CENTER FOR ARMY, CONVERSION AND DISARMAMENT STUDIES

Content
Chapter I
PEOPLE WHO SURROUND PUTIN
Chapter I I
VLADIMIR PUTIN’S PERSONALITY
RUSSIA AFTER PUTIN. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
PUTINISM AFTER PUTIN. THE ASCENT OF SERGEY IVANOV
SERGEI SHOYGU – SUCCESSOR OR PUPPET?
DMITRY ROGOZIN – RADICAL NATIONALIST OR COURT
JESTER?
VLADISLAV SURKOV – THE KREMLIN’S“GRAY CARDINAL”
LOYAL PUTIN’S MAN IGOR SECHIN – OIL TYCOON AND
RUSSIAN RICHELIEU
SERGEI CHEMEZOV. PUTIN’S ARMAMENTS BARON
ANTI-KREMLIN OPPOSITION: BETWEEN TRIUMPH AND
DECLINE
THE PLAYER WITH MARKED CARDS
CONSCIENCE SPLIT AND RESULTING DOMINANCE
OF ILLUSION OVER REALITY
BEARINGS OF THE LONELY KGB VETERAN
PUTIN AND UKRAINE: WILL EROSTRATUS BE GIVEN
A CHANCE?
4
2
11
14
17
21
25
28
31
40
45
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49
CENTER FOR ARMY, CONVERSION AND
DISARMAMENT STUDIES

he Center for Army, Conver-
sion and Disarmament Stud-
ies (hereinafter referred to as
CACDS) was established in
1999 as a non-governmental
think-tank organization, with a mission to
promote the development and expansion of
democracy in Ukraine, by way of distrib-
uting best practice information on public
control of the security sector.
Established as a voluntary association of
experts on disarmament and armament (re-
armament) of regional armed forces, security
sector reform, defense industry and Ukraine’s
performance on the international arms mar-
ket, the CACDS often deals with the subject
of civil-military relations and civilian control
of the security sector, as well as the develop-
ment of the defense and dual-use technology
industry in Ukraine. The CACDS experts are
actively engaged in research on Ukraine’s par-
ticipation in the international regimes for con-
trol of arms and critical technologies.
In 2011, the CACDS became a founder
of the News & Consulting Company “De-
fense Express” (previously known as the
“Defense Express News Agency”). Since
2001, the CACDS has cooperated with
the “Defense Express” NCC in research
programs and the publication of the jour-
nal “Arms Export and Defense- Industrial
Complex of Ukraine”.
The Center for Army, Conversion and
Disarmament Studies:
• Conducts research on the pace, pri-
orities and consequences of the security
sector reform in Ukraine; cooperates
with institutions of the security sector
in Ukraine;
• Conducts research on the tendencies
and outlook of the Ukrainian defense
industry transformation;
• Conducts continuous monitoring and
analysis of the export/import of arma-
ments, dual-use products and sensitive
technologies on the post Soviet expanse
as well as their proliferation globally;
• Publishes books and materials on
CACDS research, particularly by trans-
lating most interesting works of foreign
think tanks;
• Takes part in joint projects with interna-
tional and domestic non-governmental
organizations dealing with the subjects
of disarmament and security sector ac-
tivities or otherwise promoting democ-
ratization of the society;
• Interacts with relevant ministries, gov-
ernment institutions and domestic
companies dealing with the security
sector development (reform); provides
them with comprehensive information
support, expert assessments and recom-
mendations;
• Distributes materials on special aca-
demic conferences hosted by govern-
ment institutions, as well as meetings
and reports by counterpart non-gov-
Center for Army, Conversion
and Disarmament Studies
T

ernmental entities dealing with similar
subjects.
The CACDS’ action priorities over the
past five years include:
• Independent research on Ukraine’s
performance on the international arms
market;
• Analysis of Ukraine’s international mili-
tary-technical cooperation, particularly
programs on the co-development and
import of defense and dual-use tech-
nologies;
• Independent review of the Ukrainian
Armed Forces transformation; an analy-
sis of tendencies in the development of
regional and international armed forces;
• Independent review of the domestic
defense industry growth;
• Research on the potentials for imple-
menting different projects in the nation-
al security and defense domains.
The CACDS conducts its research ex-
clusively by means of a multi-factor analysis
of open-source information, including me-
dia reports, official and expert statements,
conferences, international exhibitions and
forums.
The CACDS since foundation has or-
ganized and participated in several inter-
national conferences and roundtable meet-
ings, and delegated its representatives to
speak at international security and defense
forums in Europe, the U.S.A. and the Rus-
sian Federation. CACDS experts publish
regular articles, research materials and
books.
In 2004, the CACDS, in conjunction
with Defense Express and VAB-Bank (for-
merly known and VABank) published
“Cult. Ukrainian arms trading business” –
the first book on the domestic arms export
business ever published in Ukraine.
with Defense Express and the Ukrainian
Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Comput-
erized Systems, published the inaugural
edition of a national review of defense and
dual-use technologies titled “Technosila”.
with Defense Express, conducted and pub-
lished the first national research into the po-
tentials for Ukraine-China cooperation in
military technology, titled “Ukraine-China;
from Projects towards Strategic Partner-
ship”.
with Defense Express, published a research
on the Ukrainian defense industry’s capa-
bilities, titled “The Ukrainian DIC – a Driv-
ing Force for the National Economy”.
with Defense Express, published a com-
pendium on future technologies for defense
and dual uses, titled “Ukrainian Arsenal.
Modern Defense & Dual-Use Equipment”.
In 2012, the CACDS and the NATO
Information and Documentation Center
in Kyiv conducted and published a joint
research titled “Integrity Building and Re-
ducing Corruption in Defense Institutions:
Ukrainian Experience”.
Also in 2012, the CACDS and the Ge-
neva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces published a joint research on
the “Challenges Facing Arms Export Con-
trol in Ukraine and the Russain Federation”.
In 2013, the CACDS, assisted by De-
fense Express analysts and non-staff ex-
perts from Ukraine and the Russian
Federation, conducted and published a re-
search on the pace and quality of military
rearmament programs in selected Central
and Eastern European countries, as well
as some aspects of the Ukrainian Armed
Forces rearmament related to specific fea-
tures of the Ukrainian military reform,
titled “The Specifics of the Armed Forces
and Defense Industry Reforms in Central
and Eastern European Countries. Lessons
for Ukraine”.

ince the beginning of 2015,
many analysts began talk-
ing about Russia after Putin.
Seriously. As Putin is devel-
oping the offensive, increas-
ing levels of confrontation, each new day
exposes more of the grave outlook: it’s only
the collapse of the Putin regime that can
put an end to the Russian war in Ukraine.
Stakeholders interested in a change of gov-
ernment in Russia are increasing in num-
bers, and those include inter alia some
members of Putin’s entourage. Too many
people realize too well that the top person
in Russia – implacable, inflexible and deep-
ly wounded – is deliberately pulling the
country into a catastrophe.
The Russian President, playing a cool-
headed leader, replied with undisguised
irony to a question from a far-sighted jour-
nalist whether he feared a possibility of a
“palace revolution”. In fact, this had an effect
of a perfect psychological operation; not
quite a couple of weeks later, Putin’s heart
failed him, making him scale back com-
munication to an indecent minimum. The
would-have-been emperor seems to under-
stand better than others without waxing too
poetic that something never-seen-before
occurred in Russian history. As Russian au-
thor and human rights activist Victor Shen-
derovich put it, “The Russians have found
themselves fallen out of the European civi-
lization; actually not fallen out but, rather,
threw themselves out – with their own
proper hands and with the hands of the ad-
ministration”. Just before the start of 2015,
foreigners began fleeing from Russia, while
the Ruble fell into a downward spiral in the
wake of oil prices crumbling. Interestingly,
former Russian deputy minister of energy
Vladimir Milov argues that Russia’s internal
holdings, including 400 billion dollars, exist
on paper only. Interviewed by “Economi-
cheskaya Pravda” in January 2015, he said:
“Holdings exist only on paper. Frankly, the
issue here is not even what will happen to
the economy. The issue is how the people
will respond, because people have got-
ten accustomed to sustainable economic
growth over the past 15 years. Society was
“lulled” by people who managed the econo-
my and ensured the growth”.
Academics, journalists, authors –
all those who have not forgotten how to
think – describe Putin’s policy as becoming
more deadlock and harmful for the coun-
try. “The collapse of Putin’s regime is likely.
Russia after Putin.
Possible scenarios
Valentin Badrak, Dmitry Kozlov
S

5Valentin Badrak, Dmitry Kozlov
Most of our opposition politicians see their
future with the so-called constitutional
component and talk about the elections to
the Duma in 2016, presidential elections in
2017,” Russian historian, philosopher and
theologian Andrei Zubov said in February
2015.
Deterioration of the Putin-led Russia
got so progressive by the start of 2015 that
it made its self-isolation inevitable. As the
Kremlin envoys are laying themselves out
to search and find allies (and, miraculously,
sometimes find them, as was the case with
Greece and Venezuela in early 2015), global
skepticism about Putin is gaining momen-
tum. Expressed in the form of sanctions,
this skepticism, in February 2015, grew to
the level where the world is ready to dem-
onstrate its unity and put the vain, stubborn
man to where he belongs. It must be said
that, by the start of 2015, the audacious ar-
rogance of the Moscow emperor gave way
to growing amazement and apprehension.
Indeed, he still keeps an impressive arse-
nal of ‘last-resort arguments’ ranging from
fighter aircraft and precision-guided mis-
siles to the ‘nuclear button’. But the truth
is that even his closest allies see the inad-
equacy of their boss even better than does
the rest of the world, and the instinct of
self-preservation will sooner or later show
them the right way. Incidentally, it’s not
a coincidence that the authoritative The
Guardian newspaper wrote at the end of
December 2014: “With oil revenues tailing
off sharply, on the one hand it will expose
how little has been done to diversify the
Russian economy during the boom years,
while on the other the amount of money
to share among the group of billionaires
around Putin will shrink dramatically. …
If the economic situation continues to de-
teriorate, and the political turmoil contin-
ues, one school of thought suggests Putin
could be in trouble from within his own
inner circle… For those in the inner circle,
sanctions have in some cases meant losing
business, property and travel opportuni-
ties in the west… Even among those ideo-
logically in tandem with Putin, if their
vast wealth begins to be threatened their
loyalty may waver”.
A broad consensus appears having
been reached among analysts to the effect
that Putin, as befits the man of fixed ideas,
will stand his ground until the end. But this
is what has recently made him vulnerable
to his own allies. One thought has been in-
creasingly heard from within the Kremlin;
no matter how far assertive one man in the
Kremlin will be, the economic downfall in
Russia will inevitably kill the carefully built
police-authoritarian regime. The architect
of the Russian war in Ukraine is still being
able to contain the Russian people without
also solving their problems, but, instead,
drawing their attention to the “American
threat” by manipulating public conscious-
ness by means of the well tuned propaganda
machine. However, in February 2015, can-
didates for Putin’s final choice as his suc-
cessor began to increase their media pres-
ence. Particularly in January 2015, Deputy
Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, during a
visit to the Chkalov Proving Flying Center
of the “Russian Helicopters” Holding, flew
on a combat reconnaissance and attack he-
licopter Ka-52 “Alligator”. Such examples

6 Russia after Putin. Possible scenarios
are aplenty, be it implacable Sergei Iva-
nov who arrogantly denied Western lead-
ers’ statements as “idiotic”, or loyal Sergei
Shoygu with his demonstrations of Russia’s
“flexed nuclear muscles” or oversea voyages
in search of new allies. But there are also
other contenders for this role. For example,
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in late 2014, offered
himself to be the leader of the “transitional
government”. There is a growing trend ob-
served that Putting should, if not fall into
oblivion, at least give way to someone who
will be able to rebuild the burnt bridges be-
tween Russia and the rest of the world.
Against the background of growing
confrontation, every new counter-step by
the West quietly tightens the noose around
Putin. If the self-styled republics LNR and
DNR are officially labeled terrorist organi-
zations, the world could designate Russia as
State Sponsor of Terrorism. There occurred
kind of a chain reaction, which was excel-
lently described by Ukrainian author and
journalist Yury Shcherbak thus: “Putin
will be accused of crimes against peace
(planning, preparation, incitement or
waging of aggressive war), crimes against
humanity (murder, enslavement, persecu-
tion on political or ethnic grounds, theft
of public and private property, destruc-
tion of towns and villages)”. Shortly after-
wards, former U.S. Undersecretary of State
for Global Affairs, senior fellow at Harvard
University’s Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Paula J. Dobriansky
wrote in The Washington Post on February
13, 2015 that Russia should be prosecuted
for its crimes against humanity. She says
‘Russia’, but many hear ‘Putin”. A change of
rhetoric is all about timing. In fact, Putin
has become a threat to the Russians. Even
the Russia-backed terrorist warlords in the
Donbas (like a certain insurgent leader Igor
Strelkov-Girkin) have come to take shots at
the Russian leader. On 9 February, again,
Rogozin emerged with a statement that
Russia’s massive military modernization
programs have fallen in jeopardy because of
growing prices of defense industry products
amidst ruble’s collapse.
It is also specific that the master of the
Kremlin is progressively losing credibility.
As Russian political analyst Stanislav Bel-
kovsky put it, “Putin wants to don Stalin’s
uniform and return to the Yalta-Potsdam
world of 1945,” but this is “impossible be-
cause that world collapsed in 1989 along
with the fall of the Berlin wall.” Even more
pessimistic is Russian poet Igor Irten’ev,
who, as early as in May 2014, spoke out
prophetically, “I am very pessimistic about
the future, foresee great upheavals in Russia
when it runs out of oil money, which will
run out very soon “.
The wait-and-see stance of Berlin and
Paris, temporary weakness during the gru-
eling Minsk negotiations on February 12,
the snapping of toothy jaws in the US Con-
gress amidst Washington’s hesitation and
indecisiveness, the launch of a very danger-
ous idea of freezing the conflict in eastern
Ukraine, see-saw battles amidst the growing
battle experience of the Ukrainian military
– these are all suffocating factors for the
Kremlin intriguer. This is confirmed by syn-
chronous statements made in January 2015
by philanthropic billionaire George Soros
and the authoritative The Economist maga-
zine. Words by the renowned financier and
open society crusader came as a harbinger
of Putin’s agony. The prominent expert in
the nature of money stated in the middle
of January 2015 that the sanctions imposed
on Russia by the US and Europe for its in-
terventions in Ukraine have worked much
faster and inflicted much more damage on
the Russian economy than anybody could
have expected. The increased damage is

largely due to a sharp decline in the price
of oil, without which the sanctions would
have been much less effective. An analyst at
The Economist is writing the following, “ …
as the oil price fell Russia has not (so far)
become any friendlier to the West nor to
its neighbors. Mr Putin seems determined
to break that correlation. Indeed, he has of-
fered the war and patriotic euphoria as a
compensation for the falling oil prices and
lack of economic growth. The only way to
bend the trend is by escalating aggression.
This year will see a contest between Mr Pu-
tin’s regime and the oil price. It will not be
a pretty sight”. Well-known British expert
James Sherr believes that Russian econo-
my will collapse in two years at the latest:
“When it comes to damaging Russia, time
favors the West. Within two years, if not
less, the prolongation of existing pressures
will seriously impair Russia’s ability to pur-
sue the course it pursues with such tenacity
today. (“Mirror Weekly”, 13/02/15).
A similar view is shared by Russian op-
positionist politician Boris Nemtsov: “The
price of oil, in my opinion, will stay at a
low level for a long time. In Russia, falling
price of oil has invariably led to a change of
government sooner or later. In the same to-
ken, if the current crisis drags on, a change
of government in Russia is inevitable”.
Nemtsov is confident that the current Rus-
sian crisis is a direct consequence of Putin’s
war in Ukraine.
It’s my sincere belief that if sanctions
continued during a full year, and the Rus-
sian economy remained under severe
pressure of falling oil prices and sanc-
tions, Putin will start pulling back forces
from Ukraine, or the Russians will be
looking for a new leader, said John Herbst,
former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and
current Director of the Eurasian Center.
Well, Putin, instead of a reasonable reset of
relations with the West and the withdrawal
of troops from Ukraine, made a reckless,
albeit outwardly brave step: he has gone
for all-or-nothing – launched an almost
open offensive deep into Ukraine, having
deployed enormous quantities of arms and
military equipment in the Donbas regions
[controlled by Russian forces], in addition
to about a dozen thousand military person-
nel to help organize military action and re-
inforce local insurgents.
So, in January 2015, dissatisfaction with
Putin’s policy course increased dramatically,
even among his inner circle. In late Janu-
ary, Bloomberg, citing unnamed sources,
reported that the dictator has narrowed his
inner circle down to several military and
security chiefs, and drastically reduced the
amount of communication even with the
people supposed to be his friends. Many
media outlets quoted Olga Kryshtanovs-
kaya, an opinion poll expert, as noting that
Putin has run into a difficult time: “He is
being criticized both by the liberals and the
‘hawks’”.
One way or another, but in the worst
case it can be that Putin may hand over the
reins of power to someone from the military
and security establishment. Not improb-
ably, this someone will be even worse than
Putin – the hardline Ivanov or tight-lipped
but quick-minded Shoygu. Another viable
candidate is Dmitry Rogozin, a loyal vassal,
who has grown sharp ‘political fangs’ over
all his years of being besides Putin, and,
also, has shown himself a decent enough
actor. It seems that intellectuals and men of
logics such as Chemezov, Surkov or Sechin,
for example, are less suited for the ‘succes-
sor’ role. Rather, they will more likely be
assigned the role of guardians of all life as-
pects of their current patron.
Softer, more positive scenarios in
which power in Russia would come to

someone from among oppositionist politi-
cians, such as Nemtsov or Navalny or even
Khodorkovsky, are less likely than “worse”
scenarios. These are only likely under cer-
tain, extreme circumstances. For example,
if the Russians rose in sufficient numbers in
protest against Putin’s disastrous course of
action in Ukraine. Not only is this very un-
likely in conditions of a police-ridden state,
but such protests can be easily stamped out,
given the availability of a powerful repres-
sive machine, supported by a horde of ser-
vant mass media.
Boris Nemtsov – an uncompromising
critic of the current Russian regime, who
has been so bold as to describe Putin’s in-
ternational policy course as being “stupid”,
and ascribed the current crisis in Russia
to Putin’s cronies and their villainous state
capitalism – has pretty better chances of
winning. But the limits of his popularity can
hardly be expanded to nation-wide propor-
tions, especially if one takes into account
that overwhelming majority of the Russians
favor a strong-arm policy, even if this puts
them in oppositions to the outside world.
In Russia, the tradition to have a ‘czar’ as a
ruler has gone nowhere. For this reason, the
appointment to the successor’s role of one of
military/security chiefs from among Putin’s
inner circle appears to be more likely than
selection of a level-headed adequate leader
who would be able to mend fences with the
West.
But even so, if Putin continued to
persist and unwilling to show flexibility
in relations with the Western world, his
ousting from power will be programmed.
Although the West seems to agree to a
reasonable palliative option, it is Putin
personally who can turn on ‘acceleration
mode’ on the path to self-destruction. As
things stand now, this scenario looks more
probable than one in which the Kremlin
czar would go for reasonable compromises
or concessions. The timing of such a sce-
nario is uncertain and depends more on
whether the West is consistent enough
in its consolidated effort to counter the
Kremlin. This may take from several
months to a few years in case the Western
attitude is sluggish, lacking in coordina-
tion and consensus. For Ukraine, any sce-
nario in which Putin is ousted from power
would open a new chance. If the Ukrai-
nian government is able to effectively take
advantage of the confusion or realignment
of forces in the Kremlin in order to create
factors for strategic deterrence of Russia,
a triumph in the battle for Ukraine will be
virtually a done deal, likewise the inter-
national community’s struggle to advance
democratic values.
As the decline of Putin’s era is inevi-
tably forthcoming, it would be helpful to
outline possible scenarios of how this could
play out.
Scenario # 1: Revolution from within
This can be carried out in a latent
form, resembling outwardly Yeltsin’s re-
tirement from office in 1999, with the ap-
pointment of a credible successor support-
ed by a massive PR campaign in the mass
media, and subsequent legitimization of
the successor through elections. The fo-
cus will be on the preservation of Puti-
nism after Putin resigns from the political
scene, meaning a continuation of the cur-
rent policy of serving the interests of the
Kremlin’s kleptocracy, preservation of the
alliance between the big business and the
military/security establishment, and the
pursuance of the current neo-imperialist
foreign policy strategy.
The most likely successors are Sergei
Ivanov and Sergei Shoygu. This scenario
calls for Putin to retire from big politics.

For Russia and for the whole world
in the long term, this means the continu-
ation of confrontation – by virtue of the
very configuration of the Russian state
as it has been created by Putin. It’s prob-
able, however, that there will be some pe-
riod of “thaw” both in the domestic and
international policies, due to the overall
fatigue from Putin, and the expectation of
change. An inevitable result will come in
the form of improving relations with the
West, which could drive the post-Putin
elite to do internal evolution and progres-
sive liberalization with subsequent transi-
tion to true reforms. Similar scenarios of
soft democratization have been successful
in many totalitarian governments.
Scenario # 2. Reshuffle
A sub-variant of Scenario #1, this is
possible in case Putin will “smell a rat” and
decide to take the lead in pressing for long
overdue change by picking somebody as he
did with Medvedev. In this scenario, Putin
would be awarded some sort of a symbolic
position in the architecture of government,
which, given the gap existing between of-
ficial positions and their actual places in
the current Kremlin hierarchy, will not pre-
vent him to continue to be the “first among
equals” in the shadow “Politburo”. This suc-
cessor could be someone from Putin’s inner
circle or a compromise figure such as Ku-
drin or, again, Medvedev. The probability is
that there will be some sort of a last-minute
variant involving a renowned opposition-
ist who will be ready to trade-off principles
for the highest public office and an oath of
loyalty to actual “masters of Russia.” One
way or another, the role the President will
be representative and symbolic only. As
with Scenario #1, there will be little, if any,
policy change, but “the effect of Putin’s re-
tirement” will play into the hands of Russia.
Scenario #3. Nationalist Revolution
For Russia, this is the worst-case sce-
nario with world-wide implications. This
can be resorted to by radicals if they find
Putin’s policies to be insufficiently sturdy, or
in the event of a precipitous drop in public
confidence in the Russian leader. Despite a
dramatic rightward shift observed recently
in Putin’s rhetoric and actions, and the ef-
fective policy of appeasement of radical na-
tionalists being pursued via “hand-picked
nationalist” Rogozin, there are many in the
ranks of marginal and radical chauvinist
parties who feel Putin’s regime to be insuf-
ficiently sturdy. The “threat from the right”
will grow if there is little progress in the
Russian offensive in Ukraine, if there is an
aggravation of the internal interethnic situ-
ation, or if there any attempts to make the
country’s international policy less aggres-
sive. Still, the Russian military and security
establishment are generally loyal to Putin,
and they are well motivated and equipped
to stamp out an insurgency effectively and
efficiently should it occur. A true threat
arises in case that there is an alliance of na-
tionalists, liberals and part of the military/
security establishment where nationalist
sentiment has been traditionally strong. In
this case, there is a hypothetical probability
of the rise to power of ultra-conservative,
radical forces hostile to the West, who are
spiritually close to the despotic Islamic
governments in the Middle East. This sce-
nario offers a wide selection of potential
leaders ranging from puppet nationalist-
jester Rogozin to half-crazy ideologues of
the Russian World, or even veterans of the
ongoing war in Ukraine, many of whom are
obsessed with extreme forms of chauvin-
ism. In a nuclear-armed nation, the possible
seizure of power by militant radicals (prob-
ably, following on the 1917 revolution mod-
el, with a short preceding reign of a weak

liberal provisional government) will have
unpredictable implications. The possibility
and probability of a planetary catastrophe
becomes pretty realistic with this scenario.
Scenario #4. Status Quo
There still remains a probability, al-
beit minor one, of preservation of the sta-
tus quo for a long time. However, further
continuation of the current architecture
of government with Putin at its top will
no longer benefit anybody, including to a
large extent even Putin himself. Continu-
ation of Putin’s tenure as the ‘czar of Rus-
sia’ will be conducive to stagnation in all
spheres of life and to a gradual but sure
deterioration of the political system that
he built, which, as befits any vacuum-
sealed political regime devoid of any
possibility of change, will become pro-
gressively more decrepit and rotten from
within – only to eventually explode and
collapse as the USSR did in 1991. In fact,
this will be simply a postponement of the
inevitable, a precursor of any of the three
scenarios described above. Each extra year
of Putin’s tenure as ‘czar’ will add to sever-
ity of turmoil after his departure from the
‘throne’, which is certainly evident for his
inner circle to see. What can make him
step down are not plummeting oil prices,
international sanctions or economic tur-
moil, but, rather, extreme fatigue of his
darling political system. Russia is stand-
ing at ‘crossroads’ between liberalization
and dipping deeper into nationalist ob-
scurantism. But there is no room left for
Putin in both of these sub-scenarios. Even
if Putinism continues as a political system
of government, the founding father has
become superfluous in the system he cre-
ated himself. Putin’s retirement would be
beneficial to all stakeholders. Changes are
progressing slowly, still they are progress-
ing. Therefore, the sunset of the Putin era
is around the corner.

t a recent press conference,
Putin said he did not intend
to stay in the presidential
office throughout his life,
but did not rule out that he
could run for another term. Given the clear
divide between the real and the formal hi-
erarchy of authority in the Russian Federa-
tion, notably the possibility of the “rule by
proxy” using a Medvedev-style puppet as
president, a transfer of presidency looks
pretty likely. A flurry of Western criticism,
effectively directed mainly against Putin
personally, has turned him into an odious
figure, whose removal from the political
fore would have a powerful propaganda
effect and contribute to the improvement
of relations with the US and the EU. For
fans and supporters in Russia and abroad,
it would be possible to concoct yet anoth-
er “tandemocracy” where Putin, having
turned himself into an icon of anti-Amer-
icanism, will continue to please his “flock”
by his presence in the Media space while
formally being on the sidelines.
In this context, the increasing media
buzz around the “successor” topic seems
to be quite natural. Since the identity of the
heir to the Russian “throne” remains a mat-
ter of debate, it would be wise to consider a
man who was already mentioned as a candi-
date for presidency in the recent past – the
man representing the worst nightmare pos-
sible for the Russian Opposition and for ev-
eryone anticipating changes in the Russian
Federation’s domestic and international
policies, and the man who is going to pur-
sue “Putinism” after Putin leaves office.
Sergei Ivanov was born in 1953 in Len-
ingrad. Ivanov graduated from the English
translation branch of the Department of
Philology at Leningrad State University.
After graduation, he spent some time in
the UK, polishing his English language
proficiency. Upon return from abroad he
linked his fate with the secret services, hav-
ing enrolled to serve in the KGB in 1975
(the same year as the future president of the
Russian Federation). While serving at the
local branch of the Committee, he became
acquainted with a young First Lieutenant of
Justice, Vladimir Putin, with whom he was
able to develop and share a strong friend-
ship since then. In 1976, Ivanov finished
the Higher Courses of the KGB in Minsk,
and four years later completed postgradu-
ate studies at the Red Banner Institute of the
KGB of the USSR. During years up to 1985,
he was serving in the KGB residencies in
Finland, and later – in Kenya.
Unlike his friend and colleague, who
was quick on the uptake on the rapid
changes and transformations taking place
in the country during Perestroika, Ivanov
Chapter I
People who surround Putin
Putinism after Putin.
The Ascent of Sergey Ivanov
Dmitry Kozlov
A

remained loyal to his job at secret services
both at the time of the 1991 coup d’etat at-
tempt by the Gang of Eight and in years
after the final collapse of the Soviet Union.
Thus he demonstrated his conservatism and
far lesser sensitivity to changes than Putin
had, on the one hand, and the unshakable
loyalty to his native organization, regardless
of its name or nationality, on the other hand.
In the period from 1991 to 1998, Ivanov
continued service in the structures of the
Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian
Federation, and resigned from service while
being in the position of the first deputy di-
rector of the European Department at the
FIS. After the 1998 Russian market crash,
Sergey Ivanov became chief of the forecast-
ing and strategic planning department, an
office which he held in conjunction with his
role as deputy director of the Federal Secu-
rity Service, headed by Putin.
Soon afterwards, Yeltsin steps down
from presidency, and the finest hour comes
for Sergei Borisovich, as well as for his pro-
tégé. On November 15, 1999, he became
Secretary of the Russian Security Council,
and also its permanent member, continu-
ing in this position after appointment to
the office of the Minister of Defense and,
later, Deputy Prime Minister – up to 2007,
when Ivanov’s influence suddenly stopped
to grow. By that time, many saw him as a
successor to Putin whose second term was
coming to an end. Surprisingly, however,
a premium was placed on a formally more
pro-Western liberal, Dmitry Medvedev, and
there are several reasons for this. On the
one hand, despite a very close relation-
ship with Putin, Ivanov has repeatedly
demonstrated an attitude of authority
and dominance, if not that of patronizing
superiority towards Putin, who, accord-
ing to some reports, even grudged Ivanov
his success as secret-service agent. The
Kremlin’s intrigues might be another fac-
tor that played against Ivanov’s candidacy;
it is known that Sergei Borisovich has very
uneasy relationship with another Putin’s fa-
vorite, Igor Sechin. In the context of the idea
that everything going on in the Kremlin is
in control of the largest financial-industrial
groups and oligarchs, who determine the
future image of the State, the choice in favor
of Medvedev could be aimed at changing
Russia’s image in the West, which is becom-
ing increasingly confrontational and more
often characterized in terms of “authoritari-
anism” and “dictatorship”. In those years,
the ruling elite in Russia was, apparently,
not yet ready to deal with the West and the
internal opposition in a more determined
and defiant manner, but was actually in-
clined to “appointing” to presidency yet
another security officer who would be even
more anti-American than Vladimir Putin
is. What might also play against Ivanov was
his – very atypical for modern Russia – lack
of connections with big business; having his
sons employed in senior positions at major
banks, Sergei Borisovich looks almost as-
cetic against the background of other mem-
bers of the Russian elite. This fact, combined
with his KGB experience that far exceeds
that of Putin, and his known hostility to the
West, makes Ivanov a pretty demonic figure.
Onewayoranother,butDmitryMedve-
dev becomes President, while Sergei Ivanov
receives a modest position of deputy prime
minister in charge of the defense industry,
transport and communications. However,
while the relationship between Ivanov and
Putin saw some periods of cooling in the
past, they had become much warmer even
before the known events in Ukraine. After
his second return to the Kremlin as presi-
dent, Putin, frightened and enraged by mas-
sive protests on Bolotnaya Square, starts the
tightening of the domestic policy stance. A

Soviet Politburo-styled administration was
set up to work in parallel to Medvedev’s
Cabinet. This small circle of people, while
formally holding not very high-level official
positions, begin to determine Russia’s poli-
cy in a much greater extent than the formal
Cabinet ministers and the “puppet” prime
minister. Medvedev’s “thaw” ends almost
before it began.
With the growth of nationalist and
anti-Western sentiments in Russia, the role
of security service who found themselves in
the shadow for some time has risen sharp-
ly, and Ivanov returns to the stage in 2011.
Having quickly recovered lost ground,
Sergey Borisovich receives the key posi-
tion of the head of the Russian Presiden-
tial Administration – arguably the second
most powerful person in the State hier-
archy after the president. Putin launched
his anti-corruption campaign, that was
masterminded to settle feuds with Medve-
dev and the Prime Minister’s associates so
to make them rapidly lose their authority
and influence, and thus weaken the liberal
camp further still. In particular, it was Iva-
nov who was mentioned by the Media as the
key driving force that led to the firing of De-
fense Minister Serdyukov.
By making numerous statements of
loyalty to Putin’s policy course and to the
president personally, Ivanov clearly implies
that he has leadership ambition himself.
Assessing the outlook for Ivanov, it should
be noted that Sergei Borisovich has ap-
proximated an almost caricatured version
of Putin. Non-charismatic, but harsh and
overbearing, an advocate of international
and domestic policy tightening and, unlike
Putin, free from the ambition-restraining
oligarchic financial “leash”, Ivanov can make
all opponents of the sitting president, both
in and outside Russia, remember Putin’s era
almost nostalgically. The likelihood of such
successor choice is high enough, meaning
Putin would be replaced by someone very
similar. This would suit the book of both the
conservatives and nationalists, but not the
Russian Opposition and the West, where
there is strong desire to forgive Russia ev-
erything in exchange for at least an illusory
liberalization of the regime. Proceeding
from this premise, it’s all the more likely
that there will be another Medvedev-style
reshuffle, with the advent of a controllable
figure – externally moderately pro-Western
and liberalistic – who would occasionally
“beat the drum” about democratic values
and human rights to the delight of the Op-
position and the international community.
Unaccustomed to protracted confrontation
and geopolitical crises, the West, and most
particularly the EU can – and even strives
to – get on the same hook again. However,
the complexity of forecasting the moves of
the very closed Kremlin’s camarilla, which
in many respects resembles a medieval re-
ligious order, leaves room for every kind
of scenarios. So it is quite possible that, in
2018, the world will find itself face-to-face
with an aggressive ultraconservative nuclear
power – led not by Lieutenant Colonel but
Colonel-General of the former Soviet KGB,
whose imperial ambitions this time around
will not be restricted even by billion worth
accounts of the Russian oligarchs.

n recent months, many
analysts have noted the
rapidly growing influence
and the rise of a group of
Putin’s “courtiers” broadly
reckoned among the “Hawks.” The rea-
sons are obvious; the “party of peace”
that used to rely on economic and po-
litical ties with the West has been giving
ground as those ties are getting loose. As
well as Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev,
the now weakened “Doves” group is sup-
posed to include Naryshkin, Dvorkovich,
Nabiullina and Siluanov, i.e. primarily
members of the economic block, not the
security block of the Russian government.
The “Hawks” – who won dominance after
the beginning of standoff with the West
over Ukraine – are, indeed, almost all
the securocrats from Putin’s inner circle,
which, in fact, has remained, with only
minor reconfigurations, as it was nearly
two decades back. The key figures of this
circle are the head of Putin’s Administra-
tion, Sergei Ivanov, Deputy Prime Min-
ister in charge of the defense industry,
Dmitry Rogozin, and, of course, Russian
Defense Minister, Sergei Shoygu. The lat-
ter deserves a bit of separate attention in
relation to reports in some Media sources
claiming that Sergei Shoygu has been se-
lected to be potential heir to the Russian
“throne”.
There are several theories explain-
ing the actual structure of the Russian
elite and the degree of mutual influence
between Putin and people who surround
him. Most analysts and researchers
would agree that the Kremlin’s “court-
iers” have very limited abilities when it
comes to identifying ultimate goals or
making key decisions, which are all the
sole discretion of the Russian leader,
which makes them unpredictable to a
substantial degree. However there is a dif-
ferent opinion that gives Putin a far more
modest role than is generally believed.
This theory suggests, first, that Putin is es-
sentially nothing more than just a picture,
kind of an “avatar” for a population long-
ing for a “strong-arm” policy, and, second,
that, as a matter of fact, he is totally de-
pendent upon and controlled by higher
echelons of the Establishment. If rumors
about the choice of Shoygu as potential
successor are confirmed, there will be a
very strong corroboration for the “pseu-
do-dictator” theory. Indeed, there is hard-
ly another high profiled political figure in
Russia who invariably shows himself to be
a loyal servant notoriously devoid of per-
sonal initiative.
The potential candidate for the role
of the head of the Russian State was born
in 1955 in Tuva – the territory, which
became part of Russia as recently as in
1944. Having worked in the construc-
tion industry for some time, where he
advanced from low levels to an executive
in charge of several construction com-
panies in Tuva ASSR, Sergei Shoygu be-
gan a successful career, which is hardly
Sergei Shoygu – successor or puppet?
I

surprising given the status of his father,
Kuzhuget Shoygu, as chairman of the
Tuva Regional Branch of the Commu-
nist Party of the USSR. If one knows
about the friendship between Shoygu Sr.
and Boris Yeltsin, the then chairman of
the Sverdlovsk Regional Branch of the
CPSU, the further dizzying climb up the
career ladder is easily understandable.
After the devastating Spitak earthquake,
a unified crisis-relief movement began
to be built up in the Soviet Union dur-
ing years when it was already in decline
as world power. In the 1990s, grass-roots
rescue teams in Russia were consolidated
in what is now a federal ministry, pre-
ceded by the RSFSR State Committee for
Emergency Situations. Patronized by the
rising Yeltsin, Sergei Shoygu, then a stu-
dent of Moscow’s Higher Party School,
was promoted to the chief of that emerg-
ing agency, which was reorganized into a
federal ministry in 1994.
From the very beginning, the emer-
gent agency in charge of crisis relief had
some features characteristic for a “quasi-
security” organization. Yeltsin had not yet
dealt with the Soviet Union, nor did he
have own security forces at the time. So he
sought to create kind of personal “Cardi-
nal guards” that would have relation nei-
ther to the Soviet Ministry of Defense nor
the KGB, nor their respective successor
organizations. Sergei Shoygu did the job
with excellence; he effectively established
a parallel military force with own armor
and aircraft units, many of which were on
a par with those of the airborne and air
assault forces. This military force, which
was rather unique to Russia, was well
equipped, far better than most of MoD’s
forces. The Yeltsin’s “Personal Guard” still
continues to exist today in somewhat re-
duced form, although grounds for presi-
dent’s standoff with security forces and
secret services effectively ceased to exist
after Putin’s “enthronement”.
Shoygu remained in charge of Rus-
sia’s emergencies ministry during 18 years
up to 2012. Reserved and tight-lipped,
not only has Sergei Shoygu been able to
become a political longman among the
Russian political elite, but also preserve
much of the remarkable popular respect
and confidence in him as “chief rescuer”,
of which few of Yeltsin’s administration
officials can boast. However, Shoygu’s
duties as minister for emergency situa-
tions were not limited to crisis relief op-
erations alone. Faithful “royal servant”,
regardless of the identity of “the king,”
he was dealing with the Ossetian-Ingush
conflict settlement in 1992, was oversee-
ing Yeltsin’s election campaign in 1996,
and, in 2000, he came to lead the Unity
party, which eventually became the Unit-
ed Russia party after having absorbed sev-
eral other political forces.
In 2012, Shoygu, apparently prepar-
ing himself for “honorable exile” in the
position of Moscow Oblast Governor,
returned again to the “major leagues” of
Russian politics after he was replaced by
Puchkov as minister for emergencies and
appointed to lead the ministry of defense,
replacing odious Serdyukov. In his enthu-
siasm to crack down on the disgraced ex-
minister’s legacy, Sergei Shoygu immedi-
ately closed many of Serdyukov’s reform
programs and launched an assault both
on the structures involved in corruption
scandals, such as Oboronservice, for ex-
ample, and on those that were transferred
from control of the corrupt reformer to
that of Dmitry Rogozin (“Rosoboronza-
kaz”). Shoygu’s strive to strengthen the
defense department manifested itself in
MoD’s attempts to absorb the Ministry of

Emergency Situations (Shoygu’s former
creation where he has lost none of his in-
fluence), which only solidifies the percep-
tion of the crisis relief agency as a parallel
security organization.
This all speaks of Shoygu’s strive to
muster his political weight. However, he
remains, as before, to be a faithful execu-
tor of the ruler’s will, while not claim-
ing discretion in decision-making. The
probability of his appointment as Putin’s
successor is hard to assess now by virtue
of the complexity of structural analysis
of the Russian political elite as a whole.
However, we can safely predict that, if
and when such a decision is taken, we will
see a substantial increase in public activ-
ity and Media presence of this usually
tight-lipped, low-profile politician. Public
confidence will need to be converted into
approval ratings. The key consequence of
the potential ascent of Shoygu to the top
of the political Olympus will be a better
understanding of how the Russian elite is
structured and how it functions. Indeed,
if a faithful watchdog of the current
Russian regime such as Sergei Shoygu
is elected to the president’s office, this
might be identified as yet another proof
of what many have long suspected – that
Putin’s absolutism is nothing less than
just a political simulacrum invented by
a certain group of national security and
financial-industrial heavyweights who
hired Putin to play the role of a puppet
“dictator”. On the one hand, this could
be considered to be a beacon of hope for
Ukraine, because, if this is the case, the
actions of the neighboring state are dic-
tated by rational calculations of interest
groups, rather than by the vapors of a
disoriented mind of a certain KGB man.
However, this also implies a more sys-
tematic, well-thought-out and calculated
nature of the Russian aggression, whose
roots should be sought in the construc-
tion of the Kremlin’s elites and in their
collective, group thinking.

n medieval Europe, royal
and aristocratic households
usually employed licensed
fools or jesters who served
not only to amuse their mas-
ter or mistress and their guests but to criti-
cize them, often by using jests or behaviors
that were otherwise regarded inappropri-
ate in official communications among the
nobility. The fools gradually disappeared
from the historical stage during the En-
lightenment era, but in countries of the for-
mer Soviet Union, many of which retained
some features characteristic for feudalism,
fools continue to exist, albeit in a somewhat
modernized incarnation. Indeed, Putin’s
Russia is no exception, where licensed fools
are present widely in media coverage. The
most known clown of Yeltsin’s era, the flam-
boyant Vladimir Zhirinovsky still emerges
sometimes in media coverage with his ex-
travagant statements, but his finest hour
has long passed. He became boring to the
public at home and abroad, and his role
of the number one court jester smoothly
transferred to another person – Deputy
Prime Minister and ex-leader of the Rodi-
na (Motherland) Party, Dmitry Rogozin.
In the recent past, Rogozin was a fairly
serious potential threat to the Russian gov-
ernment, being the leader of a highly influ-
ential and increasingly popular nationalist
opposition party. The history of the trans-
formation of Dmitry Olegovich from an
ambitious nationalist politician into a radi-
cal jester perfectly illustrates the Kremlin’s
strategy of getting rid of dangerous com-
petitors by exchanging their political capi-
tal for a small “piece of the state’s pie”. As
well as jester’s role, Rogozin now performs
far more serious functions in Russia’s politi-
cal community, which are less known to the
general public.
Dmitry Rogozin was born in Moscow
on 21 December 1963. He graduated from
Moscow State University in 1986 with a
degree in journalism. Having graduated
with honors from the Economics Branch
of the University of Marxism-Leninism at-
tached to the Moscow Committee of the
CPSU in 1988, Rogozin went to work in
the Committee of Youth Organizations of
the USSR. After work in several short-lived
political and business projects in the early
1990s, Rogozin, in March 1993, joined
the emergent people’s patriotic movement
“The Congress of Russian Communities”
(CRC) party led by General Alexander
Lebed. The movement was set up to con-
solidate the Russian ethnic communities
and socio-political organizations in na-
tional autonomies in Russia, countries of
the former Soviet Union and some foreign
countries. Rogozin run for State Duma as
a CRC party-list candidate, but the CRC
failed to clear the five percent hurdle re-
quired for parties to qualify for State Duma
seats. However, two years later, Rogozin
was able to make it into the legislature
after he garnered 38% of voter support
in a single-seat constituency in Voronezh
province. His work as State Duma deputy
Dmitry Rogozin – radical
nationalist or court jester?
I

was focused on matters consistent with
the nationalistic ideology professed by
him. So he became deputy chairman of
the Committee on Nationalities’ Affairs.
As time went by, the young politician was
climbing up the career ladder; Rogozin
was awarded a status as special envoy of
the Russian president, in which capacity
he conducted successful negotiations with
the EU and Lithuania addressing the nor-
mal functioning of the Kaliningrad region,
which become an isolated Russian exclave
surrounded by the united Europe as a re-
sult of the most recent wave of enlarge-
ment of the EU. After a brief work in yet
another short-lived political project – the
People’s Party - Rogozin is poised to join
the United Russia Party, which was about
to become finally shaped as the party in
power. There were even some media re-
ports that Dmitry Rogozin might be ap-
pointed as General Council chairman of
the United Russia Party.
It seemed that Rogozin was a step away
from entering an elite club that was being
shaped under the guise of his party for con-
solidating the new nobility of Putin’s Rus-
sia. But suddenly the prospects of the young
zealous politician dramatically darken.
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, Rogozin’s
political rival, bars his entry into the presi-
dential party leadership. Offended, but not
broken, Rogozin decides to go the other way
round.
In September 2003, Rogozin creates
and heads an electoral bloc (which was later
transformed into a party) named Rodina
(Motherland), and, as soon as in December,
he is re-elected as Duma deputy with a re-
cord high voter support of 79%. His electoral
bloc, with moderately nationalist program,
garners 9.1% of votes and gets into parlia-
ment. Soon afterwards Dmitry Rogozin be-
comes deputy Speaker of the State Duma.
The following year, during a presidential
campaign, he makes another effective move
to strengthen his position. Having denied
support for co-chairman of Rodina, Sergei
Glazyev, who fielded himself as the Duma
candidate without previous approval of the
Rodina faction, Rogozin requests the party
to support Putin moderately. This decision
proved to be right, and, by the summer of
2004, Rogozin, having beat Glazyev in the
intraparty strife, becomes sole leader of Ro-
dina.
It seems that the career of the moder-
ate “puppet” nationalist opposition member
came back to the rising track, but Rogozin
once again trips over a political “hurdle” put
for him by his longtime foe Luzhkov.
In December 2005, Rogozin’s and his
party’s nationalism became particularly evi-
dent in a propaganda video released on the
eve of elections to the Moscow City Duma.
The apparently xenophobic video called
“Clear Moscow of Rubbish” was a welcome
opportunity for Luzhkov to launch a broad-
side against his long-time rival, which he
did not miss. Under the weight of criticism
and accusations of extremism and xeno-
phobia, Rodina is removed from regional
legislative elections and comes under hard
pressure from the authorities. Rogozin, who
himself was starring in the controversial
video, faces a choice of either resigning as
chairman or having his party disbanded al-
together. Having chosen the former option,
Dmitry Rogozin abandons Rodina. Since
the Kremlin is interested in the existence, if
not more or less commensurate strengthen-
ing of the controllable systemic opposition,
the now disfavored Rodina, after a dramatic
transformation, a merger with other po-
litical forces and a change of its ideological
concept, becomes Fair Russia Party with
Sergei Mironov as its leader. The ideological
platform, free of nationalism and xenopho-

bia, basically remains the same, implying
support for Vladimir Putin’s policy course.
A year later, Dmitry Rogozin, in an at-
tempt to return to big politics, sets up a new
political party named “Great Russia”. How-
ever, the government’s denial of the party’s
registration puts an end to his ambitious
plans once again as the Kremlin seriously
decided to distance itself from the political
forces professing radical ideologies. Time
for mobilizing the nationalist electorate has
not come yet, and Rogozin’s political future
hangs in a limbo. However, as soon as in the
crisis year 2008, Russia and the world are
facing major challenges that will make sup-
porters of radical views in demand by Rus-
sia’s political elites.
In January 2008, Dmitry Rogozin, to
surprise of many, is appointed as Russia’s
permanent envoy to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization in Brussels. This ap-
pointment is being widely discussed by the
Russian political elite, and, given the na-
tionalist and anti-Western views pursued
by Rogozin, clearly implies an impending
geopolitical confrontation. The long ex-
pected worsening of relations between the
West and Russia takes place in February,
after independence of the Serbian Autono-
mous Province of Kosovo and Metohija was
proclaimed and recognized by the USA and
many EU countries. Vladimir Putin, both
then and now, made it clear that he consid-
ers the event as a precedent that opened the
way to the forced redrawing of borders of
sovereign states without regard to interna-
tional criticism. Speaking at the Moscow
CIS summit in February, Putin said: “The
Kosovo precedent is a terrible precedent.
Essentially it is blowing up the whole system
of international relations which has evolved
over the past not even decades but centu-
ries. Undoubtedly, it might provoke a whole
chain of unpredictable consequences”. The
“unpredictable consequences” began to tell
as soon as in August, resulting in the fast-
moving Russian-Georgian war. In April
2009, Rogozin is awarded the highest dip-
lomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary for his competent (as
the Russian leader saw them to be) diplo-
matic efforts during that conflict. Rogozin’s
role remains largely demonstrational thus
far; the notorious nationalist and chauvin-
ist representing Russia in NATO looks like
an apparent diplomatic travesty. However, a
few years later, the internal political situa-
tion in Russia makes Rogozin even more in
demand than ever before.
After the anti-Kremlin Bolotnaya pro-
tests, Putin, scared by the emergent explo-
sive mixture of the disaffected middle-class,
intellectuals and nationalists, understands
the need to secure the loyalty of the latter
as the only societal group potentially dan-
gerous to the regime. The eventual turn to
neo-conservatism and “spiritual bonds”
is taking place in concert with the rising
of the people who could potentially serve
as “gap bridgers” between the Kremlin
and the chauvinistic citizens. Rogozin
becomes one of those gap bridgers. Well
aware of the increased significance of the
defense industry in the new geopolitical
environment, Putin charges Rogozin to
oversee the arms industry. Though this ap-
pointment looks as more formal than not,
the more so as Rogozin’s influence in the
defense sector is very limited by the presi-
dent of the Rostech Corporation, Sergei
Chemezov, and Defense Minister, Sergei
Shoigu, who both are orbiting much closer
to the center of Russian power. Still Rogozin
enjoys some weight advantage, most nota-
bly the ability to lobby for the interests of
Viktor Livanov, the CEO of JSC “Ilyushin
Aviation Complex”, of whom Rogozin is a
relative. After Livanov’s death in Novem-

ber 2014, the JSC received the go-ahead to
launch aircraft projects on the IL-112B mili-
tary transport and IL-114 passenger carrier.
Rogozin’s limited abilities within the
political bureaucracy fit well into the over-
all Russian power architecture after the
tightening of the regime in 2011, where of-
ficial positions, modest as they are, in no
way reflect the broader influence of Putin’s
inner circle of the so-called “Politburo 2.0”.
It is undoubtedly that Rogozin today is
not member of the small group of the
president’s most influential friends. It is
inevitable that his first function (in addi-
tion to serving as a political jester) – that
of gap bridging between the Kremlin
and the nationalists – will help him con-
solidate his political influence. Against
the backdrop of worsening economic
situation and euphoria over the annexa-
tion of Crimea, it is inevitable that Putin
will have to pay more and more attention
to the nationalists as the most passionate
societal group ready for radical actions.
The loss of loyalty by that societal group
would make the probability of a coup at-
tempt much more realistic than massive
protests by “toothless” liberal opposition
parties would do. That said, Rogozin’s role
is likely to grow and potentially can be
converted into a commensurate growth
of his political influence. However, in the
current configuration of the Russian power
architecture, the likelihood seems low that
Rogozin would be promoted further up
to being appointed to the successor’s role.
But in case Putin’s approval rating would
plummet some day in the future, it is
Rogozin who can play an unexpected role.
More specifically, Rogozin, not united by
ties of long-time friendship with the presi-
dent as the people from his inner circle,
can bolster his position dramatically by
relying on the nationalists for support. For
example, he could win back his status as
an influential parliamentary actor which
he lost in 2005 due to a lack of political
experience. This time around, neither the
lack of inexperience nor counteraction on
the part of the now marginalized Yuri Lu-
zhkov will prevent Rogozin’s Rodina Party
to regain lost ground – particularly by sur-
passing Mironov’s Fair Russia Party whom
Rogozin repeatedly accused of raider at-
tacks on his own political force. Anyway,
Rogozin’s political future is to a consider-
able degree contingent on larger prospects
of Russia’s health and on how far devastat-
ing the effects of the emerging crisis would
be for the architecture of the country’s rul-
ing elite. As things stand now, the fact that
Rogozin has been relatively successful in
the politics’ arena while not being in the
same camp with marginalized politicians
such as Dugin or Prokhanov, still gives
hope for his rationality and good sense.

here is a widespread opin-
ion among the domestic and
foreign expert communities
that some of Russia’s interna-
tional policy aspects regard-
ing Ukraine are characterized by a certain
degree of inconsistency and irrationality.
All too often it is tempting to interpret this
inconsistency as a sign of a lack of logic,
even mental insanity of Russian President,
Vladimir Putin.
“Putin has lost touch with reality”, “Pu-
tin went crazy” cry headlines of even most
respected media outlets, in articles seeking
to explain, in simple, clear terms, the ac-
tions of the Russian leader. On closer exam-
ination, however, this approach comes into
conflict with everything we know about
Vladimir Putin – a smart and treacherous
man who obviously has an excellent com-
mand of his emotions, an expert engineer
of Machiavellian intrigues rather than an
obsessed madman and adventurer.
Still there are contradictions observed
in policy. An explanation of these contradic-
tions could be helped by understanding the
personality of one of Putin’s “courtiers”, who
has recently been called for to oversee the
Ukrainian vector of Russia’s international
policy. Here we are talking about Vladislav
Surkov – a man whom many called and con-
tinue to call the “Gray Cardinal”, “the chief
puppeteer of the political process”, and the
supreme ideologue of the Kremlin court.
Very interesting is the fact that the
architect of the Kremlin’s modern ide-
ologemes, without whom the concept of the
“Russian World” would definitely not exist
in its current shape and dimensions, a man
who calls himself to be “Russian by political
views” is actually not Russian by ethnic ori-
gin. Vladislav Surkov was born on 21 Sep-
tember 1964 in Duba-yurt, the Chechen-In-
gush Autonomous Republic. His birthname
was Aslanbek Dudayev. Moreover, even the
true birthplace of Surkov is uncertain, given
that the Russian presidential website says
he was born in Solntsevo village of Lipetsk
Oblast. Anyway, Surkov spent the first five
years of his life in Chechnya.
After moving to Moscow Surkov was
not much successful with getting higher edu-
cation for some time. Having studied several
years at Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys,
he dropped out in favor of Moscow Institute
of Culture, where he was accepted for a five-
year program in theater direction (the skills
he got there were certainly not redundant,
given the accomplishments he achieved in
his subsequent work in the ideology sector),
but spent only three years there.
Surkov served from 1983 to 1985 in a
Soviet artillery regiment of the Southern
Group of Forces in Hungary, according to
his official biography. But, in 2006, then-
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said in an
interview that Surkov did military service
in a SWAT unit at the Main Intelligence
Directorate of the General Staff. This fact,
which was certainly taken into account
by Surkov’s future patrons, assisted in his
ascent to the upper echelons of Russian
T
Vladislav Surkov –
the Kremlin’s “Gray Cardinal”

power, deeply rooted in the national secu-
rity establishment.
Having completed his regular service,
Surkov left the public service for a while. In
1987 he went into an emergent business sec-
tor, becoming the head of the advertising
department at the Center of inter-industrial
R&D programs (a firm set up by Mikhail
Khodorkovsky within the structure of a
Komsomol district committee). In the fol-
lowing years, Surkov held various managerial
positions in Khodorkovsky’s Menatep Group,
up until the middle 1990s, when he termi-
nated business with the oligarch to become
the head of PR at what is now “First Chan-
nel” (preceded by JSC “Russian Public Tele-
vision”) in Ostankino. Finally, in the twilight
of the Yeltsin era in 1999, Surkov returns to
public service as a deputy head of Kremlin
administration. Leaving this office in 2011,
Surkov told Interfax that he was among those
who “helped Boris Yeltsin to secure a peaceful
transfer of power” and, in the following years,
“among those who helped President Putin
stabilize the political system”. At the time
when Putin comes to power, Surkov starts
his career as the chief ideologue of the Krem-
lin court, creating pro-Putin youth projects
“Walking Together” (2000), and “Nashi”
(2005). In later years, he becomes one of the
founding fathers of the United Russia Party
and coordinates public relations with Putin’s
regime. Surkov had a range of responsibilities
that, at different times, included the Media,
statistics, work with religious organizations,
and a commission on TV broadcasting. In
the hierarchy of power, Surkov has a formal
status that is invariably far lower than his
actual status in Russian politics is. Surkov is
shying away from publicity, as befits a true
“gray cardinal”.
Surkov is probably best known as the
author of the ideology dubbed “sovereign
democracy” (or, sometimes, “managed de-
mocracy”) – the key ideologeme that un-
derlaid the presidential and parliamentary
election campaigns of 2007-2008. “Sover-
eign democracy” (which draw mixed opin-
ions both within and outside of Russia), as
other “democracies” with adjectives such as
“people’s”, “managed”, and even “Islamic”, is
certainly not a democracy proper. This con-
cept effectively envisaged as its end goal the
transition from oligarchic feudal fragmenta-
tion system of Yeltsin’s era to a neo-conser-
vative Putin’s “absolute monarchy” – with a
hand-picked legislature, massive chauvin-
istic state propaganda, limited freedom of
speech and repressions against members
of the media and the Opposition. Against
this background, noteworthy are statements
made by Surkov with regard to the massive
anti-Putin protest rallies of 2011, in which
he referred to the protesters as “the best
part of our society,” whose opinion needs to
be reckoned with etc. Such assessments of
opponents of the system, of which Surkov
was the factual creator, helped him acquire
a reputation of being an almost liberal, and
thus, once again demonstrate the highest
level of political hypocrisy.
However, in Ukraine’s context, what is
of a far greater importance was a turn of
Russia’s international policy towards the res-
toration of an independent “power center”
and the transition to an active geopolitical
confrontation with the West. Ultimately, the
fruits of policy course are now reaped both
by Ukraine and Russia itself.
As a matter of fact, Surkov was put in
charge of policy for Ukraine in the sum-
mer of 2013 at the latest, although he had
previous experience dealing with individual
projects relating to Ukraine. Particularly in
2004, Surkov, assisted by Dmitry Medvedev,
was handling the presidential campaign in
Ukraine, and, according to some reports, he
was engaged in financing electoral success

of Yanukovych in 2009-10. But it is exactly
in the summer of 2013 when Surkov became
an unofficial “charge d’affaires for Ukraine”,
and he was allegedly the one who made de-
cision on transition to a new, tougher policy
on Ukraine. This policy manifested in the
launch of a hostile campaign that included
inter alia trade wars and blockades in order
to make Viktor Yanukovych abandon Kuch-
ma’s “multi-directional” policy course in fa-
vor of a policy of Eurasian integration and
to fasten Ukraine tightly on Russia’s geo-
political orbit. Surkov was responsible for
the formation of a positive image of Russia
in the Ukrainian Media, and he personally
worked with pro-Russian political figures
such as Viktor Medvedchuk, for example.
Surkov repeatedly met with Yanu-
kovych in the midst of Euromaidan and,
according to some reports, continued with
visits to Kiev after the change of govern-
ment in Ukraine. The role played by Surkov
in the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula
and the incitement of separatist rebellion
in the East of Ukraine should never be un-
derestimated; despite the obviously authori-
tarian nature of Putin’s regime, Surkov was
apparently given a considerable degree of
discretion in determining the means and
methods by which to achieve Putin’s ob-
jectives in Ukraine. However, it is after the
beginning of active operations and direct
Russian aggression against the Ukrainian
State when Surkov’s certain personal traits
and characteristics manifested themselves,
which makes his decisions hard to predict
and turns the “Gray Cardinal of the Krem-
lin” into a very dangerous opponent.
Back at the time when Surkov was
working with Khodorkovsky, many of the
former’s colleagues noted some distin-
guishable features in the personality of
the would-be Putin’s companion-in-arms,
among them petrified coldness and even
temperedness; impassive, even tone; the
absence of external emotion – i.e. the quali-
ties he shares with the Russian president’s
character. But, while in the case of the master
of the Kremlin, these personal characteristics
are real, not pretended, the situation is more
complicated with Surkov. Vladislav Yuryev-
ich has repeatedly shown himself as an out-
standing actor who can easily set himself to
the right frame of mind and find a common
ground with anyone, be it a “Red Director” of
the 1990s or one of Putin’s cohort of national
security officers of the 2000s.
Surkov is also renowned for his creative
works that range from the lyrics for an al-
bum of the [popular Russian gothic rock
band] Agatha Christie’s ex-lead singer, Vad-
im Samoilov, to several novels published
under the pseudonym Nathan Dubovitskij,
which all won positive critics reviews and
deal with high-level corruption in govern-
ment and Media among other things. In
a critics review on one of Surkov’s novels,
Novaya Gazeta wrote: “It’s foolish not to en-
joy the undeniable gift of a man who prob-
ably chose the wrong profession.” However,
Surkov personally – who for a long time
denied his authorship of one of the nov-
els and even released a slashing review on
it – would probably not agree with such an
opinion. After all, he is as much gifted in
geopolitics as he is in the creative field.
One can argue the root causes that led
to the secession of the two self-styled re-
publics from the rest of Ukraine, but their
very existence and confrontation with
the Ukrainian government were quickly
brought under control by Surkov. His the-
ater direction skills came into their own,
and Surkov aggressively set to work pro-
ducing a new drama project named “New
Russia”. The first wave of local marginal
“functionaries” and odious radicals from
Russia such as Strelkov-Girkin (sponsored

financially by the “Orthodox oligarch”
Malofeev, according to some sources) was
mopped up; some just left the stage of the
Surkov’s “theater” (Boroday, Pushilin, Bolo-
tov, Girkin) while others have been ousted
to the sidelines (Gubarev as well as Khoda-
kovsky, who is regarded to be a crony and
an “agent of influence” of Rinat Akhmetov).
To replace them, new puppets came – those
who are devoid of radical idealism (which
isn’t applicable in this far-sighted geopo-
litical game) or were made responsible for
overseeing military and humanitarian aid
supplies. Their subsequent moves, actions
and statements – inconsistent, as it would
immediately seem, to their earlier radical
outbursts and slogans, and misinterpreted
as being illogical and adventurous – are
easily understandable, given the personality
of Surkov as a mouthpiece of some kind of
a consensus between the primeval, great-
power chauvinistic policy adopted by Putin
(and, perhaps, sincerely professed by him)
and the financial interests of the Russian
oligarchy, firmly embedded in the global
economy and uninterested in exchanging
their wealth for illusionary “greatness” and
imperial revanchism.
It is the need for Surkov to balance
out between different “Kremlin’s tow-
ers” – Putin and the financial elite – which
is reflected on the half-hearted support
for the DNR and LNR rebels, rejection of
more ambitious plans for dismemberment
of Ukraine, and the explicit strategy of ar-
resting the ongoing conflict by freezing
it within the borders of the two Eastern
regions. This strategy obviously has found
support in Kiev, and this support is due not
only to certain economic and political fac-
tors, but also to Surkov’s unsurpassed gift to
persuade and gain people’s trust. However,
we well know whose shadow looms behind
Vladislav Yuryevich. While details of the
Russian leader’s intentions are known only
to him, then their underlying strategy – that
of having Ukraine under full control or de-
structed – does not leave room for doubt.
It could well be the case that the events
in recent days – “soldier riots”, aggressive
protests by right-wing radicals outside the
Parliament building etc – are the first har-
bingers of this “creative policy” of destabiliz-
ing Ukraine further still. Such being the case,
one can try and forecast at least the overall
vector of Surkov’s future projects. The wave
of the Russia-backed idea-driven separatism
has rushed back, leaving behind only local
success on a small part of the Ukrainian ter-
ritory. But winter is looming, and with it a
predicted rapid deterioration of the socio-
economic situation, especially in industrial
regions, and rising anti-government senti-
ments. And it’s almost certain that Surkov
will not miss such a fertile opportunity for
another “spring”. This time around, it will
probably be almost devoid of pro-Russian
ideological coloring, and will be in the na-
ture of a social, anti-oligarchic protest.
Also, one should not rule out the possi-
bility that regional separatism may be insti-
gated also in the Western regions (the emer-
gent Ukrainian Galician Party may be the
first germ of potential threats), most particu-
larly in areas densely populated by Romanian
and Hungarian ethic communities, and that
radical anti-government sentiment may grow
in the already loosely controlled volunteer
forces. After all, the key strategy remains as
it was before. For translating this strategy into
reality, Vladislav Surkov – with his combined
cold-blooded rationality and hypocrisy, ex-
perience as a SWAT and GRU officer, a “shark
of capitalism” in the tumultuous 1990s, an
author and a major political functionary, and
his ability to think creatively and innovative-
ly – is a perfect weapon, the weapon which
Ukraine must be able to effectively counter.

n September 2014, Bloom-
berg released a ranking of
people who matter most in
global finance. There is one
Russian citizen – president
of Rosneft, Igor Sechin – on this Most In-
fluential 50 list. Incidentally, Sechin is also
the only Russian to be on TIME list of the
world’s most influential people.
In recent years, influence of the man –
with reference to whom the Western me-
dia wrote “We say Sechin and mean Pu-
tin” – has grown substantially, and Igor
Ivanovich himself, who previously shared
the “Gray Cardinal of the Kremlin” title
with Vladislav Surkov and was reputed to be
a “nonpublic” politician, surprisingly have
become a public figure. Sechin – one of the
most probable candidates to succeed Putin
as Russia’s president – is widely believed to
be Russia’s second most powerful person af-
ter President Putin. In this context, it would
be interesting to consider Igor Ivanovich as
kind of a sample, a matrix of the qualities
deemed indispensable for a successful polit-
ical career in Putin’s Russia. In biography of
Sechin, there are two components that are
common to almost all of Putin’s closest al-
lies. One is relationship with the secret ser-
vices and the other is earlier experience of
market activity and doing business in Soviet
international trade organizations.
A fellow townsman of Putin, Igor
Sechin was born in Leningrad on Septem-
ber 7, 1960, in a family of factory workers.
Two years prior to graduation from Lenin-
grad State University in 1984 as a linguist
fluent in Portuguese, Sechin was sent to
work in the civil war-ridden former Portu-
guese colony of Mozambique, whose gov-
ernment was supported and assisted by the
Soviet Union. At that time, trips of that kind
were hardly possible, other than under the
KGB’s auspices, although official documents
confirming Sechin’s relations to the Levia-
than KGB are nowhere to be found.
After returning from Africa two years
later, Sechin completed his university pro-
gram and graduated with a degree in French
and Portuguese Linguistics in 1984. After-
wards he was in the army doing his regular
service at a desert station in Turkmenistan,
which hosted an international air defense
training center that provided training
to military men from African countries.
Sechin was then sent on a mission to An-
gola, also torn by internecine war. When in
Angola, he was dealing with a wide range of
military matters, including in the capacity
of an adviser to commander of the Angolan
Navy.
Upon returning from Africa, Sechin
worked in organizations incorporated
with the specialized export/import cor-
poration “Technoexport” that served as
an intermediary supplier of production
equipment and other technologies for in-
dustries set up with Soviet assistance. In
the following years, he worked in the Lenin-
grad State University’s department dealing
with professor and student training pro-
grams in foreign countries. It is there where
I
Loyal Putin’s man Igor Sechin –
oil tycoon and Russian Richelieu

Igor Ivanovich made the life-changing ac-
quaintance with Assistant Vice-Rector for
International Relations – Vladimir Putin.
For some time, the paths of the two
would-be Kremlin Titans diverged when
Sechin transferred to work in the munici-
pal government of Leningrad, where he was
responsible for bolstering fraternal relations
between Leningrad and one of its twin cit-
ies, Rio de Janeiro. But in 1991, the two
men meet again at the office of St. Peters-
burg mayor Anatoly Sobchak, where Sechin
became a chief of staff of the first deputy
mayor, Vladimir Putin. From that time on,
careers of Putin and Sechin have been fol-
lowing parallel tracks.
Prior to 1996, Sechin held various po-
sitions in the Putin-led Committee on In-
ternational Trade Relations at St. Peters-
burg mayor’s office. After Sobchak suffered
a defeat in gubernatorial elections, Sechin
followed his friend and patron from St. Pe-
tersburg to the metropolitan city. As Putin
wrote later in his book “From the First Per-
son”, “When I went to work in Moscow, he
asked to come along, so I brought him with
me.” Uncertain about where Putin’s trip to
the upper echelons of the Russian power
would end, Sechin followed him without
any extra persuasion, revealing a personal
quality noted by many of his colleagues way
back from the time he served on the Ango-
lan mission – loyalty. It is personal loyalty
and devotion, so much valued by the fu-
ture Russian leader, that determined the
future of Sechin – not only as an influen-
tial political longman and member of the
new informal “politburo”, but also as chief
of kind of the Kremlin’s “shadow person-
nel department” responsible for hiring and
checking the backgrounds of the people
demanded by the regime. It is Sechin who
was put in charge of performing some sort
of sensitive missions involving the conduct-
ing of liaison between Putin and the people
with whom the Russian president cannot
communicate publicly for some or other
reason. The range of competencies assigned
to Igor Ivanovich, according to some sourc-
es, includes, inter alia, work on people and
entities unwanted by the regime, by way of
releasing relevant instructions for the Inte-
rior Ministry, the Prosecutor General’s Of-
fice and the Accounting Chamber. In fact,
Sechin continues to perform the role of “Vi-
zier” under “Sultan” Putin. As befits a “Gray
Cardinal”, and like other senior Russian
“dignitaries”, Sechin enjoys an enormous
amount of power which is incommensu-
rate with their modest official positions in
Kremlin’s administration. The absence of
titles and eye-catching external signs of
power is what distinguishes Putin’s clos-
est associates, being probably a manifes-
tation of professional habits common to
“cloak and dagger” agents.
When Putin began his second term
in 2004, Sechin retains his post as head of
Kremlin’s administration. But this time
around, long-term loyalty begins to bring
financial rewards; Igor Sechin becomes
member of the Board of Directors of state
oil company Rosneft and, a month later,
presides over it. Being at that time Rus-
sia’s sixths biggest oil company in terms
of oil production, the Sechin-led Rosneft
launches an aggressive merger campaign,
rapidly swallowing up the assets of com-
petitors, among them the now extinct
Yukos of Khodorkovsky (who pointed to
Sechin as the man who orchestrated a ha-
rassment campaign against him) and its
main competitor, TNK-BP, which merged
into Rosneft in March 2013. The monopo-
lization of the oil market, which made
Sechin into an oligarch, is part of Putin’s
broader strategy aimed at consolidation
of the key sectors of the economy, the de-

facto nationalization of strategic industries
and the creation of powerful state corpo-
rations within a state-directed capitalism
system being currently established in Rus-
sia. As a matter of fact, Sechin is much of
an architect of the grand redistribution of
capital and the replacement of the Yeltsin’s
oligarchy with new-type tycoons devoted to
Putin personally – a new class of oligarchs
referred to as “silogarchs”, who are one foot
in the business, and the other in the world
of secret services. Loyalty and modesty
are paying dividends; according to Forbes,
Sechin earned some $50 million in net in-
come in 2013 alone. Truly, “Blessed are the
meek, for they shall inherit the earth.”
Not too long ago, the media in Rus-
sia and abroad were discussing the pros-
pects for a confrontation between the two
main contenders to succeed Putin as Rus-
sia’s president – Igor Sechin and Dmitry
Medvedev – and between their respective
clans. The confrontation between the clans
led by Sechin and Medvedev, broadly re-
ferred to as “conservative-statists” and
“systemic liberals” respectively, effectively
determined the entire political agenda
after Putin’s “second coming” to power.
Sechin, after he defected to business in-
terests, seemed to have lost some of his
administrative power, while his increased
publicity seemed to tell of his intention to
unburden himself of the image as “Gray
Cardinal”. However, the rapidly changing
geopolitical situation in 2014 dealt a dev-
astating blow to administrative capacities
of Dmitry Medvedev, who, in fact, was left
without ‘men of his own’ in the security
establishment and regional governments,
and lost much of his political weight. As
Russia’s confrontation with the West began
to grow, Medvedev, being the leader of the
pro-Western lobby in the Kremlin, lost his
informal influence, thus having eventu-
ally degraded to being a purely “technical”
prime minister. At the same time, Sechin
retains his role as “the Adjutant of his
Excellency”, which, combined with per-
sonal loyalty to Putin, makes him almost
invincible politically. But the probabil-
ity of this powerful and mysterious man
(whom the Financial Times once called
“Russian Richelieu”) becoming the Mas-
ter of the Kremlin in low, contradicting
the very essence of Sechin’s personality.
It is far more likely that Sechin, whose
loyalty and devotion to his master are un-
questionable, would prefer to remain to be
the faithful shadow of a hypothetical new
leader of Russia. After all, no matter who
will lead the Russian government after Pu-
tin, he, too, will not be able to do without
an expert in court intrigues, a man capable
of dealing with most complex and difficult
challenges effectively and efficiently, while
remaining in shadow of his patron.

ergei Chemezov has been
perhaps the least visible pub-
lic personality among his
counterparts in Putin’s inner
circle. However, as is the case
with other members of the Kremlin “nobil-
ity”, publicity in this case is the inverse of
factual political weight and influence. The
role played by Chemezov in the Russian
government has been increasingly impor-
tant recently. The president of the Rostech
corporation is emerging as one of the most
powerful personalities in Putin’s Russia,
along with members of the security estab-
lishment.
The career of Sergei Chemezov could,
to a substantial degree, be called classical for
the current Russian elite. But there are some
features that distinguish Rostech’ president
from other Putin’s allies. This is, most no-
tably, his longer and stronger engagement
with market and business interests than
with security sector organizations and se-
cret services, which is not common to other
members of Putin’s entourage. Moreover,
Chemezov was engaged with these interests
long before market economy began to de-
velop in the Soviet Union.
An age mate of the current master of
the Kremlin, Sergei Chemezov was born in
1952 in the city of Cheremkhovo of Irkutsk
province. Upon graduating from Irkutsk
Institute of National Economy, he worked
for some time as an engineer and research
associate at the Scientific and Research
Institute of Nonferrous Metals. In 1980,
Chemezov transitioned to work in “Luch”
Research-Industrial Association, and three
years later he received an appointment as
the head of the Luch representative office in
Eastern Germany, which turned to be cru-
cial for his further career. It is in the GDR
where the would-be ‘armaments baron’
was able to meet and, later, develop and
share a friendship with one of his future
colleagues and associates, Andrei Bely-
aninov, an officer at the First Chief Direc-
torate of the KGB, as well as with another
young KGB officer – Vladimir Putin.
It should be noted here that Chemezov
hasneverhadanyofficialrelationwithsecret
services. However, reports of his connec-
tion with the KGB are repeatedly circulated
in the media, and Vladimir Abramov – for-
mer CEO of the export/import company
“Sovintersport”, of which Chemezov was
vice CEO from 1988 to 1996 – in a press in-
terview, referred to Sergei Viktorovich as an
FSB general. Whatever might be the formal
status of Chemezov in the hierarchy of the
KGB or its successor agencies, it is worth
noting that international trade organization
were traditionally used and continue to be
used as a front for “official” FSB residencies
and other secret service agencies.
Having abandoned Sovintersport in
1996, Chemezov, aided by patronage of
Vladimir Putin (then deputy head of the
directorate for presidential affairs) tran-
sitioned to work in Administration of the
President where he received the position of
chief of the external economic relations de-
S
Sergei Chemezov.
Putin’s armaments baron

partment, and continued in this office until
1999, when Vladimir Putin became Prime
Minister. Although the abilities of the fu-
ture Russian leader in promoting his cro-
nies to top political positions still remained
quite modest, Chemezov was among those
of Putin’s oldest and closest associates
who gained immediate profit from the in-
creased influence of their patron. In 1999,
Chemezov was promoted to the office of
CEO of the State Unitary Enterprise “State
Company Promeksport” - one of the three
state-owned companies that dealt with the
export of defense articles at that time. An-
drei Belyaninov, Chemezov’s longtime col-
league from the KGB, became a deputy of
Chemezov.
Promeksport, which was dealing with
the export of replacement parts for ret-
rofit of already operating equipment, was
ranked lower in the hierarchy of the Rus-
sian economy than Rosvooruzhenie (con-
trolled by President Yeltsin’s “family” at that
time) was. A year later, when Boris Yeltsin
resigned from the presidential post, Putin
firmly consolidated the country’s scattered
defense export capabilities into what is now
Rosoboronexport. CEO of Rosvooruzhenie,
Alexei Ogarev, a placeman of the still influ-
ential “family” of the ex-president, surpris-
ingly lost his post as a result of byzantine
intrigue. At the same time, Belyaninov be-
came CEO of “Rosoboronexport” and Che-
mezov became his senior deputy. The two
old cronies denied being competitors, hav-
ing become a strong, effective tandem team.
According to some analysts, Chemezov was
even more influential than Belyaninov was
at the time, which is indirectly confirmed by
several appointments of top managers for
the emergent company, who were invited by
the senior deputy CEO personally.
Several arms dealers continued to oper-
ate on the market independently of Roso-
boronexport, and a few more years passed
before the country’s defense export capa-
bilities were consolidated under control of
Chemezov. In 2004, Belyaninov was pro-
moted to the post of director of the Federal
Service for the Defense Procurement Order
at the Ministry of Defense. So Chemezov
became the sole ‘master’ of Rosoboronex-
port and Russia’s top official ‘arms dealer’.
From that time on, Chemezov’s career has
been raising exponentially.
The results of Chemezov’s work in the
area of defense export promotion are really
impressive. While in 2000 Russia exported
USD 3.68B worth of defense products, then
the total amount of government procure-
ment orders placed with the domestic de-
fense industries grew to USD 50B by July
2014. In addition to its traditional markets
in India and China, Russia expanded its
market reach to include South-East Asia
(Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia) and Latin
America, and became more aggressive on
arms markets in the Arab World. The be-
coming more powerful Chemezov gradu-
ally went beyond the role as an arms dealer
assigned to him, expanding his interests
into other sectors of the economy to include
non-military machine-building (Motovi-
likha Factories, AvtoVAZ) and metallurgy
(VSMP, the biggest producer of titanium in
the world).
Chemezov behaves towards the indus-
tries entrusted to his care in a manner that
is common to an average state property
manager in Putin’s Russia, but where his
other interests lie he performs like a typi-
cal oligarch seeking to extend his influence
over more markets and more market share.
This combination of an enterprising busi-
nessman and a government official, rolled
into one, is much typical to the modern
Russian elite, and, as a whole, is common
to a symbiotic system of feudal oligarchic

capitalism and militarized autocracy that
Putin has established. The impressive suc-
cesses achieved by Chemezov, in addition
to friendship with the Russian “tsar”, could
be attributed to his great experience among
other things; prior to his presidency of Ros-
tech, Chemezov was engaged with interna-
tional trade and transactions back in years
when the future Russian oligarchs did not
even think of any free-market operations.
However, a significant factor in the
case of Chemezov was a dramatic aggrava-
tion of the geopolitical situation. Back in
the middle of the last decade, the politi-
cal significance of the arms export sector
became particularly apparent as Russia
and the USA were entering a new spiral of
global confrontation. However, after the
annexation of the Crimea and the start
of the ongoing war in Ukraine, one more
factor added to others. Western sanctions,
combined with plummeting oil prices, for
the first time shook the position of the fuel
and energy sector as a major source of out-
side revenue for Russia. This has made the
Russian government refocus its attention
to other export-driven sectors, which are
not so numerous in a backward economy
like petrostate Russia. In this respect, the
export of armaments appears to hold most
promise as a source of outside revenue.
The recently announced ambitious pro-
gram on the modernization of the Izhevsk
Mechanical Plant, which includes the dis-
bursement of over RUR 4B worth of in-
vestment for the Rostech-run Kalashnikov
corporation, is one of the first signs of the
continuing militarization of the economy
and reliance on the arms export sector as
a sustainable source of revenue for gov-
ernment. As the Russia vs West confron-
tation is dragging on, the influence of the
Chemezov-led group will keep steadily
growing.

espite a notable tendency to
tightening of Putin’s regime
followingtheRussianinvasion
of Ukraine, there have been
faint signs of a pickup in the
ranks of the Russian anti-Kremlin opposition.
As the seemingly long discarded key figures
of the Yeltsin regime such as Boris Nemtsov
are returning to the foreground of the Russian
political landscape, there is some sort of un-
rest emerging among the ranks of the ruling
elite, caused by the first ever serious drying-
up of financial flows since Putin’s coming to
power, which may potentially be conducive to
the emergence of a latent internal opposition
to Putin’s regime. In view of this, it would be
helpful to review briefly the key actors across
the spectrum of the current Russian opposi-
tion and to identify the immediate key threats
to Putin’s absolute power.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky
It’s not a stretch to call Khodorkovsky
the patriarch of the modern Russian op-
position. It was long before his release from
prison that Mikhail Khodorkovsky became
kind of an icon for many Russians who are
antagonistic to the current regime. The most
renowned “prisoner of conscience”, Khodor-
kovsky was even sometimes referred to as
“another Solzhenitsyn”. Unlike most of his
counterparts in the opposition movement,
Khodorkovsky could rightfully claim to be
not just a prominent political man but sort
of a messiah, a moral authority, an idealist
thinker and a “conscience of the nation” of
some kind. However, one should not perceive
this pragmatist and practical politician to be
an ivory-tower dreamer, nor expect any dra-
matic changes in the Russian political climate
in the hypothetical case of Khodorkovsky
coming to power. After all, Khodorkovsky
still remains to be a part of the Russian po-
litical and economic culture of the 1990s from
which he came out.
Born in 1963 in Moscow, Khodorkovsky
almost immediately after graduating from
Mendeleev Moscow Institute of Chemical
Technology started several businesses dur-
ing the period of perestroika in the late 1980s.
In 1987, after the CPSU decision on the es-
tablishment of R&D centers for the creative
youth, Khodorkovsky, assisted by his fellow
Komsomol functionaries, created Center
for Scientific and Technical Creativity of the
Youth (NTTM) under the auspices of Frunze
district committee of Komsomol. In addition
to importing and reselling computers, the
‘scientific’ center was involved in trading a
wide range of other products, including fake
alcohol – a very lucrative business by Soviet
standards. Khodorkovsky also benefited from
a loophole granted to Komsomol organiza-
tions that enabled them to convert purely
administrative currency units into cash. The
cash reserves he accumulated through this
practice enabled him to take advantage of
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Simultane-
ously with this he received his second degree
in finances from Moscow Institute of National
Economy in 1988. This is where he developed
friendship with another Komsomol leader,
D
Anti-Kremlin Opposition:
Between Triumph and Decline

Alexey Golubovich who helped him greatly
in his further success, since Golubovish’s par-
ents hold top positions in Gosbank, the State
Bank of the USSR, which eventually allowed
Khodorkovsky to found the Bank Menatep.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Khodorkovsky and his partners established
connections in the new government that en-
abled them to enrich themselves on rigged
investments tenders and large-scale privati-
zation of Russian state-owned assets. By the
mid-1990s, Khodorkovsky became owner of a
number of businesses operating in the prima-
ry and secondary sectors. But Menatep was
still searching for ‘gold mine’. The collapse of
the economy and a lack of budgetary funding
for social security programs, coupled with the
need to finance the ongoing war in Chechnya
forced the Russian government to rely on pri-
vate banks for loans. The Russian government
adopted a loans-for-share scheme whereby
some of the largest state industrial assets were
leased (in effect privatized) through auctions
for money lent by commercial banks to the
government. The auctions were rigged and
lacked competition, being largely controlled
by favored insiders with political connections,
or were used for the benefit of the commer-
cial banks themselves. As neither the loans
nor the leased enterprises were returned in
time, this effectively became a form of sell-
ing for a very low price. Through this scheme,
Khodorkovsky became owner of Yukos – the
second largest Russian oil company in terms
of production and the first in terms of proven
reserves.
Having lost Bank Menatep as a result of
the 1998 financial crisis, and left without the
support of Western creditors due to a series of
failed operations on equity market, Khodor-
kovsky became one of the first among the new
Russian business elite to understand the value
of international investments for doing busi-
ness in a global market environment. Khodor-
kovsky-led Yukos began to gain weight as new
vistas were opening before it. But the ruthless
roller of Putin’s state capitalism was already
looming on the horizon, clearing the market-
place of more or less powerful competitors
that could stand in the way of Rosneft run by
Sechin – one of Putin’s favorites and closest
allies.
Arguments of those saying that Khodor-
kovsky was sentenced to what he rightfully
deserved are on the surface not unfounded.
Indeed, Khodorkovsky was involved in a vari-
ety of frauds and scams, and he made his for-
tune by means that cannot be regarded per-
fectly ‘clean’ from the perspective of the letter
of the law. If this is the case, however, then it
becomes clear upon closer consideration that
the whole process of the “wild privatization”
of the 1990s should be subjected to a strict
audit. This process was conducted to a sub-
stantial degree under conditions of collapse
and disintegration of the legal environment,
its results being regarded as highly controver-
sial by the Russian public to date. At the same
time, as stated by Putin on several occurrenc-
es, the results of privatization are not subject
to revision. There is nothing to be surprised:
the Russian leader and his entourage them-
selves, to a large extent, owe their wealth and
influence to primitive capitalism of the Yeltsin
era, and so it seems only reasonable that they
would prefer that these “dark times” be left in
the past.
Therefore,itturnsoutthatKhodorkovsky
was just selected to be a ‘scapegoat’. By elimi-
nating him from the political and economic
agenda Putin killed two birds with one stone
– rid himself, and Sechin, of a potentially
dangerous rival, and ‘tossed a bone’ to the oli-
garch-hostile Russian people. Rumors about
an allegedly impending “oligarchic coup” led
by Khodorkovsky belong more in the realm of
conspiracy than reality. It seemed that a pris-
on term for the corrupt tycoon would suit all

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