Dissertation

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
A Corporate Conspiracy?
Multinational Corporations and US Intervention in
Chile, 1964-73
Academic Year: 2013 – 2014
Submitted in support of the degree of
UHISHIS

- 1 -
Contents
List of Abbreviations ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Introduction ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
The 1964 Presidential Election ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7
Allende’s Election and Inauguration ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
Spoiling Campaigns and Opposition Funding ---------------------------------------------------------- 10
Coup Plotting -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13
The Allende Doctrine ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20
The Chile Ad Hoc Committee -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20
Expropriation ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25
Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 32
Bibliography ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35

- 2 -
List of Abbreviations
CCS – Chilean Co-operative Society.
Chiltelco – The Chilean Telephone Company.
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency, USA.
FRAP – Frente de Acción Popular (Popular Action Front), Chile.
GM – General Motors, USA.
IPC – International Petroleum Company, USA.
ITT – The International Telephone and Telegraph Company, USA.
NSDM – National Security Decision Memorandum.
PDC – Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democrat Party), Chile.
PN – Partido Nacional (National Party), Chile.
UP – Unidad Popular (Popular Unity), Chile.

- 3 -
Introduction
The events of 11 September 1973 are well known to historians of Chile, and of US foreign policy and
the Cold War more generally. Two Chilean Hawker Hunter jets bombed the Chilean presidential palace,
which contained the president Salvador Allende and a group of his armed supporters. Under the cover
of artillery fire, infantry units of the Chilean military advanced upon the burning palace and overran the
beleaguered defenders. Allende was found dead inside – the work of his own hand using a Kalashnikov
rifle given to him as a gift by Fidel Castro.1
This was the bloody culmination of years of US intervention
in the country – an attempt to keep Communism out of South America which resulted in the overthrow
of Chile’s democratically elected president and the installation of a brutal military dictatorship under
General Augusto Pinochet which lasted until 1990. It is the classic case study of the United States’
compulsion to stop the spread of Communism overriding its commitment to democracy and the principle
of self-determination.
Debate still rages over who or what was responsible for the determination of US policy towards Chile
during the period 1964-1973. While some historians argue that geopolitical concerns and the context of
the Cold War were paramount, others maintain that US corporations with holdings in Chile were decisive
in persuading the government to become involved in Chile and together they conspired to bring down
Allende. Of the former group, Tanya Harmer argues that the role of Nixon has been underplayed and
that ‘economic concerns were less of a worry’ to him than political ones.2
Kristian Gustafson states
outright that ‘U.S. corporate interest in Chile…had very little direct influence on the determination of
U.S. policy when it came to Chile,’ rather, it was the context of the Cold War which provided the
motivation.3
Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, while acknowledging the importance of national security and
1 Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2007), pp. 193-
194.
2 Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), pp.
8, 60.
3 Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), pp. 8,
200.

- 4 -
economic concerns, contends that the most serious threat presented by Allende was that ‘he could show
the possibility of the coexistence of socialism and democracy,’ which the US could not tolerate.4
Of the
latter group, Stephen Kinzer writes that ‘powerful businesses played just as great a role in pushing the
United States to intervene abroad during the Cold War as they did during the first burst of American
imperialism,’ and that business executives and government officials conspired to overthrow Allende.5
Seymour Hersh argues that ‘Nixon’s tough stance against Allende in 1970 was principally shaped by his
concern for the future of the American corporations whose assets, he believed, would be seized by an
Allende government.’6
Christopher Hitchens, and Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick emphasise the
importance of the personal influence of important businessmen such as Donald Kendall, David
Rockefeller, and John McCone in prompting the US decision to intervene.7
Others, such as Peter
Kornbluh and Jonathan Haslam, do not fall neatly into either of these categories but argue that US
corporations were used as willing tools by the US government in their plot to bring down Allende.8
The sections of these historians’ works which are focused on the role of multinational corporations in
US intervention in Chile seem to be based on a selective or incomplete reading of the extremely rich
source base on this subject, including the declassified government documents released as part of the Chile
Declassification Project, and the internal memoranda of several of the companies involved which were
made public in the wake of the Church Committee hearings. It is widely implied that US corporations
with investments in Chile were a kind of homogeneous force, unanimous in their wish for Allende not
to hold power in Chile. The historiographical debate is focused on who provided the decisive push to
intervene in Chile – business interests or members of the US government. Little thought is given to the
fact that individual corporations were independent actors whose wishes did not always align with each
4 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, Story of a Death Foretold: The Coup against Salvador Allende, 11 September 1973 (London: Bloomsbury,
2013), p. 150.
5 Kinzer, Overthrow, pp. 215, 170.
6 Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 271.
7 Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger (London and New York: Verso, 2001), p. 56; Oliver Stone and Peter
Kuznick, The Untold History of the United States (London: Ebury Press, 2013), p. 372.
8 Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York and London: The New Press,
2004), p. 17; Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide (London and
New York: Verso, 2005), p 60.

- 5 -
other or the government. Rather than it being a case of corporations either being influential or ignored
within the US government, individual corporations attempted – with varying degrees of success – to
influence both fellow corporations and the government to their point of view, while the government
similarly tried to enlist the help of corporations during the period in question. Furthermore, corporate
attempts to influence the US government did not end once the decision to intervene in Chile had been
made. The period 1964-1973 saw two different US administrations in power, and policy towards Chile
under the Nixon administration was far from constant. US policy was continuously changing, and
multinational corporations made every effort to make sure that it changed to follow their best interests.
As multinational corporations become an ever more important and powerful part of our world, their
history is bound to come under greater scrutiny, and it is important that perceptions of this history are
based upon a correct reading of the facts rather than assumptions or conspiracy theories. However, an
in-depth study of the role of multinational corporations in US intervention in Chile during the candidacy
and presidency of Allende, using the multitude of revealing documents declassified since 2000, is
profoundly lacking.
What follows is an attempt to rectify the lack of such an in-depth study, in the form of an examination
of the relationships between the various US corporations with investments in Chile, and between these
corporations and the US government. By the term ‘US government’, I refer to the executive and
legislative branches of government, including the CIA which although it could be argued acted semi-
autonomously was after all a federal agency and was overseen by government. I intend to examine
attempts by multinational corporations and the US government to influence each other and the extent to
which these attempts were successful. In order to do this I shall be focusing on three main periods when
US government and corporate desire to intervene in Chilean politics peaked: the 1964 Chilean presidential
election, the 1970 Chilean presidential election and subsequent congressional run-off election, and the
period surrounding Allende’s nationalisation of Chilean copper mines and the announcement of his
‘excess profits’ concept 1971. As for the corporations which were involved, the main focus will be on

- 6 -
three of the largest US corporations active in Chile: the Anaconda Copper Mining Company, the
Kennecott Copper Corporation, and the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT).
Anaconda and Kennecott between them owned the largest copper mines in Chile, while ITT owned 70
per cent of the Chilean telephone network (Chiltelco). Their operations in Chile were highly lucrative; in
1969 Anaconda had 16.6 per cent of its global investments in Chile yet made 79.2 per cent of its profits
there. The 1969 figures for Kennecott were 13.2 per cent and 21.3 per cent respectively.9
As for ITT, in
1970 the total value of their holdings in Chile was estimated at 150 million US dollars.10
With such
valuable investments at stake it is no wonder that these corporations wished to protect their assets in
Chile from expropriation. It was this wish to escape expropriation which led these corporations into
contact with the US government during the candidacy and presidency of Salvador Allende.
9 Guardiola-Rivera, Story of a Death Foretold, p. 367.

- 7 -
The 1964 Presidential Election
The 1964 Chilean presidential election was an important prelude to the 1970 election since, to a large
extent, it set the precedent for US policy towards corporate assistance in covert action, and also saw
efforts by US corporations to organise in order to protect their assets in Chile. As part of a wider effort
to stave off Communism in Latin America by supporting moderate reformist parties, the Johnson
Administration decided to financially support the election campaign of Eduardo Frei, leader of the
Christian Democrat Party (PDC).11
The CIA spent approximately 2.6 million dollars – over half of the
cost of the PDC’s election campaign – in order to assist Frei in securing a majority in the election, which
he did.12
US corporations with interests in Chile were just as keen to keep Communism, in the form of
the Marxist leader of the left-wing Popular Action Front (FRAP) coalition Salvador Allende, out of Chile
for fear that if a Marxist candidate won the election their assets would be nationalised and they would
therefore lose their investments. What steps did these corporations take in order to prevent the election
of Allende in 1964, and were they in any way involved with the CIA funding of Frei’s campaign?
The previous year, at the request of President Kennedy, David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank
had organised over thirty US corporations into a group known as the Business Group for Latin America,
with the primary purpose of fighting Castro.13
Among its members were the company chairmen of
Anaconda, ITT, and Pepsi Cola. In 1964 the group were active in providing financial support to the Frei
campaign.14
At the same time another group of US corporations, which included Kennecott, formed the
Chilean Cooperative Society (CCS) in order to transfer funds to Chileans who were organising an anti-
Allende propaganda campaign.15
In 1970 the US ambassador to Chile Edward Korry called the CCS ‘one
11 Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, p. xiii.
12 United States Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973: Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 9.
13 John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 398.
14 Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 260.
15 Ambassador Korry to Ambassador Crimmins Re: Chile, June 22 1970, ‘December 9, 2010 Materials Release,’ Nixon
Presidential Library and Museum, <http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/dec10.php#selection> (20
December 2013).

- 8 -
of the significant instrumentalities in the 1964 effort to elect Frei.’16
The formation of these two groups
demonstrates the emergence of co-operation between US corporations in order to protect their foreign
assets from potential expropriation. Furthermore, Korry’s comment and President Kennedy’s role in the
formation of the Business Group for Latin America suggest a close relationship between corporations
and the US government at this time. However, since in his 1970 memorandum Korry was attempting to
laud the abilities of the CCS – which were in contact with him alone – to his peers, his comment regarding
their role in the 1964 effort cannot be taken entirely at face value.17
Moreover, as shall now be seen, US
policy under the Johnson Administration was far less accommodating of the involvement of US private
businesses in covert action than under his predecessor.
Initially, private businesses were to be included in the US support of Frei and there was to be co-operation
between the CIA and the Business Group for Latin America. In May the CIA had been tasked with
‘Assisting U.S. business groups with information and advice through David Rockefeller’s Business Group
for Latin America…in their support of a Chilean business group helping Frei…’18
However, this policy
was subsequently reversed. After meeting with several of the companies with which the CIA was to be
co-operating, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann voiced his concern
that ‘there was already too much open talk in these circles which was filtering back to Chile,’ and that
working alongside private businesses would involve serious security risks.19
Tight security was paramount
in this kind of operation, since public discovery of the fact that the US was interfering in the democratic
process of a foreign country would not only result in extremely bad press for the USA, the self-proclaimed
champion of democracy, but would also in all likelihood erode the popularity of the candidate they were
supporting, therefore having the opposite effect to that which was intended. In addition to concern about
security risks, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone was uneasy at the prospect of the CIA acting
16 Ambassador Korry to Ambassador Crimmins Re: Chile, June 22 1970, ‘December 9, 2010 Materials Release.’
17 Ambassador Korry to Ambassador Crimmins Re: Chile, June 22 1970, ‘December 9, 2010 Materials Release.’
18 Memorandum from Thomas C. Mann to Dean Rusk, ‘Presidential Election in Chile,’ 1 May 1964, United States Department
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico (Washington: US
Government Printing Office, 2004), Document 253.
19 Memorandum for the Record, ‘Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group,’ 12 May 1964, United States Department of
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 257.

- 9 -
as ‘an agent, in effect, of U.S. capital,’ showing that far from being an instrument of US corporations, the
CIA was actively trying to avoid becoming one.20
A decision was reached that the CIA was ‘not to become
a partner with business interests in covert political action…’21
Hence, when several US corporations
active in Chile, including ITT, offered to give the US government 1.5 million dollars to fund anti-Allende
groups, the offer was rejected.22
It is significant that the CIA made a definitive decision not to involve
corporations in covert political action. In this way, the 1964 Chilean presidential election set the precedent
for US government responses to offers of corporate assistance. To a large extent this policy was adhered
to for the entirety of the period 1964-73.
22 United States Senate, Covert Action in Chile, p. 16; William V. Broe, Memorandum for the Record, ‘Discussion with Mr.
Harold S. Geneen, Chairman and President of ITT, Concerning Financial Support to Chile Election,’ 17 July, 1970, ‘Chile
Declassification Project Virtual Reading Room,’ US Department of State Freedom of Information Act, <http://foia.state.gov/Search
/Results.aspx?collection=CHILE&searchText=*> (18 December 2013).

- 10 -
Allende’s Election and Inauguration
Spoiling Campaigns and Opposition Funding
The 1970 presidential election was a three-way contest between the right-wing National Party (PN) led
by Jorge Alessandri, Allende’s new left-wing coalition Popular Unity (UP), and the PDC. Since, according
to the Chilean constitution, a president could not hold office for two consecutive terms, the less popular
Radomiro Tomic had replaced Frei as the PDC candidate. The USA again interfered in Chilean
democracy, though on a much less extensive scale than in 1964. This was due to the State Department’s
new ‘low profile’ towards Latin America, the relatively low priority given to Chilean matters in the White
House at this time, and the emergence of public allegations of CIA involvement in the 1964 election.23
Corporate interest in preventing the election of a Marxist in Chile remained as high as it had been in 1964
and so several US multinational corporations set about trying to persuade the US government to become
more involved in the Chilean election.
The first recorded contact between the US government and a US corporation with regards to the
upcoming election was on 10 April when the Chairman of the Board of Anaconda, C. Jay Parkinson,
made an appeal to Charles Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, for the US
government to join them in a large-scale effort to support the campaign of Jorge Alessandri. The appeal
was denied, and according to Korry’s summary Anaconda were given ‘no encouragement.’24
ITT was the next corporation to try the same approach. In a meeting with William Broe, Chief of the
CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division on 16 July, the Chairman and President of ITT Harold Geneen
declared his view that Alessandri was in need of financial support and asked Broe if the CIA would act
23 Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, p. 48; United States Senate, Covert Action in Chile, p. 17.
24 Ambassador Korry to Henry A. Kissinger Re: Chile, November 1970, ‘December 9, 2010 Materials Release.’

- 11 -
as a conduit for ITT funds to the Alessandri campaign. As with the request in 1964 for the CIA to channel
funds to the Frei campaign, the response was negative. Broe explained that since US policy was not to
support any candidate in the Chilean presidential election but instead to conduct a spoiling campaign
against Allende, the CIA could not pass funds to Alessandri but he was willing to contact the CIA
Santiago station to find out if they knew of any funding channels which ITT could use instead.25
The
unwillingness of the CIA to act as a channel for ITT funds was further highlighted in a memorandum
written by Broe on 6 August. In the memorandum, he wrote of his concerns regarding the lax security
measures of the company’s election operation and spoke of the potential security problems of working
with company executives who are ‘inclined to sit around country clubs and discuss (perhaps even brag
about) their contributions…,’ before he crossed out the quoted section and replaced it with a more tactful
version.26
Shortly after Broe’s meeting with Geneen, a meeting was arranged by John McCone – former Director
of Central Intelligence and ongoing ITT board member – between Geneen and President Nixon.27
Kristian Gustafson – confusingly, given his central argument that corporate interest was not a factor –
argues that during this meeting, Geneen ‘persuaded the pliable president that channelling extra money to
Alessandri’s campaign was a matter for the CIA.’28
Was Geneen able appeal above Broe’s head to secure
funding for Alessandri? This seems unlikely. Firstly, the CIA memorandum cited by Gustafson to support
this claim makes no mention of Nixon approving CIA funding of the Alessandri campaign, only that ITT
mentioned Alessandri was ‘broke’ and that they were ‘seriously considering remedying this.’29
Secondly,
a telephone conversation in 1973 between Nixon and Henry Kissinger during which they were discussing
the possibility of a military coup in Chile clearly demonstrates the regard in which they held ITT:
25 William V. Broe, Memorandum for the Record, ‘Discussion with Mr. Harold S. Geneen, Chairman and President of ITT,
Concerning Financial Support to Chile Election,’ 17 July, 1970, ‘Chile Declassification Project Virtual Reading Room.’
26 William Broe, Secret Memo to Santiago Station, ‘We have weighed the merits of your proposals,’ 6 August, 1970, ‘Chile
Declassification Project Virtual Reading Room.’
27 Gustafson, Hostile Intent, p. 184.
28 Gustafson, Hostile Intent, pp. 184-185.
29 Confidential CIA memorandum for the files, ‘Allende’s campaign being funded by USSR through Cuba’s Prensa Latina,’
23 July, 1970, ‘Chile Declassification Project Virtual Reading Room.’

- 12 -
Nixon: Well, we won’t have to send the ITT down to help, will we?
Kissinger: (Laughs) That’s another one of these absurdities. Because whenever the ITT came to us we turned
them off. I mean we never did anything for them.
N: I never even knew they came.
K: They came once because Flanigan had set it up. You didn’t know it. I didn’t tell you because it required
no action and I listened to them and said “thank you very much” and that was that.30
Not only does Kissinger state that they did nothing to help ITT, but surely if the meeting between Geneen
and Nixon had persuaded the president to change the US policy towards the funding of Alessandri, he
would have remembered this meeting three years later, and he and Kissinger would have demonstrated
a much higher opinion of the corporation than that shown in this conversation. It is of course possible
that Nixon and Kissinger were consciously censoring the record. However, since in a subsequent phone
call regarding the military overthrow of Allende in September 1973 Kissinger was willing to state to Nixon
that ‘we helped them [referring to the members of the Chilean military who overthrew Allende]. [Deleted]
created the conditions as great as possible…,’ it seems that Nixon and Kissinger regarded this as a secure
line through which they could, and did, speak candidly.31
These three interactions between corporations and the US government demonstrate the inability of
corporations to influence foreign policy before the election of Allende. The policy of not supporting any
individual candidate but instead conducting a spoiling operation against Allende had been approved by
the 40 Committee (the body responsible for approving US covert action) in March and corporations were
unable to persuade the government to change it.32
At this stage, US corporate intervention in Chile was
30 Transcript of telephone conversation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, 4 July 1973, 11:00am, ‘New Kissinger
‘Telcons’ Reveal Chile Plotting at Highest Levels of U.S. Government,’ The National Security Archive, <http://www2.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB255/index.htm> (4 January, 2014).
31 Transcript of telephone conversation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, 16 September 1973, 11:50am, ‘New
Kissinger ‘Telcons’ Reveal Chile Plotting at Highest Levels of U.S. Government.’
32 Background of 40 Committee Deliberations on the Chilean Presidential Elections, no date, ‘December 9, 2010 Materials
Release.’

- 13 -
limited to independent passage of funds, with ITT passing around 350,000 dollars to Alessandri and
several other unknown US companies passing a similar amount in total.33
Kennecott, unlike Anaconda and ITT, did not approach the US government seeking to pass funds to the
Alessandri campaign, but instead spearheaded the revival of the CCS. The CCS, which did not include
Anaconda and most likely did not include ITT since they were using a CIA-approved funding channel,
enabled US businesses to deposit money into bank accounts in the Bahamas which was then passed to
groups of Chileans who were conducting their own anti-Allende spoiling campaign, similar to the 1964
effort.34
After approaching the headquarters of National City Bank, Dow Chemical, Bank of America,
and other US corporations active in Chile, the CCS passed a total of 250,000 dollars to fund the
propaganda campaign.35
It is interesting to note that David Rockefeller’s Council for Latin America (the
renamed Business Group for Latin America) was purposefully kept in the dark about CCS activities since
it had a ‘reputation for indiscretion.’36
The example of the CCS demonstrates that a degree of cooperation
existed between US corporations with holdings in Chile in order to help protect their assets, though there
was also mistrust and suspicion between them. While Anaconda and ITT wished to fund the Alessandri
campaign, Kennecott and the CCS financed an anti-Allende spoiling campaign, showing that at this stage
the corporations were not unified in their methods to stop Allende.
Coup Plotting
The spoiling campaigns against Allende and the independent corporate funding of Alessandri were
ultimately unsuccessful since Allende achieved a majority in the presidential election on 4 September.
However, since no candidate received over fifty per cent of the vote a congressional run-off election was
33 United States Senate, Covert Action in Chile, p. 13.
34 Ambassador Korry to Ambassador Crimmins Re: Chile, 22 June 1970, ‘December 9, 2010 Materials Release.’
35 Ambassador Korry to Ambassador Crimmins Re: Chile, 22 June 1970, ‘December 9, 2010 Materials Release;’ Ambassador
Korry to Richard Helms Re: Chile, 22 June 1970, ‘December 9, 2010 Materials Release.’
36 Ambassador Korry to Richard Helms Re: Chile, 22 June 1970, ‘December 9, 2010 Materials Release.’

- 14 -
to be called on 24 October which would determine who would be president. The period between 4
September and 24 October was when US covert intervention in Chile reached its peak.37
A plan was
hatched to use funds from US multinationals to bribe Chilean congressmen to vote against Allende.38
However, when the CIA found out that Tomic intended to deliver the PDC vote to Allende, the plan fell
through and instead the CIA ‘was directed to undertake an effort to promote a military coup in Chile…’
in order to prevent Allende assuming the presidency.39
Were representatives of US corporations able to
bring about this change in policy? Stephen Kinzer seems to think so, arguing that ‘directors of large
companies were the first to wish…Allende overthrown. They persuaded leaders in Washington, who had
somewhat different interests, to depose [him].’40
However, from the available evidence it seems highly
doubtful that they possessed that level of influence.
As previously seen, Nixon and Kissinger held ITT in low regard so it seems very unlikely that any
representative of ITT could have been able to influence such a radical change in policy. Moreover, in a
meeting with the State Department in September, McCone and Geneen had tried and failed to secure
two million dollars from the US government for Alessandri, showing that ITT plans were still focused
on the passage of funds to Allende’s opposition rather than coup plotting.41
At around the same time,
McCone had approached Kissinger and Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms and told them
that Geneen was offering one million dollars to the US government to help stop Allende, but Kissinger
did not take him up on the offer.42
This casts further doubt upon the idea that a conspiratorial relationship
existed between the US government and ITT. If ITT, the most vehemently anti-Allende of US
multinational corporations, was not involved in pushing for a coup it seems very unlikely that any other
corporation was. A CIA memorandum dated 10 September demonstrates that the CIA still viewed
38 Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile, p. 67.
39 Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile, p. 67; United States Senate, Covert Action in Chile, p. 10.
40 Kinzer, Overthrow, p. 216.
41 Secret Contact Report, ‘Meeting with [deleted] ITT, New York – 17 September 1970,’ 23 September, 1970, ‘Chile
42 United States Senate, The International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 1970-1971: Report to the Committee on Foreign
Relations United States Senate by the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1973)
pp. 4-5.

- 15 -
multinational corporations in Chile as a liability rather than fellow conspirators. The author of the
memorandum doubted that the corporations could be ‘coordinated or channelled,’ and believed that
there was no way of preventing them from acting independently to protect their assets: ‘Short of telling
them what is being done, …arguments would carry little weight.’43
The way this last part is phrased
indicates that the CIA was hesitant to share operational information about their covert activities in Chile
with private corporations. It therefore seems improbable that private corporations were responsible for
initiating these covert activities in the first place.
Christopher Hitchens has argued that Nixon was ‘personally beholden to Donald Kendall, the President
of Pepsi Cola…’ and that after discussions between Kendall, David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan
Bank, Richard Helms, and Henry Kissinger, Kissinger and Helms had been so persuaded that a coup in
Chile was necessary that they met with Nixon on 15 September 1970 and persuaded him to foster a
military coup to prevent Allende’s inauguration.44
However, Kendall had previously visited the White
House, the CIA, and elsewhere in government circles in June, asking for the US to financially support
the Alessandri campaign.45
As has been mentioned previously, no such funding was approved, and the
only action prompted by news of Alessandri’s slippage in the polls was an expansion of the spoiling
campaign, not funding of Alessandri.46
If Nixon was indeed ‘personally beholden’ to Kendall, and Kendall
was able to persuade Helms and Kissinger to advocate Chilean coup plotting, is it not likely that he would
also have been able to change US policy towards the much less potentially damaging action of funding
the Alessandri campaign?
Because neither the Chilean military nor President Frei were willing to instigate a coup, a new plan was
created whereby the CIA, with the assistance of the embassy and the White House, would create a ‘coup
43 Secret CIA memorandum, ‘800 million dollars of investments are at stake,’ 10 September 1970, ‘Chile Declassification
Project Virtual Reading Room.’
44 Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, p. 56.
Release.’
Release.’

- 16 -
climate’ – an atmosphere of such economic and political turmoil that either Frei or the military would
feel compelled to act.47
In the atmosphere of desperation due to the short time-frame given to them, the
CIA temporarily disregarded its previous concerns about working with private corporations and began
to ‘determine what direct steps could be taken by the U.S. business firms represented in Chile to apply
economic pressure.’48
Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick write that ‘U.S. business interests in Chile helped
Washington destabilize the government,’ and Peter Kornbluh writes that ‘Both CIA and State
Department officials enlisted the support and help of U.S. businesses with interests in Chile.’49
Are these
views accurate? Was the US government able to recruit US multinationals to help create a coup climate
in Chile?
On 24 September Korry sent a list of proposals to Kissinger as to how US businesses could promote
economic chaos in Chile, including such measures as US banks not renewing credits to Chile, companies
foot-dragging as much as possible with regards to sending money and delivering orders and spare parts,
and putting ‘pressure’ on Chilean building and loan associations in such a way that they would have to
shut their doors.50
In a meeting with Edward Gerrity, Senior Vice-President of ITT, on 29 September,
Broe conveyed a shortened list of Korry’s proposals to him, adding that ‘certain steps were being taken
but that he was looking for additional help aimed at inducing economic collapse.’ Broe gave him a list of
companies and enquired if ITT could approach them to ask if they would be interested in helping with
the proposed action plan.51
The results were not promising. Bill Merriam, ITT Vice-President in charge
of their Washington office, complained to Gerrity that ‘repeated calls to firms such as GM, Ford, and
banks in California and New York have drawn no offers of help. All have some sort of excuse,’ and to
McCone that ‘practically no progress has been made in trying to get American businesses to cooperate
47 Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, pp. 16-17.
48 Secret CIA report, ‘[Deleted] Situation Report #1,’ 17 September 1970, ‘Chile Declassification Project Virtual Reading
Room.’
49 Stone and Kuznick, The Untold History of the United States, p. 375; Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, p. 17.
50 Secret memorandum from Thomas Karamessines to Alexander Haig, ‘Messages from Ambassador Korry to Dr. Kissinger,’
29 September 1970, ‘Chile Declassification Project Virtual Reading Room.’
51 ITT internal memorandum from Edward Gerrity to Harold Geneen, no subject, 29 September 1970, Subversion in Chile: A
Case Study in U.S. Corporate Intrigue in the Third World (Nottingham: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1972), pp. 39-41.

- 17 -
in some way so as to bring on economic chaos.’52
Both Gerrity and McCone were doubtful that the plan
would work and Geneen decided that ITT would not be involved, leading the 40 Committee to declare
on 14 October that ‘efforts to convince U.S. businesses with economic interest in Chile to assist inducing
a downswing in the Chilean economy have not been successful.’53
In a meeting held by Secretary of State
William Rogers with US corporations active in Chile on 20 October, when Rogers proposed an informal
embargo on spare parts and materials to Chile in order to harm the Chilean economy, the response was
‘quite mixed,’ with only ITT supporting strong measures against Allende.54
This shows that there was a
lack of unanimity amongst US corporations as to what action should be taken, and that the US
government was unable to convince a majority of corporations to support even this significantly less
drastic action plan.
Although ITT was the most fervently anti-Allende of corporations at this time, their main goal seems not
to have been trying to oust Allende before he had even assumed the presidency. Rather, ITT’s focus
appears to have been on lobbying the US government to take a firm public stance against Allende and
discourage him from fulfilling his campaign promises of nationalising US-owned industries. In a letter to
Kissinger dated 23 October, Merriam called for the US government to ‘confront the new president
[Allende] on what the resultant action of the United States Government will be in the event he carries
out his threats,’ meaning his planned nationalisations, and to ‘inform him that in the event speedy
compensation [for expropriation] is not forthcoming there will be immediate repercussions in official
and private circles. This would mean a stoppage of all loans by international banks and U.S. private
banks.’55
What ITT envisaged was a reversal of the State Department’s low profile policy towards Latin
America. They believed what needed to be done was to firmly warn Allende of what the consequences
would be if he took expropriatory action towards US corporations, not engage in covert action while
52 ITT internal memorandum from Bill Merriam to Edward Gerrity, ‘Chile,’ 7 October 1970, Subversion in Chile, p. 51; ITT
memorandum from Bill Merriam to John McCone, no subject, 9 October 1970, Subversion in Chile, p. 52.
53 United States Senate, The International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, p. 10; Secret memorandum, ‘Talking Paper
for 40 Committee – 14 October 1970,’ 14 October 1970, ‘Chile Declassification Project Virtual Reading Room.’
54 Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 155-
156.
55 Letter from Bill Merriam to Henry Kissinger, 23 October 1970, Subversion in Chile, pp. 95-100.

- 18 -
keeping up a friendly façade. Although the attempt by the CIA to recruit US businesses to cause economic
chaos in Chile was in itself highly inappropriate, the evidence strongly suggests that it was an unsuccessful
attempt, and that rather than conspiring to bring down Allende, US corporations and government had
very different ideas of what action should be taken.
Even though the attempt to persuade US corporations to help bring about an economic crisis in Chile
failed, the CIA nonetheless made contact small with groups within the Chilean military willing to launch
a coup before Allende’s inauguration, and gave them assurances of strong US support both before and
after the coup took place.56
The first step in the coup plot, which the CIA knew about, was to kidnap the
Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army General René Schneider, whose belief in strict adherence to
the constitution was discouraging large sections of the Chilean military from advocating any coup
attempt.57
It was hoped that with Schneider removed, once a coup was launched it would be supported
by the Chilean military rather than quelled.58
This led to a botched kidnap attempt on 22 October during
which Schneider was killed.59
An ITT internal memorandum discussing Schneider’s assassination makes
no mention of CIA support and demonstrates no knowledge of who was responsible, instead speculating
that it was most likely extreme rightist or leftist groups.60
This lack of knowledge on the part of ITT
further suggests that the corporation was in no way involved in the coup plotting process.
This desperate, ill-conceived, and poorly executed plan to prevent Allende’s accession to the presidency
was a failure. As had been expected, the Chilean congress voted in favour of Allende and he was
inaugurated as president of Chile on 3 November. The US government, however, did not give up on the
possibility of removing Allende from office, but rather switched tactics from short-term coup plotting to
56 United States Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 225.
57 Secret CIA memorandum, ‘Schneider Kidnapping,’ 14 October 1970, ‘Chile Declassification Project Virtual Reading Room;’
United States Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, p. 240.
60 ITT internal memorandum from Hal Hendrix to Edward Gerrity, ‘Chile,’ 22 October 1970, Subversion in Chile, p. 73.

- 19 -
long-term political and economic pressure.61
The US plan was to publicly maintain a ‘correct but cool’
stance towards Chile while covertly engaging in operations designed to destabilise its government.62
In
order to increase political pressure against Allende, the 40 Committee authorised 7 million dollars for the
CIA to spend on supporting Chilean opposition groups – mostly the PDC and PN – and to fund a
widespread anti-Allende propaganda campaign.63
As for economic pressure, NSDM 93 set out a list of
actions which were to be taken, including bringing ‘maximum feasible influence to bear in international
financial institutions to limit credit or other financing assistance to Chile,’ and making sure that ‘no new
bilateral economic aid commitments [would] be undertaken with the Government of Chile…’ The
memorandum indicates that the US government did not intend to repeat its attempt to involve private
corporations in covert action. US businesses with investments in Chile were to be ‘made aware of the
concern with which the U.S. Government views the Government of Chile and the restrictive nature of
the policies which the U.S. Government intends to follow,’ but they were not invited to take part in the
application of economic pressure.64
There could be no public knowledge of the US effort to weaken the
Allende government otherwise he could use this to consolidate domestic and international support for
his regime by blaming any failings of his government on hostile US action. As had been stated in the
1964 and 1970 election operations, the involvement of private corporations brought with it a significant
security risk, and therefore it is no surprise that they were not invited to participate. However, the events
of the following year would increase the desperation of US multinationals to embroil themselves with
the US government.
61 Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, p. 79.
62 National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 93, ‘Policy Towards Chile,’ 9 November 1970,
Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, p. 129.
64 National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 93, ‘Policy Towards Chile,’ 9 November 1970,
Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, p. 130.

- 20 -
The Allende Doctrine
The Chile Ad Hoc Committee
Copper dominated the Chilean economy. The copper industry alone accounted for 80 per cent of all
Chilean export earnings.65
Despite the vital importance of the copper industry for the health of the
Chilean economy, before Frei’s election in 1964 it was not owned by Chileans but was controlled by two
US corporations – Anaconda and Kennecott – which between them controlled 80 per cent of the
industry.66
This situation made the Chilean economy heavily dependent on the USA, with two thirds of
foreign investment in Chile coming from US businesses.67
The issue of dependency had long been a key
feature of Chilean politics, and one of Allende’s main campaign promises had been to reduce the
dependence of the Chilean economy on US capital by nationalising the vital copper industry, along with
other important foreign-owned industries.68
Nationalisation was not a new development brought to Chile
with the election of Allende; in fact the nationalisation of US-owned copper mines had been initiated
under the Frei government, which as has previously been seen was helped into power by both the US
government and US corporations.69
During Frei’s presidency, Kennecott had – on their own initiative –
sold a 51 per cent share of their Chilean subsidiary to the Chilean government. It is worth noting that
this was not due to any sort of goodwill on the part of Kennecott. Selling 51 per cent would reduce the
tax rate from over 80 per cent to 40 per cent, and also allowed the company to get the Chilean government
to partially finance a necessary expansion of their mine at El Teniente which would increase its output
by almost two thirds. This meant that overall they would actually make more money.70
After this
perceived success, Frei pushed for a similar agreement with Anaconda. However, fearing that once they
68 Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton and London: Princeton
University Press, 1974), pp. 3-4.
69 Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, p. 119.
70 Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, pp. 128, 134.

- 21 -
started selling shares to the Chilean government it was only a matter of time before they assumed full
control, the corporation decided to cut their losses and asked to be nationalised. An agreement was
reached whereby 51 per cent of Anaconda was nationalised immediately with compensation, with the
rest to be bought in subsequent years at an undetermined price.71
What was novel about nationalisation
under Allende was his concept of ‘excess profits’, later known as the Allende Doctrine, which first began
to be articulated in early 1971.72
In February 1971, ITT became aware of proposals being put before the Chilean congress which would
allow all US-owned copper mines to be nationalised. More importantly, according to the proposals ‘the
government would be empowered to determine amounts to be paid which would be lessened by whatever
amount is considered to be excessive profits since 1955.’73
This preliminary articulation of the concept
of excess profits was enough to greatly alarm the corporation since the previous year Allende had
announced that Chiltelco was among the companies which were to be nationalised as part of his
expropriation program.74
If such a concept was to be applied to expropriated copper mines, there was no
reason why it would not also be applied to the other companies which Allende planned to nationalise.
Anaconda, quite understandably, was likewise concerned when it got word of the proposals going before
the Chilean congress. Anaconda had largely ignored attempts by ITT to ‘rouse them’ during the 1970
election operation, but now Ralph Mecham, Anaconda’s Vice President for Federal Government
Relations, initiated a series of meetings between the Washington representatives of US corporations
active in Chile, before asking Bill Merriam of ITT to take up the reins.75
This group of corporate
73 ITT internal memorandum from Jack Guilfoyle to Harold Geneen, ‘Board Note – Chile,’ 4 February 1971, United States
Senate, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Ninety-Third Congress on the International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile,
1970-71 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 769.
74 ITT internal memorandum from Holmes Chiltelco Santiago to Stinson Intelco New York, ‘Chiltelco Weekly Report,’ 2
September 1970, United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, p. 570.
75 ITT internal memorandum from Hal Hendrix to Edward Gerrity, ‘Chile – Latin America – HSG,’ 20 November 1970,
United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, p. 761; Anaconda internal memorandum from
Ralph Mecham to C. Jay Parkinson, 10 February 1971, United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign
Policy, p. 1009.

- 22 -
representatives, known as the Chile Ad Hoc Committee, could be seen as the beginning of a corporate
conspiracy to bring down Allende. Stephen Kinzer certainly seems to think that this is the case, writing
that ‘its members set out on a quiet destabilization campaign of their own that included office closings,
delayed payments, slow deliveries, and credit denial.’76
However, from the minutes of the first meeting
of the Chile Ad Hoc Committee it appears that its purpose was very different. At the first meeting – held
on 9 February and attended by ten corporations including Anaconda, Kennecott, and ITT – no mention
was made of embarking on a ‘quiet destabilization campaign,’ but instead the action which its members
were urged to take was to get in contact with the White House and the State Department and lobby them
to take a firm public stance against Allende’s planned expropriation campaign.77
The representative of
Bank of America, after attending a second meeting of the Committee on 5 March, reported to his superior
that ‘again the thrust of the meeting was for the application of pressure wherever in the U.S.
government.’78
Ralph Mecham, whose brainchild the Committee was, reported to the Chairman of the
Board of Anaconda that its purpose was ‘to keep the pressure on Kissinger and the White House and to
get frequent speeches in the Congressional Record, calling attention to the seriousness of the problem in
Chile and in Latin America generally.’79
[Emphasis in original]. The pressure to be exerted by the members
of the Chile Ad Hoc Committee was to be kept within Washington, directed at the US government rather
than Allende.
The Chile Ad Hoc Committee is another instance of US corporations coming together in an attempt to
protect their interests in Chile, and the first such group which Anaconda, Kennecott, and ITT were all
part of. However, self-interest ran deeper than cooperation and the Committee did not represent a unified
effort by these companies to follow an established and mutually beneficial plan, but rather an occasional
get-together to swap tips and information while they pursued separate tracks. Two of the original ten
77 Minutes of Chile Ad Hoc Committee Meeting, 9 February 1971, United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and United
States Foreign Policy, pp. 794-796.
78 Bank of America internal memorandum from Ronald R. Raddatz to Robert L. James, 10 March 1971, United States Senate,
Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, p. 528.
79 Anaconda internal memorandum from Ralph Mecham to C. Jay Parkinson, 10 February 1971, United States Senate,

- 23 -
companies, Ralston Purina and Bank of America, left the Committee after two meetings because they
felt that they had gained sufficient information and that the furtherance of their membership may harm
their ability to negotiate with the Allende government, should it become public knowledge.80
Even while
championing the merits of corporations co-operating to achieve their aims, ITT was readily working to
undermine the companies it was collaborating with in order to secure preferential treatment. On 11
February, only two days after the first meeting of the Chile Ad Hoc Committee, Gerrity wrote to Geneen
that ‘perhaps we are near the time when we should approach Allende directly on the same basis we
handled the situation in Peru in the wake of the IPC problem.’81
In 1968 when the Velasco regime in
Peru nationalised without compensation the International Petroleum Company (IPC), a subsidiary of the
Exxon Corporation, and ITT feared its assets would suffer the same fate, they managed to secure an
agreement whereby the Peruvian government purchased ITT’s holdings rather than nationalising them.
They achieved this by persuading the Peruvian government that by entering into a reasonable agreement
with ITT they could argue that the nationalisation of IPC was a special case and not a sign of ‘general
financial irresponsibility.’82
By February 1971 it appears that ITT had decided to pursue a similar strategy
in Chile, whereby a reasonable negotiation with ITT could be used by Allende to nationalise the other
US corporate holdings in Chile while avoiding an international backlash.83
The meeting with Allende went
ahead on 10 March and initiated a long and drawn out process of negotiation over the price to be paid
by the Chilean government for Chiltelco.84
Perhaps more than any other example, this episode
demonstrates that ‘corporate interest’ cannot be seen as a homogeneous force. In the world of business
where profit is sovereign and competition is the order of the day, corporations must be expected to act
above all in their own self-interest, which in many cases does not align with the interests of other
corporations.
80 United States Senate, The International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, p. 13.
81 ITT internal memorandum from Edward Gerrity to Harold Geneen, ‘Chile,’ 11 February 1971, United States Senate,
83 ITT internal memorandum from Edward Gerrity to Harold Geneen, ‘Chile,’ 11 February 1971, United States Senate,
84 ITT internal memorandum from Hal Hendrix to K. M. Perkins, ‘Meeting with Allende 3-10-71 Santiago,’ 12 March 1971,
United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, p. 824.

- 24 -
What was the relationship between multinational corporations and the US government during this
period? Contact between the two mostly appears to have been unidirectional, taking the form of
corporate lobbying of areas of the government demanding that they take a firm stance against any
possible expropriation without proper compensation. Both ITT and Anaconda saturated various
government departments with their representatives during the lobbying campaign. ITT representatives
met with Charles Meyer’s deputy, John Crimmins, and informed him that ‘ITT wants the U.S. to take the
strongest measures to see that just payment is made to the copper companies because this will set the
example for other possible expropriations.’85
As well as meeting with other, less influential members of
the State Department, ITT officials initiated contact with Congressmen, particularly those on foreign
affairs committees, and ‘prepared draft letters to be sent by appropriate Congressmen and Senators to
Administration officials.’86
Anaconda followed a similar line, sending Mecham on a one-man lobbying
campaign. He met with Meyer, Crimmins, another official from the State Department, various members
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the International Economic Policy Association, Secretary
of the Treasury David Kennedy, and his designate John Connally in order to discuss Anaconda’s position
in Chile.87
In addition, Mecham arranged a meeting with Kissinger’s chief aide for Latin American affairs,
Arnold Nachmanoff. In his letter requesting the meeting, Mecham protested that ‘the fact that we were
soft in Peru and Bolivia, and now we are apparently soft in Chile, can only whet the appetites of the
nationalist extremists in every underdeveloped country on the globe. … Our government must take a
strong stand, quite apart from the economic interests of Anaconda in such firmness.’88
The lobbying
campaigns appear to have had some success in increasing the profile of the corporations’ plight in Chile.
The CIA’s 1971 national intelligence estimate for Chile declared that ‘at the moment US-Chilean relations
85 ITT internal memorandum from Jack Neal to Bill Merriam, ‘Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Argentina – Discussion with State
Department,’ 17 February 1971, United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, p. 807.
86 ITT internal memorandum, ‘Chile – Activity by Washington Office,’ no date, United States Senate, Multinational Corporations
and United States Foreign Policy, pp. 801-802.
87 Anaconda internal memorandum from Ralph Mecham to C. Jay Parkinson, 15 January 1971, United States Senate,
88 Letter from Ralph Mecham to Arnold Nachmanoff, 4 February 1971, United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and
United States Foreign Policy, p. 1063.

- 25 -
are dominated by the problems of nationalization.’89
However, there was as yet no change in the ‘correct
but cool’ US public stance towards Allende. The same concern which had prevented the CIA involving
corporations in its operations in Chile prohibited any public criticism of Allende. As Mecham bemoaned
after his meeting with Nachmanoff, ‘Nachmanoff shares the common concern that I have run into
everywhere in the Administration -- mainly that it is important to avoid open challenge to Allende which
could have the effect, in the Administration’s view, of strengthening him.’90
Expropriation
In July 1971, the Chilean Congress unanimously passed a constitutional amendment which permitted the
immediate nationalisation of the Chilean subsidiaries of Anaconda, Kennecott, and the significantly
smaller Cerro Mining Corporation.91
Even at this point, ITT still believed that its negotiations with
Allende could pay off and it might be able to receive compensation at the expense of its fellow
corporations.92
They were simultaneously badgering Anaconda and Kennecott to follow ITT’s lead and
step up their lobbying of the US government. In a letter to Ralph Mecham of Anaconda and Lyle Mercer,
Director of Kennecott’s Washington office, Merriam wrote:
As you know, ITT doesn’t sit still when its future is being jeopardized. All of us are surprised that Kennecott
and Anaconda aren’t raising more hell publicly about the hosing they are about to get in Chile. We have
started an all-out educational campaign with the press to carry our points forward, and we are beginning to
mount a letter-writing campaign from selected members of Congress to various members of the
Administration to strengthen their backs on Latin American matters.93
89 CIA memorandum, ‘Special National Intelligence Estimate: The Outlook for Chile under Allende,’ 4 August 1971, ‘Chile
90 Anaconda internal memorandum from Ralph Mecham to C. Jay Parkinson, 10 February 1971, United States Senate,
91 Moran, Multinational Corporation and the Politics of Dependence, p. 147.
92 ITT internal memorandum from Jack Guilfoyle to Harold Geneen, ‘Chile Board Notice,’ 9 July 1971, United States Senate,
93 Letter from Bill Merriam (ITT) to Ralph Mecham (Anaconda) and Lyle Mercer (Kennecott), 22 July 1971, United States
Senate, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, p. 1037.

- 26 -
On 28 September the nationalisation of copper mines in Chile was followed up by the long awaited legal
enshrinement of the Allende Doctrine, which declared that excess profits – defined as profits exceeding
twelve per cent of a company’s book value between 1955 and 1970 – would be deducted from the
compensation due to be paid to the nationalised copper companies. In the case of Anaconda and
Kennecott, this ruling resulted in the companies actually owing the Chilean government money, rather
than the other way round.94
ITT had become greatly alarmed a few days before the ruling, when the Vice
Chairman of Anaconda Bill Quigley had warned Jack Guilfoyle – ITT’s Vice President in New York and
President of its business empire in Latin America – of the methods being used by the Chilean government
to calculate excess profits, and that similar methods would probably be used when it came to Chiltelco.95
Thus, a meeting was organised on 28 September between ITT and several state department officials,
including Meyer, Crimmins, and the new US ambassador to Chile Nathaniel Davis. When asked what the
State Department’s policy towards Chile was, and whether they would act on behalf of the companies
whose assets were being expropriated, Meyer replied that ‘there was as yet no published policy: that the
whole matter of Chilean relationships and expropriations of American investments was under review.’96
The lack of any published policy towards the expropriation of corporate assets in Chile suggests that the
corporate lobbying of the US government up to this point had been largely ineffectual in altering US
policy.
The following day, the Chilean government assumed management control of Chiltelco. Negotiations
between ITT and the Chilean government to determine the amount of compensation were still ongoing,
but this new development was enough to encourage ITT to change tack and appeal directly to the White
House for immediate covert action designed to remove Allende from office. On 1 October, Merriam
94 Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, pp. 112-113.
95 ITT internal memorandum from Jack Guilfoyle to Harold Geneen and F. J. Dunleavy, ‘Chile/Anaconda,’ 24 September
1971, United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, p. 937.
96 ITT internal memorandum, ‘Chile – State Department Visit, September 28, 1971,’ 15 October 1971, United States Senate,

- 27 -
sent a letter to Peter Peterson, Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, containing
an eighteen-point action plan, to be carried out ‘quietly but effectively to see that Allende does not get
through the crucial next six months.’ Measures to be carried out included loan restriction, embargoing
Chilean goods especially copper, cutting off vital US exports to Chile, involving the CIA in some
unspecified way, and establishing contact with the Chilean military.97
It is important to note that legal
action was not an option available to the expropriated companies since the Allende Doctrine was not
technically illegal, which explains why ITT leapt to covert action rather than simply encouraging
Anaconda and Kennecott to sue the Chilean government in an international court. A resolution had been
passed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1962 on ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources’ which, in the event of the nationalisation of foreign-owned extractive industries, allowed ‘for
compensation rules to be set in accordance with the laws of the state making the nationalisation, and
establish[ed] the courts of that country as the appropriate place in which to settle any resulting conflict.’98
Since the Allende Doctrine had successfully passed through the Chilean congress, the copper
nationalisations were carried out in accordance with this resolution.
What was the US government’s response to ITT’s eighteen-point action plan? They seem to have taken
very little notice of it. There is no mention of the plan in any of the CIA’s résumés of their contact with
ITT, and during the entirety of 1971 the CIA only held five luncheon meetings with ITT at irregular
intervals – the same number as that held between July and October 1970.99
This seems hardly sufficient
for a conspiratorial relationship. At these luncheon meetings, according to a CIA summary,
‘discussions…did not involve any Chilean proposals, but were devoted mainly to the general situation in
Latin America at the time.’100
Can this statement be trusted? This is the same summary which recounts
that ‘during the period between the election and inauguration of Allende (September-November 1970),
97 Letter from Bill Merriam to Peter G. Peterson, 1 October 1971, United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and United
States Foreign Policy, pp. 945-953.
99 Secret CIA memorandum, ‘CIA Relations with ITT,’ 7 March 1973, ‘Chile Declassification Project Virtual Reading Room.’
100 Secret CIA memorandum, ‘Resume of Contacts with ITT Officials Regarding Chile,’ 19 March 1972, ‘Chile Declassification
Project Virtual Reading Room.’

- 28 -
a strong effort was made [deleted.]’ Although most of the statement has fallen victim to the black
permanent marker of censorship, it is quite obvious that this is referring to the CIA coup plotting after
Allende’s election. The fact that the CIA were willing to write this in the summary suggests that any
censorship of the facts occurred after the document had been written, rather than at the time of writing,
so its contents can by and large be trusted. It therefore appears that no action was taken on ITT’s vague
wish to involve the CIA in Chile. There is no further mention of the plan within ITT’s internal
memoranda, and at the end of November the Nixon Administration’s policy towards Latin America was
still being called ‘soft’, which presumably it would not have been if the plan had been implemented.101
Furthermore, Peter Peterson testified before the Church Committee that ‘he took no action to implement
the Merriam plan.’102
It seems likely that Peterson was telling the truth, since as has previously been seen
the US government was extremely wary of involving private corporations in covert operations. Moreover,
at three strategy review meetings held between June and November 1971, Kissinger and strategists from
both the State Department and CIA had all agreed that defending economic interests at all costs – as
advocated by Treasury officials – would be ‘too risky for the United States’ prestige in Latin America and
the Third World.’103
It seems unlikely that ITT would have been able to reverse this stance when officials
from the US Treasury were unable to do so.
Anaconda and Kennecott both took different paths to ITT following the announcement that their copper
mines were to be nationalised without any compensation. Anaconda continued along the government
lobbying track, enlisting two Senators and several Congressmen to speak on their behalf at the Foreign
Relations and Finance Committees, and visiting the White House, State Department, and National
Security Council in order to ‘demand that the U.S. take a positive stand on the expropriation in Chile.’104
Bill Quigley of Anaconda informed ITT’s Jack Guilfoyle that ‘Kennecott [was] also moving somewhat
101 ITT internal memorandum from Jack Neal to Bill Merriam, ‘Chile – Question of Embargo of Chilean Funds in the U.S.,’
30 November 1971, United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, p. 985.
103 Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, p. 119.
104 ITT internal memorandum from Jack Guilfoyle to Harold Geneen, ‘Anaconda – Chile,’ 14 October 1971, United States

- 29 -
along the same lines but separately.’105
In addition to this, Kennecott initiated a series of intense legal
battles which would last until Allende’s agreement to compensate the corporation in February 1972.
Kennecott announced to all potential buyers of Chilean copper that it had rights of ownership over the
copper extracted from its expropriated mine at El Teniente and therefore it, rather than the Chilean
government, deserved payment for such copper.106
On 30 September, the corporation attempted to
secure payment from a French company which had bought a consignment of Chilean copper, and
following the success of this action they attempted to do the same in Sweden, Germany, and Italy.107
Furthermore, in the US Federal Court they tried to secure writs of attachment to any Chilean property
within the state of New York – including the aeroplanes of the Chilean national airline when they landed
– using the unconditional guarantees of payment for the remaining 49 per cent of Kennecott’s holdings
which had been given to them under Frei.108
The divergent activities of ITT, Anaconda, and Kennecott
demonstrate that even at this stage – after attempts to unite them through the Chile Ad Hoc Committee
and ongoing contact between the three corporations – they were not unified in what they wanted to
achieve or the methods they wished to use. Rather than pooling their resources or conspiring to bring
about the downfall of Allende, they were pushing in different directions for different things.
On 13 October, Secretary of State Rogers issued a public statement criticising Allende’s expropriations,
declaring that ‘The United States Government is deeply disappointed and disturbed at this serious
departure from accepted standards of international law. … The unprecedented retroactive application of
the excess profits concept…is particularly disquieting.’109
This was the first time a representative of the
US government had spoken publicly on the issue, and although no retaliatory policy was announced at
this stage, this statement can be seen as the beginnings of a reappraisal of the State Department’s low
profile policy towards Latin America. It is unclear whether this policy shift was influenced by the
105 ITT internal memorandum from Jack Guilfoyle to Harold Geneen, ‘Anaconda – Chile,’ 14 October 1971, United States
106 Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, p. 184.
107 Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, p. 184.
109 United States Senate, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, p. 957; Benjamin Welless, ‘Rogers Reproves
Chile on Seizures,’ New York Times, 14 October 1971, p. 1.

- 30 -
multinational corporations’ lobbying campaign, though it seems more likely that Nixon pushed this
through as a result of his sympathy for Secretary of the Treasury John Connally’s concern that a lax
response to Allende’s expropriations would encourage other countries in Latin America to do the same,
and that this could potentially cost the Treasury a significant amount of money in overseas private
investment insurance payouts to the expropriated companies.110
A tough US public stance against Allende
became firm policy on 19 January 1972 when Nixon announced that should any country expropriate US
holdings without adequate compensation, the United States would end all aid to that country, and vote
against any motions by international lending institutions to loan money to that country.111
This statement
was quite obviously aimed at Chile, and in accordance with it when Allende approached the Paris Club
to re-negotiate Chile’s 800 million dollar foreign debts, Nixon fought for the Club to demand that Chile
pay full compensation to expropriated foreign companies before it would consider such action; however
in this Nixon was unsuccessful.112
This new, tough stance against expropriation indicated a closer alignment between US government policy
and that of ITT, Anaconda, and Kennecott, and could have potentially initiated a period of co-operation
between the government and these corporations. However, barely two months after Nixon’s
announcement, Jack Anderson published an article in the Washington Post which revealed the contact
between the CIA and ITT in 1970, in particular Broe’s request that ITT help the CIA create economic
chaos in Chile, based on leaked ITT memoranda.113
In response to this revelation, Allende publicly
condemned the corporation and immediately broke off compensation negotiations, and the United States
Senate Foreign Relations Committee created a Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations to launch
an investigation into Anderson’s claims.114
At this point, any subsequent discovery of close contact
110 Transcript of conversation between Richard Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, and Henry Kissinger, 11 June 1971, 9:37-10:36am,
Richard A. Moss, Luke Nichter, and Anand Toprani, ‘“[W]e’re going to give Allende the hook”: The Nixon Administration’s
Response to Salvador Allende and Chilean Expropriation,’ Nixontapes.org, <http://nixontapeaudio.org/chile/chile.pdf> (23
March 2014), p. 17.
111 Robert B. Semple Jr, ‘Nixon Announces Tough U.S. Stand on Expropriation,’ New York Times, 20 January 1972, p. 1;
‘Allende, Criticizing Nixon, Says Chile Can Dictate Her Own Laws,’ New York Times, 20 January 1972, p. 4.
112 United States Senate, Covert Action in Chile, p. 32; Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, p. 151.
113 Jack Anderson, ‘Memos Bare ITT Try for Chile Coup,’ Washington Post, 21 March 1972, p. B13.
114 Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, p. 98; United States Senate, The International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, p. 1.

- 31 -
between the government and a private corporation would have been politically disastrous for the Nixon
Administration, especially given the upcoming presidential election, and thus any contemplation of
further co-operation between the government and multinational corporations was out of the question.
Furthermore, in February Allende had made an agreement to compensate Kennecott, removing one of
the key corporate players from the equation and reducing Congressional support for sanctions against
Chile since the potential insurance payout to expropriated companies had been significantly reduced.115
More revelations followed Anderson’s initial article, including news of ITT’s eighteen point action plan
which became public knowledge in July and which Allende announced to the world in a speech to the
United Nations on 4 December, gaining him widespread sympathy.116
From the publication of
Anderson’s article until Allende’s overthrow in September 1973, there is no evidence of any contact
between the US government and ITT, Anaconda, or Kennecott. Nor is there any evidence that the
corporations pursued any further action to ensure that they would be compensated or to remove Allende
from office. Of course it must be said that many documents pertaining to this period still remain wholly
or partly classified and thus it is impossible to know definitively whether or not any further contact or
action occurred. Ultimately, only Kennecott managed to obtain compensation from Allende, and this
was due to its own legal action rather than any collaboration with the US government or other
corporations. All three corporations got their own way in the end when Pinochet agreed to compensate
them in full in 1974.117
115 Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, pp. 148-149.
116 Salvador Allende, Speech to the United Nations, 4 December 1972, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/allende/1972/
december/04.htm> (24 March 2014); Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, p. 202.

- 32 -
Conclusion
Based on the available evidence, corporate concern about the potential expropriation of assets in Chile
seems not to have been the prime motivation for US intervention. Representatives of corporations did
not possess the level of influence necessary to alter US foreign policy, and the government did not even
have a published policy on expropriations until after they had actually taken place, let alone a policy which
would have led to covert action in Chile to prevent such expropriation. Rather than corporate concerns,
geopolitical concerns about the spread of Communism appear to have been decisive in prompting the
US decision to intervene. Contrary to what some have claimed, no conspiratorial relationship existed
between multinational corporations and the US government with relation to Chile during the period
1964-1973. Both multinational corporations and the US government did engage in covert action in Chile
intended to prevent the election of Salvador Allende, but these efforts were carried out in parallel rather
than as a united effort. Instead of embracing their co-operation, the US government was generally
unsympathetic to approaches by these corporations, and was deeply concerned by the security risks which
collaboration with these corporations would entail. At no point were these corporations used as tools –
willing or otherwise – by the US government in their plot to bring down Allende. The corporations
displayed remarkably little knowledge of the ongoing US covert action against Allende, and contact
between corporations and the government was too infrequent for a conspiratorial relationship to have
been in place. There were attempts by corporations to contribute to US intervention in Chile, such as
offers of financial assistance during the 1964 and 1970 election operations, and ITT’s proposed eighteen-
point action plan. There was also a short-lived attempt in 1970 by the CIA to involve multinational
corporations in their effort to induce economic collapse in Chile. However, all of these attempts at covert
collaboration were unsuccessful. In addition, the CIA’s attempt to work with multinational corporations
was driven by desperation due to the impossibly short time-frame it was given, not by any long-standing
wish of the Agency to conspire with business interests.

- 33 -
Several writers, including Stephen Kinzer, Christopher Hitchens, and Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick
contend that US intervention in Chile occurred because US multinational corporations with interests in
Chile were able to persuade their government to become involved to protect their investments from
potential expropriation. The implication here is that because the corporations wished to protect their
investments they automatically wanted rid of Allende. However, there is no evidence that they were hell-
bent on Allende’s removal. During the 1964 and 1970 elections, multinational corporations contributed
financially to Allende’s opposition or anti-Allende propaganda campaigns because these were relatively
low-risk operations so it was worth trying to prevent a Marxist candidate from taking power. However,
once Allende was elected, the corporations changed tack and put their best efforts into lobbying the US
government to alter its public stance towards Chile and firmly warn Allende against taking any
expropriatory action. Despite the attention often given to ITT’s eighteen-point plan, even ITT devoted
far more time and effort to lobbying the US government than plotting covert action. Moreover, ITT was
more than willing to enter into negotiation with the Allende government; as long as it was given adequate
compensation for its nationalised subsidiary the corporation was not too interested in Allende’s fate. It
was only when it seemed that obtaining such compensation would be impossible that ITT encouraged
the US government to remove Allende. The goals of US multinational corporations and the US
government rarely aligned during this period; the major focus of the government was on Allende’s
removal whereas the corporations were focused on the prevention of or compensation for expropriation.
When the goals of multinational corporations and the government did align – as they did during the 1964
and 1970 election operations or in early 1972 – differences in operational tactics, security concerns, or
the political toxicity of public discovery of collaboration meant that this was not acted upon.
It would be a mistake to assume that because multinational corporations with holdings in Chile wished
to protect their investments, their policies inevitably aligned with one another. Corporations certainly did
co-operate with each other, as demonstrated by the formation of groups such as the CCS, Business
Group for Latin America, and Chile Ad Hoc Committee. However, different corporations were also

- 34 -
mistrustful of one another and at times were willing to double-cross their fellow corporations in order to
secure a preferential deal for themselves, as ITT attempted to do in 1971. Different corporations had
different plans as to how to achieve their goals; for example in late September 1971 ITT, Anaconda, and
Kennecott, even after repeated attempts to unify their policies, each believed respectively that covert
action, lobbying the US government, and independent legal action were the best ways to go about
securing compensation for themselves.
Much of the historiography on this topic, whether arguing that corporate influence was or was not a
factor, has implied that multinational corporations and the US government were essentially moving along
the same path – they all wished for the removal of Allende – and that the only issue is the extent to which
corporations and the government collaborated with each other. However, it is clear from my research
that individual corporations and the US government had different goals and followed separate paths. At
times these paths converged, but for the most part they remained distinct, despite the various efforts by
all of these actors to bring them closer together at one time or another. The story of US intervention in
Chile between 1964 and 1973 is not a simplistic tale of conspiracy between corporations and the
government; nor is it an equally simplistic tale of the complete separation of corporation and state. The
degree of collaboration between multinational corporations and the US government with regards to Chile
has certainly been overplayed, but at the same time efforts by corporations to influence their government
and the attempts at collaboration should not be overlooked. The importance and complexity of this topic
calls for detail and nuance, rather than over-simplification.
Word count: 9,957

- 35 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Online Documents and Document Collections
Allende, Salvador. Speech to the United Nations. 4 December 1972. <https://www.marxists.org/archive
/allende/1972/december/04.htm>. Accessed 24 March 2014.
‘Chile Declassification Project Virtual Reading Room.’ US Department of State Freedom of Information Act.
<http://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?collection=CHILE&searchText=*>. Accessed 18
December 2013.
‘December 9, 2010 Materials Release.’ Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. <http://www.nixonlibrary.
gov/virtuallibrary/documents/dec10.php#selection>. Accessed 20 December 2013.
Moss, Richard A., Nichter, Luke, and Toprani, Anand. ‘“[W]e’re going to give Allende the hook”: The
Nixon Administration’s Response to Salvador Allende and Chilean Expropriation.’
Nixontapes.org. <http://nixontapeaudio.org/chile/chile.pdf>. Accessed 23 March 2014.
‘New Kissinger ‘Telcons’ Reveal Chile Plotting at Highest Levels of U.S. Government.’ The National
Security Archive. <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB255/index.htm>.
Accessed 4 January, 2014.
Published Document Collections
Subversion in Chile: A Case Study in U.S. Corporate Intrigue in the Third World. Nottingham: Bertrand Russell
Peace Foundation, 1972.
United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South
and Central America; Mexico. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2004.

- 36 -
United States Senate. Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Ninety-Third
Congress on the International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 1970-71. Washington: US
Government Printing Office, 1973.
Newspaper Articles
‘Allende, Criticizing Nixon, Says Chile Can Dictate Her Own Laws.’ New York Times. 20 January 1972, 4.
Anderson, Jack. ‘Memos Bare ITT Try for Chile Coup.’ Washington Post. 21 March 1972, B13.
Semple, Robert B. Jr. ‘Nixon Announces Tough U.S. Stand on Expropriation.’ New York Times. 20
January 1972, 1, 4.
Welless, Benjamin. ‘Rogers Reproves Chile on Seizures.’ New York Times. 14 October 1971, 1, 15.
United States Senate Reports
United States Senate. The International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 1970-1971: Report to the
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate by the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations.
Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1973.
United States Senate. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities. Washington: US
Government Printing Office, 1975.
United States Senate. Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973: Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975.

- 37 -
Secondary Sources
Contemporary Secondary Works
Moran, Theodore H. Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile. Princeton and
London: Princeton University Press, 1974.
Sigmund, Paul E. The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976. University of Pittsburgh Press,
1977.
Modern Secondary Works
Guardiola-Rivera, Oscar. Story of a Death Foretold: The Coup against Salvador Allende, 11 September 1973.
London: Bloomsbury, 2013.
Gustafson, Kristian. Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974. Washington, D.C.: Potomac
Books, 2007.
Harmer, Tanya. Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War. Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2011.
Haslam, Jonathan. The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide. London
and New York: Verso, 2005.
Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Summit Books, 1983.
Hitchens, Christopher. The Trial of Henry Kissinger. London and New York: Verso, 2001.
Kinzer, Stephen. Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq. New York: Times Books,
2007.
Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New York and
London: The New Press, 2004.
Prados, John. Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006.
Stone, Oliver and Kuznick, Peter. The Untold History of the United States. London: Ebury Press, 2013.

Dissertation

Recomendados

Recomendados

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

Mais procurados (20)

Semelhante a Dissertation

Semelhante a Dissertation (6)

Dissertation