1. Mitchel Lange
The Effect of the Economy on the Rapid Aging of Japanese Society
Reports claim that Japan has experienced the fastest case of population aging in history.1
In 1960 only 12.7% of adults in Japan were over 60 years old, but this ratio had grown to 21.5%
by 1990.2 Continuing to increase, 31.2% of the adult Japanese population was over 60 in 2005.3
Such rapid aging can adversely affect societies and there is a wide range of literature covering
possible issues threatening Japan. Such imbalances in the age ratio due to the growing
percentage of seniors can strain the country’s pension system. With the increasing ratio of
seniors to the rest of the population, the amount of taxpayers to beneficiaries will become more
and more skewed toward beneficiaries. Unless fundamental changes to the social security system
are enacted, supporting the older population economically will become increasingly difficult.
The possibility of a critical shortage of laborers sweeping the country is also a common point of
discussion. With younger generations occupying a smaller part of the population distribution, the
ratio of earners to consumers will be imbalanced heavily in favor of the consumers. In such a
case the available amount of resources (including income) for people across the country will
shrink.
The three most instrumental factors affecting the age structure of a population in the long
run are deemed to be fertility, mortality, and migration.4 For all three of these factors Japan is a
case of extremes. To start, immigration to Japan is quite low. Due to strict laws on citizenship
1 Ogawa, “Japan's changing fertility mechanisms and its policy changes.”
2 Clark et al., “Population Decline, Labor Force Stability, and the Future of the Japanese
Economy.”
3 Ibid.
4 Lee and Mason, “Is Low Fertility Really a Problem?”

2. and reported xenophobia among Japanese nationals, Japan has been described as a country
unattractive to immigrants.5 Data seems to reflect this sentiment. Among countries with non-
negative migration rates (with negative meaning more people are emigrating than immigrating),
Japan was one country among many (including Iraq, Madagascar, South Korea, and Guinea) tied
for last for having the least amount of immigrants entering the country in 2014.6 On average,
Japan’s net migration rate between 2010 and 2014 was 0.06 per 1,000 people. However, Japan
experiences extremely high life expectancies. As of 2012 Japan has the highest average life
expectancy of any country in the world, with an average of 81 and 87 years for men and women
respectively.7 As for fertility, Japan’s total fertility rate (TFR) dropped below replacement levels
in the 1970’s and has been falling continuously since.8
As for these three factors in the context of population aging, advocating higher fertility
receives the most attention from governments. Although immigration can indeed bolster the
numbers of the younger generation in the short term, it has been noted to have a muted effect in
the long term, with the age distributions of immigrant populations eventually adapting to that in
the receiving country.9 Mortality decline also plays a role in the aging of a population, but no
government has ever realistically considered raising mortality amongst its citizens. Therefore, as
opposed to these other factors, the issue of addressing fertility decline receives substantial
attention. In this paper, I too will focus on fertility decline in Japan over mortality and migration.
I examine whether and to what degree the “lost decade” has hastened the rapid aging of Japanese
5 Jung, “Can Japan Become “A Society Attractive for Immigrants?”
6 Central Intelligence Agency, COUNTRY COMPARISON:: NET MIGRATION RATE.
7 World Health Organization, Life Expectancy Data by Country.
8 Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Standardized Vital
Rates and Reproduction Rates.
9 Lee and Mason, “Is Low Fertility Really a Problem?”

3. society. I hypothesize that economic change and hardships brought upon by the lost decade have
led to lower fertility rates in Japan, exacerbating the aging issue.
First I will describe the lost decade’s effects on the Japanese labor market, and what
effects these changes have had on Japanese society in the context of population aging. Effects of
labor markets on income, marriage, and fertility are examined. Then I will describe how
emerging demographics, all with a noted disinterest in marriage, are a result of the lost decade
and how they could be affecting Japanese fertility now as well as in the future. Finally, I examine
post-lost decade Japan in context of the capabilities approach to development as well as the
insufficiency of current policies regarding fertility and how they can be improved.
The economic crash and subsequent influence on marriage in Japan
The “lost decade” is the term used to refer to the time of economic hardship that swept
Japan in the 1990’s. Due to tighter economic conditions and the ever-present threat of global
competition, pressures to reduce unnecessary costs were more dire than ever. From these
conditions, the deregulation of the Japanese labor market was endorsed and there was a burst of
temporary employment. Starting in the late 1990’s, in an attempt by the Liberal Democratic
Party of Japan to revitalize the economy through the creation of new job opportunities,
restrictions on hiring shirt-term temporary sectors were removed. While previously only specific
fields were able to have part-time laborers, this policy shift removed such restrictions and paved
the way for temporary contract labor to permeate the job market. Also, due to the fact social
insurance benefits were only mandated for regular (aka not temporary) workers, an incentive to
hire more temporary workers was created. These irregular workers were also highly disposable
and easy to dump if keeping them around proved too costly. Firms reduced new hires and cut

4. positions while expanding temporary employment thus leading to an explosion of temporary
work in Japan. In 1984 only 15.3% of the labor force consisted of laborers in non-regular
positions but this number had more than doubled to 34.1% by 2008.10
Marriage rates by age and employment status Regular (full-time) Irregular (part-time)
15-19 years old 3.40% 1.70%
20-24 years old 12.10% 5.70%
25-29 years old 34.40% 14.80%
30-34 years old 59.20% 30.30%
Table 1, data fromMinistryof Health, Labor,andWelfare
This rapid increase of irregular work is important in the context of marriage in Japan.
Table 1 summarizes results of a government study that determined laborers in stable, full time
work have considerably higher marriage rates than those in part-time work.11 As described by
Osawa et al., another government study in 2011 discovered that a yearly income of ¥3,600,000
(approximately $30,000 as of February 2015) acted as a crucial dividing line for marriage. While
only 8% to 10% of men in their 20’s and 30’s below this income threshold were married, the
proportion of married people with incomes above that threshold was recorded to be as high as
40%.12
In the context of the disparity between marriage rates of irregular and regular workers,
the significance of this dividing line becomes clear if you examine another government survey
analyzing wage profiles of Japanese laborers. While those in regular jobs enjoy seniority based
pay raises and a steady increase of income as they age, wages for irregular workers constantly
10 Osawa, Kim, and Kingston, “Precarious Work in Japan.”
11 Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Marriage Rates by Employment Status in Japan.
12 Osawa, Kim, and Kingston, “Precarious Work in Japan.”

5. stayed within the ¥2,500,000-3,000,000 range regardless of the age group.13 Because the mean
wages for irregular jobs are falling below the dividing line of a yearly income of ¥3,600,000,
laborers’ chances of marrying are being reduced if they are hired into irregular work.
But why the focus on marriage, as opposed to fertility, in analyzing the effect of Japan’s
economic conditions on population aging when I already stated fertility is the most important
factor in determining the age structure of a population? In Japan’s case, fertility is greatly
dependent on marriage. Between 1990 and 1998 the mean percentage of births that happened
among unmarried couples ranged between 1.1 and 1.4%.14 As of 2003 only 1.9% of all births
took place between unmarried couples. 15 Because fertility in Japan is a phenomenon that
primarily happens within marriage, fertility trends across the country as a whole generally reflect
those among married couples. This is reinforced by data, as fertility within marriage (table 2)16
has followed the same trends as total fertility (table 3)17 over the last 60 years.
Table 2, data fromMinistryof Internal Affairs andCommunications
13 Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Basic Survey of Wage Structure 2008.
14 United Nations Statistics Division, Live Births by Legitimacy Status and Percent
Illegitimate: 1990-1998.
15 Boling, “Demography, Culture and Policy.”
16 Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Standardized Vital
Rates and Reproduction Rates.
17 United Nations Statistics Division, Live Births by Legitimacy Status and Percent
Illegitimate: 1990-1998.
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Total Fertility Rates in Japan by Year

6. Table 3, data fromUnitedNationStatistics Division
Since fertility in Japan is hugely dependent on marriage, any factors affecting marriage
rates can also be influential on reproduction. A decline in marriage will most certainly lower
fertility in Japan. Therefore due to the fact marriage rates are lower among those employed in
temporary positions and temporary work has come to represent a greater percentage of the labor
market, it can be said that the economic downfall of the lost decade and resulting deregulation of
the labor market is pulling down fertility rates in Japan.
The lost decade’s instrumental role in emerging demographics
Another perspective on the lost decade’s effect on marriage and fertility focuses on its
role in the creation of certain demographic groups. With the explosion of irregular work came
fundamental changes to identities and lifestyles in Japan, leading to the creation of new
demographics among younger Japanese generations. In particular two such emergent
demographics I wish to introduce are herbivore men and parasite singles. These groups have
attracted considerable media attention in Japan and are noted for a mutual apathy towards
relationships.
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Fertility Among Married Couples

7. - The Herbivore Man
Herbivore masculinity is an emerging lifestyle among young males that deprioritizes sex
and emphasizes soft masculinity. While the hegemonic form of masculinity of post-war Japan
was salaryman masculinity, which was based on the notion of married male breadwinners (called
salarymen colloquially) supporting a family through employment in regular work, herbivore
masculinity deemphasizes job security and the economic factors of masculinity, instead focusing
on personal appearance and cultivating platonic friendships with the opposite sex. While
opposite-sex, platonic friendship was not impossible for these salarymen, male-female
relationships were not recognized much outside of concepts of husband-wife and girlfriend-
boyfriend. The fact herbivore masculinity highlights platonic friendship with women can be seen
as an assertion of rejecting masculinity standards of the past. As salaryman masculinity was built
upon the pillar of having a stable job, its foundations were challenged when the job market was
deregulated and a rise of irregular work spread across the country. It is suggested that herbivore
masculinity is a societal response to this shake-up of the previously hegemonic form of
masculinity.18 Since these new herbivores did not need to have a stable job to be masculine, men
in contract labor were able to sustain a form of masculinity despite not earning enough money to
support a family.
These herbivore men could be influencing Japan’s aging issue due to their apparent
apathy towards sex and romantic relationships. As described by Charlebois, Ushikubo’s research
on this emerging demographic shows us how their lifestyle choices could be further hastening
18 Charlebois, “Herbivore Masculinity as an Oppositional Form of Masculinity.”

8. the falling of the country’s reproduction rates.19 Ushikubo tells us these men often see sex as
mendokusai, a word used in Japanese to describe something tiresome that one would rather not
do but is often forced to. These men describe sex as a duty, not something to be enjoyed. Some
of the men who partook in the study, despite being in committed romantic relationships, were not
sexually involved with their partners. Although sexual desire is not equivalent to fertility, their
disinterest in relationships could indeed be causing a subsequent disinterest in marriage as well,
fueling fertility decline.
-The Parasite Single
The second demographic I wish to introduce is the parasite single. In Japan, parasite
single refers to young adults who continue to live with their family well into their adult lives.
Encompassing a large demographic, 2006 estimates suggested parasite singles consisted over
10% of the population with their numbers as high as 14 million.20 Because the group is so large,
it is difficult to define this demographic as a homogenous whole. However, noted mutually
common qualities characteristic of parasite singles include financial dependence (usually placed
on their parents) and the pursuit of a lifestyle promoting singleness, postponing marriage.
The Japanese media likes to label parasite singles lazy, stigmatizing their irregular work
lifestyle as a choice. Whether this is truly a matter of choice is up for debate. A theory on the
cause of parasite singles posited by Yuji Genda states that parasite singles are living a life of
financial dependence out of necessity due to the disappearance of career positions that took place
in the lost decade. 21 Instead of an unwillingness to abandon their comfortable lifestyle of
19 Ibid.
20 Tran, “Unable or Unwilling to Leave the Nest?”
21 Genda, “Youth Employment and Parasite Singles.”

9. singleness and dependency, Genda asserts that the decrease in opportunities for young people to
find permanent employment has forced them to gravitate towards their parents for financial
stability as opposed to careers.
The explosion of irregular work in the lost decade is theorized to be the cause of the shift
in masculinity that created herbivore masculinity, which is creating a demographic of men
disinterested in relationships. Similarly, the inability of youth to find regular work has been
theorized to be the reason parasite singles have been unable to break away from their parents and
establish independence. Just how influential are these emergent demographics going to be on
Japan’s reproductive future? As noted before, fertility in Japan is heavily dependent on marriage.
The more people begin to spend a longer part of their lives single and delay marriage, the more
that fertility will decline. Herbivore men and parasite singles are demographics noted for their
trend toward singleness and it can be supposed this trend will be detrimental to marriage rates
and in turn, fertility rates.
Concluding thoughts and the capabilities approach.
An important result of the lost decade in Japan was the rise of low paying, irregular work.
This shift in labor trends increased the number of Japanese who fell beneath the crucial dividing
income threshold for marriage and also inspired the creation of herbivore men and parasite
singles, two emergent demographics in Japan that are not pursuing marriage. In this respect, it
can be deemed that the lost decade resulted in lower marriage rates, which lowered fertility and
hastened the aging of Japan.
In the context of the capabilities approach to development, the Japanese are lacking the
economic facilities necessary to support marriage. According to Sen, economic facilities refer to

10. an individual’s ability to be agents in their own economic activities; to consume, produce or
exchange as they see fit.22 With the growing proportion of irregular work in the Japanese job
market, more laborers are being forced to accept incomes that place them below the crucial
dividing income threshold necessary for supporting marriage. In turn, it can be said these people
are also lacking the economic facilities to have children. In a study by Kono, as cited by the
Family Planning Perspectives journal, it was determined that the average Japanese couple
wanted more children than they had.23 As for why they were unable to have as many as they
wanted, the two most frequently cited reasons were the cost of education and cost of childrearing
in general. It is clear the Japanese are lacking the combined capabilities of economic facilities to
allow them to have children.
In response to this, there are ways the government could alleviate some of the burdens of
childrearing in Japan economically. The Japanese government has established pro-fertility
policies involving subsidized childcare, paid parental leave, and family allowances, but results
have been insufficient. 24 Although other social and cultural factors are likely playing an
important part in changing fertility rates and peoples’ reactions to these policies, as far as these
policies are concerned in an economic sense I do not believe there are any fundamental flaws.
Rather, they have not been generous enough to bring about effective results. Subsidized daycare
centers have proved ineffective due to the fact their working hours do not line up with the
required overtime parents are required to work.25 Also, the centers are noted to be undersupplied
22 Sen, Development as Freedom.
23 Family Planning Perspectives, “Japan’s Fertility Trends Linked to Late Marriage, Unique
Social Factors, Heavy Reliance on Abortion.”
24 Boling, “Demography, Culture and Policy.”
25 Nosaka, “THE M-SHAPED DILEMMA.”

11. in more crowded areas of the country, where there are long waiting for toddlers to be accepted.26
As for policies regarding paid parental leave, Boling describes how the established policy that
allows a year of leave for working parents at 40% of usual pay reportedly lead to hardships for
families that are dependent on the leave taker’s salary. This policy could be improved in theory
not only by allowing a higher amount of pay, but also by changing the payment’s distribution.
Currently some of the 40% is paid in advance and some is paid after the worker returns to work,
but a more even distribution during the parent’s period of leave would most likely prove helpful
in childrearing. As for family allowances, simple funding increases would likely increase their
effectiveness. In an economic sense, more generous funding by the government of policies
advocating fertility could make childrearing more affordable for parents, enabling them to have
more children.
26 Boling, “Demography, Culture and Policy.”

12. References
Boling, Patricia. “Demography, Culture and Policy: Understanding Japan’s Low
fertility.(Statistical Data).” Population and Development Review 34, no. 2 (2008): 307–
26.
Central Intelligence Agency. COUNTRY COMPARISON:: NET MIGRATION RATE, n.d.
Charlebois, Justin. “Herbivore Masculinity as an Oppositional Form of Masculinity.” Culture,
Society and Masculinities 5, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 89–104.
Clark, Robert, Naohiro Ogawa, Makoto Kondo, and Rikiya Matsukura. “Population Decline,
Labor Force Stability, and the Future of the Japanese Economy.” European Journal of
Population / Revue Européenne de Démographie 26, no. 2 (2010): 207–27.
doi:10.1007/s10680-009-9179-9.
Family Planning Perspectives. “Japan’s Fertility Trends Linked to Late Marriage, Unique Social
Factors, Heavy Reliance on Abortion” 19, no. 4 (July 1, 1987): 166–67.
doi:10.2307/2135164.
Genda, Yuji. “Youth Employment and Parasite Singles” 39, no. 3 (2000).
Jung, Yeong-hae. “Can Japan Become ‘A Society Attractive for Immigrants?’ Identity, Gender
and Nation‐ States under Globalization in East Asia.” International Journal of Japanese
Sociology 13, no. 1 (2004): 53–68. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6781.2004.00053.x.
Lee, Ronald, and Andrew Mason. “Is Low Fertility Really a Problem? Population Aging,
Dependency, and consumption.(ECONOMIC DEMOGRAPHY)(Author Abstract).”
Science 346, no. 6206 (2014): 229.
Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare. Basic Survey of Wage Structure 2008, 2008.
———. Marriage Rates by Employment Status in Japan, 2006.
Nosaka, Akiko. “THE M-SHAPED DILEMMA: LIFE STRATEGIES AND FERTILITY
TRENDS AMONG WORKING WOMEN IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN.” Ethnology
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Ogawa, Naohiro. “JAPAN’S CHANGING FERTILITY MECHANISMS AND ITS POLICY
RESPONSES.” Journal of Population Research 20, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 89–106.
Osawa, Machiko, Myoung Jung Kim, and Jeff Kingston. “Precarious Work in Japan.” American
Behavioral Scientist 57, no. 3 (March 1, 2013): 309–34. doi:10.1177/0002764212466240.
Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf, 1999.
Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Standardized Vital Rates
and Reproduction Rates, n.d.
Tran, Mariko. “Unable or Unwilling to Leave the Nest? An Analysis and Evaluation of Japanese
Parasite Single Theories.” Text, July 3, 2006.
http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/2006/Tran.html.
United Nations Statistics Division. Live Births by Legitimacy Status and Percent Illegitimate:
1990-1998, n.d.
World Health Organization. Life Expectancy Data by Country, n.d.