Three Roads to Sustainability - Considering Three Common Narratives in Conservation
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These slides were used in a lecture on giving an overview of what I see as the three dominant narratives in conservation today. It was strongly informed by my own experience working in global conservation among some of the larger eNGOs in Washington, DC, and - of course - remains a perspective in progress. It was delivered as part of an undergraduate study abroad course considering wildlife conservation in Madagascar.
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Three Roads to Sustainability - Considering Three Common Narratives in Conservation
- 2. Overview 1. The Ideal vs. the Real 2. A Sea Monster to the Rescue 3. All We Need is an (Invisible) Hand 4. Trust Me, We Can Do This Together 5. Traversing the Conservation Reality
- 3. The Ideal vs. the Real
- 4. Theories, Frameworks & Models Three tools in social science Theory (explanatory/predictive) Frameworks (descriptive) Models (normative) Today we’ll focus on the types of models used in conservation At it’s most basic, there are three narratives about how we achieve sustainability
- 5. Three Types of Models These three narratives emphasize: Coercion Incentives Cooperation I term these narratives: “A Sea Monster to the Rescue” “All We Need is an (Invisible) Hand” “Trust Me, We Can Do This”
- 6. A Sea Monster to the Rescue
- 8. The State as Sovereign Basic argument: State of nature is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” To overcome, we need an absolute sovereign Today, the leviathan is not a king, but the state This argument can be applied to conservation
- 9. Modern Tragedies Garrett Hardin. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons”. Science Individually rational, collectively irrational Commons: fish, forests, freshwater, etc. Conclusion Free access & unrestricted demand for a finite resource ultimately reduces the resource through over-exploitation
- 10. Hardin’s Solutions Hardin suggested two possible solutions: Strong state intervention – coercive force limits exploitation Privatization – gives incentive to enforce sustainable use
- 12. Possible Examples Yellowstone National Park, est. 1872 Endangered Species Act of 1973 Fuel Economy Standards, first in place in 1978
- 13. All We Need is an (Invisible) Hand
- 14. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776
- 15. The Market Produces the Best Outcomes Basic argument: “by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is…led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.” Limit the role of government to administration of justice and provision of public goods This argument can be applied to conservation
- 16. Free Market Environmentalism Terry Anderson & Donald Leal, 1991 Focus on: Tort law Property Rights Market incentives The state is often the problem Fuel subsidies Free access to national parks Lack of property rights
- 17. Possible Examples High Efficiency Light Bulbs Erin Brockovich Pacific Gas & Electric Case North Pacific Halibut, catch shares in 90s
- 18. Trust Me, We Can Do This Together
- 20. Modern Origins? Recent scholars have noted that sometimes individuals are able to cooperate and overcome the tragedy This has led to the rise of modern models of conservation based on “cooperation” It could perhaps be argued that a philosophical precursor can be found in both socialist and religious thought Marx, 1867
- 21. An Institutional Theorist Elinor Ostrom (1933-2012) 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics, shared with Oliver E. Williamson Indiana University and Arizona State University Founded the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at IU
- 22. Common Pool Resources Ostrom’s Law: A resource arrangement that works in practice can work in theory. Most famous work is on how communities are able to create their own solutions to manage common pool resources for long time periods Private Goods (food, clothing, cars) Common-pool Resources (fish stocks, timber, coal) Club Goods (golf course, satellite TV) Public Goods (roads, air, national security) Excludable/Non-excludable* Rivalrous / . Non-rivalrous
- 24. Highly Sophisticated Community- Solution Alanya, Turkey 100 local fishers using 3-person boats Half members of fishing cooperative Set up rules Every September, list of eligible fishers is prepared Fishing area divided into zones Fishers assigned zones by lots for Sept. to May period Sept. to Jan., each fisher moves each day to the next easterly location, after Jan., switch to moving westward
- 25. Eight Principles for Cooperative Solutions P1: Clearly defined boundaries. P2: Rules adapted to local social and biological conditions. P3: Collective choice arrangements. P4: Accountable monitoring. P5: Graduated sanctions. P6: Provide accessible, lost cost means for dispute resolution. P7: Recognition of rights to organize. P8: Nested systems.
- 27. Conservation is Not “Either/Or” In practice, we see a mix of these three models Which model dominates? Consider what matters most: Coercion Incentives Cooperation For example: Fisheries conservation often requires restructuring property rights (incentives), but which are enforced by the state (coercion), and typically cannot be set up without fishermen’s support (cooperation)
- 28. Conserving Madagascar Is any model more popular? Scales (2014) argues that there is a “fortress conservation policy Establishment of protected areas has led to severe restrictions on natural resource use and the disruption of livelihoods, property systems and cultural values Horning (2012) notes the ineffectiveness of the the state, the “tame leviathan”
- 29. Conserving Madagascar (cont.) Is another model likely to be more successful? Market Incentives? Tourism-led conservation But geographically limited: Four national parks (Andasibe-Mantadia, Isalo, Ranomafana, Montagne d’Ambre) and one special reserve (Ankarana) attracted over 88% of the visitors between 1992 and 2000. Little employment generation Eco-labeling for fish
- 30. Conserving Madagascar (cont.) Community Cooperation Co-management of nature reserves Reserves mainly limit access to natural resources Can Malagasy and conservation biologists agree? Concessions for fisheries Blue Ventures suggests benefits are possible Horning (2012) notes “some communities are conserving forests successfully while others are not”
Notas do Editor
- For more: Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ostrom, E. 2009. Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What Have We Learned? Ch. 2. in: G.K. Ingram & Y.H. Hong (eds.) Property Rights and Land Policies. The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Kindle Edition.
- Movements allow everyone equal opportunity to take advantage of stocks moving east, and stocks moving west. Probably a better solution than a government could have devised, or a private sector solution Fishery ostensibly closed May through September
- Ostrom, E. 2009. Design Principles of Robust Property Rights Institutions: What Have We Learned? Ch. 2. in: G.K. Ingram & Y.H. Hong (eds.) Property Rights and Land Policies. The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Kindle Edition. “after working with colleagues to amass, read, and code a large number of individual cases of long-lasting and of failed systems, I tried valiantly to find the specific rules that were associated with the systems that had survived for long periods of time using Kenneth Shepsle's (1989) definition of a robust institution as one that was long-lasting and had operational rules that had been devised and modified over time according to a set of higher-level rules (which institutional analysts would usually call collective choice rules).” "group that designs a property rights system that meets most of the design principles has increased the probability of its surviving many disturbances over time and being robust.” ”in thinking about the practical implications of the design principles, one approach is to think of them as the starting point for conducting a search of appropriate means of solving problems.” P1: Boundaries Using this principle enables participants to know who is in and who is out of a defined set of relationships and, thus, with whom to cooperate. Two dimensions Boundaries of a resource system Property rights of individuals/groups. Rights of: Access, Withdrawal, Management, Exculsion, Alientation P2: Local conditions Equitable Ecologically sound P3: Collective choice arrangements Most of the individuals affected by a resource regime are authorized to participate in making and modifying the rules P4: Monitoring Biophysical monitoring Compliance monitoring Community monitoring facilitated when individuals have a defined right to harvest Challenge: making government compliance monitors accountable to authorized users P5: Graduated sanctions. 1st sanction conveys information to individual -not permitted- and others -violations not tolerated often element of minor embarrassment/social disapproval