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Design Considerations for Safe and
Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems



       Project Management Challenge 2008
             Daytona Beach, Florida
              February 26 - 27, 2008




               Dawn M. Schaible
        NASA Engineering and Safety Center



              Engineering Excellence         1
Background


• In late 2005, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center
  (NESC) was asked by the Astronaut Office to answer
  the basic question:


          "How do you know you have a safe
               and reliable system?"




                    Engineering Excellence               2
Background

• A multi-disciplinary team was established, consisting
  of representatives from across NASA and industry
   –   Identified techniques, methodologies, and best practices
       from a wide variety of resources


• The team set out to document:
   –   How systems have performed historically
   –   How to achieve a reliable spacecraft
   –   How to know where redundancy is and isn’t required
   –   How to determine if a design is reliable




                          Engineering Excellence                  3
Background

• What does make a system safe?
   –   Two failure tolerance?
   –   Using COTS components that have never failure before?
   –   Failure probability predictions of 1 in 10,000?
   –   Meeting requirements?


• The answer to each of these taken individually is “No”
   –   No a priori prescription for the design of a safe human rated system
   –   No single process or rule will assure safety and mission success
   –   Hazards exist in context of a design and operational sequence
   –   Unexpected interactions can occur when system elements operate
       together in the natural and induced environments with a flexible and
       variable operational scenario


                            Engineering Excellence                            4
Background

• Two-part report focused on safety and reliability
  considerations
     Volume 1 – Systems Engineering
     Volume 2 – Discipline-specific best practices


• Not intended to replace existing standards and
  policy or duplicate existing references


• This presentation will focus on the Volume I –
  Systems Engineering. Subsequent presentations
  will focus on specific disciplines and case studies



                      Engineering Excellence            5
Top Level Conclusions

• History indicates no subsystem, component, or
  system element is immune from failure
• There is no single requirement, method, or process,
  which, by itself, assures the “right stuff” for safety and
  reliability
• System level safety and reliability is achieved by
  maintaining a vigilant focus on identifying and
  addressing risks throughout the DDT&E life cycle and
  during spacecraft operations




                      Engineering Excellence                   6
Guiding Principles

1. Define a clear and simple set of prioritized program needs,
   objectives and constraints, including safety, that form the
   validation basis for subsequent work
2. Manage and lead the program with a safety focus, simple
   and easy to understand management structures, and clear
   lines of authority and responsibility among the elements
3. Specify safety and reliability requirements through a triad of
   fault tolerance, bounding failure probability, and adhering to
   proven practices and standards
4. Manage complexity by keeping the primary (mission)
   objectives as simple and minimal as possible and adding
   complexity to the system only where necessary to achieve
   these objectives


                        Engineering Excellence                      7
Guiding Principles

5. Conceive the right system conceptual design early in the life
   cycle by thoroughly exploring risks from the top down and
   using a risk-based design loop to iterate the operations
   concept, the design, and the requirements until the system
   meets mission objectives at minimum complexity and is
   achievable within constraints
6. Build the system right by applying a multilayered, defense in
   depth approach of following proven design and
   manufacturing practices, holding independent reviews,
   inspecting the end product, and employing a “test like you fly,
   fly like you test” philosophy
7. Seek and collect warning signs and precursors to safety,
   mission success and development risks throughout the life
   cycle, and integrate those into a total risk picture with
   appropriate mitigation activities

                        Engineering Excellence                       8
1. Defining Program Needs,
                Objectives, and Constraints


Define a clear and simple set of prioritized program needs,
objectives, and constraints, including safety, that form the
validation basis for subsequent work
   –   Primary requirements of the spacecraft and its related
       systems are derived from the mission objectives
   –   Simple mission objectives are easier to validate and manage
   –   Expansive and ill-defined mission objectives allow for all
       manner of add-ons that could eventually produce a system
       that either cannot be built or, if built, cannot be operated with
       a high degree of confidence




                         Engineering Excellence                            9
2. Organizing and Managing the Program


Manage and lead the program with a safety focus, simple
and easy to understand management structures, and clear
lines of authority and responsibility among the elements
   –   Select the right objectives, organizational structure, and key
       personnel
   –   Ensure that each manager’s authority and responsibility are
       unambiguous, co-aligned, and supported
   –   Delegating authority and responsibility to a team that will be
       working under intense pressure for years, management
       must provide a safety net by maintaining discipline in
       execution of the Program Plan, ensuring transparency, and
       providing timely independent assessments of progress



                        Engineering Excellence                          10
3. Defining Safety and Reliability
                 for Human Rated Systems

Specify safety and
reliability
requirements
through a triad of
fault tolerance,
bounding failure
probability, and
adhering to proven
practices and
standards




                      Engineering Excellence      11
4. Managing Complexity


Manage complexity by keeping the primary (mission)
objectives as simple and minimal as possible and adding
complexity to the system only where necessary to achieve
these objectives
   –   Complexity is the antithesis of reliability and should be
       limited to what is needed to accomplish the mission
       objective
   –   Manage and integrate pieces into a cohesive whole
   –   Understand the external and induced environments
   –   Control implications of new technology
   –   Apply heritage and COTS system elements with care




                        Engineering Excellence                     12
5. Conceiving the Right System


Conceive the right system
conceptual design early in the
life cycle by thoroughly
exploring risks from the top
down and using a risk-based
design loop to iterate the
operations concept, design,
and requirements until the
system meets mission
objectives at minimum
complexity and is achievable
within constraints




                         Engineering Excellence   13
5. Conceiving the Right System

“Build up” methodology for developing a design:
   Step 1 - Define needs, objectives, and constraints
   Step 2 - Define the minimum set of functions necessary to
     accomplish the mission objectives according to an operational
     sequence
   Step 3 - Make it work. Create the simplest conceptual design of
     the contemplated system that accomplishes the functions
     necessary to meet mission objectives with inherent safety
   Step 4 - Make it safe. Add simple elements to the system at the
     minimum performance necessary to assure safe crew return.
     A simple diverse system maximizes the independence from
     prime system faults and should be easier to understand and
     verify



                        Engineering Excellence                       14
5. Conceiving the Right System

“Build up” methodology for developing a design (continued):
   Step 5 - Make it reliable. Consider additional elements or other
     “legs,” preferentially an additional primary leg of equivalent
     performance but not necessarily identical design for mission
     success

   Step 6 - Make it Affordable. Estimate cost and schedule to
     develop, produce, and operate the system design

   Step 7 - Capture the Conceptual Design as the derived
     requirements, baseline operations concept, and baseline
     conceptual design




                         Engineering Excellence                       15
5. Conceiving the Right System

“Build up” methodology driven by a risk-based iterative
design loop provides the rationale for the total system
design, including:
   –   Existence of each system element and component
   –   Chosen failure tolerance
   –   Technical (mass, power) and programmatic resources




                           Engineering Excellence           16
5. Conceiving the Right System




        Engineering Excellence   17
6. Building the System Right


Build the system right by applying a multilayered, defense
in-depth approach of following proven design and
manufacturing practices, holding independent reviews and
inspecting, and employing a “test like you fly, fly like you
test” approach to assure that the system is safe and
reliable




                     Engineering Excellence                    18
6. Building the System Right




      Engineering Excellence   19
7. Integrating Risks Throughout the Life Cycle

Seek and collect warning signs and precursors to safety, mission
success, and development risks throughout the life cycle, and
integrate those into a total risk picture with appropriate mitigation
activities
   –   Integrate a total risk picture from each contributory increment of risk
   –   Provide a method of distinguishing, comparing, evaluating, and
       prioritizing risks with differing and sometimes competing consequences
   –   Foster curiosity, skepticism, and imagination to identify risks, seek
       warning signs, and precursors to potential failures and problems
   –   Start risk assessments early in the life cycle in a top down fashion
   –   Validate system risk assessments with historical knowledge of failures
       and their causes in comparable systems
   –   Identify residual risks, close calls, anomalies, or issues that do not have
       a definitive cause or corrective action


                             Engineering Excellence                                  20
Guiding Principles Applied to End-to-End
Development of a Safe and Reliable System




             Engineering Excellence         21
Conclusions

• Absent a prescription for a safe design, the challenge is
  to always design the system for the minimum risk

• These risks must be explored during the upfront design
  work which provides the most leverage in obviating or
  mitigating weakness of the design or operational
  approach

• Exploring risks and obviating them must be approached
  with a flexible iterative design loop which seeks the
  simplest and least complex system necessary to
  accomplish mission objectives




                      Engineering Excellence                  22
Conclusions

• Full report available on-line at: nesc.nasa.gov

• Volume 2 addresses discipline-specific best practices:
     –   Structures *
     –   Electrical Systems *
     –   Flight and Ground Software *
     –   Guidance, Navigation and Control *
     –   Propulsion
     –   Environmental Control and Life Support
     –   Mechanical Systems
     –   Human Factors *
     –   Materials and Processes

                      * Topics of additional PM Challenge presentations


                        Engineering Excellence                            23

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Dawn.schaible

  • 1. Design Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems Project Management Challenge 2008 Daytona Beach, Florida February 26 - 27, 2008 Dawn M. Schaible NASA Engineering and Safety Center Engineering Excellence 1
  • 2. Background • In late 2005, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was asked by the Astronaut Office to answer the basic question: "How do you know you have a safe and reliable system?" Engineering Excellence 2
  • 3. Background • A multi-disciplinary team was established, consisting of representatives from across NASA and industry – Identified techniques, methodologies, and best practices from a wide variety of resources • The team set out to document: – How systems have performed historically – How to achieve a reliable spacecraft – How to know where redundancy is and isn’t required – How to determine if a design is reliable Engineering Excellence 3
  • 4. Background • What does make a system safe? – Two failure tolerance? – Using COTS components that have never failure before? – Failure probability predictions of 1 in 10,000? – Meeting requirements? • The answer to each of these taken individually is “No” – No a priori prescription for the design of a safe human rated system – No single process or rule will assure safety and mission success – Hazards exist in context of a design and operational sequence – Unexpected interactions can occur when system elements operate together in the natural and induced environments with a flexible and variable operational scenario Engineering Excellence 4
  • 5. Background • Two-part report focused on safety and reliability considerations Volume 1 – Systems Engineering Volume 2 – Discipline-specific best practices • Not intended to replace existing standards and policy or duplicate existing references • This presentation will focus on the Volume I – Systems Engineering. Subsequent presentations will focus on specific disciplines and case studies Engineering Excellence 5
  • 6. Top Level Conclusions • History indicates no subsystem, component, or system element is immune from failure • There is no single requirement, method, or process, which, by itself, assures the “right stuff” for safety and reliability • System level safety and reliability is achieved by maintaining a vigilant focus on identifying and addressing risks throughout the DDT&E life cycle and during spacecraft operations Engineering Excellence 6
  • 7. Guiding Principles 1. Define a clear and simple set of prioritized program needs, objectives and constraints, including safety, that form the validation basis for subsequent work 2. Manage and lead the program with a safety focus, simple and easy to understand management structures, and clear lines of authority and responsibility among the elements 3. Specify safety and reliability requirements through a triad of fault tolerance, bounding failure probability, and adhering to proven practices and standards 4. Manage complexity by keeping the primary (mission) objectives as simple and minimal as possible and adding complexity to the system only where necessary to achieve these objectives Engineering Excellence 7
  • 8. Guiding Principles 5. Conceive the right system conceptual design early in the life cycle by thoroughly exploring risks from the top down and using a risk-based design loop to iterate the operations concept, the design, and the requirements until the system meets mission objectives at minimum complexity and is achievable within constraints 6. Build the system right by applying a multilayered, defense in depth approach of following proven design and manufacturing practices, holding independent reviews, inspecting the end product, and employing a “test like you fly, fly like you test” philosophy 7. Seek and collect warning signs and precursors to safety, mission success and development risks throughout the life cycle, and integrate those into a total risk picture with appropriate mitigation activities Engineering Excellence 8
  • 9. 1. Defining Program Needs, Objectives, and Constraints Define a clear and simple set of prioritized program needs, objectives, and constraints, including safety, that form the validation basis for subsequent work – Primary requirements of the spacecraft and its related systems are derived from the mission objectives – Simple mission objectives are easier to validate and manage – Expansive and ill-defined mission objectives allow for all manner of add-ons that could eventually produce a system that either cannot be built or, if built, cannot be operated with a high degree of confidence Engineering Excellence 9
  • 10. 2. Organizing and Managing the Program Manage and lead the program with a safety focus, simple and easy to understand management structures, and clear lines of authority and responsibility among the elements – Select the right objectives, organizational structure, and key personnel – Ensure that each manager’s authority and responsibility are unambiguous, co-aligned, and supported – Delegating authority and responsibility to a team that will be working under intense pressure for years, management must provide a safety net by maintaining discipline in execution of the Program Plan, ensuring transparency, and providing timely independent assessments of progress Engineering Excellence 10
  • 11. 3. Defining Safety and Reliability for Human Rated Systems Specify safety and reliability requirements through a triad of fault tolerance, bounding failure probability, and adhering to proven practices and standards Engineering Excellence 11
  • 12. 4. Managing Complexity Manage complexity by keeping the primary (mission) objectives as simple and minimal as possible and adding complexity to the system only where necessary to achieve these objectives – Complexity is the antithesis of reliability and should be limited to what is needed to accomplish the mission objective – Manage and integrate pieces into a cohesive whole – Understand the external and induced environments – Control implications of new technology – Apply heritage and COTS system elements with care Engineering Excellence 12
  • 13. 5. Conceiving the Right System Conceive the right system conceptual design early in the life cycle by thoroughly exploring risks from the top down and using a risk-based design loop to iterate the operations concept, design, and requirements until the system meets mission objectives at minimum complexity and is achievable within constraints Engineering Excellence 13
  • 14. 5. Conceiving the Right System “Build up” methodology for developing a design: Step 1 - Define needs, objectives, and constraints Step 2 - Define the minimum set of functions necessary to accomplish the mission objectives according to an operational sequence Step 3 - Make it work. Create the simplest conceptual design of the contemplated system that accomplishes the functions necessary to meet mission objectives with inherent safety Step 4 - Make it safe. Add simple elements to the system at the minimum performance necessary to assure safe crew return. A simple diverse system maximizes the independence from prime system faults and should be easier to understand and verify Engineering Excellence 14
  • 15. 5. Conceiving the Right System “Build up” methodology for developing a design (continued): Step 5 - Make it reliable. Consider additional elements or other “legs,” preferentially an additional primary leg of equivalent performance but not necessarily identical design for mission success Step 6 - Make it Affordable. Estimate cost and schedule to develop, produce, and operate the system design Step 7 - Capture the Conceptual Design as the derived requirements, baseline operations concept, and baseline conceptual design Engineering Excellence 15
  • 16. 5. Conceiving the Right System “Build up” methodology driven by a risk-based iterative design loop provides the rationale for the total system design, including: – Existence of each system element and component – Chosen failure tolerance – Technical (mass, power) and programmatic resources Engineering Excellence 16
  • 17. 5. Conceiving the Right System Engineering Excellence 17
  • 18. 6. Building the System Right Build the system right by applying a multilayered, defense in-depth approach of following proven design and manufacturing practices, holding independent reviews and inspecting, and employing a “test like you fly, fly like you test” approach to assure that the system is safe and reliable Engineering Excellence 18
  • 19. 6. Building the System Right Engineering Excellence 19
  • 20. 7. Integrating Risks Throughout the Life Cycle Seek and collect warning signs and precursors to safety, mission success, and development risks throughout the life cycle, and integrate those into a total risk picture with appropriate mitigation activities – Integrate a total risk picture from each contributory increment of risk – Provide a method of distinguishing, comparing, evaluating, and prioritizing risks with differing and sometimes competing consequences – Foster curiosity, skepticism, and imagination to identify risks, seek warning signs, and precursors to potential failures and problems – Start risk assessments early in the life cycle in a top down fashion – Validate system risk assessments with historical knowledge of failures and their causes in comparable systems – Identify residual risks, close calls, anomalies, or issues that do not have a definitive cause or corrective action Engineering Excellence 20
  • 21. Guiding Principles Applied to End-to-End Development of a Safe and Reliable System Engineering Excellence 21
  • 22. Conclusions • Absent a prescription for a safe design, the challenge is to always design the system for the minimum risk • These risks must be explored during the upfront design work which provides the most leverage in obviating or mitigating weakness of the design or operational approach • Exploring risks and obviating them must be approached with a flexible iterative design loop which seeks the simplest and least complex system necessary to accomplish mission objectives Engineering Excellence 22
  • 23. Conclusions • Full report available on-line at: nesc.nasa.gov • Volume 2 addresses discipline-specific best practices: – Structures * – Electrical Systems * – Flight and Ground Software * – Guidance, Navigation and Control * – Propulsion – Environmental Control and Life Support – Mechanical Systems – Human Factors * – Materials and Processes * Topics of additional PM Challenge presentations Engineering Excellence 23