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Lori McDonald
Prof. Lloyd Totty
IMAG 1101 Imagery Intelligence
April 30, 2014
Counterintelligence
Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to protect
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on
behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not
including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs.–Executive
Order 12333.1
Since the founding of the United States, counterintelligence is considered by many to be
one of the most important tools for our national security. The threat from foreign intelligence
and foreign entities has increasingly become more intricate, diverse, and more difficult to
counter than ever before. Counterintelligence has the job of defending the nation from both of
internal and external aggression. According to the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive, counterintelligence has both a defensive mission and an offensive mission for
protecting the nation. It must protect the nation’s secrets and assets against foreign intelligence
penetration, as well as find out what foreign intelligence organizations are planning to be able to

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counter those efforts. Counterintelligence is considered by many to be a highly specialized kind
of investigative work. According to Roy Godson, it is the identification and neutralization of a
threat posed by foreign intelligence services, and the manipulation of those services for the
manipulator’s benefit.1
Good intelligence practices depends on adequate and competent
counterintelligence programs to be able to provide the warning and protective measures against
those that have malicious intent against the United States and its sovereignty. The need for
counterintelligence throughout U.S. history has not gone away, and is not likely to in the future.
The United States, as a world superpower, will be the constant target of jealousies, resentments,
rivalries, and challenges to its economic well-being, security, and leadership in the world. 5
Although everyone in this country may not agree on the priorities or specifics of how
counterintelligence is conducted, there is no denying the fact that counterintelligence is essential
as a strong national priority.
Counterintelligence: The American Revolution
Counterintelligence in American history has its roots in the establishment of the first
American colonies prior to the revolutionary war and the formation of the United States as an
independent country. General George Washington was America’s first master spy.2
He made
excellent use of counterintelligence strategies, but never created an organization to coordinate
defensive counterintelligence or coordinate its activity. 3
Throughout the revolutionary war he
misled the British on many occasions. He also ran one of the largest espionage operations in
U.S. history through the use of deception, secret ink, informants, and covert action.2
One of the
more notable figures in early U.S. history for counterintelligence was John Honeyman. Playing
the role of a British spy, he was sent to Trenton New Jersey to watch the British. There he was
“caught” and “imprisoned” as a by Washington’s troops, then later “escaped” as a front to the

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British to gain their trust. He then went to the British and provided misinformation about how
the U.S. troops were badly disorganized and not ready for battle.2
The British, believing this
information to be true, were then able to be exploited by Washington in a surprise attack the day
after Christmas. Tactics such as this in early counterintelligence were commonplace; as
deception was the main tool utilized to misinterpret strength or weakness.2
Right at the onset of
the American Revolutionary War, the first patriot organization for counterintelligence was
created in New York in 1776 to 1778. 3
Called the Committee (later Commission) for Detecting
and Defeating, its role was to collect intelligence on and apprehend British spies and suspected
sympathizers. They also had the power to arrest, convict, jail, or deport those suspected of
supporting the British. The first director of this committee was John Jay. He was known as the
first chief of American counterintelligence.3
Several other members of this organization such as
Nathaniel Scott, Col. William Duer, and Capt. David Gray were able to use counterintelligence
measures to seek out and expose British agents, as well as mislead British troops by posing as
sympathizers that were “caught” by American forces and later “escaped” with information
designed to manipulate British actions. 3
Another well-known Revolutionary War figure, Col.
Benjamin Tallmadge, also played a role in early counterintelligence. The chief of the British
secret service, Maj. Andre, was reported through U.S. sources to be in contact with a “John
Anderson” who was expecting a surrender of a “major patriot installation”.3
Tallmadge learned
that “Anderson” had passed through the lines and was on his way to General Benedict Arnold,
the commander of West Point. Tallmadge had his forces find and apprehend “Anderson”, who
admitted his true identity as Maj. Andre. Benedict Arnold, learning that Andre was captured and
had most likely exposed him as a traitor, fled West Point before he could be captured and joined
the British forces. Without the use of effective counterintelligence, important military stations

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such as West Point may have been lost to British power, and the conclusion of the Revolutionary
War may have had a different outcome. With the close of the Revolutionary War and the
establishment of a new nation, there were many different opportunities to create a
counterintelligence service; however it wasn’t until the Civil War that a federal agency created a
counterintelligence agency.3
Counterintelligence in the American Civil War
Six weeks after the election of Pres. Lincoln, South Carolina seceded from the Union. In
February of 1861, Louisiana, Texas, Georgia, Alabama, Florida and Mississippi followed,
forming the Confederate States of America. When President Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers
after Fort Sumter was fired upon in April 1861, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina and
Tennessee joined the Confederacy. 4
This was the onset of the Civil War. At the beginning,
neither the North or South had any significant intelligence or counterintelligence capability; and
leaders operated their own espionage rings. President Lincoln was concerned that the capital
was permeated with southern sympathizers, so he elected Allan Pinkerton to take on the role as
counterintelligence chief. 4 Pinkerton was very effective in stopping the flow of intelligence to
the Confederacy. He also was an important player in intelligence gathering in 1861 and 1862
when he organized a system for intelligence gathering and double agents to obtaining military
information in the Southern states.4
The Confederacy did not formerly establish a Secret Service
Bureau until November 1864; with the conclusion of the war being in April 1865.4
The full
extent of the Confederacy's counterintelligence operations and activities will never be known due
to Judah Benjamin, the Secretary of State for the confederacy. As the Union Army entered
Richmond, he ordered all espionage records to be burned.

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As the country advanced towards the beginning of WWI, the U.S. had little to no functioning
intelligence organization with any capability for counterintelligence operations. The modern
concept of a counterintelligence community did not exist. Even with this deficit of
counterintelligence capability, in March 1892 the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was
created. It was considered by the U.S. government to be one of the most reliable and
authoritative source of information with regard to foreign military affairs.6
To be adequately
prepared for WWI, the War College in 1917 organized the Military Intelligence Section, or
MIS.3
The new MIS was headed by Major Ralph Van Deman. The initial threat addressed by
federal officials was the activity of German agents, including sabotage and espionage directed at
the United States in the period before America entered the war. In the MIS, Van Deman
distinguished the difference between positive intelligence and negative intelligence. Positive
intelligence is the action of gaining information on the enemy. Negative intelligence denies
information to the enemy. Until this point, the intelligence community did not have a specific
focus on counterintelligence, and did not specifically distinguish between positive and negative
intelligence. The MIS was in charge of policies, plans, collecting, and control of espionage and
counterespionage activities. Until the MIS developed these policies and guidelines, the War
Department had never previously collected counterintelligence information.2
After the WWI
began and the draft had been implemented, the MIS investigators believed that the military had
been infiltrated by enemy agents and sympathizers. Congress strengthened the ability of federal
investigations by enacting the Espionage Act of 1917 to assist the war effort.6
This led to the
MIS creation of an extensive network of clandestine agents in the Army made up of intelligence
officers from the U.S. civilian population.2
The growing number of incident reports generated

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by this system prompted the expansion of the MIS, and led to the formation of the Corps of
Intelligence Police, or CIP. 3
While Military Intelligence started out as simply a division of the
War College, it evolved into its own branch, the Military Intelligence Division (MID) when the
War College Division was abolished. 2
In September of 1918 the supervision of all the
counterintelligence operations was transferred from the positive branch to the negative branch.
This allowed for censorship to deny the flow of information to the enemy, as there were concerns
about Mexico providing Germany with information about the U.S. 2
The counterintelligence
efforts of the Secret Service, the Bureau of Investigation (later the FBI), and War Department's
Military Intelligence and Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence were insignificant and not
coordinated and unprepared to deal with the disingenuous espionage and sabotage ring organized
in the United States by German Ambassador Johann von Bernstorff. 6
Counterintelligence in the World Wars
Between WWI and WWII, there were several advances in developing agencies that
helped to further the counterintelligence community, although it lacked the structure that we
know today. In 1939, the Counterintelligence Branch was established in the Army’s MID. Also
in June of 1939 the president assigned all investigations of espionage and counterespionage to
the MID and the ONI, however later in that year in September the president reallocated those
responsibilities solely to the FBI.6
After WWI, intelligence was not handled in a coordinated
manner, and there was a serious lack of coordination between the Navy and Army intelligence.
This was a significant failure on behalf of the intelligence community. The surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor in 1941 was a direct result of this failure at the inception of WWII. With the
American leaders unanimously stating “never again” with respect to the failure at Pearl Harbor, a

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centralized intelligence structure was established. 2
In 1942, President Roosevelt enacted several
changes to aid in the ability of the intelligence community to be able to foresee and handle
threats from foreign national powers, and also created new departments to accomplish this. He
established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), and
the Counterintelligence Corps (CIC). 2
The OSS included specialists in many fields of language,
history, geography and economics, while the MIS performed various types of reconnaissance, as
well as analyzing signals and photo intelligence. 2
Together these groups helped strengthen the
nation’s counterintelligence ability. The CIC specifically addressed both the need and
importance of accurate, timely, and relevant counterintelligence. They recruited and trained
Army personnel to perform in their division to be able to perform security investigations and sent
detachments overseas. They also responsible for oversight on the Manhattan Project where the
Atomic bomb was developed and tested, as well as following U.S. forces into combat and
capturing German Scientists and work they were doing on developing their own atomic bombs or
rockets. 2
After the conclusion of WWII, the CIC also played an important role in bringing to
justice Nazis and war criminals. They completely infiltrated the enemy and countered any acts
of sabotage through assisting local authorities promote law and order, taking control of enemy
headquarters and arresting enemy agents. They also halted the spread of Nazi propaganda by
gaining control of radio and communications, as well as gaining many strategically important
informants. 2

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Post WWII: The Korean War, the Red Scare and beginning of the Cold War era
For this part in American counterintelligence history, it is important to describe the
beginning of the American Communist Party (CPUSA), as this was a time period of great tension
and fear of communism and Soviet control. The CPUSA was developed at the same time as the
large rings of Soviet espionage groups in the United States. 6
The CPUSA was founded in 1919
in Chicago and was an outgrowth of the Socialist Party, founded in 1900. 6
The early CPUSA
had an overwhelming majority of members that were of Jewish decent, and were foreign born
from Russian or other Eastern European nations. In the 1920s, the US government attempted to
penalize Communists for alleged spy activities. Many states even enacted laws denying members
of the Communist Party the right to hold public office or to obtain public jobs.6
In the 1940s,
states tried to deny jobs or force out members of the Communist party again, but the Supreme
Court ruled against it. The American historian Richard Hofstadter suggested that periodically in
American history, during times of great worry, many individuals turn to “conspiracy theories” to
explain their anxieties. The early post–World War II scene was such a period.6
The peace that
the American public expected after defeating the Nazis was not there, and they attributed that as
the result of widespread treason.6
The fear of the country being inundated with communist
supporters undermining American prosperity and overtaking those in government is referred to
as the Red Scare. 7
There were two main periods of time that the Red Scare was the most
pronounced. President Harry Truman was slowed down with the situation in Korea, and was
unwilling to commit the resources to win because the United States had to build up NATO to
defend Europe.6
As a result he did not focus on the Communist threat, and was deemed by
some right-wing politicians as being soft on communism, In 1945, President Truman abolished

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the OSS in favor of the formation of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). As a stronger force for counterintelligence, the CIA’s main
objective was to coordinate national security intelligence.2
Following the conclusion of WWII,
much of the counterintelligence structures and systems from the U.S. Army and Air Force were
dismantled. This again, left a deficit of structure and strength in the intelligence community the
U.S. unprepared for the onset of the Korean War. The absence of serious and consistent
counterintelligence gave an open opportunity to the spread of communist espionage within
American government and industry. In the mid 1930’s, the FBI’s initiated their
counterintelligence program, however it wasn’t until the 1950’s that it had any real effect on
Communist espionage.7
On September 23, 1949, Truman announced that the USSR had exploded an atomic
device.6
This had a drastic impact on the US national security policy. This even started a fear in
the American public that began the Second Red Scare, which was a major contributing factor in
start of the Cold War.7
As the leader of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover greatly expanded his efforts to
undermine communist espionage efforts, and required loyalty oaths for all government
employees.6
The second Red Scare was more popularly known as “McCarthyism” after its is
most famous supporter Senator Joseph McCarthy. During that time he challenged anyone he
suspected of being a communist, which probably hindered any real investigation into actual
espionage more than it helped it.7
Following the revelation that the Soviets had atomic
capabilities that many feared they would use against the United States, the FBI investigated the
advancement of the newfound Soviet abilities and were able to decrypt material that indicated
the presence of a spy within the Manhattan project.7
They found Klaus Fuchs as their suspect.
Fuchs, who was Jewish and a member of the CPUSA, had previously been a member of the

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German Communist party and had fled Germany when the Nazis took over. During FBI
questioning, he confessed to revealing secrets of the Manhattan Project to Soviet intelligence,
and named a second man, Harry Gold as his courier of information.6
When the FBI questioned
Gold, it began one of the biggest espionage cases in U.S. history. Gold named co-conspirator
David Greenglass as another person responsible for leaking atomic secrets. Greenglass, when
interrogated, fully confessed to his involvement and agreed to full cooperation with the FBI. He
named his sister and brother-in-law, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg as his accomplices and leaders
of a Soviet Communist espionage ring.6
Julius Rosenberg worked on classified projects for the
Army Signals Corps from 1940 to 1945 until his membership in the CPUSA became widely
known. When the Rosenberg trial began in 1951, they were found guilty for conspiracy and
were sentenced to death. 6
This case was a milestone for the FBI’s counterintelligence
capabilities and respect gained by world entities.
The Cold War from 1947 to 1991 put the counterintelligence as well as intelligence
capabilities of the U.S. to the test. Every president during this period beginning with Harry
Truman had to design its foreign policy around the overwhelming fact that the United States was
in a potentially fatal competition with the Soviet Union. To the Counterintelligence Community,
this meant its resources and energy had to be focused on that threat.6
Called by some a
“bloodless war”, the Cold War was mainly a war of intelligence, counterintelligence, and
espionage. Tensions involving the Soviet Union along with its eastern allies, and the U.S. with
its allies, created a desire to prevent large scale fighting and the potential beginning of what
might become WWIII. At the height of the Cold War, there were as many as 80 different
intelligence agencies operating for or against one nation or another in Berlin.2

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From the 60’s to the 70’s: Counterintelligence during the Vietnam War era
The power of counterintelligence investigations and information is detailed information.
Agencies that deal with counterintelligence must be able to establish patterns, connections, and
associations to be able to provide accurate and relevant information. The problem with this
detailed information gathering in the 1960’s and 1970’s is the fear of the public that their rights
were being infringed upon because of the classified nature of much of the intelligence
community’s information collection techniques. The National Security Act of 947 provided the
CIA with the legal ability to “correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security,
and provide the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence”.8
It outlined the purpose of the
CIA to investigating in the field of foreign intelligence with respect to counterintelligence.
Internal security functions were to be the responsibility of the FBI and other law enforcement
agencies. The CIA in the early 1960’s was directed to produce intelligence for the benefit of
policy makers, such as the capabilities of Soviet weapons systems or strategies. They conducted
clandestine operations to collect foreign intelligence and carry out counterintelligence for agency
heads such as the Directorate for Intelligence, the DDI.8
The DDO, or Directorate for Operations
was the unit that was responsible for the collection of information through covert collection of
information by human sources on issues such as international terrorism.
Counterintelligence community members such as the CIA and the FBI have to protect
their collection methods and abilities with a degree of secrecy. The ability of these agencies to
protect these secrets is essential to their work as it can endanger those in the field; make certain
targets more available to terrorists or alert foreign government to collection ability and give them

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the knowledge to counter those actions. The conflict with these measures of secrecy in how these
departments operate and what secrets that they keep is the fear of the American public that their
rights were being infringed upon and their expectation of privacy from government interference
was being violated. The role of counterintelligence in 1954 was scrutinized by President
Eisenhower in a special committee headed by Gen. James Doolittle that was to examine the
covert activities of the CIA. The committee found that the importance of counterintelligence was
vital to the strength of the country, and supported its objectives.8
In 1970, the Huston Plan was
proposed to confront domestic unrest with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection
activities of the FBI, DIA, NSA, and CIA.8
The Huston Plan was not implemented, but an
Interagency Evaluation Committee was established by the Counsel to the President.
In 1952, the CIA and the FBI began the practice of opening mail that they identified as having
potential intelligence value. The CIA targeted mail addressed to and from the USSR while the
FBI was less discriminate on the mail they chose to open, and targeted individuals that were
involved in current cases. The practice continued until 1966 when it was terminated by J. Edgar
Hoover, who believed that higher Government officials would not support him in the use of
questionable investigative practices.8
During this time, there were also concerns by the American public over wiretaps
conducted by the FBI because of the possibility that it was being used against citizens in a
warrantless manner. In 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt issued a memorandum to the
Attorney General stating his view that electronic surveillance would be proper under the
Constitution for matters involving defense of the nation.8
In 1954, the unrestricted use of
microphone surveillance was authorized to Hoover for issues of national safety and security.8
However, in 1965, in a letter to the Attorney General, Director Hoover stated that with the

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“present atmosphere, brought about by the unrestrained and injudicious use of special
investigative techniques by other agencies and departments, resulting in Congressional and
public alarm and opposition to any activity that could in any way be termed an invasion of
privacy.”8
The practice of unrestrained wiretapping was then discontinued due to the concern of
violating American citizen’s 4th Amendment rights.
The Vietnam War also was a significant factor in the public mood and policies enacted
by the counterintelligence community. In this period from 1956 to 1975, being a publically
unpopular war, it exemplified public unhappiness with the government and what was perceived
as “big brother” and imperialism controlling the lives of U.S. citizens. The FBI’s
counterintelligence program was established in 1965 in response to the need to neutralize
individuals or organizations that advocated or participated in disorder on campuses and urban
riots and violence.
The U.S. Army during this era also established a more diversified branch to deal with the
increasing need for more refined counterintelligence. The U.S. Army Intelligence Command
(INSCOM) was established in 1965 to address this issue; however it was discontinued in 1974
and replaced with the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency. In mid-1965, the Military Assistance
Command counterintelligence resources were very limited.9
Under the staff supervision of the
Counterintelligence and Security Division of the Military Assistance Command, the 704th
Intelligence Corps Detachment provided counterintelligence support to the command and served
in an advisory role with the South Vietnamese Military Security Service.9
This was the extent of
the U.S. Army counterintelligence ability at the start of the war. Reorganization of the original
counterintelligence staff in 1965 reformed the Army Counterintelligence and Security Division

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to the Counterintelligence Division.
Continuing into 1966, Colonel Goodman of the U.S. Army worked closely with the
Military Security Service and increased the counterintelligence ability of the Army with the
deployment of counterintelligence teams to each province of South Vietnam. These teams
participated regularly in combined operations; however the lack of linguists and the inability to
blend inconspicuously with the Vietnamese made the combined operations with English
speaking Vietnamese essential. By 1967, the counterintelligence effort by the U.S. Army finally
began to become more functional with the War effort. 9
The 135th MI group assumed the role
of executing the counterintelligence mission by confronting the effects of anti-American
propaganda by the Vietnamese that was of particular concern to American soldiers, and to install
a security program to prevent sabotage and secure communications.9
The Vietnam War was
challenging to American armed forces because it was a different type of conflict than anything
that had been experienced by the United States. It mainly consisted of guerilla military tactics by
the opposition, to which American forces had a steep learning curve overcoming and
understanding the counterintelligence aspects involved.10
Along with the political turmoil that was caused by the Vietnam War, the fear of the
public for potential violations of their 4th amendment rights and distrust of the intelligence
community became a serious issue. In 1972, the Watergate scandal involved the break-in and
theft of information at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate
Complex in Washington D.C. This event was associated with the illegal and clandestine efforts
of Nixon administration officials during his reelection campaign.8
The five men arrested in
association with the break-in had past CIA ties, furthering the public mistrust of the government

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intelligence agencies. This fear of intelligence misuse was brought to a head in 1974 when the
New York Times published an article that accused the CIA of spying on the American public. To
address this problem, President Ford appointed a commission to look into these allegations. In
January of 1975, he signed an executive order creating the Commission on CIA activities.8
This
commission was named after Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, the chairman of the
commission. Its task was to investigate if the CIA had overstepped the boundaries safeguarding
4th amendment rights, and there were adequate procedures in place for intelligence and
counterintelligence activities. This commission foundseveral abuses by the CIA and the rights of
American citizens. As a result of the Rockefeller commission, the Civil Applications Committee
(CAC) was established in 1975.11
Its function was to provide communication between civil users
of intelligence and intelligence providers. As a response to a clear need for concise structure and
policy guiding intelligence and counterintelligence, in 1978 President Carter signed Executive
Order 12036 to reshape the structure of intelligence and provide detailed guidance on all aspects
of intelligence activities. In 1979, Executive Order 12139 addressed the exercise of authority
with electronic surveillance.8
It authorized the use of electronic surveillance for the purpose of
foreign intelligence purposes, without the need for a court order.8
The 1980’s: Counterintelligence Community Cooperation and Refinement
The 1980’s is referred in some texts as the decade of the spy. U.S. counterintelligence
either arrested or neutralized over 60 Americans who attempted or carried out acts of
espionage.11
While it was the cases against spy networks or agents that captured the attention of
the public, the most important milestone in counterintelligence during this decade was the
beginning of CI community cooperation. Careful to preserve the delicate balance between

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security and freedom, a broad range of improvements were made to the counterintelligence
community without adversely affecting the rights of individuals. A major counterintelligence
event that took place at this time was the signing of Executive order 12333 by President Ronald
Regan.11
Executive Order 12333 defined counterintelligence as “information gathered and
activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or
assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or
international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or
communications security programs.”11
This definition of counterintelligence is still used in the
CI community today. Executive Order 12333 is important in that it requires that agencies such as
the CIA coordinate with the FBI before conducting any foreign intelligence collecting activities
or counterintelligence. Likewise, the FBI must coordinate with the CIA before it does the same.11
In 1982, President Regan also signed the National Security Decision Directive-2. This Directive
further increased the sophistication in the intelligence community by developing standards and
doctrines for counterintelligence activities, as well as resolving any interagency differences
concerning the implementation of the new policies. 11
These further advances in
counterintelligence practices only served to strengthen the country’s ability to collect relevant
information, as well as correctly follow laws and statutes put into place to protect individual civil
liberties. The signing of these orders outlined the need for greater counterintelligence and
security awareness. In 1988, the Counterintelligence Center was created in the CIA. Its mission
was to improve coordination, management, effectiveness, and planning of counterintelligence
activities. This served the need for earlier involvement in cases of suspected espionage; and also
provides more timely and accurate information about suspect activities to strengthen U.S.
counterintelligence and security without violating constitutional rights. In 1989, President Bush

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signed the National Security Directive, which reorganized the structure of the National Security
Council.11
Threat analysis is now shared among U.S. counterintelligence, foreign intelligence
and security agencies. Development of an effective national counterintelligence strategy requires
centralized assessment of the threat posed. 11
Counterintelligence in the 1990’s through the end of the 20th Century
In the 1990’s through the year 2000 and beyond, the counterintelligence community continued to
improve its cooperation between CI community members, and refine its information collecting
capabilities to be among the best counterintelligence systems in the world. The use of satellites
and UAV technology innovated the way that the counterintelligence information was gathered
and utilized. After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the American public began to
believe that there was little need for collecting foreign intelligence or countering espionage.
However, in 1994 the nation was shocked when the FBI arrested Hazen Aldrich Ames, who was
a senior CIA officer that had been spying for almost a decade for the Russians.11
As a
consequence of Ames’ betrayal of the nation and compromise of national security radically
altered U.S. counterintelligence.11
Congress demanded change and wanted adjustments in
counterintelligence policy. To address this, President Clinton issued an Executive Order called
the Presidential Decision Directive NSC-24 in 1994, which reorganized counterintelligence.
Under this Order, the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB) was created to
coordinate CI activities and resolve interagency disagreements.11
Unlike previous similar
groups, the NACIPB reported to the National Security Council. In addition, the order created a
National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) to share and evaluate information regarding

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foreign intelligence.11
In 1995, Congress recognized that countries not previously considered
intelligence threats were stealing American technology and decided to take action.
In 1996, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, was signed by the President to address countries
that were stealing American technology.11
In 2002, the attacks of 9/11 led the Bush
administration to establish the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).12
Having both law
enforcement and intelligence responsibilities, it redefined the relationship between law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. 9/11 made it clear that intelligence efforts needed to
change quickly to meet the global threat of terrorism. Also with these attacks and the increased
threat from terrorist networks, there was an increased demand for imaging of the U.S. With
concern for the process of gathering these images, the Senate Intelligence Committee directed
the DCI to coordinate with NIMA and the NRO to provide a report on processes in which
satellites would be used 12
The Bush administration also implemented the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act in 2004, in which the Director of National Intelligence was created
as a replacement for the DCI.12
The DNI helped to further and coordinate its activities with law
enforcement. Because of the turmoil caused in the past with intelligence and counterintelligence
gathering practices interfering with the 4th amendment rights of U.S. citizens, there was what
some described as an intelligence and law enforcement “wall” with respect to sharing of
information that was gathered on U.S. persons.12
The newly created DNI along with the USGS
formed an Independent Study Group (ISG) to review these obstacles to the sharing of
information. As a result of the ISG, Homeland Security was suggested as an intermediary
between the intelligence community and law enforcement. To be able to accomplish this, a new
Domestic Applications Office, or DAO, was created. In 2007, the DNI designated Homeland
Security to take charge of another new office, the NAO.12
This caused concern about using spy

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satellites against the American public and infringing on their civil liberties. A hearing to address
these issues was conducted in 2007, where many civil liberties organizations criticized the
NAO.12
Bush addressed these concerns by establishing a framework for the NAO that ensured
that it followed the U.S. Constitution and existing laws. Another advancement made for the
counterintelligence community was the Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006. 12
In this Act, the
President, through the Attorney General, can authorize electronic surveillance for up to 45 days
if it is deemed necessary to protect the U.S. from terrorist activity. Once Bush left office and
President Obama was elected, his administration immediately began a review of the NAO, and
decided to abolish it. 12
The counterintelligence community: Practices and Policies Today
Today, counterintelligence is more than just what people see as traditional spies passing
U.S. secrets to foreign governments. It involves the activities those who would complete actions
against the prosperity of the U.S. such as stealing valuable trade secrets of American universities
or business, cyber threats, or economic sabotage. The FBI today is the lead agency for exposing,
preventing, and investigating intelligence activities on U.S. soil.13
Through the use of the
Counterintelligence National Strategy, the FBI continues to address threats using a full suite of
investigative intelligence capabilities.
Although the Counterintelligence National Strategy is classified, the overall goals are to
keep weapons of mass destruction and like technology from falling into the wrong hands. This
strategy is key for using intelligence to keep threats from becoming reality. Besides protecting
U.S. citizens from physically destructive forces such as WMD’s, the national strategy also strives

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to protect the secrets of the U.S. intelligence community, as well as protect the nation’s critical
assets such as advanced technologies and sensitive information in the defense, intelligence,
economic, financial, public health, and science and technology sectors. 13
It also performs the
more traditional role to counter the activities of international spies. Being able to achieve this
level of security involves strategic partnerships of sharing coordination of knowledge and
resources of the FBI, the U.S. intelligence community, other U.S. government agencies, and
global partners to combat foreign intelligence activities. 13
A new and emerging threat that is
receiving more emphasis each day is cyber security. FBI Counterintelligence Assistant Director
Frank Figliuzzi stresses the importance of deterring foreign-sponsored cyber intelligence threats
to government and private sector information systems. In an increasingly technologically savvy
world, “Sometimes, the bad guys don’t have to physically be in the U.S. to steal targeted
information…sometimes they can be halfway around the world, sitting at a keyboard.” 13
In the years since 9/11, the FBI has transformed itself into an intelligence-driven organization.
This is the most apparent in U.S. intelligence analyst program. Analyzing and disseminating
intelligence enables the FBI and it's domestic and international partners to get ahead of existing
and emerging threats. Prior to 9/11, there were approximately 1,000 intelligence analysts (IAs) in
the FBI. Now, there are more than triple that number. 13
The Directorate of Intelligence (DI)
manages all FBI intelligence activities and was established in 2005 as a key component of the
FBI’s National Security Branch. The entire intelligence analyst program is administered under
the DI, allowing intelligence and counterintelligence to be much more broadly and efficiently
connected to programs and current investigations. The FBI today is more than just a law
enforcement agency but also a national security intelligence entity.
The FBI’s national security mission is to lead and coordinate intelligence efforts that drive

21. 21
actions to protect the United States. 13
Their goal is to develop a comprehensive understanding
of the threats and penetrate national and transnational networks that have a desire or capability to
harm the U.S. For this mission to be successful, the FBI must understand the threat, integrate
intelligence and law enforcement capabilities in every FBI operational program, and expand the
contribution to the Intelligence Community knowledge base. 13
Along with the FBI, the Office of National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) is a
part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The mission of the ONCIX is to
provide effective leadership and support to the counterintelligence and security activities of the
US Intelligence Community, the US Government, and U.S. private sector entities who are at risk
of intelligence collection or attack by foreign adversaries.14
Since 2012, Frank Montoya has been
the National Counterintelligence Executive officer. This office focuses on many different aspects
of counterintelligence, however, recently has focused on cyber-enabled economic espionage.14
The ONCIX develops, coordinates, and produces foreign intelligence threat assessments,
national CI strategy for Government officials, priorities for CI operations, and CI program
budgets that reflect strategic priorities.14
In October 2011, President Obama issued Executive
Order 13587 establishing the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF), under joint leadership
of the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. 14
The primary mission of the
NITTF is to prevent, deter and detect compromises of classified information by malicious
insiders.14
The NITTF assists counterintelligence agencies to develop and implement insider
threat programs, as well as ensuring the program standards do not erode civil liberties. 14
A major focus of counterintelligence today is the increasing threat of foreign-based cyber
operations and economic espionage that can be carried out through wireless channels. The U.S.
relies on a cyber infrastructure for everything from communications to the management of

22. 22
critical infrastructure, to the command and control of the military. This dependence on
technology, along with the rapid rate of technological innovation, creates numerous
vulnerabilities that U.S. adversaries seek to exploit. 14
Foreign cyber attacks can be conducted
relatively cheaply and easily. They serve adversaries to collect intelligence or diminish the
effectiveness of the technology that we depend on. Cyber attacks are a very attractive option for
foreign intelligence organizations because they easily have the ability to offer high returns with a
low degree of risk. 14
Cyber crimes can also be carried out fairly anonymously and remotely,
and are relatively quick and inexpensive. Counterintelligence against cyber threats plays a
significant role in insider threat detection programs that can increase the likelihood of identifying
threat activities on our cyber networks. Counterintelligence collection and analysis increases how
cyber threats are understood, and how to defend against them. The NCIX focuses on offensive
CI operations help to identify adversarial tactics and thereby reduce the effectiveness of their
cyber operations. 14
Conclusion
Historically, the United States Counterintelligence has divided its intelligence gathering
capabilities and responsibilities for address foreign intelligence threats pragmatically, rather than
strategically.15
Throughout history this can be seen in the progression of the counterintelligence
capabilities from the Revolutionary war to what it has evolved to today. CI programs in the past
have served objectives that were very agency-specific. Now they have evolved into a
counterintelligence community that has interagency cooperation to meet the constantly evolving
strategic threat. Foreign Intelligence operations against the United States are now more diffuse,
more aggressive, more technologically sophisticated, and potentially more successful than ever
before.15
Today’s major players in the CI community; the FBI, CIA, and DOD have responded

23. 23
to the collection requirements that have been refined to identify those who would exploit U.S.
vulnerabilities, and diminish emerging threats posed by foreign adversaries.
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