum represents the worst case.
       Higher is better, so the maximum represents the best case.

Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Confidence:
      On a scale that includes “Very Low”, “Low”, “Average”, “High”,
      and “Very High”, how confident are you in the accuracy of
      your estimates?

      This parameter controls the sampling around the most likely
      value, and thereby also controls the height of the histogram
      or slope of the cumulative plot.

      For most analyses, using “Average” for the confidence
      parameter works well. In this instance, “Average” really
      means having no strong feeling about the matter – being
      evenly divided between under-confidence and over-
      confidence.



Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Percentile Tables




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Percentile Tables

       1% of values are <= 10,044 and 99% are > 10,044
       10% of values are <= 11,120 and 90% are > 11,120
       20% of values are <= 11,658 and 80% are > 11,658
       50% of values are <= 13,025 and 50% are > 13,025

       The 50th percentile has another name - it’s called
       the Median.

       The Median is the mid-point in a list of values - half
       of the values in the list are less and half are greater
       than the Median.
Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Histogram




 Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
 Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Cumulative Plot




 Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
 Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Thank you !
                                                                     Risk Analysis for the 21st Century ®
                                            Patrick Florer
                                        CTO and Co-founder
                                      Risk Centric Security, Inc
                                  patrick@riskcentricsecurity.com

                                                   214.828.1172


                   Authorized reseller of ModelRisk from Vose Software

Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Open Security Foundation: datalossdb and osvdb
   http://www.opensecurityfoundation.org/

   Computer Security Institute (CSI): http://gocsi.com/

   Office of Inadequate Security: http://www.databreaches.net/

   Identity Theft Resource Center: http://www.idtheftcenter.org/

   ISACA:                 www.isaca.org

   ISSA:                  www.issa.org



Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Mitre Corporation:                                    www.mitre.org

   OWASP: http://owasp.com/index.php/Main_Page

   Privacy Rights Clearing House: http://www.privacyrights.org/

   SANS:                  www.sans.org

   The Ponemon Institute: www.ponemon.org




Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
Conference procedings: Black Hat, RSA, Source Conferences, BSides

   Internet tools:

           Search engines: Google, Bing, Yahoo, Ask.com

           Trend Analyzers:

                  Google trends:                         http://www.google.com/trends

                  Twitter Trends:                        www.trendistic.com

                  Amazon:                                http://www.metricjunkie.com/



Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
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Securitymetrics.org – mailing list

    Society of Information Risk Analysts (SIRA)

Books:
     How to Measure Anything – Hubbard
     The Failure of Risk Management – Hubbard
     Risk Analysis: A Quantitative Guide – Vose
     Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics - Kramer


 Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary.
 Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.

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Measurement, Qualitative vs Quantitative Methods, and other Cool Stuff

  • 1. Risk Centric Security, Inc. www.riskcentricsecurity.com Authorized reseller of ModelRisk from Vose Software Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary . Risk Analysis for the 21st Century® Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 2. Patrick Florer has worked in information technology for 30 years. In addition, he worked a parallel track in medical outcomes research, analysis, and the creation of evidence-based guidelines for medical treatment. His roles have included IT operations, programming, and systems analysis. From 1986 until now, he has worked as an independent consultant, helping customers with strategic development, analytics, risk analysis, and decision analysis. He is a cofounder of Risk Centric Security and currently serves as Chief Technology Officer. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary . Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 3. This webinar is about language and ideas. No one owns the definitions of words, but it is often useful to: Understand what we mean when we use certain words and express certain ideas Understand what others mean when they do the same Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 4. When speaking with our customers, we recognized: Information Security Professionals are comfortable speaking the technical language of firewalls, logs, threats, vulnerabilities, and exploits. Business managers are comfortable speaking the language of return on investment, discounted cash flows, and risk as financial impact. Mutual misunderstanding can occur, and it is often a source of frustration for everyone. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 5. By learning to speak about risk in business terms, Information Security Professionals can reach out and bridge the language gap. The technical details of sql injection attacks may be important to you, but your business counterparts may not understand, and they usually don’t care. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 6. Instead of talking about threats, vulnerabilities, and controls, talk about risk in terms of financial impact. Tell the business people what a sql injection attack could cost. They will understand that! (They may not believe you, but they will understand what you are saying!) Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 7. Risk – What it is and what it isn’t Risk and Opportunity Possibility vs. probability Measurement Variability and Uncertainty Precision vs. accuracy Qualitative vs. quantitative methods The “not enough data” syndrome Monte Carlo simulation Modeling expert opinion and the PERT distribution Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 8. From The American Heritage dictionary*: The possibility of suffering harm or loss; danger. A factor, thing, element, or course involving uncertain danger; a hazard. The danger or probability of loss to an insurer. The amount that an insurance company stands to lose. The variability of returns from an investment. The chance of nonpayment of a debt. *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Copyright © 2006, 2000. Houghton Mifflin Company. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 9. From ISO 31000: 1.1 risk - effect of uncertainty on objectives NOTE 1 An effect is a deviation from the expected —positive and/or negative. NOTE 2 Objectives can have different aspects (such as financial, health and safety, and environmental goals) and can apply at different levels (such as strategic, organization-wide, project, product and process). NOTE 3 Risk is often characterized by reference to potential events (3.5.1.3) and consequences (3.6.1.3), or a combination of these. NOTE 4 Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event (including changes in circumstances) and the associated likelihood (3.6.1.1) of occurrence. NOTE 5 Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of information related to, understanding or knowledge of, an event, its consequence, or likelihood Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 10. In the USA, NIST, Special Publication 800-30 describes risk in the following way: Risk is: “the net mission impact considering the probability that a particular threat-source will exercise (accidentally trigger or intentionally exploit) a particular information system vulnerability, and the resulting impact if this should occur.” Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 11. NIST (The National Institute of Standards and Technology), provides an additional definition of risk in Special Publication 800-39: Risk A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence. Information system-related security risks are those risks that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or information systems and reflect the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. NIST, The National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special Publication 800-39, Appendix B, Page B-7. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 12. A probability that something will happen A probable impact if something does happen Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 13. The probability that something will happen to cause a negative impact in financial terms: For example, a 50% chance that it will cost 50 million dollars if our data are stolen. Another way to express this is to multiply the two numbers together and say that: Risk = 25 million dollars on an annualized basis Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 14. Threats and exploits are not risks. Threat agents are not risks. Vulnerabilities are not risks. Ineffective controls are not risks. Each of these elements factors into understanding risk, but none of them constitute risk. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 15. For our discussion today, Risk will be used to indicate loss or harm. Opportunity can be viewed as the positive aspect of Risk. The techniques that apply to Risk analysis can also be applied to Opportunity analysis. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 16. Let’s look at tossing a coin: What are the possibilities? What are the probabilities? Does knowing either help us predict what will happen when we toss the coin next time? Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 17. A possibility is something that is “capable of happening, existing, or being true without contradicting proven facts, laws, or circumstances known to be true. *” A probability is "the likelihood that a given event will occur.”* *All quotes from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Copyright © 2006, 2000. Houghton Mifflin Company. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 18. In statistics, a probability is “a number expressing the likelihood that a specific event will occur, expressed as the ratio of the number of actual occurrences to the number of possible occurrences.“ Probability is calculated after tossing the coin many times. Probability is always a number between 0 and 1, sometimes expressed as: *All quotes from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Copyright © 2006, 2000. Houghton Mifflin Company. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 19. How can we use this in information security risk analysis? The fact that something can happen (possibility) doesn't tell us how likely it is to happen (probability), or how much impact it might have if it does happen (probability). Estimating these values helps us prioritize our activities in a rational way. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 20. What is a measurement? An observation that “ascertains the dimensions, quantity, or capacity of” an object or process”* A set of observations that reduce uncertainty where the result is expressed as a quantity** *TheAmerican Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Copyright © 2006, 2000. Houghton Mifflin Company ** Hubbard, Douglas W., “How to Measure Anything 2nd Edition”, John Wiley & Sons, New Jersey, 2010, p. 23 Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 21. What are the properties of a measurement? Validity – does the measurement actually do what you think it does? Reproducibility – when repeated, does the measurement give a consistent answer? Detail – does the measurement provide a useful level of detail? Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 22. What are some sources of error in measurement? Random error – a function of the instrument Bias – a function of the measurement taker Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 23. Why do we make measurements? Measurements are a way to collect data. Making measurements should be about reducing uncertainty. A measurement only has to be good enough for the decision at hand. Sometimes, you cannot get the data you think you need, so you have to use a proxy. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 24. Variability and uncertainty are not the same thing, and it can be useful to be aware of the difference. “Variability is the effect of chance and is a function of the system. It is not reproducible through either study or further measurement, but may be reduced by changing the physical system” * In order to reduce variability in a system, you have to change the system. *David Vose, Risk Analysis, A Quantitative Guide, 3rd edition, 2008, pp. 47-48 Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 25. “Uncertainty is the assessor’s lack of knowledge (level of ignorance) about the parameters that characterize the physical system being modeled. It is sometimes reducible through further measurement or study, or by consulting more experts” Uncertainty is a normal characteristic of the assessor/measurer of an IT system. Lack of perfect certainty, and having to operate with less than perfect information is the norm here. In order to reduce uncertainty, you have to collect and analyze data. *David Vose, Risk Analysis, A Quantitative Guide, 3rd edition, 2008, pp. 47-48 Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 26. Using a coin for an example: Imagine that you don’t know anything about the possible outcomes - Variability: heads or tails is a random event. Uncertainty: what is the probability of heads or tails? After a few trials, we begin to get an idea. After many trials, we have a better idea. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 27. Precision is “the ability of a measurement to be consistently reproduced.” Accuracy is “the ability of a measurement to match the actual value of the quantity being measured.” *All quotes from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Copyright © 2006, 2000. Houghton Mifflin Company. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 28. Precision: a machine can produce the same part to within 1/1000th mm all day long. This is no guarantee that the part is the correct length, however. Accuracy: a machine can produce the same part to within +/- 2/1000th mm of the correct length. Although some parts are a bit shorter and some are a bit longer, every part is within spec. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 29. Precision: 100.001, or 10.233% Accuracy: 100 or 10%, or 10.2% Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 30. Prefer Accuracy to Precision. Precise Accuracy? – it would be nice! Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 31. Qualitative methods: Categorical: green/yellow/red; male/female Nominal: male = 1/female = 2 Ordinal: rank ordering – first/second/third; 0 – 5 Interval: intervals are equal, but no zero point – temperature in Faherenheit Quantitative methods: real numbers (cardinal numbers, ratio scale). Most of the time, quantitative methods are easier. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 32. Benefits of qualitative methods? They are useful in certain scenarios, and can be quick and good enough. Good for quick ordering/prioritization of options Be careful with aggregation – if done incorrectly, an erroneous picture will be presented Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 33. Benefits of Qualitative Methods From ISO 17999 Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 34. Problems with qualitative methods? No ability to compare between different qualitative scales Variability between assessors Inconsistency of a single assessor Arithmetic and statistical operations not possible Problems near the boundaries of categories Loss of information Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 35. No ability to compare between different qualitative scales Red – Yellow – Green don’t mean the same thing in my method as they do in your method. 0 – 5 on my scale doesn’t mean the same thing as 0 – 5 on your scale. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 36. Variability between assessors Faced with the same set of facts, different assessors apply a scale differently. Two QSA’s apply the PCI standards differently. Two risk analysts classify risks differently – one says low, one say medium Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 37. Inconsistency of a single assessor Given the same set of facts, an assessor might make different assessments when the only difference is the passage of time. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 38. Difficulty with arithmetic and statistical operations From ISO 17999 Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 39. Difficulty with arithmetic and statistical operations From ISO 17999 Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 40. Difficulty with arithmetic and statistical operations From ISO 17999 Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 41. Difficulty with arithmetic and statistical operations Imagine if money worked this way: The value of a dollar would be relative to the purchase price of an item. The value of a dollar might vary from store to store. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 42. Problems with aggregation and estimates near the boundaries of categories Assume that: Low = < 1M Medium = 1M – 5M High = >5M Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 43. And assume that the following risks have been identified and put into categories: $100K, 500K, 800K: all in Low category $1M, 3M, 3M, 4M: all in Medium category Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 44. What happens when you aggregate based upon qualitative scales? What is the real difference between a very “high Low” and a very “low Medium”? How can we justify and defend category boundaries that are essentially arbitrary? Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 45. Loss of information Most of the time, we get a number in mind. Then, we assign it to a category. Why not just keep the number? Or better yet, create a distribution around a range of estimates to better express our beliefs and confidence? Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 46. Benefits of quantitative methods? The numbers mean what they are (cardinality). Arithmetic and statistical methods are possible. Problems with quantitative methods? Data are required. Estimates are estimates – the future hasn’t happened yet. Formal training in calibration techniques is very helpful. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 47. They say: there isn’t enough “good” data, so you are just processing “garbage in and garbage out.” The reason we need data is to reduce uncertainty in decision-making. The decision we need to make will define the data we need – some decisions require very little data, others require quite a bit. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 48. A sample can be smaller than you think. Parametric vs. non-parametric methods Contact us for more information on these topics. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 49. We often hear that the data are poor – What does this mean? Data are just data – some data may be more interesting than other data – it depends on what you are doing. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 50. Dan Geer et al.: The Index of Cybersecurity (http://www.cybersecurityindex.org/) Prediction Market Project The Beewise Project (http://beewise.org/markets/metricon.ctrl) Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 51. Please refer to the slides at the end of this presentation. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 52. Monte Carlo simulation is a game changer for information security risk analysis. Less sophisticated methods use single-point estimates or even simple ranges of estimates: 35%, or from 20% - 51% Monte Carlo methods sample thousands or tens of thousands of values, and provide a much clearer picture of the possible outcomes. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 53. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 54. Minimum: What is the least or lowest (best or worst) numerical estimate that you believe to be reasonable? This will be the smallest number you come up with. Most Likely: What is the most likely or most probable numerical estimate in your opinion? This number must fall between the minimum and maximum. It may equal either the minimum or the maximum, but should not equal both Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 55. Maximum: What is the greatest or highest (best or worst) numerical estimate that you believe to be reasonable? Note that “best” or “worst” case estimates could be either minimum or maximum values, depending upon the scenario. In a risk / loss exposure scenario, lower is better, so the minimum represents the lowest loss, or best outcome. The maximum represents the highest loss, or worst outcome. In a sales or opportunity scenario, it’s the reverse: lower is not better, so the minimum represents the worst case. Higher is better, so the maximum represents the best case. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 56. Confidence: On a scale that includes “Very Low”, “Low”, “Average”, “High”, and “Very High”, how confident are you in the accuracy of your estimates? This parameter controls the sampling around the most likely value, and thereby also controls the height of the histogram or slope of the cumulative plot. For most analyses, using “Average” for the confidence parameter works well. In this instance, “Average” really means having no strong feeling about the matter – being evenly divided between under-confidence and over- confidence. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 57. Percentile Tables Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 58. Percentile Tables 1% of values are <= 10,044 and 99% are > 10,044 10% of values are <= 11,120 and 90% are > 11,120 20% of values are <= 11,658 and 80% are > 11,658 50% of values are <= 13,025 and 50% are > 13,025 The 50th percentile has another name - it’s called the Median. The Median is the mid-point in a list of values - half of the values in the list are less and half are greater than the Median. Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 59. Histogram Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 60. Cumulative Plot Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 61. Thank you ! Risk Analysis for the 21st Century ® Patrick Florer CTO and Co-founder Risk Centric Security, Inc patrick@riskcentricsecurity.com 214.828.1172 Authorized reseller of ModelRisk from Vose Software Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 62. Open Security Foundation: datalossdb and osvdb http://www.opensecurityfoundation.org/ Computer Security Institute (CSI): http://gocsi.com/ Office of Inadequate Security: http://www.databreaches.net/ Identity Theft Resource Center: http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ ISACA: www.isaca.org ISSA: www.issa.org Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 63. Mitre Corporation: www.mitre.org OWASP: http://owasp.com/index.php/Main_Page Privacy Rights Clearing House: http://www.privacyrights.org/ SANS: www.sans.org The Ponemon Institute: www.ponemon.org Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 64. Conference procedings: Black Hat, RSA, Source Conferences, BSides Internet tools: Search engines: Google, Bing, Yahoo, Ask.com Trend Analyzers: Google trends: http://www.google.com/trends Twitter Trends: www.trendistic.com Amazon: http://www.metricjunkie.com/ Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.
  • 65. Securitymetrics.org – mailing list Society of Information Risk Analysts (SIRA) Books: How to Measure Anything – Hubbard The Failure of Risk Management – Hubbard Risk Analysis: A Quantitative Guide – Vose Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics - Kramer Risk Centric Security, Inc. Confidential and Proprietary. Copyright © 2011 Risk Centric Security, Inc . All rights reserved.