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National Aeronautics and Space Administration




       NASA Project Management Challenge 2009
       Effective PM Response for Protecting NASA’s Mission
       Critical Technologies in a Growing Threat Environment

                   Terry E. Odum, CPP,1† Ryan Averbeck,2† G. A. Gaddy, Ph.D. 2
                                   1. NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL
                                   2. Concurrent Technologies Corporation, Huntsville, AL
                                                       † Presenter




                                                     25 February 2009
Why Technology Protection? – Advantage


        There is a strong symbiotic relationship
         between space research and national
         security…We've worked too hard and
    accomplished too much, to willfully forfeit our
    leadership in space. Let's make the necessary
     adjustments to maintain our supremacy. Our
                 future depends on it.




                             Kay Bailey Hutchinson
                             Member of the Senate Commerce, Science
                             And Transportation, and Appropriations, Committees
                             Special Section: Defense & Aerospace
                             October 2007
Protection Needs Assessment

We asked ourselves…

    •   Does NASA and its industrial base develop state-of-the-art systems and
        technologies that are of strong interest to other countries?

    •   Is the risk of loss or compromise to NASA’s technologies growing?

    •   Could the loss impact mission success, reputation, or national security?

    •   Is a process in place to assist the PM in effectively managing security risks?

ESMD addressed these questions by piloting a system protection program

    • Tailored for NASA after gleaning the “best of breed” approaches,
      methodologies and techniques from DoD protection programs.




        The need to implement a systematic protection process may never be greater
Policy Guidelines –
Cohesive Implementation Strategy Is Needed
 NPR 1600.1
 NASA Security Procedural Requirement
 Chapter 8 Program Security

 NPR 7120.5D
 NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements
 Section 3.13

 NASA/SP-2007-6105
 NASA Systems Engineering Handbook
 Appendix Q

 NPR 8000.4
 NASA Risk Management Procedural Requirements
 P.1; 2.6.1

 NPR 1660.1
 NASA Counterintelligence Policy
 Para 2.10

 NPR 2810.1A
 Security of Information Technology
 Preface P.1

 NPR 2190.1
 NASA Export Control
 P.1 Chapter 2



 Referenced policies all serve to provide national level security guidance.
Why Technology Protection? - The Threat

The targeting and theft of U.S. innovation has significant dire
effects on our nation.
       Chamber of commerce estimates 750,000 jobs lost annually
       due to the theft of innovation

       Department of Justice estimates the loss of research and
       technology costs U.S. companies as much as $250 billion
       annually

       The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) estimates
       the loss associated with foreign espionage directed at the
       U.S. to be $300 billion and rising

NASA is a world leader in innovation, and thus, a highly targeted
organization.



Exploitation of cyberspace to attempt to gain access to space systems technologies and
            information is growing exponentially and requires constant diligence.
Why Now?


What is the national priority at this time?

       • President’s Vision for Space Exploration directed NASA to design and build
         systems and infrastructure to return the nation to the Moon, Mars, and beyond.

       • Exploration Systems represent NASA’s future and one of its highest priorities.

       • Under the “10 Healthy Centers” concept, all ten (10) NASA Centers have
         Exploration Systems Work Assignments.

       • The Constellation architecture involves new systems, technologies, tooling and
         equipment, and manufacturing processes that may provide the U.S. a
         technological advantage.

       • National Space Policy states that the U.S. will take those actions necessary to
         “protect its space assets”.



Recently completed counterintelligence threat products address specific threats to NASA research, technologies, and
               programs. Contact your Center Security or Counterintelligence Office for availability.
The ESMD Model
         The Technology Protection Working Group (TPWG)

Multi-discipline Agency-wide forum with the core skills necessary for
managing security risks on major high priority programs / projects

Facilitates Technology Protection Program planning and implementation:
          Assists the PM in identifying Mission Critical Information
          Enhances operational readiness and mission success
          Protects national security interests against threats
          Prevents unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information
          Helps maintain the U.S. technological advantage in Space
          Ensures the proper horizontal protection of inherited technologies from
          DoD and other government entities




 TPWG processes and recommendations do not hinder the authorized sharing of NASA information. The
       process is designed to quickly and precisely identify the information requiring protection.
Technology Protection Program Full Integration
NPR 7123.1A                                                      Technology Protection Working Group
NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements              Charter

Purpose:                                                         Goal:

The stakeholder expectations definition process is used to       “The goal of the TPWG is to assist Program Managers in
elicit and define use cases, scenarios, operational              the identification and protection of Mission Critical
concepts, and stakeholder expectations for the applicable        Information (MCI) generated by the research,
product-line life-cycle phases and WBS model. This               development and acquisition communities that provides
includes requirements for:                                       and maintains NASA’s competitive advantage in Space.”
                                                                 This includes requirements for:
      a. operational end products and life-cycle-enabling
         products of the WBS model;                                      a. identifying MCI in the WBS model
      b. expected skills/capabilities of operators or users;             b. operational protection end products and life-
                                                                            cycle-enabling protection processes of the WBS
      c. expected number of simultaneous users;
                                                                            model
      d. system and human performance criteria;
                                                                         c. performance criteria for protection
      e. technical authority, standards, regulations, and
                                                                         d. technical authority, standards, regulations, and
          laws;
                                                                            laws with respect to protection/security
      f. factors such as safety, quality, security, context
                                                                         e. security factors (vulnerability and threat)
          of use by humans, reliability, availability,
          maintainability, electromagnetic compatibility,                f. local management constraints on how protection
          interoperability, testability, transportability,                  will be implemented (e.g., operating procedures)
          supportability, usability, and disposability;
      g. local management constraints on how work will
          be done (e.g., operating procedures)


           The TPWG mitigates program security risks, improves the efficiency of the protection program, reduces
                            regulatory compliance costs, and streamlines security operations.
Protection Products
                          Full Range of Tailored
                   Security Product Offerings Include…

•   Security Management Plan          •   Security Classification Guide
•   Technology Assessment and         •   Life-cycle Cost Analysis
    Control Plan (TA/CP)              •   Transportation Security Plan
•   Export Control Plan               •   Preliminary System Security
•   Security Surveys                      Concept
•   Security Trade Studies            •   Systems Security Authorization
•   Threat & Vulnerability Reports        Agreement for IT Systems
•   Counterintelligence Surveys       •   Mission Critical Information
•   TP Process Assurance Maps             Assessment (MCIA)
Protection Services
                          Comprehensive Set of
                       Security Services to Include…

•   Security Requirements Definition      •   Risk Management and Decision
•   Security Policy Reviews                   Support
                                          •   Export Control Guidance
•   Threat & Vulnerability Analysis
                                          •   Information Technology
•   Protection and Mitigation Planning        Security/Information Protection
•   Multi-Center/Multi-Agency                 Coordination
    Coordination                          •   Technology Protection Working
•   Industry Partner Security Interface       Group Facilitation
    and Performance Monitoring            •   Education & Awareness (e.g.,
•   International Cooperation                 SBU)
    Interface                             •   Counterintelligence Support
                                          •   Secure Communications Planning
TPWG Organization Structure
      Exploration Systems Mission Directorate                                Office of Security and Program Protection
         (ESMD ) Associate Administrator                                                       (OSPP)




                     Directorate Integration                                                      Assistant
                              Officer                                                            Administrator



                                       Technology Protection Working Group Chair
       CxP                                                                                                                   OCIO, S&MA,
Management                   • Program TPOs              • Counterintelligence            • Center IPOs                      Export, etc.
                             • Center TPOs               • Industry partners              • ESMD RM
      ACD                    • Scientists                • Center security                • Engineers                        Center
Management                                                                                                                   Management
                           Program     Technology     System Security   Threat and      Horizontal     Policy
                          Protection    Trending        Engineering     Vulnerability   Protection   Compliance


                                                    Program
                                                       Project
                                                              Element
                                                                  System
                                                                        Component                                 “Complex System”
                                                                                                                  Distributed Organizations
    Implementation                                                          Technology
    Policy
                                                                                   Information
    Execution
TPWG NASA Representation – Full Integration




       Constellation Program fully engaged
       Scientists and engineers supported
       Ares I and Orion Technology Protection Portfolios 70% complete
       “Ten healthy Centers”
Technology Protection Program – A Project Resource
ESMD TPWG Community of Practice (CoP)




       Oversight by ESMD Directorate Integration Office
       Community in excess of 60 active members
       Risk Managers, Engineers, Export Officials, Security
       Industry partners
Technology Protection Program IPT




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                                 Center Chiefs of Security



                      NASA Office of Security and
                         Program Protection
ESMD Technology Protection Program Model

                        CI




         Program      TPWG        Information
          Project                  Protection
           TPO                       IPO
                       MCI




                    Information
                    Technology
                      Security
What is Mission Critical Information (MCI)?

NASA information related to research, technologies, projects, programs,
or systems that, if released outside established protocols could:

   Significantly affect NASA resources, requiring additional research, development,
   tests, or evaluation to overcome the adverse effects of unauthorized releases

                                                   - and / or -

   Significantly reduce the performance or effectiveness of NASA research, projects,
   technologies, programs, or systems

                                                   - and / or -

   Have a significantly adverse affect on the United States’ advantage in space and
   other current and emerging technologies


  With a multitude of technologies and systems under review, the definition of significant will be specific to each
  potential MCI during an assessment, with a basis of concepts such as Evolutionary/Revolutionary, State-of-the-
  Art (SOA) vs. State-of-the-World (SOW), and specific impacts to NASA’s programs and missions.
Technology Protection Program Full Integration
The TP Program Model                                             The TP Program Team




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                                                                                        Center Chiefs of Security
                 Information
                 Technology
                   Security                                                        NASA Office of Security and
                                                                                      Program Protection



The NASA TP Program model works because of the MCI team’s understanding of the Program’s cost, schedule and
   performance drivers. The technology protection team is respectful of the NASA mission, history and culture.
       These characteristics are the key to minimizing the impact to the Program schedule and is one of the
                                       reasons for the Program’s success.
MCI Assessment Participants
    PM
                           PM Selected Project SMEs




                                               (as needed)




    TPO                 Mission Critical Information Assessment                    TPWG
                                          Team
                                                                                           Oversight




                         Counterintelligence, IA, IT, security, etc.



                      Mission Critical Information Assessment Team
•   Team of scientists, engineers, and security analysts
•   Technical connection with NASA Program personnel
•   Recommends MCI for PM consideration
•   Develops and delivers all associated documentation (Technology Protection Portfolio)
•   Collaborates with the Security and Intelligence functions of the TPWG team
MCI Assessment NASA Personnel and Contributions




                             NASA Scientists and Engineers




              MCI            Project/Element Manager




                             Protective Services (OSPP)
Technology Protection Cycle

                                                                                      Requires NASA Program
P1                                                                                        Level Decision
      Discovery
      Activities


                            P2                                  P4
     Assessment                  Initiate NASA                          Perform
     Preparation                  TVA Process                         Risk Analysis




     Technical                      Initiate                          Select Final
     Discussions                    Controls                               v
                                                                       Controls


                           P3                                   P5
 Technical Discussion              Evaluate                             Develop
      Analysis                   Vulnerabilities                     Protection Plan




         MCI                                     Continuously         Develop
     Confirmation                                                Implementation Plan

                                  Periodically
Technology Protection Program Full Integration




                NASA Project Life Cycle NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, page 20, DECEMBER 2007
                                                                              *MCI re-assessments performed as required
                              MCI review

  Technology                               MCI assessment completion

  Protection                               Identify initial controls and threats

   Activities                                             Identify vulnerabilities and validate threat

                                                                      Final controls selection / continuous risk management
Technology Protection Phases and Associated Activities
                         Element Technology                          Determine                                                                                            Determine impact                                        Utilize security “best




                                                P2 - Initiate TVA




                                                                                                                                                                                                 P5 - Protection Implementation
P1 - MCI Assessment




                                                                                                                                                     P4 - Risk Analysis
                         Information                                 adversary intent                                                                                     on NASA if                                              practices” (trade
                         gathering and                               and capability to                                                                                    exploitation occurs                                     studies, etc.)
                         review                                      exploit technology
                                                                                                                                                                          Determine                                               Implement cost
                         Conduct technical                           Determine facilities,                                                                                appropriate /                                           effective and
                         discussions with                            personnel                                                                                            acceptable level of                                     efficient controls
                         scientists,                                 (government and                                                                                      risk                                                    based on risk
                         engineers, security,                        contractor, US and                                                                                                                                           analysis
                         and CI professionals                        foreign),                                                                                            Develop controls
                                                                     components where                                        Review final                                 which mitigate risks                                    Continuously




                                                                                             P3 - Evaluate Vulnerabilities
                         Reach back to                               MCI resides                                             (element specific)                           and bring risk into                                     monitor and
                         contractor                                                                                          threat product                               “acceptable” limits                                     improve the
                         teammates                                   Implement initial                                                                                                                                            protection process
                         scientists and                              transparent controls                                    Determine threats
                         engineers as                                                                                        to MCI in programs,                                                                                  Ensure
                         necessary                                                                                           facilities, systems,                                                                                 improvements are
                                                                                                                             components, and                                                                                      documented and
                         MCI and information                                                                                 personnel                                                                                            considered for
                         requiring controls                                                                                                                                                                                       implementation
                         identified                                                                                          Prioritize
                                                                                                                             vulnerabilities of
                         Immediate controls                                                                                  MCI
                         placed on
                         information as                                                                                      Adjust initial
                         required                                                                                            controls if necessary




                        MCIA Report                                 Initial Controls                                                                         Final Controls Report                              Implementation Plan
                      Significant Issues                                 Report

      Portfolio Sections I - V                               Portfolio Section VI                                                                               Portfolio Section VII                          Portfolio Section VIII
Element, Project, Technology Protection Portfolios

               Program Management Technology Protection Process Brief
 Section I     This brief provides an overview of the NASA Technology Protection (TP) Process. This overview includes key participants, defines key terminology,
               outlines the phases of the TP Process and provides details of the products from the various phases of the TP Process.



               Technology Protection Process Execution Plan (EP)
 Section II    This plan describes in detail the TP Process phases and associated documentation. The plan also provides a schedule, personnel selected by the
               Element Manager (EM), and NASA TP Program points of contact.


               Scientist and Engineers Technology Protection Process Brief
Section III    This brief provides an overview of the NASA TP Program and outlines the roles and responsibilities of the scientists and engineers identified by the EM.
               The brief also presents the initial results of the discovery phase of the TP Process.


               Mission Critical Information (MCI) Technical Discussions Results Brief
Section IV     This brief provides the EM MCI recommendations from the Technology Protection Working Group (TPWG) based on the analysis of the technical
               discussions with Element scientists and engineers.


               Mission Critical Information Assessment Report (MCIA-R)
Section V      This report documents the EM determination of MCI. The report also provides detailed information about Element MCI and highlights any significant
               issues identified during the TP Process.


               Initial Controls Report (ICR)
Section VI     This report documents the TPWG recommendations for initial Element controls to immediately enhance the protection of MCI based on the baseline
               threats to the Element MCI. The report also includes Element general threat awareness.


               Final Controls Report (FCR)
Section VII    This report contains the NASA Headquarters Counterintelligence (CI) validated threats to Element MCI, vulnerability analysis, and TPWG recommended
               final controls based on the level of risk acceptable to the EM and metrics obtained from the initial controls selected in the ICR.


               Implementation Guidance
Section VIII   This document provides recommendations to the EM detailing the manner in which the EM selected final controls may be implemented. This
               guidance is focused on the MCI only.
Example: J-2X Technology Protection Portfolio
The Information Dilemma


   Desire / need                                                              Department of
      to publish                                                              Commerce


      Mandate to                                                              Department of
      collaborate                                                             State


     International                                                            National
     partnerships                                                             Security


   Need to Share                                                            Need to Protect



National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 calls   National Space Policy, 2006, states that space
for the widespread dissemination of newfound       capabilities are vital to the Nation’s interests and
technologies to the public.                        the U.S. will “take those actions necessary to
                                                   protect its space capabilities.”
ESMD Technology Protection Program To-date




             On center activities
             Planned center activities (< 6 months)
             Planned center activities (> 6 months)
Technology Protection Program Full Integration
Pilot Program (Years 1-2)           Year 3                        Year 4+
   Program Development           Lunar Lander                        Ares V
          Ares I            Extravehicular Activities   Science and Technology Elements
          Orion              Program refinement           Systems Integration Elements
Constellation Program Work Breakdown Structure




                          Pilot Program
                          Year 3
                          Sustainment
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element         SM                         US




  MCI




Location




Threat
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element            SM                          US




  MCI      1   2        3   4   5          6        7




Location




Threat
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element            SM                          US




  MCI      1   2        3   4   5          6        7




Location




Threat
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                               US




  MCI          1       2            3       4       5                       6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E   F       G   H   I   J   K            L       M




Threat
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                               US




  MCI          1       2            3       4       5                       6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E   F       G   H   I   J   K            L       M




Threat
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                                       US




  MCI          1       2            3       4           5                           6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E       F       G   H   I   J       K            L       M




Threat                         α                β               γ           δ
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                                       US




  MCI          1       2            3       4           5                           6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E       F       G   H   I   J       K            L       M




Threat                         α                β               γ           δ
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                                       US




  MCI          1       2            3       4           5                           6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E       F       G   H   I   J       K            L       M




Threat                         α                β               γ           δ
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                                       US




  MCI          1       2            3       4           5                           6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E       F       G   H   I   J       K            L       M




Threat                         α                β               γ           δ
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                                       US




  MCI          1       2            3       4           5                           6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E       F       G   H   I   J       K            L       M




Threat                         α                β               γ           δ
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                                       US




  MCI          1       2            3       4           5                           6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E       F       G   H   I   J       K            L       M




Threat                         α                β               γ           δ
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                                       US




  MCI          1       2            3       4           5                           6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E       F       G   H   I   J       K            L       M




Threat                         α                β               γ           δ
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                                       US




  MCI          1       2            3       4           5                           6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E       F       G   H   I   J       K            L       M




Threat                         α                β               γ           δ
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                                       US




  MCI          1       2            3       4           5                           6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E       F       G   H   I   J       K            L       M




Threat                         α                β               γ           δ
Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI

Element                        SM                                                       US




  MCI          1       2            3       4           5                           6            7




Location   A       B       C            D   E       F       G   H   I   J       K            L       M




Threat                         α                β               γ           δ
Technology Protection Program Benefits to the PM

           Increased Project Manager Control
           •   Puts PM in control of Technology Protection process
           •   Program specific tailored execution plan
           •   Programs will be proactive instead of remaining reactive
           •   Function is responsive to the Program
           •   Real time Technology Protection status and metrics
           •   Not an audit or inspection



                            Increased Value
       • Multi-disciplinary team of unbiased subject matter experts
       • Extremely useful products (TP Portfolio with 8 sections) which is
         100% consistent with existing NPR and other policy requirements
       • Horizontal aspects
                Communication
                Integration
                Protection resulting in consolidated ESMD MCI List
       • Team develops all Technology Protection related documents
                Coordinating with all relevant Program, Center, Directorate,
                and NASA HQ Technology Protection stakeholders
Results Oriented

           We Moved From…                                                         …To
Not Knowing Program Expectations and Security Needs       Direct PM Involvement and Decision Making


Minimal Direct Security Staff Involvement w/ Projects     Cohesive Team w/ Core Security Competencies

                                                          Implementation of Security Risk Management;
No candidate program security risks
                                                          Mitigation of two Top Directorate Security Risks

Inconsistent Adherence to Security Policy and Practices   PM approved comprehensive Security Management Plan


“Reactive” Security Response to Projects                  “Proactive” Security Response/Results Oriented

                                                          Greater Employee Security Awareness, online education
Negligible Program Workforce Security Awareness
                                                          tools, and quality briefings

Minimal Understanding of Threats directed at NASA         Current Program Threat Assessment


No Process to Determine Mission Critical Information      Model Process for Determining MCI


Few Quality Security Products                             Multiple High Quality Security Products


No Cross-cutting Communications                           Established Integrated Product Team (IPT)


No overall Program Protection Strategy                    Protection Strategies Designed to Ensure Success




            TPWG is the controlling element of a Closed-Loop Security System
Acronyms
   ACD    -
     CI   -   Counterintelligence
   CoP    -   Community of Practice
   CPP    -   Certified Protection Professional
   CxP    -   Constellation Program
   DIO    -   Directorate Integration Office
    EP    -   Execution Plan
 ESMD     -   Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
   FCR    -   Final Controls Report
    HQ    -   Headquarters
     IA   -   Information Assurance
   ICR    -   Initial Controls Report
   IPO    -   Information Protection Officer
     IT   -   Information Technology
   MCI    -   Mission Critical Information
  MCIA    -   Mission Critical Information Assessment
MCIA-R    -   Mission Critical Information Assessment Report
  NCIX    -   National Counterintelligence Executive
   NPR    -   NASA Procedural Requirements
  OCIO    -   Office of the Chief Information Officer
  OSPP    -   Office of Security and Program Protection
    RM    -   Risk Manager
 S&MA     -   Safety and Mission Assurance
    SM    -   Service Module
   TBD    -   To be determined
    TP    -   Technology Protection
   TPO    -   Technology Protection Officer
 TPWG     -   Technology Protection Working Group
   TVA    -   Threat and Vulnerability Assessment
    US    -   Upper Stage
  WBS     -   Work Breakdown Structure
Backup
When Technology Protection? Earlier the better…

                                                                         Desired Capability
                                                       X >> Y



                                                   X                                         Y
     Capability




                                                                                                       s
                                                                    ss




                                                                                                       s
                                                                 re




                                                                                                    gre
                                                                g
                                                              ro
                                                            rp




                                                                                                 pro
                                                        a
                                                      ne
                                                   Li




                                                                                              ted
                                                                                         elera
                                                                                      Acc
    We are
    here…..
                           But on this track?                                       Or, on this track?


      Capability / maturation level when initial
         implementation of TP is too late                    Time         http://www.foresight.org/UTF/Unbound_LBW/chapt_4.html
CxP Security Documentation Tree


                                                                         Program Plan
                                                                                                   A1: Needs, Goals & Objectives
                                                                          CxP 70003
                                                                                                   A2: Integrated Master Plan
                                                                                                   A3: Acquisition Plan




                            System s                                                                             M anagem ent                   Architecture
 Cx Architecture                            Safety, Reliability &                           Program                                             Description
                           Engineering                              Risk M anagem ent                            System s Plan
  Requirement                               Quality Assurance                           M anagem ent Plan                                        Docum ent
                        M anagem ent Plan                               Plan (RM )                                  (M SP)
Docum ent (CARD )                                (SR&QA)                                     (PMP)                                                 (ADD )
                             (SEMP)                                       70056                                     70072
     70000                                         70055                                     70070                                                 70077
                              70013


                                                                                                              CxP 70070-ANX05-03 - SMP          CxP 70171 – Information
              CxP 70170 - Functional                                                     CxP 70070-ANX05      Book 3: Information Systems
                                                                                                              Contingency Planning &              Technology Security
              Security Requirements
                                                                                            Security          Reporting                          Architecture (Form erly
              (Formerly SMP Book 1)
                                                                                                                                                     SMP Book 2)
                                                                                        M anagement Plan      CxP 70070-ANX05-04 - SMP
                                                                                                              Book 4: Technology Protection
                                                                                             (SMP)            Program Plan (TPPP)


                                                                                                              CxP 70070-ANX05-05 - SMP
                                                                                                              Book 5: Emergency Response
                                                                                                              & Continuity of Operations Plan
                                                                                                              (COOP)




                                                  M ission                 Ground
                                                                                           EVA System s                                          Lunar System s
      Orion                     Ares            Operations               Operations                                  Altair
                                                                                                (ES)                                                Surface
   Project Plan             Project Plan           (M O)                    (GO)                                  Project Plan
                                                                                            Project Plan                                          Project Plan
                                                Project Plan             Project Plan
Technology Protection Program – The Early Days
•    Focused on the “bigger picture” – broader national perspective

•    Performed an early Gap Analysis to determine in-place vs. desired end state for security

•    Identified and applied security Lessons Learned from past NASA and DoD programs

•    Heavily leveraged use of institutional security support, thus gaining PM backing

•    Tracked the program “flow of events” to establish what issues are most important to attack first

•    Recruited team players; valued all contributions

•    Brought energy, intensity, and a creative new approach to security planning

•    Took small steps over time and quietly overcame objections or obstacles

•    Established a holistic approach for prioritizing security goals based on mission objectives

•    Leveraged use of in-house (no cost) software tools to enhance efficiency




         Building future capability and gaining respect from within the intelligence and DoD communities
Benefits/Value
•   Customer Focused – better able to satisfy most urgent ESMD security needs

•   Early life-cycle Planning – so that resources can be applied and managed; early
    discovery and resolution of problems

•   Maximum Flexibility – encourage creative problem solving

•   Event Driven – to ensure security product maturity is incrementally demonstrated,
    i.e., response to key decision point / critical milestone reviews

•   Multi-disciplinary Teamwork – Synergy: right people at the right place and at the
    right time to make timely decisions

•   Seamless Management and Communication Tools – to ensure teams have all
    available information, i.e., risk management tool, community of practice, etc.

•   Proactive Risk Identification – rapid reduction of risk/uncertainty

              Technology Protection must demonstrate a Return on Investment

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NASA Project Management Challenge

  • 1. National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA Project Management Challenge 2009 Effective PM Response for Protecting NASA’s Mission Critical Technologies in a Growing Threat Environment Terry E. Odum, CPP,1† Ryan Averbeck,2† G. A. Gaddy, Ph.D. 2 1. NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL 2. Concurrent Technologies Corporation, Huntsville, AL † Presenter 25 February 2009
  • 2. Why Technology Protection? – Advantage There is a strong symbiotic relationship between space research and national security…We've worked too hard and accomplished too much, to willfully forfeit our leadership in space. Let's make the necessary adjustments to maintain our supremacy. Our future depends on it. Kay Bailey Hutchinson Member of the Senate Commerce, Science And Transportation, and Appropriations, Committees Special Section: Defense & Aerospace October 2007
  • 3. Protection Needs Assessment We asked ourselves… • Does NASA and its industrial base develop state-of-the-art systems and technologies that are of strong interest to other countries? • Is the risk of loss or compromise to NASA’s technologies growing? • Could the loss impact mission success, reputation, or national security? • Is a process in place to assist the PM in effectively managing security risks? ESMD addressed these questions by piloting a system protection program • Tailored for NASA after gleaning the “best of breed” approaches, methodologies and techniques from DoD protection programs. The need to implement a systematic protection process may never be greater
  • 4. Policy Guidelines – Cohesive Implementation Strategy Is Needed NPR 1600.1 NASA Security Procedural Requirement Chapter 8 Program Security NPR 7120.5D NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements Section 3.13 NASA/SP-2007-6105 NASA Systems Engineering Handbook Appendix Q NPR 8000.4 NASA Risk Management Procedural Requirements P.1; 2.6.1 NPR 1660.1 NASA Counterintelligence Policy Para 2.10 NPR 2810.1A Security of Information Technology Preface P.1 NPR 2190.1 NASA Export Control P.1 Chapter 2 Referenced policies all serve to provide national level security guidance.
  • 5. Why Technology Protection? - The Threat The targeting and theft of U.S. innovation has significant dire effects on our nation. Chamber of commerce estimates 750,000 jobs lost annually due to the theft of innovation Department of Justice estimates the loss of research and technology costs U.S. companies as much as $250 billion annually The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) estimates the loss associated with foreign espionage directed at the U.S. to be $300 billion and rising NASA is a world leader in innovation, and thus, a highly targeted organization. Exploitation of cyberspace to attempt to gain access to space systems technologies and information is growing exponentially and requires constant diligence.
  • 6. Why Now? What is the national priority at this time? • President’s Vision for Space Exploration directed NASA to design and build systems and infrastructure to return the nation to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. • Exploration Systems represent NASA’s future and one of its highest priorities. • Under the “10 Healthy Centers” concept, all ten (10) NASA Centers have Exploration Systems Work Assignments. • The Constellation architecture involves new systems, technologies, tooling and equipment, and manufacturing processes that may provide the U.S. a technological advantage. • National Space Policy states that the U.S. will take those actions necessary to “protect its space assets”. Recently completed counterintelligence threat products address specific threats to NASA research, technologies, and programs. Contact your Center Security or Counterintelligence Office for availability.
  • 7. The ESMD Model The Technology Protection Working Group (TPWG) Multi-discipline Agency-wide forum with the core skills necessary for managing security risks on major high priority programs / projects Facilitates Technology Protection Program planning and implementation: Assists the PM in identifying Mission Critical Information Enhances operational readiness and mission success Protects national security interests against threats Prevents unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information Helps maintain the U.S. technological advantage in Space Ensures the proper horizontal protection of inherited technologies from DoD and other government entities TPWG processes and recommendations do not hinder the authorized sharing of NASA information. The process is designed to quickly and precisely identify the information requiring protection.
  • 8. Technology Protection Program Full Integration NPR 7123.1A Technology Protection Working Group NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements Charter Purpose: Goal: The stakeholder expectations definition process is used to “The goal of the TPWG is to assist Program Managers in elicit and define use cases, scenarios, operational the identification and protection of Mission Critical concepts, and stakeholder expectations for the applicable Information (MCI) generated by the research, product-line life-cycle phases and WBS model. This development and acquisition communities that provides includes requirements for: and maintains NASA’s competitive advantage in Space.” This includes requirements for: a. operational end products and life-cycle-enabling products of the WBS model; a. identifying MCI in the WBS model b. expected skills/capabilities of operators or users; b. operational protection end products and life- cycle-enabling protection processes of the WBS c. expected number of simultaneous users; model d. system and human performance criteria; c. performance criteria for protection e. technical authority, standards, regulations, and d. technical authority, standards, regulations, and laws; laws with respect to protection/security f. factors such as safety, quality, security, context e. security factors (vulnerability and threat) of use by humans, reliability, availability, maintainability, electromagnetic compatibility, f. local management constraints on how protection interoperability, testability, transportability, will be implemented (e.g., operating procedures) supportability, usability, and disposability; g. local management constraints on how work will be done (e.g., operating procedures) The TPWG mitigates program security risks, improves the efficiency of the protection program, reduces regulatory compliance costs, and streamlines security operations.
  • 9. Protection Products Full Range of Tailored Security Product Offerings Include… • Security Management Plan • Security Classification Guide • Technology Assessment and • Life-cycle Cost Analysis Control Plan (TA/CP) • Transportation Security Plan • Export Control Plan • Preliminary System Security • Security Surveys Concept • Security Trade Studies • Systems Security Authorization • Threat & Vulnerability Reports Agreement for IT Systems • Counterintelligence Surveys • Mission Critical Information • TP Process Assurance Maps Assessment (MCIA)
  • 10. Protection Services Comprehensive Set of Security Services to Include… • Security Requirements Definition • Risk Management and Decision • Security Policy Reviews Support • Export Control Guidance • Threat & Vulnerability Analysis • Information Technology • Protection and Mitigation Planning Security/Information Protection • Multi-Center/Multi-Agency Coordination Coordination • Technology Protection Working • Industry Partner Security Interface Group Facilitation and Performance Monitoring • Education & Awareness (e.g., • International Cooperation SBU) Interface • Counterintelligence Support • Secure Communications Planning
  • 11. TPWG Organization Structure Exploration Systems Mission Directorate Office of Security and Program Protection (ESMD ) Associate Administrator (OSPP) Directorate Integration Assistant Officer Administrator Technology Protection Working Group Chair CxP OCIO, S&MA, Management • Program TPOs • Counterintelligence • Center IPOs Export, etc. • Center TPOs • Industry partners • ESMD RM ACD • Scientists • Center security • Engineers Center Management Management Program Technology System Security Threat and Horizontal Policy Protection Trending Engineering Vulnerability Protection Compliance Program Project Element System Component “Complex System” Distributed Organizations Implementation Technology Policy Information Execution
  • 12. TPWG NASA Representation – Full Integration Constellation Program fully engaged Scientists and engineers supported Ares I and Orion Technology Protection Portfolios 70% complete “Ten healthy Centers”
  • 13. Technology Protection Program – A Project Resource
  • 14. ESMD TPWG Community of Practice (CoP) Oversight by ESMD Directorate Integration Office Community in excess of 60 active members Risk Managers, Engineers, Export Officials, Security Industry partners
  • 15. Technology Protection Program IPT ES MD ou ction an ng Prote d p n Pro ea atio Gr Pro nd E e n f o rm gr a m Wo logy gra ng a m sm In tT m inee rki no ses itical Ma Sc ch ien rs na r Te C tis ge on ts As ss i me Mi nt Center Chiefs of Security NASA Office of Security and Program Protection
  • 16. ESMD Technology Protection Program Model CI Program TPWG Information Project Protection TPO IPO MCI Information Technology Security
  • 17. What is Mission Critical Information (MCI)? NASA information related to research, technologies, projects, programs, or systems that, if released outside established protocols could: Significantly affect NASA resources, requiring additional research, development, tests, or evaluation to overcome the adverse effects of unauthorized releases - and / or - Significantly reduce the performance or effectiveness of NASA research, projects, technologies, programs, or systems - and / or - Have a significantly adverse affect on the United States’ advantage in space and other current and emerging technologies With a multitude of technologies and systems under review, the definition of significant will be specific to each potential MCI during an assessment, with a basis of concepts such as Evolutionary/Revolutionary, State-of-the- Art (SOA) vs. State-of-the-World (SOW), and specific impacts to NASA’s programs and missions.
  • 18. Technology Protection Program Full Integration The TP Program Model The TP Program Team ES CI MD ou ction nd a ng Prote n p ea atio Pro Pro nd E Gr en form Program TPWG Information m g Wo ology gra ng a ram Project Protection ssm l In tT m inee rki TPO IPO sse itica Sc Ma n ch ien rs MCI n Cr Te ag tis on ts em ssi A en Mi t Center Chiefs of Security Information Technology Security NASA Office of Security and Program Protection The NASA TP Program model works because of the MCI team’s understanding of the Program’s cost, schedule and performance drivers. The technology protection team is respectful of the NASA mission, history and culture. These characteristics are the key to minimizing the impact to the Program schedule and is one of the reasons for the Program’s success.
  • 19. MCI Assessment Participants PM PM Selected Project SMEs (as needed) TPO Mission Critical Information Assessment TPWG Team Oversight Counterintelligence, IA, IT, security, etc. Mission Critical Information Assessment Team • Team of scientists, engineers, and security analysts • Technical connection with NASA Program personnel • Recommends MCI for PM consideration • Develops and delivers all associated documentation (Technology Protection Portfolio) • Collaborates with the Security and Intelligence functions of the TPWG team
  • 20. MCI Assessment NASA Personnel and Contributions NASA Scientists and Engineers MCI Project/Element Manager Protective Services (OSPP)
  • 21. Technology Protection Cycle Requires NASA Program P1 Level Decision Discovery Activities P2 P4 Assessment Initiate NASA Perform Preparation TVA Process Risk Analysis Technical Initiate Select Final Discussions Controls v Controls P3 P5 Technical Discussion Evaluate Develop Analysis Vulnerabilities Protection Plan MCI Continuously Develop Confirmation Implementation Plan Periodically
  • 22. Technology Protection Program Full Integration NASA Project Life Cycle NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, page 20, DECEMBER 2007 *MCI re-assessments performed as required MCI review Technology MCI assessment completion Protection Identify initial controls and threats Activities Identify vulnerabilities and validate threat Final controls selection / continuous risk management
  • 23. Technology Protection Phases and Associated Activities Element Technology Determine Determine impact Utilize security “best P2 - Initiate TVA P5 - Protection Implementation P1 - MCI Assessment P4 - Risk Analysis Information adversary intent on NASA if practices” (trade gathering and and capability to exploitation occurs studies, etc.) review exploit technology Determine Implement cost Conduct technical Determine facilities, appropriate / effective and discussions with personnel acceptable level of efficient controls scientists, (government and risk based on risk engineers, security, contractor, US and analysis and CI professionals foreign), Develop controls components where Review final which mitigate risks Continuously P3 - Evaluate Vulnerabilities Reach back to MCI resides (element specific) and bring risk into monitor and contractor threat product “acceptable” limits improve the teammates Implement initial protection process scientists and transparent controls Determine threats engineers as to MCI in programs, Ensure necessary facilities, systems, improvements are components, and documented and MCI and information personnel considered for requiring controls implementation identified Prioritize vulnerabilities of Immediate controls MCI placed on information as Adjust initial required controls if necessary MCIA Report Initial Controls Final Controls Report Implementation Plan Significant Issues Report Portfolio Sections I - V Portfolio Section VI Portfolio Section VII Portfolio Section VIII
  • 24. Element, Project, Technology Protection Portfolios Program Management Technology Protection Process Brief Section I This brief provides an overview of the NASA Technology Protection (TP) Process. This overview includes key participants, defines key terminology, outlines the phases of the TP Process and provides details of the products from the various phases of the TP Process. Technology Protection Process Execution Plan (EP) Section II This plan describes in detail the TP Process phases and associated documentation. The plan also provides a schedule, personnel selected by the Element Manager (EM), and NASA TP Program points of contact. Scientist and Engineers Technology Protection Process Brief Section III This brief provides an overview of the NASA TP Program and outlines the roles and responsibilities of the scientists and engineers identified by the EM. The brief also presents the initial results of the discovery phase of the TP Process. Mission Critical Information (MCI) Technical Discussions Results Brief Section IV This brief provides the EM MCI recommendations from the Technology Protection Working Group (TPWG) based on the analysis of the technical discussions with Element scientists and engineers. Mission Critical Information Assessment Report (MCIA-R) Section V This report documents the EM determination of MCI. The report also provides detailed information about Element MCI and highlights any significant issues identified during the TP Process. Initial Controls Report (ICR) Section VI This report documents the TPWG recommendations for initial Element controls to immediately enhance the protection of MCI based on the baseline threats to the Element MCI. The report also includes Element general threat awareness. Final Controls Report (FCR) Section VII This report contains the NASA Headquarters Counterintelligence (CI) validated threats to Element MCI, vulnerability analysis, and TPWG recommended final controls based on the level of risk acceptable to the EM and metrics obtained from the initial controls selected in the ICR. Implementation Guidance Section VIII This document provides recommendations to the EM detailing the manner in which the EM selected final controls may be implemented. This guidance is focused on the MCI only.
  • 25. Example: J-2X Technology Protection Portfolio
  • 26. The Information Dilemma Desire / need Department of to publish Commerce Mandate to Department of collaborate State International National partnerships Security Need to Share Need to Protect National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 calls National Space Policy, 2006, states that space for the widespread dissemination of newfound capabilities are vital to the Nation’s interests and technologies to the public. the U.S. will “take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities.”
  • 27. ESMD Technology Protection Program To-date On center activities Planned center activities (< 6 months) Planned center activities (> 6 months)
  • 28. Technology Protection Program Full Integration Pilot Program (Years 1-2) Year 3 Year 4+ Program Development Lunar Lander Ares V Ares I Extravehicular Activities Science and Technology Elements Orion Program refinement Systems Integration Elements
  • 29. Constellation Program Work Breakdown Structure Pilot Program Year 3 Sustainment
  • 30. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI Location Threat
  • 31. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location Threat
  • 32. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location Threat
  • 33. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat
  • 34. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat
  • 35. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat α β γ δ
  • 36. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat α β γ δ
  • 37. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat α β γ δ
  • 38. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat α β γ δ
  • 39. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat α β γ δ
  • 40. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat α β γ δ
  • 41. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat α β γ δ
  • 42. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat α β γ δ
  • 43. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat α β γ δ
  • 44. Horizontal Protection and Awareness of NASA MCI Element SM US MCI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Location A B C D E F G H I J K L M Threat α β γ δ
  • 45. Technology Protection Program Benefits to the PM Increased Project Manager Control • Puts PM in control of Technology Protection process • Program specific tailored execution plan • Programs will be proactive instead of remaining reactive • Function is responsive to the Program • Real time Technology Protection status and metrics • Not an audit or inspection Increased Value • Multi-disciplinary team of unbiased subject matter experts • Extremely useful products (TP Portfolio with 8 sections) which is 100% consistent with existing NPR and other policy requirements • Horizontal aspects Communication Integration Protection resulting in consolidated ESMD MCI List • Team develops all Technology Protection related documents Coordinating with all relevant Program, Center, Directorate, and NASA HQ Technology Protection stakeholders
  • 46. Results Oriented We Moved From… …To Not Knowing Program Expectations and Security Needs Direct PM Involvement and Decision Making Minimal Direct Security Staff Involvement w/ Projects Cohesive Team w/ Core Security Competencies Implementation of Security Risk Management; No candidate program security risks Mitigation of two Top Directorate Security Risks Inconsistent Adherence to Security Policy and Practices PM approved comprehensive Security Management Plan “Reactive” Security Response to Projects “Proactive” Security Response/Results Oriented Greater Employee Security Awareness, online education Negligible Program Workforce Security Awareness tools, and quality briefings Minimal Understanding of Threats directed at NASA Current Program Threat Assessment No Process to Determine Mission Critical Information Model Process for Determining MCI Few Quality Security Products Multiple High Quality Security Products No Cross-cutting Communications Established Integrated Product Team (IPT) No overall Program Protection Strategy Protection Strategies Designed to Ensure Success TPWG is the controlling element of a Closed-Loop Security System
  • 47. Acronyms ACD - CI - Counterintelligence CoP - Community of Practice CPP - Certified Protection Professional CxP - Constellation Program DIO - Directorate Integration Office EP - Execution Plan ESMD - Exploration Systems Mission Directorate FCR - Final Controls Report HQ - Headquarters IA - Information Assurance ICR - Initial Controls Report IPO - Information Protection Officer IT - Information Technology MCI - Mission Critical Information MCIA - Mission Critical Information Assessment MCIA-R - Mission Critical Information Assessment Report NCIX - National Counterintelligence Executive NPR - NASA Procedural Requirements OCIO - Office of the Chief Information Officer OSPP - Office of Security and Program Protection RM - Risk Manager S&MA - Safety and Mission Assurance SM - Service Module TBD - To be determined TP - Technology Protection TPO - Technology Protection Officer TPWG - Technology Protection Working Group TVA - Threat and Vulnerability Assessment US - Upper Stage WBS - Work Breakdown Structure
  • 49. When Technology Protection? Earlier the better… Desired Capability X >> Y X Y Capability s ss s re gre g ro rp pro a ne Li ted elera Acc We are here….. But on this track? Or, on this track? Capability / maturation level when initial implementation of TP is too late Time http://www.foresight.org/UTF/Unbound_LBW/chapt_4.html
  • 50. CxP Security Documentation Tree Program Plan A1: Needs, Goals & Objectives CxP 70003 A2: Integrated Master Plan A3: Acquisition Plan System s M anagem ent Architecture Cx Architecture Safety, Reliability & Program Description Engineering Risk M anagem ent System s Plan Requirement Quality Assurance M anagem ent Plan Docum ent M anagem ent Plan Plan (RM ) (M SP) Docum ent (CARD ) (SR&QA) (PMP) (ADD ) (SEMP) 70056 70072 70000 70055 70070 70077 70013 CxP 70070-ANX05-03 - SMP CxP 70171 – Information CxP 70170 - Functional CxP 70070-ANX05 Book 3: Information Systems Contingency Planning & Technology Security Security Requirements Security Reporting Architecture (Form erly (Formerly SMP Book 1) SMP Book 2) M anagement Plan CxP 70070-ANX05-04 - SMP Book 4: Technology Protection (SMP) Program Plan (TPPP) CxP 70070-ANX05-05 - SMP Book 5: Emergency Response & Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) M ission Ground EVA System s Lunar System s Orion Ares Operations Operations Altair (ES) Surface Project Plan Project Plan (M O) (GO) Project Plan Project Plan Project Plan Project Plan Project Plan
  • 51. Technology Protection Program – The Early Days • Focused on the “bigger picture” – broader national perspective • Performed an early Gap Analysis to determine in-place vs. desired end state for security • Identified and applied security Lessons Learned from past NASA and DoD programs • Heavily leveraged use of institutional security support, thus gaining PM backing • Tracked the program “flow of events” to establish what issues are most important to attack first • Recruited team players; valued all contributions • Brought energy, intensity, and a creative new approach to security planning • Took small steps over time and quietly overcame objections or obstacles • Established a holistic approach for prioritizing security goals based on mission objectives • Leveraged use of in-house (no cost) software tools to enhance efficiency Building future capability and gaining respect from within the intelligence and DoD communities
  • 52. Benefits/Value • Customer Focused – better able to satisfy most urgent ESMD security needs • Early life-cycle Planning – so that resources can be applied and managed; early discovery and resolution of problems • Maximum Flexibility – encourage creative problem solving • Event Driven – to ensure security product maturity is incrementally demonstrated, i.e., response to key decision point / critical milestone reviews • Multi-disciplinary Teamwork – Synergy: right people at the right place and at the right time to make timely decisions • Seamless Management and Communication Tools – to ensure teams have all available information, i.e., risk management tool, community of practice, etc. • Proactive Risk Identification – rapid reduction of risk/uncertainty Technology Protection must demonstrate a Return on Investment