This communication audit examines communication within an Army recruiting battalion located across multiple states in the Pacific Northwest. The battalion has a headquarters staff and is divided into companies located at various stations. The audit utilized observations, focus groups, surveys, and interviews to analyze internal communication between staff and companies, external communication, and training communication. The results found that while communication between staff sections and companies was generally good, communication had broken down between commander's intent and the station level. The audit concludes with recommendations to improve communication areas.

1. Running head: COMMUNICATIONS AUDIT WITHIN SEATTLE ARMY RECRUITING 1
Communications Audit within Seattle Army Recruiting Battalion
Margaret Shartel
Gonzaga University
Organizational Communication
COML 504
Dr. Joe Ayres
September 28, 2011

2. COMMUNICATIONS AUDIT WITHIN SEATTLE ARMY RECRUITING 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This communication audit examines in depth the communication that takes place within
an Army Recruiting Battalion that is geographically dispersed across several states within the
Pacific Northwest. The Battalion, while geographically scattered, also has many levels of
Department of the Army civilian employees making up the bulk of the headquarters staff, several
small companies headed by a junior officer and a senior non-commissioned officer as well as
several junior non-commissioned officers in leadership roles separated between 42 stations. The
findings presented within this audit were gathered through extensive field observations of
training, focus groups conducted at the company (rather than headquarters) level, survey
questionnaires, and interviews with mid-level supervisors, the chief of staff and the battalion
commander. Through the exhaustive research, many parallel communication strengths and
weaknesses were analyzed so that a clear picture of training communication, internal
communication and external communication can be recognized and/or addressed.
The results of the four methods (observation, focus-groups, surveys and interviews) used
to gain analytical insight into the overall organizational communication of the Battalion show a
strong desire to consistently meet the commanders communicated intent. Communication
between staff sections were often described as ―good, but there is always room for improvement‖
and communication between the staff and the company command groups (CCG‘s) were also
rated as good. However, the audit also noted that communication had broken down between the
commander‘s intent and the station level implementing the previously stated intent.

3. Further, the audit also identified several key areas where there is room for improvement
and accordingly, this audit concludes with recommendations of not only areas of improvement,
but areas where communication is going well and can be expanded upon in the future. This audit
also contains the raw data collected throughout the study for further review and expansion of the
audit if requested at a later time.

4. Table of Contents
The Purpose of this Study ………………………………………...5
Description of the Recruiting Battalion……..…………………….7
The Structure of the Battalion……………………………..7
Grass Roots Advisory Board……………………………...12
Research Methods……………………………………………..….13
Limitations…………………………………….…………..13
Methodology……………………………………………...14
Organizational Analysis……………………………………………16
Systems Lens of the Organization....………………………..21
Formal and Informal Communication ………………….….26
Organizational Communication as Strategy...……………...33
Staff Motivation..............................................................…...35
Summary of Major Findings..……………………………………...37
Conclusions and Recommendations…………………………….....39
References…………………………………………….……………43
Appendices

5. Notwithstanding that the success of any Recruiting Battalion at any given time is
determined by mission requirements, market share and many other factors, the underlying trend
to being able to recruit the high-quality, dynamic applicants needed for today‘s Army depends
almost solely on the ability to communicate. In an era of a quickly changing demographic, and a
highly social and interactive one at that, the ability to adapt to that change and still fill the needs
of the Army is an intensive communicative process emphasized not only from the Battalion
down, but from the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) down. ―Although
many people accept the concept of communication as being important to organizational
effectiveness, they often oversimplify its role, considering communication to be a mere message
exchange or a simple technique that if followed, can automatically mold a person into an
effective communicator.‖ (Downs & Adrian, 2004). The ability to not only recruit, but retain
future soldiers is an integral part of the Battalion‘s recruiting mission, and therfore deeply
informed by internal and external communication as well as soldier and civilian training.
Accordingly, the Battalion Commander recognized the need for a full communication
audit of his battalion staff, company leadership, and non-commissioned officers on the ground
recruiting and the process of retaining qualified applicants. In an effort to reach the recruiting
potential and market share of a seemingly difficult area to recruit in, and understanding that ―it is
through communication that employees obtain information, make sense of situations they
encounter, and decide how to act,‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005) this audit was conducted. The
comprehensive purpose of this study was to define areas necessary to improve upon within
thebattalion‘s specific communication realm as well as
To analyze how the organization communicates with external audiences,
stakeholders, the general public and the Battalion‘s grass-roots advisory board.

6. To observe how communication moves through the battalion, whether follow-up
is conducted in a timely manner, or if internal communication channels can be
improved upon for an increase in not only productivity but also job satisfaction
To provide a cursey overview of training mechanisms within the civilian staff and
the soldiers within the battalion footprint to identify if trainingstructures should be
increased or decreased accordingly
To estimate the awareness of the commanders intent for the recruiting year 2012
and the interaction required to emphasize the future soldier training program
To highlight how communication can support defined organizational outcomes
for the coming year
and finally,
To provide recoomondations to improve the overall functioning of the
communications process in the battalion.
The overall purpose of this study, consequently, is to define the organizational
communication process currently within the battalion, and to determine how to better engage the
staff and soldiers of the battalion in an effort to fully implement the commanders intent of
battalion excellence within USAREC for Recruiting Year 2012.

7. ORGANIZATIONAL DESCRIPTION
In order to fully audit and recommend courses of action, it is important to
understand the command structure of the organization, the mission and the intent for the coming
year.
MISSION OF THE BATTALION
The Battalion‘s core mission is to support the needs of the Army by recruiting highly
qualified applicants to fill key vacancies within the officer and enlisted ranks of the Regular
Army (RA) and the Army Reserve (AR). The public website states the mission as the following:
“Seattle Recruiting Battalion will recruit with integrity the high quality men and women
necessary to meet the needs of the United States Army and Army Reserve through leader
development, quality training, and caring of soldiers and families.” (Seattle Recruiting
Battalion, 2009).
As for Key Values, every single soldier learns the values throughout their career of Loyalty,
Duty, Respect, Selfless-Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage (providing them with the
acronymn LDRSHIP=leadership) as well as the warrior ethos to guide their principle decission
making during their years of service. However, the Battalion Commander of Seattle Recruiting
Battalion has set aside four guiding principles in order to adhere to his key values and produce
mission success, they are:
Care: There is no way to define the emphasis of caring throughout our
command. Those in leadership positions must care for soldiers, civilians, family
members and future soldiers. There is no greater leadership challenge than caring.

8. Integrety and Honor: Our business is based on trust, if we comprimise our
integrity then we lose our honor and our trust among not only the command, but the
community as a whole.
Teamwork: We are a team comprised of teams, the ability to work within
not only our individual teams but also to work up and down the chain, through the
community as a team is key to our mission success. Every part of our teams, from
sections, to units and to our civilian counterparts and advisory board define the
essence of teamwork within the organization and throughout the community.
Personal and Professional Excellence: There are no monetary gains such
as bonuses or [monetary based] awards in our business for soldiers. The drive from
personnel must come from inside them to exceed the standards set before all other
soldiers and give 110% to our mission. The desire to recruit to our market potential
rather than our mission emphasizes this personal and professional excellence.
Therefore, this audit must take the mission, vision, values and future operations into
account when reviewing all data pertinent to the organizational communication.

9. STRUCTURE OF THE BATTALION
The Battalion is organized with a command group consisting of a Battalion Commander,
an Executive Officer, and a Battalion Command Sergeant Major all of whom share one
administrative assistant (civilian). Within the staff, which is headquartered with the command
group, there is a section for personnel, (1 officer and 2 civilian staff members), an operations
section (1 officer, 4 enlisted and 2 civilian staff), a Fusion cell (1 Mission Market Analysis, 2
Advertising and Public Affairs, and 1 Education Services staff members—all civilian), a training
section (with between 3 and 5 training non-commissioned officers), a Family Services Assistant
(civilian), a Budget Analyst (civilian), 2 computer networking personnel (civilian) and a
Logistics section with 4 civilian personnel. Those 30 some personnel make up the battalion staff
and run the day-to-day operations of the battalion supporting 272 non-commissioned officers in
everything dealing with being a soldier, recruiting a soldier and helping maintain a soldier before
they ship off to basic training.
Outside the Battalion area there are 7 companies commanded by a captain, a first
sergeant and with a company secretary (generally, there is currently one company without a
company secretary due to budget and contracting constraints). Between the seven companies, 42
stations are set up in key areas throughout the battalion ―footprint‖ or recruiting zones, which
cover areas within four separate states. This is a general lay-out of any recruiting battalion only
the numbers of recruiting non-commissioned officers, number of stations, and to some extent the
number of companies change. The size of the ‗footprint‘ is also different in any of the 43
recruiting battalions in the country. Each Battalion reports to one of 7 Brigades, which all report
to the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). Figure 1 illustrates the general
layout of the battalion structure:

10. Commander
Family Support
Operations Executive
Company Human Resources
Officer
Commanders
Fusion
Budget
Cell Information Logistics
Technology
Command Sergeant
Major
Company First
Sergeants
Station
Figure 1 Commanders
Recruiting Non-
commissioned
Officers

11. COMMUNICATIONS AUDIT WITHIN SEATTLE ARMY RECRUITING 11
Communications Audit within Seattle Army Recruiting Battalion
Description of this structure indicates a mix of traditional hierarchy combined with a
team-based organization. No one section takes absolute precedence over another in the day-to-
day operations of the organization; however the hierarchy of rank and position are still adhered
to. The commander has the ultimate say, and he works not only through the traditional channels
of the executive officer and company commanders, but also directly works with staff sections in
order to provide a more egalitarian feel in the office. The hierarchy of the non-commissioned
officer chain is more pronounced than within the battalion staff sections, even though the
personnel involved tend to be more geographically dispersed than company commands and
headquarters elements. For example, the Battalion Command Sergeant Major is in Seattle, while
the Alaska Company First Sergeant is in Anchorage, and his soldiers are throughout the state of
Alaska. The geographical differences as well as limits of technology may pose a communication
breakdown risk later in the audit.
If the organization were only a traditional hierarchical bureaucracy, clear lines of
decision making would follow traditional lines of the organizational chart and lead one to think
that:
―Various groups of employees have specialized skills necessary to complete their
assigned tasks efficiently and effectively, [and]… lines of authority are clear to all…
Decision making and control are centralized. This means that all major decisions facing
the organization are made by the people who occupy the positions at the top of the
organizational hierarchy. Of course, all members of the organization are responsible for
making routine decisions in their areas of responsibility. But they must base their
decisions on policies and procedures that are established at the top.‖ (p. 69)

12. However, with the mixed nature of the two separate areas of the organization (the staff
headquarters element and the field recruiting element) it is easier to view the organization as a
networked organization:
―the team based structure of a network implies that leaders must be able to promote
teamwork…Because teams are self-managing, leaders should take on the role of coach, rather
than directive leader advising the team and helping it to solve problems…Managers and
members of units in networked organizations must also manage relationships with other units
and organizations, because integrating functions are so important.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005).
This mixed structure will be discussed furtherin the audit.
Grass Roots Advisory Board
On the periphery of the organization lies the local Grass Roots Advisory Board. This
board was created in 2009 in order to engage local business leaders, educators and politicians in
order to define the role of Army Recruiting in the battalion footprint. The board is made up of
several regional leaders who provide guidance on issues such as school access, local
organizations willing to help discuss the Army in a proactive and positive way, and implement
knowledge of the notion of the Army not being a ‗second choice‘ anymore. The board mainly
works with the battalion leadership on issues of battalion wide importance, though each region
within the Washington State portion of the battalion has a leadership post on the board. The
interaction of the board will be discussed further in the audit.

13. RESEARCH METHODS
This audit used a variety of different forms of research in order to gain a thorough in-
depth understanding of three main communicative processes in the Seattle Recruiting Battalion.
From intensive interviews as far out in the battalion footprint as possible, to review of external
communication methods used on the World Wide Web, any resource available was used to gain
the bigger picture of the communication within Seattle Recruiting Battalion.
LIMITATIONS
While this research was certainly limited by the time allowed in finalizing the audit, the
research was also stalled by the researcher, who did not include a thorough study of the Army
section of the Military Entrance Processing center located near the battalion headquarters and
where several members of battalion staff also work, and each recruiting NCO takes their recruits
to process into the Army. Since this research was limited not only by the class time constraints,
it was also conducted at the very end of a recruiting year, wherein much of the staff and soldiers
were traveling or not available due to the nature of year-end processing or training. Also related
to the time-limits of the audit conducted, the researcher was unable to engage the advisory board
fully in the research methods used throughout the rest of the battalion.
Further, full access was granted to the researcher from battalion headquarters, however,
this did not mean that anyone in the organization could be forced to take a survey or relent to an
interview; participation was voluntary. It should be noted, however, that the entire organization
gave the researcher all access needed, the entire communicationsoffice refused participation in
either completing the 20 question survey directly related to their positions, or allowing an
interview or observation. The external communication information was reviewed from

14. interviews of others in the battalion staff who work directly with or whom the communications
office works directly for in order to measure engagement. Also, in reviewing the online presence
of the recruiting battalion, the research was limited to stations and companies the researcher was
a ‗fan‘ of on Facebook in order to conduct a thorough study of external interaction from the
recruiter level.
Nonetheless, these limitations had to be addressed as the audit went on, changing the
methodologies throughout the process.
METHODOLOGY
Since the battalion also reports to a brigade, which reports to a command and further up
the chain of command through the pentagon and to the commander in chief, the scope of the
research conducted needed to be limited to a free standing battalion within the reach of the
researcher. After an off-the-record discussion with the battalion commander, it was decided that
a study of internal, external and to a smaller extent training communication be reviewed. This
was to be accomplished from training observation, observation of communication in the office
environment, survey questionnaires and in-depth interviews after the surveys were completed.
Interviews were conducted after the surveys because of the nature of the relationship of the
researcher to the battalion as the researcher is a former employee of the battalion, and therefore
answers to surveys may have been informed by who was conducting the audit.
The interviews were limited by time to the battalion leadership, mid-level supervisors and
on the ground recruiters. Questions began with cursory overview of what the audit process was
about, and a formal review that the researcher kept all questions in strict confidentiality,
including who answered what questions. Also, the researcher heavily emphasized that the she no

15. longer worked for the battalion, nor had ties in any way related to the organization save the
current project being conducted for educational purposes. This was conducted this way in order
to allow the free-flowing of information between researcher and interview subject to gain the
fullest understanding of where communication stood from several levels within the organization.

16. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
In order to gain insight into the organization before research fully began, the research
sought out how the organization communicated currently without emphasis on the project at
hand. This was done through a combination of narrative analysis and observation between
battalion leadership and a recruiting company. A variety of external sources were used,
including:
External Media: Through the web presence review of the organization, including the
review of the official website, the battalion blog and the Facebook pages of stations, it was noted
that updates are not being performed, nor is there a story of the battalion from a narrative
perspective. A review of media interaction was asked for, though not provided save during a few
interviews, and this was in the end, determined to be hearsay. It should be noted, however, that
the position held by the researcher did in fact create the external communications plan, and
implement it prior to her position being eliminated. The researcher‘s contract ran out in August
of 2011, and through formal interviews it was noted that no battalion level Facebook posts, no
blog entries, or tweets existed since that time—further there was no record of media advisories or
press releases being sent out. There had been external partnership events, but no stories related
to the impact on either recruiting or adding to the narrative of the organization were available for
review.
Internal Communication: Review of the internal command information newsletters also
did not tell a story about the battalion, it was slapped together without regard for audience,
storytelling, or gaining any interest of the organization. There was not a newsletter produced
since October of 2010. Informative emails were in abundance, however, through quiet
observation it was noted that most personnel glossed over these emails in lieu of ―something

17. productive‖ or ―job related‖. The information between battalion and the advisory board was
scattered—some had pieces of information, and some had other pieces of information.
Information sharing was not emphasized, especially in the Fusion Cell, which houses the
communication office, although emails went between the personnel readily, a communication
breakdown was emphasized by out-right open hostility toward the chief of the office, as noted
during several observation periods. Through cursory observations it was also noted that internal
customer service was lacking (as well as external). When the researcher entered the
communications office in order to explain the nature of the audit, the secretary held a hand up to
the researcher‘s face and stated, ―I don‘t have time for you.‖ The staff handbook is still in
production phase and available electronically—therefore it could not be reviewed as in-depth as
the researcher wished.
Training: In reviewing training, it was noted that traditionally the training is far different
when the battalion leadership is around—which is actually pretty traditional in organizations.
The actual training conducted emphasized mandatory training sent down from higher
headquarters, and training for individuals working to advance their military career. Therefore
questions were raised and asked about civilian training mechanisms available and its emphasis in
the near future because this audit is a forward looking document as requested by the battalion
leadership. The main question of the audit, therefore, is ―how can the battalion communicate
better in the future in order to reach mission success and success throughout the command in
recruiting year 2012.‖
Therefore through an informal review of the organization the decision to emphasize a
thorough command wide review of external communication, internal communication (including

18. internal customer service and a review of the advisory board) and how training communication
took place, was made.
To fully understand the communication within the battalion, such questions as ―Do you
know what the advisory board is‖ and ―how do you communication throughout the battalion‖
had to be asked. These questions were first emphasized in surveys conducted separately at
battalion headquarters and in the recruiting field, in order to gain insight into any differences in
communication that may become noticeable. It was decided to ask fully open ended questions
during the interview process in order to not lead the interview subjects in any one direction.
While other areas of communication will be looked at in a very slight way, these were the
emphasizing traits of the audit as it unfolded and changed due to the time the audit was
conducted. Further, a review of the current communications programs were reviewed, an noted
further in the study—as well as an in-depth examination of the operations office, who seem to be
taking the future communication needs of the battalion and creating programs to benefit the
organization and decrease its communication shortfalls.
In addition to fact finding through external organizational research and un-obstructive
observation, this study relied heavily upon interviews. The first two interviews were with the
battalion commander and were mainly fact finding discussions. During this process we
discussed the commander‘s vision, his intent for the organization and where he preferred we
emphasize some information gathering. These interviews were conducted off the record with
little to no note-taking as a means to gain trust in what the researcher hoped to accomplish.
The next interviews consisted of departmental heads, such as the supervisor of logistics,
or the executive officer. There were also individual interviews conducted off site with recruiters,
company level officers and first sergeants. Interviews lasted between 15 minutes and 1 hour 30

19. minutes. They were free response, phrased in such a way as to not lead an answer. If a certain
question led to another line of inquiry it was followed, thus the difference in time between each
of the interviews conducted.
Therefore the following basic questions were used from Assessing Organizational
Communication: Strategic Communication Audits by Cal Downs and Allyson Adrian:
―Describe the Way decisions are made in your section? The Organization?
―Describe the Organizations primary objectives for [recruiting year] 2012. What
would success look like?‖
―What are the major communication strengths of the organization? The
weaknesses?‖
―How would you describe the general communication climate here?‖
―How does the communication climate effect your job satisfaction? Would you
consider this reaction typical?‖
Interviews were set up in person along with a five minute (more or less) overview of the
general questions the researcher would be asking. Rarely was an interview set up over the
phone, and if so it was due to time constraints or locational difficulty. For example, one follow
up interview had to be conducted with the battalion commander while he was traveling to his
stations, in which case the interview question was provided ahead of time so that he could gather
his thoughts about that question.
Further there was a heavy interaction during a focus group with one specific company
chose for its distant location from the battalion and thusly furthest away from daily face-to-face
interaction with battalion leadership and staff. Observations at recruiting stations with and

20. without company or battalion leadership led to some of the differences in communication
methods between the lower echelons of staff and leadership.
Finally, although actually conducted after the initial interviews with the commander, but
before most observation and training was a survey. The survey consisted of 20 questions relating
to many aspects of internal and external communication. It was limited however, as the end of
the recruiting year posed the difficulty of producing enough information from a short survey so
that personnel would be willing to take it. In the battalion staff, headquarters element, 25 paper
surveys were handed to the staff, of which 11 were returned. Further, an electronic survey was
sent to every recruiter, NCO and company staff element (amounting to about 200 surveys sent
out) of which 38 were completed, and 89 additional started. Due to the limitations of the
program where the survey online was completed, the 89 which were began but not completed are
not included in the final report. While the survey should have provided the most insight, the
limitations and lack of desire for staff to complete (or possibly time limits in their respective
positions) still allowed for some valuable insight. However, it should be noted that the
interviews provided the most information as did focus groups and observation, even without the
primary survey as a strong enough method of data collection.
Thusly, through the in-depth observational analysis, interviews, survey questionnaires
and focus groups a better interpretive review of the organization and potential directions for the
future could be gained.

21. ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS AS A LENS TO VIEW SEATTLE RECRUITING BATTALION
One of the most important means to understand the communication within Seattle
Recruiting Battalion is to recognize not only the extensive network it covers, but also how the
interactions of the different hierarchies within the battalion operate and communicate amongst
themselves. ―Most of us have been taught to break things into manageable parts, to focus on a
single problem and look for its cause‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005). If looking for a single cause, the
battalion will use a Band-Aid to cover the bullet hole, rather than address the long-standing
communication issues and moving forward. There are far too many minor issues, and major
issues as well that defeat morale, decrease productivity and eliminate the command and control
the organization must have in order to function. In reviewing Seattle Recruiting Battalion, not
only the organization must be looked at, but the processes that define the organization as well—
whether they are inherent or implied.
In looking at Seattle Battalion as a system in and of itself, one must look at the
components that make up the system: ―If the components are units or departments, relationships
include authority (which departments have authority over which other), communication (which
departments communicate with one another), and work (where departments fit into the work-
flow of the organization; which departments work with which)‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005).
Secondly, in looking at the processes which define Seattle recruiting battalion, it was important
to also look at inherent and implied. The processes are much defined, though not recognized
throughout the battalion like this: ―A cake is created from separate ingredients, but a cake is
totally different from the assembled raw ingredients. In much the same way, an organizational
system is more than the sum of its individual members and units and their relationships with each

22. other.‖(Conrad & Poole, 2005). In this case there is no definition within the battalion of either
the organization, or the sum of its parts.
When interviews began within the battalion, the most common response to ―describe the
communication atmosphere here in battalion‖ was ―non-existent.‖ Implying that at its core, the
battalion itself not only lacked in-depth communication, but also a process that created
information flow within sections and between sections and the field. The concept of wholeness
here would be important, for if the battalion could become a whole system, or a whole team, with
a defined narrative and defined goal, then ―the variables can be defined independently, but their
influence is due to how they interact with each other‖ within the system. However, there must
first be a defined system and a defined process.
Therefore, in order to understand this process and the systems at work within the
battalion, analysis of both parts are reviewed. Throughout the remaining analysis of the systems
and subsystems within Seattle Recruiting Battalion, the audit will focus on the process of moving
forward with an eye to the battalion commander‘s construct of an egalitarian organization,
flattened at the top with a ―discipline in thought and deed.‖ (Robinson, 2011)
Since this study was vastly limited on time, it was impossible to discuss communication
within all of the systems and subsystems within the battalion. Therefore, only the 1-5 corridor
companies and stations available to the researcher were addressed, the further out from the
battalion the system or subsystem was, the less likely the researcher was to communicate with
them. However, it is important to note that within the battalion, subsystems such as station level
future soldiers, stations themselves and suprasystems such as the army advisory board do interact
with and influence the communication within the battalion. For example, the advisory board is
set up in order to bring a different notion of service to the population through interaction with

23. centers of influence such as business leaders, educational leaders and political leaders throughout
the state—however, the advisory board is limited to Washington State, and lacks sufficient
external funding to encompass all of the particular state at any given time.
Nonetheless, the data presented in the audit showed an acute breakdown of subsystems
defining roles, and key to being a ―mover and shaker‖ within the organization was defined
almost wholly by membership to certain sub-groups—implied membership or actual. Therefore
the main conclusions are as follows: The management teams (first line supervisors) see a need to
improve internal and external communications as well as institute training mechanisms
throughout the battalion, not only for the soldier staff but for the civilian staff as well. Those that
are not in leadership roles define a lack of communication throughout the battalion, and readily
place the blame on the ―flavor of the month,‖ however through observations rather than survey
and interview techniques, the flavor of the month ends up being someone who communicates
more often with battalion leadership for whatever given purpose. Further, there is a lack of
defined roles in the organization leaving everyone at every level to feel they have command and
control over things that should be elevated, regardless of the flatness of the organizational
hierarchy. The personnel within the organization often feel ―out of the loop‖ on numerous
topics, whether they are briefed to the individuals or the organization as a whole. The internal
communication mechanisms need a process; a strategy in order for personnel to feel inside the
organization, but this, in and of itself may breed more detriment to the process or systems
already in place.
In contrast, those in leadership roles feel they give the information needed to create the
products needed for mission success but feel limited because of lack of timely information from
higher level headquarters (brigade and command). However, the single greatest question raised

24. without a defined answer is: ―what would communication success look like for RY 2012?‖ This
question had as many answers as times it was asked, e.g., there was no battalion-level defined
response; that is to say, no one knew.
While line-staff did not participate in formal interviews, most personnel were asked off
line many of the questions relating to the interviews given to supervisors and battalion
leadership. Many expressed the notion that the company commanders of the organization are in a
new set of defined roles and that this could be where the communication breakdown, both
internally and externally could be stemming from. One interviewee explained it as this: ―In a
typical Army organization, the First Sergeant fills the role of an administrative driving force.
They ensure the soldier needs are met, while the commander would fill the role of operations,
making sure mission is met. Here in recruiting, those roles are reversed—long term for the first
sergeant, but only for a two year period with commanders.‖ Because the roles are reversed, and
reversed early on for first sergeants who have typically been in the recruiting field for years, the
first sergeant cannot guide the commander in a way that a typical ―line-unit‖ company command
group would function. Since this switch is so immediate and forceful for the new commander, it
is difficult to train them to communicate with battalion staff and their subordinates in a new way,
before it is time to have them move to their next Army position which will likely not be in
recruiting.
Interestingly, when asked about communication of initiatives throughout the battalion
footprint, only 18.75% of respondents felt that initiatives were communicated throughout the
footprint. The same question produced a response of neutral, some-what disagree, and disagree
strongly among over 45% of those surveyed. When asked to expand upon this question in an
interview setting many respondents either described where they believed the ―communication

25. breakdown‖ was, or said simply ―It‘s getting better, now.‖ If, however, ―Communication
effectiveness is often judged in terms of normative ideals, that is, those that are assumed to be
characteristic of properly functioning organizations,‖ (Downs & Adrian, 2004) then getting
better or placing blame does not create a cohesive environment to moving forward in
organizational communication at the battalion level.

26. THE DIVISIVE MIX OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL COMMUNICATION
Through observations and interviews, the audit showed a confused dynamic of formal
communication being disregarded, and informal communication being taken as initiative. Formal
Communication broke down first (during observation) from the communications office, who
organized a partnership game with a local sports franchise, but would not follow through on
information sharing until all the personnel had reported the names of the soldiers going. Because
the communication office held onto information in order to give it to everyone at once, improper
and inadequate information was given to the field and one soldier showed up in an improper
uniform at the last minute, unable to change into something more fitting for the event. (She wore
pumps and a skirt to an event wherein she had to help run a flag across a mud-soaked field at full
speed). This breakdown of formal communication led to a sense of animosity from the field
directed not only at the communications office but toward the entire battalion. Further the
statement was made during the same focus group: ―Nothing is going to change, no matter what
we say, no matter if we complain. The battalion leadership doesn‘t care, or they would take care
of the fact that people ‗up there‘ refuse to give us what we need to do our mission.‖ (Focus
Group, 2011). However, since this was a focus group, it must be noted that: ―Comments must be
interpreted in context as auditors try to get a ‗feel‘ for the organization and as they try to draw
out the subtle, complex aspects of organizational processes and relationships.‖(Downs & Adrian,
2004). In this case, there was very little subtlety, this subgroup of the organization felt alienated
and separate from the organization as a whole, and set out to ―just do our mission.‖(Focus
Group, 2011).
Further, within the realm of formal communication there were many narrative pieces
missing from the battalion. There has not been an update to the website, internal or external

27. since the battalion commander took over in 2010, there has not been an internal newsletter since
October 2010—and the battalion newsletters before that time told no narrative of the
organization, which would create a sense of organizational cohesion. There was no formal
internal email format unless there was a big event of change that needed to be addressed quickly.
However, one can argue that the biggest issue with internal communication within the battalion
is not that there is a lack of product for the organization, but rather a lack of organizational
narrative. In the narrative, it would be useful to explain that the battalion commander sees his
organization as a network—and sets the strategy accordingly. Because the organizational leader
emphasizes team-work in a flattened organization, the commander must ―be able to deal with
workforce management in a responsive, creative manner.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005). However,
because of past processes not being the same dynamic, personnel in the field do not know how to
react to the commander‘s ideal of egalitarian teamwork and instead say, ―If there is a set of rules
for our organizational dynamics, a hierarchy that should be followed,it should be implemented
without regard to other people‘s feelings.‖(Focus Group, 2011).
Informal communication is another matter entirely, because it stems from the same
inadequate processes that the formal communication of the battalion stems from. One
interviewee stated about the informal lines of communication that ―there is a lack of protocol,
there is no knowledge of how to manage civilian personnel, and because of that the bad
personnel will be here forever.‖ ((1), 2011). In this instance the interviewee was relating to
personnel who do not work within the dynamic of the office and because of inadequate personnel
staffing, those who are the most detriment to the organization will likely be there until they can
retire. Informal communication also began a rumor mill, which is alive and well throughout the
battalion. It is through these internal forms of rumor management that the subsystems in the

28. battalion thrive. Mentioned in the survey results were statements such as ―I get information from
those who ‗have the ear of the commander‘‖ and a disagreement with being able to go to the
command on any issue because ―I have seen informal discipline and shutting-out when someone
used the open-door policy.‖ It must be noted, however, that this may not be in direct relationship
to the current command—as the former command is brought up regularly as a description of
repression in the organization. Many informal interviews and anonymous surveys, however,
noted what was described as ―blatant favoritism‖ stemming from the command group—however,
analytically one can go back to the subsystems within the battalion lacking knowledge of who
really runs the office—even with the obvious statement that the commander does.
Nonetheless, it must be noted that these formal and informal communication breakdowns
were monitored in the battalion headquarters—and further, there were two subsystems that were
not in the mix of the informal communication lines: Logistics and Operations. While Logistics
stayed out of the rumor mill as a whole, and internalized all their processes in a very effective
manner, Operations took on the role of informing the battalion when the need presented itself.
While logistics sees not only ―a ton of informal norms‖ of communication within the
battalion, but also the network of ―confidants who are avenues of information‖ ((2), 2011), the
office as a whole communicates not only amongst themselves at a very high level, but also
throughout the battalion. However, the section supervisor mentioned a lack of personal
interaction during VCS (virtual classroom service) meetings and conferences. Further he notes
that there is not enough personal interface between the sections that the sections do not
understand that they are in actuality dependent upon each other.
Where the Logistics section tries to stay out of informal lines of communication, the
Operations section sets up processes to defeat them, taking on a role of informational gatekeeper

29. and releaser. The section has implemented information flows through in-depth taskings,
operational orders, and a streamlined avenue of share-point releases of PowerPoints and
informational papers. However, the section supervisor notes that it takes both sides for the
information to flow—for if he posts something there is no guarantee it will be read or followed,
regardless of how many people it pertains through in the battalion.
Formal meetings and the interaction gained during them were a definitive topic for the
audit analysis—for while all staff meetings rarely existed, instead less formal pot-lucks were
given for team-building and morale purposes two separate questions were asked with some-what
different responses.
Formal meetings accomplish what they should
Order Answer Responses Percent
1 I agree 12 32%
2 I somewhat agree 14 37%
3 I neither agree nor disagree 6 16%
4 I somewhat disagree 4 11%
5 I disagree 2 5%
And
There is a goal to face-to-face meetings and those goals are communicated clearly
to those in attendance.
Order Answer Responses Percent
1 I agree 10 26%
2 I somewhat agree 19 50%
3 I neither agree nor disagree 6 16%
4 I somewhat disagree 1 3%
5 I disagree 2 5%

30. In this case, 69% of respondents agreed in some manner that formal meetings accomplish
what they should, but 76% reported that there was a purpose to meetings, and the purpose is
communicated. It should be further noted, that generally formal meetings are held between the
battalion executive officer and the staff supervisors or leads and this response group is from the
field organizations. However, when the staff-sections only are looked at in the survey, there is a
higher propensity for the answer of ―neither agree nor disagree‖ with a write-in of ‗sometimes‘
being included mostly by section leads. Generally section members do not feel adequately
communicated with regarding the meetings their supervisors went to.
Therefore the first major conclusion is that within the lack-of-narrative philosophy, there
is a lack of communication between staff leads and staff as well as between commanders and
non-commissioned officers. Again, this audit returns to most personnel feeling that they are in
charge of every-day decisions (and profess such through the informal communications in the
battalion) and leaders (especially those in undefined roles) acting as gatekeepers of information.
It is also important to remember that this organization is a new network organization – it has not
been egalitarian as it is now, before the new commander took the reins. Therefore, ―It is often not
easy to determine who is responsible for what in network organizations. Unless units [within the
organization]specifically work out how they will coordinate activities and constantly
communicate with each other, important things can fall through the cracks.‖(Conrad & Poole,
2005).
In returning to the divisive nature of the informal and formal communications channels, it
is important to note that this commander has a liberal open door policy, and tries to walk through
the organization at regular intervals in order to gain the feel of the organization at that time.
(Robinson, 2011). The commander observes regularly, and communicates on many levels with

31. the organizational members, however the chief of staff is the executive officer—he is tasked with
implementing the commander‘s intent through the formal channels of communication. It should
be noted also, that over 65% of the organization stated that they agree with the statement: ―I can
go to the command on any issue.‖ Considering the nature of the responses in retrospect the audit
should have included the question: ―when I go to the command, my grievances are heard and
addressed.‖ The problem therefore is not the formal or informal lines of communication, but the
centralized units those two conflicting notions breed—and the informal rigidity now seen in the
headquarters. ―Another reason why networks tend to become rigid is that the units in highest
prestige, centrally, and closeness tend to grow more powerful over time. They have the
information that other units do not have; they enjoy the status due to their centrality; they can
control the flow of information.‖(Conrad & Poole, 2005).
Another notable piece of information was the lack outside the battalion headquarters
knowledge of the subsystem of the grass roots advisory board. The Fusion Cell, the Command
Leadership, and Operations all knew the intent and function of the board, but the recruiter level
was blissfully unaware. Because the board can be such an important part of the battalion
communication process, this lack of knowledge was telling in that an outside, volunteer
organization that can really help mission accomplishment in fitting within the commander‘s key
values is unknown and underutilized. Over 60% of the headquarters staff wrote in ―N/A‖ or ―I
don‘t work with the WSAAB‖ on their surveys on all three questions relating to the board.
While 27% percent of the field stated they agree or somewhat agree that ―I am regularly told of
advisory board help available.‖ 32% of the field understood the purpose of the advisory board,
and 34% of the recruiter force believes the board is effective in meeting mission goals. By
engaging this subsystem in the communication plan of the organization, further productivity and

32. recruiting use can be met. The board was created in 2009 and one survey responded: ―The long-
term effectiveness of the board may not ever be realized.‖
Two other notable trends noted were lack of civilian training, and lack of supervisor stake
in training across the board, as well as lack of future soldier communication skills. Since future
soldiers communication skills is, while not entirely separate from this audit, a system in and of
itself, it should be addressed separately as a training module for the staff and NCO‘s who need to
know how to communicate with this new generation of recruits.
Overall, while many interviewers stated there is always room for improvement within the
battalion communication methods, most noted that it did not affect their personal job satisfaction.
Again, this audit was limited on time, and not all personnel were involved in the study—the
interviews were generally conducted at battalion headquarters.
Since this organization showed such a pervasive interdependence on formal and informal
communication channels, it was impossible not to review one without alluding to the other. And
since informal communication channels are opened during meetings, holding those via VCS may
not ensure camaraderie or esprit de corps are built in more formal, recognized ways.

33. ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION AS STRATEGY
Every military organization has a strategy to implement in order to meet mission
requirements, and within this rule, Seattle Recruiting Battalion is no different. It is one thing,
however to have a strategy, it is another entirely to express that strategy to the soldiers tasked to
implement and follow through on strategy. Within the term as used by Seattle recruiting
battalion it is important to remember:
1) ―The term strategy derives from the ancient Greek term for ―artifice‖ or ―trick,‖ and
its early use referred to suppressing the enemy in battle.‖
2) ―The person who conceived the strategy, the strategos, was a general‖ (in this case a
Lt. Col.).
3) They knew that situations often changed and the strategos had to adapt. In our day
too strategy has an element of improvisation and cannot follow a rigid plan.‖
(Conrad & Poole, 2005)
A srategy therefore of defining a narrative of the organization, of implementing change
and following through must come from not only the commander, but across the levels of staff
leads. If the organization is going to be flattened at the top and more egalitarian, it must be so in
all respects, or further rigidness will ensue, and those percieving themselves to have positions of
power over others with naturally move to enforce their notion of power-holding. It may seem
counter-productive, but a standard of conduct, or a standard of information sharing must be
developed, implemented and disseminated throughout the battalion footprint. While the
commander has a leadership philosophy, a set of key values, there is no connecting of the dots
amongst the staff elements in order to see the communication vision through.

34. Since ―communication is generally defined as a process through which people, acting
together, create, sustain, and manage meanings through the use of verbal and non-verbal signs
and symbols withing a particular context,‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005) the strategy of the battalion
communication must include all those parts. Through the analytical review of the surveys and
interviews, the battalion currently has the people and management of meanings, but is lacking in
the acting together, (not in the notion of one on one conversation, but as a team) nor can they
create or sustain the processes there to provide the command with proper communications. ―Just
as we created relationships through conversation, we also create organizations through
conversation,‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005) therefore without a narrative of the organization, a story
that makes Seattle Recruiting Battalion unique, the organization can not be created in a flattened
way without stakeholders pushing the conversation forward—and further, being heard by the
inteded recievers. ―The miracle of organizational communication processes is that they allow
large numbers of people, from very different backgrounds, ways of thinking, needs and goals to
coordinate their actions and create ―organizations‖ that at least seem to be stable containers
within which information flows from person to person.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005).
In reviewing the communication as a strategic notion, also, within the battalion, what
would success for 2012 look like? Several staff members were asked this question during the
interview process, and always a numerical quotient was given. The general consensus, therefore
was ―success would bring the battalion to number x on the list of battalions within USAREC.‖ If
the audit takes this at face value, that a numerica quotient exists so that the battalion can describe
how well or how poorly they are doing, then certainly a strategy must exist to bring that
numerical score to fruition. The strategy, therefore of narrative of the organization and
organizational goals must be vocalized and realized by all levels of staff.

35. STAFF MOTIVATION
Since Seattle Recruiting Battalion is inherently hierarchical (by nature as a military
organization), but with a staff level of a networked organization, defining what will engage staff
motivation is difficult at best. Since networked staffs are generally motivated through three
defined processes, we will look at those:
1) A network of trust. ―Trust is the ideal cement for the network organizations. They
have little or no hierarchy, so hierarchy cannot be a source of authority to coordinate
control.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005)
2) Inspiration or meaningful tasks. ―A meaningful task or goal can inspire units and
individuals in the network to work hard and ensure they coordinate with other units.‖
(Conrad & Poole, 2005)
3) Formal systems of monitoring and control. ―Networked systems may attempt to
develop structures to formally coordinate unit activities.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005)
Therefore within these three frames of reference, where would Seattle Recruiting
Battalion stand, according to the communication audit study conducted? Since trust was
not formally reviewed, only analysis of the information provided can be rendered.
Earlier, a communication breakdown in the communications office produced animosity
from the field recruiters to the battalion staff and command, in one mentioned instance.
However, considering that the follow-on statement was ―Nothing is going to change, no
matter what we say, no matter if we complain. The battalion leadership doesn‘t care, or
they would take care of the fact that people ‗up there‘ refuse to give us what we need to
do our mission‖ (Focus Group, 2011) one could deduce that trust is not inherant in the

36. organization as it now fucntions-especially between certain staff elements and the field-
force.
Next, we look at inspiration, and meaningful tasks. The battalion commander states as
one of his key values, Personal and Professional Excellence: ―There are no monitary gains such
as bonuses or monetary based awards in our business for soldiers. The drive within personnel
must come from inside them to exceed the standards set before all other soldiers and give 110%
to our mission. The desire to recruit to our market potential rather than our mission emphasizes
this personal and professional excellence.‖ (Robinson, 2011). In this context there is a need for
inherant good deeds done for the betterment of the organization. However, there is little
insipration, nor description of meaningful tasks within the organization.
Finally, formal systems of conduct and control. While the battalion is flattened and
egalitarian at the top, there currently is no established method of recourse if a staff member is not
meeting their fair share of duties, or keeping with their end of the organizational bargin. Because
there is so little recourse, staff members revert to ―the way its always been done,‖ and rarely are
inadequacies at the staff level adressed. To be fair, while this is an anaylisis from empircal
evidence given in the form of focus groups and interviews, there is a difficulty in removing
difficient civilian personnel and senior soldiers from certain positions because of the lengthly
paperwork process required by the Office of Personnel Management and Humand Resources
Command. The process of couseling and removing those who do not adhear to the battalion
mentality may in essence breed the lack of buy-in of the commanders organizational structure at
the staff level.

37. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
Through focus groups, interviews, survey questionares and observational analysis, Seattle
Recruiting Battalion can be viewed through many interpretive lenses as certain models of
organizational behavior. The complex network of structures, from the traditional heirarchy seen
in the field to the flattened egalitarian nature of the organizational headquarters staff, serve as an
interesting mix of dynamics. Through a systematic look at the different organizational levels
that the communication between those involved, each individual, section and subsystem within
the organization views the organization and by proxy its communication differently.
Strengths fo the organization as defined by the audit:
1) The battalion as a whole generally strives for success at the individual and organizational
level. Every person interviewed or spoken with described recognition that there is always
room for improvement, and that they want to improve as a organization.
2) Staff officers and civilians generally have a good communicative relationship—they
work together as a team, or strive to. Further, communication between the executive
officer (chief of staff) and staff supervisors is also good.
3) Proceedures and processes of communicating the commanders intent to the field are
currently being set up, and the process is moving forward.
Weaknesses of the organization as defined by the audit are as follows:
1) There is little buy-in at the staff level of the commander‘s initiatives, reccomondations
and desire to generate a egalitarian networked organization.

38. 2) External communication is non-existant, and internal communication suffers without a
battalion narrative to engender the staff, recruiters and future soldiers to the positive
relationship the commander desires with the community.
3) The informal communication channels are devisive and often dismiss the formal
communication sent out by the command. Rumors abound throughout the battalion,
though in more hushed terms than previously noticed by the command.

39. CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMONDATIONS
A change of the magnitude the Seattle Recruiting Battalion is in the middle of cannot
ever take place in a singe meeting, memo or communication audit. However, certain issues and
reccomondations to those issues must be addressed at the staff level because ―the flatness of
networked organizations necessitates a negotiator for the manager.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005).
Failing to negotiate in a flattened organization or communicate across the disciplines within the
organization can lead to burn out, turn-over and loss of highly productive and motivated
individuals who can move the battalion forward in the coming years.
When asked what one would do if they were in charge for a day, one respondent said: ―I
would enforce the nature of the hierarchical organization. I would ensure enforcement and
follow-though were adheared to and that no one individual on the staff had more of a say than
anyone but the commander.‖ ((3), 2011). This juxtapostion of the commanders intent of a
flattened organization and a reoccuring theme of ―lack of command and control‖ should be
addressed as soon as possible. Without staff buy-in of a flattened organization, the commander
is viewed as weak and ineffectual by the traditional hierarchical standards of a military
organization. In describing his purpose as part of the greater narrative of the organization, a
better buy in from the staff level may be possible and create a better sense of unity and
coheision.
That being said, if the commander is going to be egalitarian, be egalitarian. Nowhere in
in networked organizations can (perceived) favortism take place without creating a more (non)
traditional hierarchy. One staff member commented during an interview, ―It‘s all about who can
talk to the commander, who he wants to hear.‖ ((2), 2011). If moving forward in the direction of
an innovative, productive team who works for the good of the organization is the desired effect

40. of this transition of organizational behavior, the commander must be egalitarian in responding to
individual‘s voices. Ideas and processes seem to be stiffled, according to the feelings of certain
staff members based on percieved favoritism. If ideas and processes are addressed accordingly,
heard, then innovation and production can increase. The innovation and production can not be
quantified by monetary value either, to borrow a quote from Steve Jobs, ―It‘s not about money.
It‘s about the people you have, how you‘re led, and how much you get it.‖ (Valentino-DeVries,
2011). The team mentality must be fostered at the local level, and internal customer service must
be expanded upon.
While being completely egalitarian may not be feasible right away—the very nature of
the positions within the battalion dictate that at some points some subsystems are in fact more
important than others, the notion of honest and transparent communication can be. A system of
communicating not only within the organization can be created, in the form of something simple
like a weekly email from the battalion commander or executive officer telling the office
personnel where they stand as a battalion. If the key values are going to be implemented at the
battalion level to be disseminated throughout the companies as well, explain that. Why is this
direction being pursued? ―Team-based organizations should give rewards to teams rather than
basing salaries and promotions individual performance. But most people are accustomed to
expect rewards based on an individual basis, as specified in the traditional strategy and passed on
to the relational strategy.‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005).
However, in direct relationship to moving forward, the battalion can certainly implement
some form of participatory decision making. If the organization will be involved in a flattening
at the top, and buy-in can be achieved, by following through on a program of PDM, though time-
consuming, morale should increase, as well as buy-into the tenants of leadership and key values

41. in relationship to Seattle Recruiting Battalion‘s stated mission for RY2012. Nonetheless,
―Regardless of its particular form, PDM will increase organizational performance only if certain
requirements are met:
1) Subordinates must want to be involved in the decision making…
2) Supervisors must be willing to allow their subordinates participate legitimately…
3) The issues being discussed must be important to the participants…
4) All the participants must have expertise and information relevant to the problems
being discussed…
5) Managers must foster and support the beliefs, values, and attitudes neccisary to
legitimate participatory systems…‖ (Conrad & Poole, 2005).
In engaging and creating a new form of PDM, it could take the simple form of opening
the lines of staff communication through formal or informal meeting held in the conference
room. By inviting participants within the flattened organization, this will foster a desire of
organizational involvement, provide them with a legitimate say in the organization and its
processes, validate experience and knowledge of individuals on the team, and create a sense of
connectedness to the organization.
Further, the organization must have an external voice. This notion goes without saying,
except it is not being utilized. In this time of lowered budget for advertising, the battalion must
learn to actually communicate and not rely on the tired methods used when they had a budget 4
times the size it is currently. Again, the researcher must take certain ownership in this lack of
external voice—as it was her position before it was eliminated. The information for continuing
an external communication program is at the battalion level, perhaps in hands that cannot
implement them. Just as an internal narrative must be constructed, so must the external

42. narrative—the website must be updated, communication lines with the media and potential
external publication produced on the web should be looked into. Not one media advisory or
press release could be found to review for current operations. This information, as stated above is
in the hands of the battalion, as well as templates in constructing a battalion story—it was
expected to be reviewed during the audit process, but instead the information was not found in
the communications office. This is wholly the responsibility of the researcher and not the
battalion leadership or communications office—for not providing it to the communications office
and instead following the process of the fusion cell. The external media, or bloggers or even
potential recruits do not hear about the battalion and its education initiatives in the community
through new media or word-of-mouth. If market share is going to be reached for RY 2012, new
innovative ways of communicating with the target demographic must be implemented or the
battalion will recruit numbers and not the high quality recruits it is capable of recruiting. In
recruiting those high-quality recruits, therefore, the battalion can be a force of shaping the Army
of the future, they can have a say in the next generation of soldiers.
Finally the single thing most lacking in the organization and which should be addressed
first, is the team. The team needs more informal methods of communication. Setting up training
and conferences via VCS, while generally more productive, does not allow for interaction and
engagement. The organization all sits at their desks during VCS meetings, without cross-talk, or
innovative ideas during the meetings. ―But innovation comes from people meeting up in the
hallways or calling each other at 10:30 at night with a new idea, or because they realized
something that shoots holes in how we‘ve been thinking about a problem. It‘s ad hoc meetings of
six people called by someone who thinks he has figured out the coolest new thing ever and who
wants to know what other people think of his idea.‖(Valentino-DeVries, 2011). Without the

43. cross-talk in meetings or the internal search of those new ideas, a flattened and transparent
organization will do nothing. Without a team really honestly being a team, and with a narrative
to move the organization forward, the hierarchy will return, and everyone in the organization will
return to their independent, ―it‘s not in my job description‖ mentality.

44. Bibliography
(1), A. (2011, 09 30). (M. Shartel, Interviewer)
(2), A. (2011, 10 03). Communication in Seattle Battalion. (M. Shartel, Interviewer)
(3), A. (2011, 09 30). Seattle Recruiting Battalion Communication. (M. Shartel, Interviewer)
Seattle Recruiting Battalion. (2009). Retrieved September 20, 2011, from
http://www.usarec.army.mil/6thbde/6lbn/
Conrad, C., & Poole, M. S. (2005). Strategic Organizational Communication in a Global
Economy. Belmont, Ca: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.
Downs, C. W., & Adrian, A. D. (2004). Assessing Organizational Communication. New York,
NY: The Guilford Press.
Focus Group, 7. C. (2011, 09 22). Communications Audit Focus Group Meeting. (M. Shartel,
Interviewer)
Robinson, L. C. (2011, 10 09). Seattle Army Recruiting Battalion Commander. (M. Shartel,
Interviewer)
Valentino-DeVries, J. (2011, 08 24). Washington Street Journal Blogs. Retrieved 10 09, 2011,
from Digits: http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/08/24/steve-jobss-best-quotes/

45. The following Appendices should follow from here:
1) Example of Battalion Newsletter
2) Example of Media Advisory
3) Example of In-processing checklist
4) Example of Tasking Email
5) Example of OPORDER
6) Example of Social Media OPORDER (sent from USAREC)
While the researcher saw these items, they were not provided in a timely enough manner
to include in this final product.