1. The Faith
Game
Religion, Humanity &
Political Action
DIVIDED INDIA God Bless America Nuclear Chess
The NEW TURKISH WOMAN buddhist nationalism
FAR-RIGHT EuRope CAN BENEDICT be sued?
TheSydneyGlobalistVOLUME VIII ISSUE II MARCH 2013

3. 1TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
Editorial Team
Board of Advisers
The Hon. Catherine Branson QC, President, Australian
Human Rights Commission
Professor Alan Dupont, Senior Fellow at the Lowy
Institute for International Policy
Professor the Hon. Gareth Evans AO QC, President
Emeritus, International Crisis Group
Professor Graeme Gill, University of Sydney
Mr. Owen Harries, Senior Fellow, Centre for
Independent Studies
Professor Michael Jackson, University of Sydney
The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG
Sponsors
Platinum Sponsors
Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne
Gold Sponsors
Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales
Sydney Law School, University of Sydney
Faculty of Law, University of Technology
The University of Sydney Business School
Department of Government & International Relations,
University of Sydney
“God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.”
So wrote Friedrich Nietzsche in 1882. It was a brutal and
controversial take on the state of religion post-enlightenment,
capturing the fundamental challenge for religion in the
industrialised era. Time magazine later asked a similar
question in April 1966: “Is God dead?”, read their front cover,
a stark reference to the prolific rise of Atheism in the United
States. The ‘movement’ of religious naysayers had become
popularised, their beliefs cemented.
And yet, that belief has gone astray in recent years. Though
religion faces fundamental challenges to its multifaceted
strands of faith, it remains preeminent in the hearts and minds
of global citizens. Despite the calls of its demise, it can still
be the catalyst of conflict, the dictator of politics, the only
relief when all feels lost in a world that is harsh for some and
generous for others.
The articles in this edition of The Sydney Globalist paint
a picture of a modern religious landscape. That landscape is
a competitive one. The modern game of faith is a struggle
to remain relevant in a world of scientific, technocratic and
economic advancement – to create a narrative that appeals to a
changing global society.
In our lead article for this edition, ‘Can Benedict be Sued?’,
Phoebe Saintilan asks a question essential to developments
around the world, but particularly to recent events in
Australia: is our international legal system capable of holding
the former Pope responsible for the crimes of endemic sexual
abuse committed by those who were once indirectly under
his control? Saintilan’s analysis is ripe with the intricacies of
international law - as Benedict is no longer subject to ‘head of
state’ immunities, she argues, calls for litigation become more
substantiated.
Other contributors to this edition have explored the
intertwine between the Russian Orthodox Church and the
political class; the temptation of China’s rapidly expanding
‘soul market’ to religious institutions; the ‘extreme’ side of Islam
in Pakistan; the international black market for antiquities;
nationalism as a strand of faith; the relationship between faith
and HIV/AIDS in Cambodia; amongst others.
It has been a pleasure editing The Sydney Globalist over the
past year, and the production of this magazine is a testament to
the diligent and professional work of the entire editorial team.
Global21 is forever expanding. Recently we saw the creation
of a Melbourne chapter, and it is pleasing to see the network
continue to develop relationships with global institutions –
most recently Future Challenges in Germany. We are a network
of magazines webbed together by the ideas of students around
the globe, and those ideas will keep our magazine enduring for
many years to come.
Yours in Global Affairs,
Lewis Hamilton | Editor-in-Chief
A WORD FROM THE EDITOR
Editor-in-Chief
Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Publisher
Assistant Publisher
Executive Director
Assistant Executive Director
Chief Copy Editor
Global 21 Liason
Online Director
Artistic Design
Associate Editors
Lewis Hamilton
Hitesh Chugh
John Fennel
Raihana Haidary
Tom Neale
James McElroy
Rebecca Dang
Laurence Hendry
Pristine Ong
Jack Luxford
Rafi Alam, Nick Boyce, Ben
Brooks, Natasha Burrows,
Stephanie Constand,
Madeleine King, Dennis Mak,
Jahan Navidi, Oswin Perera,
Drew Rooke, Michael Shiraev,
Dominique Spoelder, Vaishnavi
Suryaprakash, Zac Thompson,
Dmitry Titkov, Trevor Tsui
Lucy Bradshaw, Lasya
Chitrapu, Hae-Ran Chung,
Sarah Copland, Felix Donovan,
Jeremy Elphick, Alicia Gray,
Robert Lozelle, Colleen Ma,
Timothy Maybury, Nathan
McDonnell, Kristin Romano,
Erica Taylor, Stephanie Zughbi
Assistant Copy Editors
Front cover image courtesy of Nasrulekam, from Fotopedia (CC BY 2.0)

4. Accredited
by
Australian
member of

5. 3TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
TheSydneyGlobalist VOLUME VIII ISSUE II MARCH 2013
CONTENTS
30
Can Benedict be Sued?
12 God Bless America, My Home Sweet
Home
Rebecca Dang
14 The Religious Divide
Virat Nehru
16 A Turbulent Western Front
Stephanie Anne
17 China’s Soul Market
Lucy Connell
18 The Path of Siddhartha
James Farquharson
20 The Re-Veiling of a New Turkish
Woman
Manna Mostaghim
26 The March of Extremism
Sarah Copland
28 Putin’s Russia
Dmitry Titkov
30 Can Benedict be Sued?
Phoebe Santilan
34 The Illegal Atheists
Natasha Burrows
36 Faith, Sex and Stigma
Daniel Liu
38 Europe’s Far-Right Populist Movement
Greta Ulbrich
39 A Strong Sense of Déjà Vu
Yannick Slade-Caffarel
FEATURES
REGULARS THE FAITH GAME
13 The Forgotten Player in Nuclear Chess
Jahan Navidi
29 The Future of the Past
Stefanie Contand
24 The Land of Jasmine Rice
Apiwat Pradmuang
PHOTOGRAPHIC ESSAY
5 The Roundtable
Jeremy Elphick
6 The Sydney Globalist Meets: Kerry Brown
8 Foreign Correspondent: The Legacy of
Colour in South American Identity
Max Horder
10 Flashback: The American Election
Felix Donovan
22 Review: Argo
Raihana Haidary
32 Profile: Ali Shariati
Nathan McDonnell
40 The Last Word
Hitesh Chugh
Phoebe Santilan
Catholic Church (England and Wales) via Flickr (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

6. The Melbourne JD Law degree
Experiences that mean the world
www.law.unimelb.edu.au/jd

7. 5TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
In the wake of the Supreme Court
decision in Citizens United v Federal
Election Commissioner, political scientists,
pundits and politicians endlessly espoused
the view that the 2012 election would be
determined by whichever side had the
capacity to outspend the other. In the
election contest, this was heavily skewed
towards the Republican Party and the
interest groups that fell within its spectrum:
big oil, Wall Street, and corporations.
Daniel Zwi argued, in the previous edition
of The Sydney Globalist, that the inclusion
of Super PACs in the 2012 election would
lead to an increase in corrupt conduct due
to the effect this increased availability of
funds would have on candidates seeking an
endorsement for their tilt at office. While
Zwi’s argument can be seen as highly
reasonable in the pre-election context
during which it was written, it is more
than apt to reflect on the quantitative effect
that these Super PACs actually had on the
campaign. Overall, Super PAC spending
was almost double for conservative groups
compared to liberal advocacy, but the
failure of conservative groups on the whole
in the electoral cycle raises a question that
Zwi did not fully address: how influential is
money in politics?
ThemostpalpablefailureofSuperPACswas
seen in Karl Rove’s American Crossroads,
which spent over $103 million throughout
the election cycle, despite achieving only a
1 per cent success rate (that is, the Super
PAC spent $103 million dollars, and only
1 per cent of it was spent on a successful
candidate). Citizens United did open the
floodgates in terms of corporate spending
and resultantly, the 2012 election was the
most expensive of all time.
Zwi observed that issues stemming from
Citizens United would be more evident in
policies enacted once politicians who had
been elected on corporate money were in
office. That said, the damage that could
be caused in such a scenario is still deeply
restricted. Take, for instance, Scott Brown,
the former Senator from Massachusetts.
Elected as one of Washington’s wealthiest
individuals, Brown found deep-rooted
support from corporate money. In his
re-election campaign against Elizabeth
Warren, Super PACs donated $3.2 million
to Brown and only $600,000 to Warren.
Despite being heavily outspent by her
opponent, Warren beat Brown by close to
8 per cent of the vote.
Alongside Scott Brown was Joe Walsh,
on whom FreedomWorks wasted $1.6
million in an attempt to have him elected
in favour of now-congresswoman, Tammy
Duckworth. Linda McMahon, another
failed Republican candidate, outspent
her opponent, Chris Murphy, by more
than four times. As results of the election
trickled out, it became clear that money was
not influential, as most pundits and writers
had predicted beforehand. Daniel Zwi’s
article was highly accurate in predicting
that Super PACs would change the way
elections were run: clogging the airways
with advertisements, forcing candidates
to change their approach to spending,
and letting the negative campaign flourish
throughout the election season. Despite
this, the 2012 elections have disproven,
beyond a doubt, the view that Super PAC’s
could change the outcome of elections.
Jeremy Elphick is in his second year of a
Bachelor of Arts, majoring in Government
and International Relations.
The Roundtable
Jeremy Elphick responds to ‘Citizens Divided’, from Volume
VIII, Issue I of The Sydney Globalist.
Interested in contributing to The Roundtable?
Send a short, incisive response to an article in this issue to
editor@thesydneyglobalist.org
TobymviaFlickr(CCBY-NC-ND2.0)

8. 6TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
The Sydney Globalist meets
KERRY BROWN
The Executive Director of the China Studies Centre speaks with The Sydney Globalist
about recent events in China.
We are all in an unprecedented position.
Never has a developing country risen so
quickly in modern times, and on such
a scale. China has the world’s second
largest economy, but it is 96th in terms of
per capita wealth. So it is rich and poor
at the same time, and this creates unique
challenges, because we simply lack the
most suitable conceptual framework within
which to make sense of China and create
the right policy towards it. While we don’t
have that appropriate framework, these
sorts of quandaries about going with the
U.S. for security and China for economic
prosperity will continue.
For the Centre, we want to create a richer,
better informed and more nuanced public
awareness about what China’s impact on
the world’s economy, its geopolitics and
its governance will mean. The `Australia
in the Asian Century’ White Paper issued
late last year stated there was a need for an
“informed policy community” about Asia.
We can adapt that to China. Specialist
knowledge about China has never been
more in demand by policy makers in
government, business, and civil society.
What would be great is for the China
Studies Centre – as one of its core functions
– to be a facilitator between its highly well-
informed membership on China and the
broader community around, both in the
Australia is at a tipping point
in history, divided between its
historical alliance with the U.S.
and its economic relationship
with China. Where does the
China Studies Centre fit into this
changing relationship?
University, the Australian government and
business, so that expert knowledge – much
of it based on many decades scholarly
engagement with China – can be of the
widest use possible.
The broad commitment across these two
generations of leadership to maintaining
good growth in China has to continue, so
we won’t see changes in terms of macro-
economic strategic objectives. China wants
to double its GDP in the next decade.
It wants to become a middle income
country by 2020 with per capita GDP of
$U.S.10,000. More broadly, it wants – as
Hu frequently said during his decade as
Party Secretary and President – to be a
rich strong country, and one which has
the status of a major global power able to
lift its people into prosperity. Xi has talked
more of reconnecting with the people
through attacking Party corruption, and of
reacquiring some of the moral leadership
which the Party has lost as China has
become increasingly contentious, wealthy
and unequal over the last decade.
Xi will almost certainly differ from Hu
in terms of presentation. During his visit
to the U.S. in early 2012, it was already
clear Xi was going to speak in a different
way to Hu, and engage with the domestic
and international public in ways that Hu
seemed incapable of doing. Hu was the
consummate administrator, and typified
The 18th Party Congress recently
supported Xi Jinping as the new
President. How different do you
think China’s new leader will be
from his predecessor, Hu Jintao?
a technocratic leadership, often speaking
like a robot and mystifying interlocutors
inside and outside the country because of
his wooden, and somewhat sterile personal
style. Xi comes across as warmer and more
approachable. But in terms of substance,
the broad policy parameters set out above
are not ones that can easily change.
It is clear is that the future challenges for
the Chinese leadership led by Xi will not be
economic, but socio-political. There is still
plenty of space for growth in the Chinese
economy so, barring disaster, major
problemstherearenotlikely.Themainissue
is that in terms of governance, the journey
to middle income status for this country
will be a tough one. Inequality remains
high, corruption – or at least the perception
of it – is rife. The Party is still seeking new
forms of legitimacy as its historic rights
to power wear away and memories of the
1949 revolution fade. Trying to create
cohesion in a society of such dynamism
and complexity will pose enormous issues.
China is a continental-sized entity, where
there are multiple communities across the
rural and urban divide, the middle class
and the migrant labourers, party and non-
party members, and then on gender and
ethnic forms of identity. Having a political
system that allows an increasingly well
informed and self-conscious society with
such richly multiple forms of identity, and
At the same Congress, Hu Jintao
spoke of the need for political
reform, but was not specific on
the details. What direction do you
see China taking in its approach
to such reform?
6 March 2013 | TheSydneyGlobalist

9. 7TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
ways to participate in decision-making
when change has been so swift and deep
will be an unprecedented task. Chinese
scholars and officials are deeply aware of
the nature of the problems facing them,
and there is immense work on the types of
social and political solutions that might be
appropriate.
But in the end, the function of elite political
leadership under the Communist Party is
to create the consensus to go in a specific
direction, and then mobilize society to
implement that. All we can say is that since
1978, Chinese society has been immensely
successful at producing GDP growth
under the guidance of the Communist
Party, and this has brought profound social
changes. But, in terms of the institutions
of governance and political organization,
very little has changed. The one innovation
has been village elections, and an increase
in rule of law. But the real changes are yet
to be decided on and delivered, and it is
unclear whether the Party has the political
will, or indeed the capital, to undertake
what might be risky and highly complex
changes. The one thing it can’t do however
is nothing. This is the quandary of the fifth
generation leadership of China.
One of the great paradoxes of the modern
world is that the world’s second largest
economy and its highest growth one,
is run by a Communist Party with a
monopoly on power. In that sense, the
Party has been unbelievably successful. It
is 83 million members strong, and has no
real valid opposition. It is the sole entity
that supplies cohesion across a society of
such complexity, and in that sense it has,
and continues, to work. But there are
also ways in which the Party’s failure to
deal with its own internal governance, its
secrecy, its historic issues ranging from
the great famines in the early 1960s to the
Cultural Revolution and the 1989 student
suppression are all combining to dampen
and inhibit its rule. Structurally, we have
to ask whether the Party can really fulfill
all the functions expected of it. Its ideology
is now largely irrelevant to the vast mass
of the people, and its moral authority
compromised by tales of official waste and
corruption. It speaks to a society which
listens to it with rising levels of cynicism.
Its one great asset is the ability to deliver
growth. But there is a sense that one day
this will also no longer be as strong a card
as it is now, and then the Party’s ability to
evolve into a more modern political force
will be tested.
At the moment, China is being run on a
system largely borrowed from the Soviet
Union in the middle of the 20th century.
Can we really see China in twenty or thirty
years run in this way? I think it is almost
certain that the Communist Party either
has to undergo radical transformation, and
allow some form of organized opposition,
or face the real possibility that it might
collapse when a crisis occurs. The latter
possibility would be a tragedy for China
and have a massive impact on the world
because of the country’s role in the global
economy and stability - and so for that
reason, we have to seek ways to work
constructively with China on its own
internal reform.
Firstly, to support the non-state sector
within China, by welcoming them
as investors and business partners to
Australia. The non-state sector will be
critically important for the future wellbeing
of China’s economy as a job creator and
innovator. Australia needs to be at the
forefront of working with them. Secondly,
to find creative, intelligent ways to work
with Chinese partners on the internal
reform issues: legal reform, the creation
of civil society, and the ways in which
the public can participate in decision
making. This doesn’t mean promoting any
particular model of democracy, but finding
ways in which we can address common
challenges of governance together and
learn from each other. Finally, work with
China as a global partner, making it aware
of its responsibilities and the need to
act according to its status now as a truly
global power. That means urging it to show
restraint over its border disputes, and to
continue its commitment to global political
and economic governance.
Kerry Brown is the Executive Director
of the China Studies Centre. To find out
about courses offered at the Centre, visit
them online at http://sydney.edu.au/china_
studies_centre/.
JonathanLeveneurviaFotoepdia(CCBY-NC-ND2.0)
Hu Jintao’s political report
highlighted a number of
challenges for the Party over the
next decade, including systematic
corruption. What trajectory
do you see China taking in its
approach to these matters?
What would you say should be
the key priorities for Australia
in the years ahead when it
comes to approaching the China
relationship?

10. 8TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
Venezuelan President, Hugo
Chávez has been memorable for
colourful speeches about the evils of
United States foreign policy and the social
limits of modern capitalism. A recent of
his, “long live the unity of Latin America”,
is an unremarkable yet tentative quote
that deserves an equal amount of further
examination. It is fair to wonder to what
degree such a unity actually exists in
contemporary practice. Certainly Simón
Bolívar, the great Liberator of Spanish
America, thought it did. If we are to
examine the region’s history, before the
modern divergences that led to different
nation-state formation, it is easy to see why.
The story of Christopher Columbus’
discovery of America in 1492 is known to
most, as are the calculated extermination of
indigenous people (numbering in the tens
of millions) and the fusion of Spanish and
Portuguese language and culture into the
South American continent. What appears
to have often been left out of the discourse
about contemporary Latin America,
however, is the extent to which the African
diaspora was a significant part of this
historical process.
The United States is famous for its attempts
to come to terms with the legacy of the
transatlantic trade that brought 450,000
people in from Africa to be exploited as
slaves, mostly on plantations that grew
cash crops like tobacco and cotton. Over
time however, the U.S. has become fertile
ground for the creation of new social
forms of black identity, solidarity and civil
resistance.
On the other hand, Cuba imported
approximately 800,000 Africans slaves
to labour on similarly lucrative sugar
plantations right up until 1886. The figure
is nearly double the number of those
that were imported into the U.S. and is
surprising given the relative sizes of the two
countries. What is even more astonishing,
however, is that Brazil received more than
5,000,000 Africans – ten times that of the
United States.
There is no doubt in anyone’s mind as to
the strong influence of African culture in
Latin countries like Brazil. One need only
think of syncretic religions like Santería,
or dances like Salsa and Samba. Capoeira,
too, was created by black Brazilian slaves
as a form of defensive martial arts that
appeared to be only harmless dancing.
Similarly, there are approximately nine
million people of African descent currently
living in Colombia. They have added much
to the country’s culture, famously through
the influence of Cumbia music.
It is also relevant to note that, just like in
North America, citizens of African descent
are often some of the most impoverished,
uneducated and malnourished people of
the continent. Afro-Brazilians – largely
the descendants of slaves – are still more
likely to be living in poverty than their
white neighbours. Most Afro-Colombians
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT
Max Horder from the London School of Economics draws a new light on African social
identity in Latin America.
The Legacy of Colour in
Contemporary Latin American Identity
United Nations via Flickr (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
8 March 2013 | TheSydneyGlobalist

11. 9TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
live by the Pacific Coast in what can only
be described as one of the most abjectly
under-developed areas of the country.
Of these people, 78.5 per cent live below
the poverty line. Hundreds of thousands
of those that live in rural areas have
been displaced from their land to make
way for further commodity extraction
(especially African Palm Oil) by large-scale
agribusiness over the past three decades.
What’s more, they retain a chronic lack of
political representation in the Colombian
political institutions as well as often having
to live with the historically prejudiced
perceptions of many of their fellow
citizens. Their current fate seems to have
been conveniently forgotten by most.
So why did the kind of black social identity
that grew to prominence in the U.S. during
the 20th century not develop in the same
way in Latin America?
One particularly interesting explanation
has been referred to by many as ‘Latin
American Exceptionalism’. As with
many other post-colonial countries,
Latin America’s borders and the national
characteristics that accompany them had
to be created at independence from Spain
and Portugal. Mostly, they were drawn up
with relative arbitrariness and have led to
many territorial disputes, such as the War
of the Pacific between Bolivia, Peru and
Chile that ended in 1883, and the tension
between Argentina and Chile over the
frontier in Tierra del Fuego that nearly led
to war in 1978.
Latin American borders and states are
not just politically unclear, however. The
different countries also reflect a continent
that was, and still is, incredibly racially and
culturally diversified. That is not to claim
that European colonialists did not (at
least for a long time) insist on white racial
‘purity’ as in many other countries, and
neither does it ignore the contemporary
racial inequality of white domination of
Latin American political and economic
spheres.
Nevertheless, racial mixing did still occur
much more frequently and ubiquitously
in Latin countries as compared with the
almost entirely segregated North America.
It must be briefly added, however, that
this blend of different people did not
occur in all Latin American countries.
With a population that is approximately
90 per cent white, Argentina remains
homogeneously European even today.
But to speak in general terms, from the
European conquest in the 16th century
right up to the current moment, Latin
America has been characterised by an
unprecedented level of racial and cultural
heterogeneity. The most demographically
significant fusions of people tend to be
categorised in terms of ‘mesitzo’ (mixed-
race between white and Amerindian) and
‘mulatto’ (mixed-race between white and
black).
Ofcourse,itwouldbeawildexaggerationto
claim that this has produced a colour-blind
and multicultural utopia. Chronic racism
still persists and permeates many aspects of
modern Latin American society. In Mexico
for instance, The National Council for
Prevention of Discrimination conducted a
recent survey which found 40 per cent of
Mexicans to have treated people differently
because of their skin colour. However,
the continent has still largely managed to
create new and interesting structures of
ethnic consciousness, tolerance and inter-
mixing that the rest of the world would do
well to learn from.
The development of these Latin forms of
race and identity pertained to what the
Mexican philosopher José Vasconcelos
called ‘La Raza cósmica’ (‘The Cosmic
Race’): the idea of an agglomeration of
all people into a ‘fifth race’ that would
build a new society free from the physical
prejudices of the old. It is true that Latin
America still has many issues of racial
inequality that need to be addressed. But
if we bear in mind the great ancestral
intermingling of the people living in these
countries and pause for a moment to
consider a world where children are “not
to be judged by the colour of their skin, but
by the content of their character”, it would
be wise, even with the acknowledgement
of its problems, to take a closer look at the
hybrid forms of identity in contemporary
Latin America.
Max Horder is studying Anthropology at the
London School of Economics. This article
first appeared in The London Globalist.
Jack Luxford, 2012

12. 10TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
American presidential elections are
often remembered by the one-liners
engraved into the public memory. In a
turn that I’m sure has political historians
shaking their fists, slogans tell the story
of democracy in America. In 1984, it was
Reagan’s ‘Morning in America’. Clinton’s
election victory in 1992 was, ‘It’s the
economy, stupid.’ The presidential race of
2000 is remembered as ‘Oh-God-what-has-
the-Supreme-Court-done?’ Some slogans
seem to distil the spirit of a presidency:
‘I Like Ike’ captured the banal decency of
Eisenhower. Others crystallise the irony:
Woodrow Wilson won the 1916 election
with the slogan, ‘He kept us out of war’.
This election couldn’t be condensed so
easily. Despite what the candidates claimed,
the 2012 race for the White House was not
a battle of grand ideals, or a referendum on
a disappointing presidency. Rather, it was a
story of parts, held together thinly by a cast
of eccentric, sometimes brilliant but more
often abhorrent, characters.
Past Presidents found prominence again.
Both Republicans and Democrats claimed
the mantle of Reagan. George W. Bush
was blamed by Democrats, and disowned
by Republicans. Romney gave one of
his longest answers of the presidential
debates when asked about the differences
between he and the 43rd President (which
was only made more humorous during
the third debate when Romney was in
such aggressive agreement with Obama
that Republican Senator-elect Ted Cruz
wondered aloud whether his candidate was
trying to “French-kiss” the President). Bill
Clinton was greeted with cheers of “Four
More Years!” following his spirited defence
of the President at the Democratic National
Convention. A lingering question: About
whom were the delegates cheering?
Thefirstcasualtyoftheelectionwasscience.
Even as Sandy struck the Eastern seaboard
of the United States, savaging cities and
taking lives, the Democrats maintained
their resolute silence on climate change.
It was with a sigh of relief rather than the
intensity of conviction that Obama finally
mentioned climate change as a priority.
Some Ohioans asked for their ballots back.
The uterus was quite badly misunderstood
when Senate candidate Todd Akin was
asked what his opinion on abortion in
cases of rape was. Not a problem, he told
the audience of a local television station,
because the problem doesn’t exist: “If it’s a
legitimate rape, the female body has ways
to try to shut the whole thing down.”
Fact shared the fate of science. Even with
the proliferation of online fact-checkers,
the campaigns were not deterred from
imagination and embellishment (indeed,
one Romney staffer told reporters, “We’re
not going to let our campaign be dictated
by fact-checkers”). Incredulity was a word
invented for the look on Obama’s face when
Romney persevered with the accusation
that the President had been on an apology
tour of the Middle East. The reaction of
his Vice President was different. Joe Biden
took it upon himself to be the instant
fact-checker during the Vice Presidential
debate, interrupting Paul Ryan more than
80 times.
Democracy prevailed against a siege of
money and suppression. The Supreme
Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision
allowed the campaigns and ‘outside’
groups to try to buy the Oval Office like
never before. Fortunately – unless the
reader works on Wall Street – excessive
advertisements made very little difference
(except to the pockets of a few television
station owners in Ohio and Florida).
Inundated by information, voters chose to
believe none of it. Equally, laws passed by
Republican Governors to fight against the
chimerical rash of voter fraud – which in
effect restricted the ability of minorities
and the elderly to vote – seemed to
backfire. The threat of disenfranchisement
mobilised groups that often stay home
on Election Day. Hispanics turned out
in record numbers to vote for Obama by
a record margin. It is easy to forget how
resilient democracy is when a recalcitrant
Congress hogs headlines.
Liberals cheered on 6 November, and in his
victory speech, Obama claimed a mandate
for “the belief that our destiny is shared;
that this country only works when we
accept certain obligations to one another”.
He struck a bipartisan tone, promising to
work with Republicans, thanking those
citizens who campaigned for Romney.
More than at any time since the Civil War,
however, America is a union of red states
and blue states; of minorities (who were 5
times more likely to vote for Obama than
Romney) and an increasingly slim white
majority;ofFoxNewsandMSNBC.Amidst
this, the idea that a Republican Congress
will roll over for a Democratic President
is a farce. Indeed, the only mandate won
on November 6 was for Jim Messina and
his campaign staff to run the ‘Hillary 2016’
campaign. The work goes on.
Felix Donovan is in his third year of a
Bachelor of Arts at the University of Sydney.
He is the 2012 winner of the American
Review Essay Competition.
FLASHBACK: THE
AMERICAN ELECTION
Felix Donovan looks back on the election that was.
Barack Obama via Flickr (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)
10 March 2013 | TheSydneyGlobalist

13. law.unsw.edu.au/globalist
CricosProviderNo.00098G
WE WILL DEBATE
THE BIG ISSUES,
DEFEND THOSE
WHO CAN’T DEFEND
THEMSELVES, AND
RELISH THE
CHALLENGES
ALONG THE WAY.
WE WILL MAKE
A DIFFERENCE
IN THIS WORLD.
Law
UNSW JD Postgraduate Law
LawNever Stand Still

14. 12TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
For a foreigner traveling in America,
the country’s nationalism is immediately
apparent and all-encompassing. From
the swathes of star-spangled-banners
adorning the public facade, to the national
monuments that populate almost every
block of the American capital, the symbols
of America and the national myths that
they entail are a fact of everyday life in
the U.S. That most Americans are able to
impart these myths whenever the question
is casually raised indicates that American
nationalism is not merely tokenistic, but an
experience that is lived and developed.
Phrased in this way, American
nationalism seems to take on a religious
character: uniting a single moral
community of citizens as a religion does
followers. Whilst debate exists as to the
extent to which nationalism and religion
are analogous in method and means, in
America, nationalism is, for scholars like
Anthony Smith, the “new religion”.
Theories of the relationship between
nationalismandreligionspanacontinuum:
they range from a conception of the two
systems as totally analogous phenomena,
to a view that they are ontologically distinct
concepts.
Thelatter,moredatedviewismanifested
in Benedict Anderson’s seminal study of
nationalism, Imagined Communities.
Anderson defines the ‘nation’ as an
“imagined political community that is
imagined as both inherently limited and
sovereign”, with emphasis on sovereignty
as the distinguishing characteristic that
symbolises the independence of the
nation-state from the structures of religion.
Nationalism, so envisaged, becomes a
secular force that fills the moral and social
space of religion as the latter recedes with
the separation of church and state.
This view has been criticised as
being neglectful of how nationalism is
experienced: a quick survey of our global
environment reveals that, rather than
nationalism succeeding religion, the two
systems in fact operate in varying degrees
of entanglement. The extreme of this
position is that other end of the above
spectrum: nationalism and religion as
analogous phenomena. Anthony Smith,
a strong proponent of this view, points to
the fact that nationalism exhibits the very
qualities of religion, being: faith in an
external power; feelings of reverence; the
role of legends; and symbolic ceremonial
rituals.
Although the noted theoretical
positions are by no means exhaustive, it is
clear that American nationalism is much
more aligned with the latter position,
accounting for each of the above listed
qualities.
The perception that American
nationalism has an inherently religious
character is not new. In recounting his
visit to the New World in 1831, Alexis de
Tocqueville observes in Democracy in
America that American nationalism “is a
sort of religion itself; it does not reason, it
feels, it acts”.
American nationalism is tangibly
manifested in its reverence for national
heroes, mainly former Presidents and,
on occasion, military servicemen and
activists who have shaped the national
narrative. National sentiment is also
manifest in the symbols of America,
which abundantly populate city centres.
Although the American flag is central to
this symbolism, the national narrative has
also been consciously reconstructed in
architecture and monuments, which serve
the important function of fixing, forever, a
specific myth in the national memory.
These tangible aspects of American
nationalism are drawn together through
ceremonial rites. The most striking of
these is in the lying in state of deceased
former Presidents staged in the heart of the
Capitol rotunda – a venue which is itself
the very enshrinement of the American
democracy and its history. Through this
ritual, the people are united in a social
experience; a national legend is created
around the deceased who is inducted into
the national narrative, and nationalism is
lived by citizens.
It is this last point which distinguishes
American nationalism from nationalism
per se. National narratives, legends,
symbols and rituals are constitutive of
most nationalisms: for Tocqueville, what is
unique about nationalism in America and,
indeed, what makes it so potent, is that it
is driven by the people, who – by virtue of
historical experience – see their prosperity
as inherently tied to the public fortune.
Accordingly, the state is a reflection of the
people, creating a compulsion in the citizen
to defend the state as if they are defending
themselves.
Almost two centuries later, Americans
continue to experience and live their
nationalism with devotion comparable
to that with which followers practice a
religion. A World Values Survey conducted
in 2003, during a period of resurgent
nationalism globally, found that more than
70 per cent of Americans surveyed stated
they were “very proud” of their nationality,
whereas this figure was less than 50 per cent
in other Western democracies. Bearing in
mind Tocqueville’s insight, it is apparent
that the pseudo-religious characteristics
of American nationalism, spurred by the
nation’s unique social facts, has inspired a
practice and culture amongst citizens that
has ensured its sustainment. In the face
of deepening globalization and devolving
identity politics, it will be interesting to
observe how American nationalism will
utilise its internal qualities to react to a
shifting world.
Rebecca Dang is in her third year of a
combined Bachelor of International and
Global Studies and Bachelor of Laws degree
at the University of Sydney. She is the Chief
Copy Editor of The Sydney Globalist.
God Bless America,
My Home Sweet Home
Struck by her experience of America, Rebecca Dang examines
the pseudo-religious power of nationalism in the
land of the free.
American nationalism is a sort of
religion itself; it does not reason,
it feels, it acts.
MDB28viaFotopedia(CCBY-NC-ND2.0)
12 March 2013 | TheSydneyGlobalist

15. 13TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
From the deplorable events in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to the Cuban
Missile crisis, and, more recently, the
seemingly endless impasse over possible
future proliferation in the Middle East,
nuclear weapons remain a pertinent topic
of discussion within international security.
However, an oft-neglected component
of this debate lies in the weapons capacity
of the Middle East’s only established
nuclear power – Israel. Whilst officially
maintaining a status of nuclear ambiguity,
‘whistle-blowers’ such as Mordechai
Vanunu have estimated Israel’s nuclear
capacity is approximately 150 to 200
nuclear warheads. Yet Israel, along with
India, Pakistan and North Korea remains
one of only four countries outside the scope
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
This article explores Israel’s clandestine
nuclear program and concludes by
suggesting Israel’s nuclear weapons must
become an integral part of the debate in
tackling nuclear proliferation.
Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program
Israel’s intentional policy of nuclear opacity
has made it considerably difficult to piece
together information on the origins of
its nuclear program. Yet this blanket
censorship has failed to silence all of those
involved in its development. These select
individuals have provided compelling
evidence of the existence of Israel’s
clandestine nuclear weapons program.
It is widely believed that the program
began under the guise of the first Israeli
Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion,
in response to their perceived security
predicament. By developing a formidable
nuclear arsenal, Israel aimed to gain
significant strategic advantages over their
neighbours by utilising the nuclear bomb
as a deterrent.
Indeed, Israeli nuclear expert Avner
Cohen has argued that their capacity was
bolstered by support from the French
government in the 1950s and 1960s, under
a French-Israeli nuclear deal. France,
which developed its own nuclear weapons
program around the same time, provided
Israel with the expertise to develop
weapons capabilities. Specifically, the
Dimona nuclear facility was established to
enrich uranium, enabling Israel’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons.
As prominent realists John
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have
argued, the United States has, since 1968,
acknowledged Israel’s nuclear weapons and
“tacitly supported Israel’s effort to maintain
regional military superiority by turning a
blind eye towards its various clandestine
WMD programs”.
Vanunu the Whistleblower
Former Israeli nuclear technician
Mordechai Vanunu has revealed important
logistical details on the country’s nuclear
program. Vanunu’s leaked reports and
photographs of his work at the Dimona
facility have provided systematic evidence
of the existence, nature, and scope of
Israel’s nuclear weapons.
Subsequently, Vanunu has become a
prime target of the Israeli secret service.
Whilst abroad in Rome in 1986, following
a revealing interview with the Sunday
Times, he was poisoned and abducted.
Forcibly removed to Israel, Vanunu was
sentenced to 18 years in gaol and continues
to face significant restrictions on his civil
liberties.
Vanunu’s efforts have shed considerable
light on the extent of the Israeli nuclear
program and the extent to which their
security apparatus was willing to silence
opposition.
International Law
YetIsraelremainsoneofonlyfourcountries
notboundbythenuclearNon-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). Their nuclear program has
avoided significant inspections since the
1960s, and, alongside security risks, has
posed a health hazard to nearby residents in
Dimona who have complained of radiation
poisoning. More recently, secret ministerial
documents suggest Israel offered to sell
nuclear weapons to South Africa in 1975
at the height of the apartheid regime.
Israel’s blanket refusal to join the 189
other states party to the NPT suggests
that a necessary player has been excluded
from the debate on nuclear proliferation.
Whilst an NPT Review Conference
Resolution was passed in 2010 urging
Israel to place its nuclear weapons program
under the inspection of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), U.S.
veto power within the United Nations
Security Council, and the absence of any
international treaty obligations mean this
is of little practical value.
The Future
Rather than being isolated, sanctioned
or criticised, the Israeli nuclear weapons
program is deliberately overlooked by
countries such as the United States, France
and the United Kingdom. Indeed, America
continues to support Israel, providing
in excess of $U.S. 3 billion dollars of
unconditional aid annually – more so than
any other country.
Yet these supporters are quick to
condemn and impose sanctions on nation-
statesforpursuingnuclearprogramswhich,
in the absence of compelling evidence to
the contrary, remain civilian-oriented, and
under the supervision of the IAEA. Whilst
Israel continues to criticise countries for
pursuing nuclear programs, it refuses to
submit to international obligations itself.
Equipped with such an understanding
of Israel’s clandestine nuclear program,
it is hard not to see the hypocrisy and
inconsistency of its nuclear rhetoric.
It is only by engaging Israel on an even
playing field and placing Israel’s nuclear
program under the auspices of the IAEA
that the efficacy and credibility of the NPT
may be bolstered. This will go some way to
reducing double standards, by dealing with
issues of nuclear proliferation in a more
transparent and consistent manner.
Jahan Navidi recently completed his final
year of a combined Bachelor of Laws /
Bachelor of International & Global Studies
at the University of Sydney.
The Forgotten
Player in
Nuclear Chess
Jahan Navidi explores Israel’s clandestine nuclear
weapons program and recommends their inclusion
in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
KudomonoviaFlickr(CCBY2.0)

16. 14TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
In the post-independence era of India
and Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the
founder of Pakistan, has been labelled
many things. For much of India and the
world, he was a communalist, a fanatical
Muslim, a separatist, an egoist, an
opponent of the Indian National Congress
and an ally of the British imperialists: the
very sort of villain against whom Gandhi
would be characterised as a triumphant
hero. Contrary to popular perception, in
his early years as a political leader, Jinnah
was rather seen as a beacon of hope for
Hindu-Muslim unity. It is hence interesting
to note that his disillusionment with the
whole process is what led him to abandon
this cause and advocate the formation of a
separate nation state, Pakistan.
A symbol of Hindu-Muslim unity
Jinnah was a man who valued modern
thought and progressiveness, and was
agnostic in his way of thinking. The
concept of a single, independent nation
was not part of the general public’s
consciousness. The political climate was
rife with attempts of creating ‘princely
states’, areas controlled by smaller kings
and princes wanting to increase their
respective territorial boundaries based on
communal interests. It was mainly because
of his agnosticism that Jinnah was seen
to best represent Hindu-Muslim unity in
India upon his arrival from London as a
successful barrister in 1906. The leaders
of the Indian National Congress were sure
that Jinnah’s lack of religious allegiance
would make him a ‘neutral’ candidate
unaffected by the communal and regional
influences of Indian politics.
In Jinnah’s early years as a political leader,
unity of the people of India had become
his mission. His efforts bore fruit in 1916,
when the Indian National Congress and
the All India Muslim League decided to
join hands and fight for self-governance.
Jinnah’s success greatly strengthened
nationalist sentiment in India and his
efforts were lauded by nationalist forces.
Jinnah’s refusal to openly state, in the early
1920s, whether he supported the Hindu or
the Muslim cause in the fight for Indian
nationalism created an unlikely paradox:
People loved him but started to become
suspicious. They loved him because of his
secularism but were weary of him because
of uncertainty of whom he would side with
when the time came. The Muslims thought
he supported the Hindu cause because he
was part of the Indian National Congress
(a primarily Hindu party) even though he
was a leader of the All India Muslim League
(a primarily Muslim party). The Hindus
thought he supported the Muslim cause,
especially when he brought the All India
Muslim League to work together with the
Indian National Congress, while the British
were weary because he was a rational
opponent who sought to eradicate the
seeds of communal discord they had sown
in self-interest. Hence, a stark irony arose;
Jinnah had isolated himself by propagating
secularism and wanting to eradicate the
religious divide that permeated India’s
political sphere.
Feelings of discontent were the first step
in Jinnah’s disillusionment as he began to
realise the power of the communal forces
at play. His relationship with Gandhi and
Jawaharlal Nehru indicated the ideological
differences that were prevalent between his
vision of a future, India’s independence and
that of the Indian National Congress. Over
the next two decades, the divide would
grow and, by 1940, Jinnah demanded
what he had fought against previously: the
creation of a separate state, ‘Pakistan’.
Relationship with Gandhi
Gandhi and Jinnah’s relationship
played a crucial role in leading India
towards partition and their ideological
differences were a major factor in
Jinnah’s disillusionment with the united
Hindu-Muslim cause. Despite perceived
similarities, they were completely different
with respect to ideas, appearance, outlook
and activities. Conflict and confrontation
was certain. However this conflict acquired
The Religious Divide
Virat Nehru explores how a man who was a symbol of Hindu-Muslim unity became the major
proponent of the partition between India and Pakistan.
SDuffy via Fotopedia (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)
14 March 2013 | TheSydneyGlobalist

17. 15TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
such a dimension that it destroyed the
promise of a united India, creating a
seething divide.
There were many similarities between
Gandhi and Jinnah. Both were from the
province of Gujarat, studied law in Britain
and were impressed by Western culture.
In the beginning of their political careers,
both were significantly helped by the
other’s community, Gandhi by Muslims
and Jinnah by Hindus. Initially, both
sought the same outcome: Hindu-Muslim
unity.
Irrespective of these similarities, Jinnah
and Gandhi were the antithesis of each
other. Gandhi was a deeply religious whilst
Jinnah was not. Gandhi was quite adept at
utilising rhetoric and religious terminology
during political discussions and addresses,
whereas Jinnah chose his words carefully
to avoid religious undertones. Jinnah was
a rich man who dressed in a western way
and preferred speaking English, whereas
Gandhi wore nothing but a loincloth
and avoided English whenever possible,
advising Jinnah to do the same.
A staunch secularist, Jinnah resented the
fact that Gandhi chose to mix politics
with religion and held ‘religious fasts’ to
muster support for the non-cooperation
and civil disobedience movements against
British rule. The difference lay in the way in
which both men perceived religion. Jinnah
was firmly against any religious rhetoric
in politics, believing that doing so would
bring disharmony and hatred, whereas
Gandhi believed faith and religion gave the
people a stronger purpose. Gandhi’s brand
of spiritualism had mass appeal and when
he took control of the Indian National
Congress in the 1920s, Jinnah knew he no
longer wished to be associated with the
direction Congress took.
Relationship with Jawaharlal Nehru
Like Jinnah, the future first prime minister
of India, Jawaharlal Nehru was also quite
western, progressive and secular. Both
had studied law in England and wanted
to unite India. Nehru also shared Jinnah’s
reservations against Gandhi’s practices.
Like Jinnah, Nehru was critical of mixing
politics with religion and was against
Gandhi’s political discourse, which
frequently referenced religion. Even
though Nehru was ideologically to Gandhi,
he willingly supported him publicly,
infuriating Jinnah.
Nehru supported Gandhi largely due to
his own political ambitions. Gandhi had
considerable influence on the general
populace of India and within the Indian
National Congress. Nehru had plans to
lead the party, which required Ghandi’s
support. However, Jinnah’s liberal ideals
did not permit him to endorse anything
against his principles. His disagreements
with Gandhi caused him to leave the party,
whereas Jawaharlal remained onboard,
enjoying Ghandi’s confidence and
eventually became his successor.
Jinnah’s exit from the Indian National
Congress, coupled with his public
expression of disdain for Gandhi’s ideology,
resulted in his role as leader of the All India
Muslim League being his sole holding of
public office. He had been gradually ousted
from most posts due to his continuing
criticisms of Gandhi. Gandhi had become
a darling of the masses and Jinnah was
sidelined. By the 1930s Jinnah harboured
a strong dislike for the direction the nation
was taking. Political schism between the
leaders of the Indian National Congress
and the All India Muslim League didn’t
take long to manifest into a religious one.
Unable to reconcile himself with the
fact that India’s future course would be
determined by Gandhi’s influence and
unwilling to compromise his principles,
Jinnah finally succumbed to the one evil
he had been fighting against as a secular
nationalist: communalism. He wished
to wield Gandhi’s weapon, religion,
against him. He accused Gandhi of being
responsible for using the Indian National
Congress as an instrument for propagating
Hinduism. Religion was already Gandhi’s
forte and it didn’t take long for the egos of
both individuals to create an irreparable
religious divide.
It is evident that Jinnah’s differences
with Gandhi and the inability of the two
individuals to reconcile their differences
had a significant impact on shaping India
and Pakistan’s destiny. The circumstances
had little to do with religious differences:
Instead the religious divide between
Hindus and Muslims was deepened by
the hurt egos and stubbornness of Jinnah
and Gandhi, each utilising and escalating
existing tensions.. It is ironic that both
Gandhi and Jinnah set out to accomplish
Hindu-Muslim unity for India but, in the
process, accomplished only the opposite.
Virat Nehru is in his third year of a Bachelor
of Arts/Bachelor of Laws, majoring in Media
& Communications, and Philosophy.
Damien Roue via Fotopedia (CC BY-NC 2.0)

18. 16TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
Surrounded by the Tian Shan
Mountains and the arid Taklamakan
Desert, Kashgar was once a burgeoning
city along the Silk Road. As a trade route, it
connects China’s Yellow River Valley with
the Mediterranean and India. Today, the Id
Kah Mosque in Kashgar is China’s largest,
frequently accommodating more than
10,000 worshippers during Friday prayer.
Within the mosque is a noticeboard
proclaiming the central government’s
generosity for investing in restoration.
Yet, for every public declaration of the
government’s commitment to allowing
the free expression of China’s ethnic
minorities, there are stories of a more
disturbing reality: orders against “illegal
religious activities” such as unauthorised
pilgrimages to Mecca; restrictions upon
Ramadan observance; mosque interiors
laced with government propaganda; and
severe internet clampdowns.
Kashgar belongs to the Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region (XUAR), a region
plagued by ethnically charged unrest. The
XUAR is home to twenty million people
from thirteen major ethnic groups, the
largest of which is the chiefly Muslim
Uighur people. The conflict between the
ethnic Turkic Uighurs and the ethnic Han
Chinese authorities and migrants too
regularly manifests itself as devastating
violence. In July 2009, almost 200 people
died and more than 1,600 were injured in
relatedriots.Twoyearslater,aseriesofknife
and bomb attacks in Kashgar killed 23. A
further 12 were killed in February this year.
The government’s ban on outside media
entering the region means information
must be sourced from state-sponsored
media or overseas Uighur activists with
supposed regional contacts. So while the
threat of terrorism may be tangible, official
government sources conflate religious
practice with extremist ideology.
When violence erupts, the government
often points to “separatist” forces, including
the East Turkestan Islamic Movement,
otherwise known as the Turkistan Islamic
Party. This group’s existence is contended
by some Uighur advocates. The absence of a
source independently verifying facts results
in consistently muddied information, so
distinguishing specific issue-protests from
calculated acts of terrorism is virtually
impossible.
Within the region, Beijing’s economic
policy does well to antagonize existing
aggravations. Holding more than a
quarter of China’s oil and gas reserves,
the XUAR is unquestionably important
to the government’s national development
blueprint. During the early 1990s, the
central government attempted to stimulate
growth in the west by creating special
economic zones, investing in infrastructure
and overhauling taxes.
The government insists that demographic
change is not a goal of economic policy.
Nevertheless, there has been a migration
of close to two million Han Chinese
people over the last two decades. In 2010, a
meeting of the Chinese Communist Party
led to a five year plan intended to ‘leapfrog
development’ in the XUAR. Prosperity
reduced discontent in Eastern China and
it is hoped that a similar effect will be
witnessed westward. Following Shenzhen’s
lead, Kashgar is fast becoming a “trading
hub and manufacturing centre”.
However, as the migrant population rises
in the region, many Uighurs highlight
the resultant “reduced human access to
clean water and fertile soil for drinking,
irrigation and agriculture.” According to
the Asian Development Bank, income
inequality between these ethnic groups
remains the highest in all of China.
Moreover, in 2006, the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China (CECC),
an independent agency of the United States
government, reported that 800 of 840 civil
servant job positions in the XUAR were
reserved for Han Chinese people. While
this was officially changed in 2011, the
effects of discriminatory hiring practices
are still felt.
The government pursues seemingly
conflicting objectives simultaneously. On
paper, China’s policy in relation to ethnic
minorities is based on a system of regional
autonomy. In autonomous areas such as the
XUAR, ethnic minorities enjoy a number
of favourable policies, including a special
quota system in political representation
and education. Regardless of whether
or not such policies are practiced, in
theory they work against the principle of
national integration, which is crucial to the
development of a national Chinese identity.
The mayor of Urumqi, the XUAR’s capital,
once described the crusade to maintain
China’s unity as “a political battle that’s
fierce and of blood and fire”. In the
imminent future, ethno-religious tension
is unlikely to disappear, with government
coerciveness bringing riots to a halt. While
China’s far-reaching and incredibly costly
domestic security machine can continue to
behave as pugnaciously as ever, such tactics
simply serve to make long-lasting stability
less attainable.
Stephanie Anne is in her third year of a
combined Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of
Laws degree, at the University of Sydney.
A Turbulent
Western Front
Stephanie Anne examines the strained relations between the dominant ethnic
and religious groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
FOCUS: China
ReurinkjanviaFlickr(CCBY2.0)
16 March 2013 | TheSydneyGlobalist

19. 17TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
Against a backdrop of social
upheaval, Christianity in China
is making a comeback. Evangelical
churches sprout like mushrooms across
city landscapes, brazenly declaring their
services in defiance of official sanction.
Inside, their swelling congregations sing
lusty hymns, while countrymen elsewhere
enthusiastically embrace a myriad of
spiritual alternatives.
China is the world’s biggest soul market.
Seventypercentofits1.3billionpopulation
declare no official religious affiliation,
presenting a mouth-watering prospect for
those infused with missionary zeal. Just
as citizens are clamoring for consumer
goods after years of frugal living, many
Chinese are eagerly receptive to evangelical
marketing after decades of aggressive state
secularism.
In 2010, the number of Christians in China
hit a new peak of 23 million according to
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
though many sources postulate a figure of
nearly triple this. However, Christianity
is not the only beneficiary of the greater
plurality, individualism and assertiveness
of ‘New China’. Social change is rapidly
forming new spaces for religion to flourish
and to extend its roots.
This growth has been fuelled by the decline
of secular Marxist narratives and, in
particular, the stresses of modernisation.
The tale of Yueyue, a two-year-old run over
twice and ignored by passers-by, has only
deepened existing national soul-searching
over China’s “decaying” social fabric.
Anxiety is rife about the moral void left
by fading Maoist rhetoric, and the family
structures fractured by mass urban
migration. Many Chinese commentators
have mourned the loss of a common moral
code and sense of social obligation to their
fellow man.
The state’s protracted disengagement from
the “iron rice bowl” model of welfare
provision has exacerbated this sense
of dislocation. Life-long social services
are no longer guaranteed by the state,
forcing many workers to make their own
arrangements.
It is into this vacuum of morality and
communal support that religious
organisations have surged, their appeals
newly resonant amongst disaffected
citizens.
This is not to downplay the long-held
antipathies to religion that still hold sway
over much official policy and constrain
religious freedom. Since 1958, China’s
Constitution has acknowledged only five
main religions: Buddhism, Islam, Daoism,
Catholicism and Protestantism.
Each was coopted into state-supervised
entities like the Chinese Patriotic Catholics
Association and the Protestant Three-
Self Church Movement. This was seen as
an effort to homogenise denominations,
centralise control and emphasise national
loyalty above sectarian identities.
Today, exchanges between the Vatican
and China’s ruling party remain
terse. Though relations have warmed
considerably since their Cold War nadir
when Chinese Catholic leaders were
threatened with excommunication, no
formal rapprochement appears likely.
The appointment of Bishops and the
recognition of Taiwan are sticking points
that highlight deep-rooted sensitivities
in China over external challenges to
sovereignty.
Paradoxically, given the Communist Party
leadership’s reputation for xenophobia,
their approach to homegrown alternatives
has been surprisingly belligerent.
Confucianism was notably the subject
of bitter derision from Communist elites
who labeled the philosophy backward,
conservative, and antithetical to political
enlightenment and modern progress.
Spiritual “cults” like Yi Guan Dao and
the Falun Gong were, and continue to
be, viciously suppressed. The devotion
of followers and their mass mobilisation
provoked a state mindful of historical
precedents such as the Boxer Rebellion
of 1900-01, and harshly intolerant of this
distinctive breed of “dangerous subversion”.
Christianity’s expanding toe-hold in China
and the blossoming of religion at large,
should therefore be placed within the
contours of a highly-contested political
landscape. Recent gains remain fragile
amongst rapidly shifting currents.
While the Bureau of Religious Affairs
now seems to be adopting a more benign
legislative approach, (and grudgingly
accepting the need for a strengthened civil
society), there are signs that the climate
may become less hospitable to religious
diversity.
Indeed recent developments point
to a subtle reversal of the historical
preference for foreign religions, over the
conservative ’backward’ values of Chinese
Confucianism. In 2008, a nine-metre high
statue of the scholar was placed in the
sacred and untouched political space of
Tiananmen Square.
An exponential growth in Confucian
studies and the official celebration of the
philosopher’s birthday point to a growing
interest in this “authentically Chinese”
philosophy. Much of this proliferation has
stemmed from organic interest at a local
level, yet it is also clear that the state is
energetically driving in this process.
An official promotion of the Confucian
code is not necessarily incompatible with
wider religious liberty. However, it does
signpost a dramatic shift in strategy. The
state’s increasing cooption of this ancient
dogma may well come at the expense
of the relatively privileged international
ideologies.
More worryingly for Christian groups
is the flammable popular nationalism
(seen recently in outbreaks of virulent
anti-Japanese riots), partly driving this
search for a common, centralised moral
code. In a volatile and jingoistic national
climate, religions associated with foreign
encroachments and past humiliations will
perhaps face a tougher sell.
Lucy Connell is a third year Arts/Commerce
student majoring in history and economics.
CHINA’S SOUL
MARKET
Lucy Connell examines the rise of religion in
modern-day China.
It is into this vacuum of morality
and communal support that
religious organisations have
surged
FOCUS: China
gabriel.jorby(CCBY-NC-ND2.0)

20. 18TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
On 20 April 2012, a 2,000-strong mob
led by saffron-robed Buddhist monks
attackedamosqueinthetownofDambulla,
148 kilometres north-east of Colombo. The
mob, armed with petrol bombs, damaged
the mosque and assaulted worshippers.
Whipped into a frenzy, the crowd claimed
that the mosque was an “illegal” structure
built on sacred Buddhist land, despite
it having been in existence for over 60
years. This incident is a microcosm of an
alarming dynamic within post-civil war
Sri Lankan society, one where Buddhism
is playing an increasingly chauvinistic and
intolerant role.
Sri Lanka is a country of immense ethnic
and religious diversity. It is home to five
major ethnic groups (the two largest
being Sinhalese and Tamils) and four
religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam,
and Christianity, with Buddhism making
up 70 per cent, and Hinduism and
Christianity – the predominate faiths of
the Tamils – making up 15 per cent and 7.5
per cent respectively. Throughout the long
history of the ‘tear-drop isle’, ethnic and
religious tensions have been at the core of
many conflicts. The Sri Lankan civil war
(1983-2009), a 26-year conflict between
the Sinhalese-dominated government
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), had its roots in the political and
economic marginalisation of the Tamil
minority by the Sinhalese (Buddhist)
central government. In this conflict and its
aftermath, Buddhism – and in particular,
the sangha (Buddhist clergy) – have played
a prominent role.
The unique Theravada Buddhist traditions
of Sri Lanka have little in common with
Western preconceptions of this ancient
religion. Buddhism was born in Northern
India in the sixth century BC, and spread
throughout the subcontinent and beyond.
However, within 900 years, Buddhism
was on the defensive as it was supplanted
by a new school of devotional Hinduism.
Against this encroaching tide of Hinduism
– which virtually replaced Buddhism
on the mainland – Sri Lanka’s Buddhist
monks began to view the island as a refuge
to be protected at all cost. For Sinhalese
Buddhists, Sri Lanka became dhammadipa,
or ‘the island of righteousness’: a land
visited by Buddha on three occasions,
according to the Mahavamsa, the sacred
text of Theravada Buddhists.
This defensive mindset and sense of
exceptionalism fostered an intolerant
chauvinism within some elements of the
Theravada Buddhist sangha. The Tamil
populations of northern and eastern
Sri Lanka, combined with the Tamil
population of Tamil Nadu in India,
created a paranoid minority complex in
the minds of many Sinhalese Buddhists,
despite their position as the island’s ethnic
majority. This fear of the Tamils and other
minorities became increasingly evident
after independence from Britain in 1948.
In the 1950s and 60s, factions of the
sangha became ardent foes of any political
or economic concessions to the Tamil
community, since it would undermine
the ‘unique’ Buddhist characteristic of Sri
Lanka. In 1959, a Buddhist monk gunned
down Solomon Bandaranaike, the fourth
Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, due to his
political concessions to minorities on the
issue of federalism. Due to the nature of
their religious vows, the sangha remained
detached from the parliamentary process,
though they persisted as the loud, and
sometimes violent, voice of Buddhist and
Sinhalese exceptionalism.
This situation changed in the mid-2000s.
The 2004 parliamentary elections were
a watershed moment in the history of
sangha’s involvement in the political
process. The general election marked
the debut of the Jathika Hela Urumaya
(JHU) or National Heritage Party, a
Sinhalese nationalist party exclusively led
by Buddhist monks. The JHU, an offshoot
of Sihala Urumaya (SU), was able to gain
nine seats in the parliament and achieved 6
per cent of total votes. The party’s platform
combined elements of Theravada Buddhist
morality and virtue, Sinhalese nationalism
and an uncompromising attitude towards
minority rights. The results also reflected
a Sinhalese electorate that increasingly
favoured a hard-line attitude towards the
LTTE and minority rights.
The motivations for the creation of the
JHU party reflected both the spiritual and
political realities of Sri Lanka. Mahinda
Deegalle, a scholar of contemporary
Buddhism, claims the Venerable Soma –
a popular Buddhist preacher – inspired a
new wave of Buddhist activism. Soma was
a student of Anagarika Dharmapala, the
famous early twentieth-century Buddhist
reformer hailed for raising Sinhalese socio-
cultural awareness as well as resistance to
British colonial rule and the influence of
Christian minorities. Soma was critical
of Sinhalese politicians and their corrupt
activities, which included facilitating
negotiations with the LTTE. He wanted
the state to protect Buddhism, and
asserted that Sri Lanka should be ruled
in accordance with Buddhist principles of
righteous living.
The emergence of the JHU came at an
opportune time for Sinhalese-Buddhist
nationalists. By July 2006, the Norwegian-
brokered ceasefire had frayed following
violations by both sides and an escalation
James Farquharson explores Buddhist chauvinism in Sri Lanka and its
impact on the country’s contemporary politics.
The PatH of
Siddhartha
Sippakorn Yamkasikorn via Fotopedia (CC BY 3.0)
18 March 2013 | TheSydneyGlobalist

21. 19TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
of LTTE terrorist activity. The return to
hostilities was a victory for the JHU over a
weak peace process, forced on Sri Lanka by
international forces.
In May 2009, the world witnessed the
destruction of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan
armed forces around the sand pits and
mangrove swamps of Nanthikadal lagoon,
in the northeast of the country. According
to conservative UN statistics, as many as
7,000 civilians were killed in the bloody
final months, although the toll could be as
high as 40,000. The victory announced on
May 16 by President Mahinda Rajapaksa,
a former Sinhalese lawyer, signalled the
final defeat of one of the world’s most
feared guerrilla armies and ruthless
terrorist groups. The LTTE, and its
supreme leader Velupillai Prabhakaran,
had no moral qualms over assassinating
opposition members and repressing all
those that opposed its policies, including
fellow Tamils. However, victory brought
vindication for those Sinhalese nationalists
– including the JHU – who had pushed for
a military solution rather than resolving
underlining political grievances through
negotiations. This divine victory brought
about a new wave of Sinhalese-Buddhist
chauvinism that would affect the post-war
reconstruction of the country and shape its
international relations.
In particular, the JHU and elements of
the sangha have adopted a policy of open
defiance towards external attempts to
investigate alleged war crimes committed
during the conflict and the post-war plans
of the Rajapaksa administration. Since
May 2009, the United Nations, European
Union, United States, India and Australia
have voiced concern at the approach
taken by the Rajapaksa government
towards the reconstruction effort due to
its lack of international oversight. The
accountability of the Sri Lanka human
rights investigation, known as the Lessons
Learnt and Reconciliation Commission
(LLRC) is less than credible: Human Rights
Watch and the International Crisis Group
have both labelled it a useless, government-
sponsored body. United Nations Secretary,
Ban Ki-Moon also expressed his concern
with the nature of the investigation.
In the face of this international pressure,
the JHU and elements of the sangha
have adopted the traditional Theravada
defensive mindset. Following the United
Nations Human Rights Council vote to
jumpstart the process of prosecuting those
responsible for killing civilians during
the latter stages of the war, monks and
nationalists protested the “victimisation” of
Sri Lanka. For the ultra-nationalist monks,
the dark forces of the United Nations,
“neo-imperialist” powers, and foreign
backers of minorities are aligning to stifle
the righteous cause of Sinhalese Buddhism.
India has faced the harshest criticism for its
decision to vote for the UN Human Rights
Council resolution in March 2012.
The Indian government strongly supported
the Rajapaksa government’s handling of
the final stages of the war. There was no
love lost between India and the LTTE, with
the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and the
ill-fated Indian military intervention in
Sri Lanka in the late 1980s being the most
prominent examples. However, intense
lobbying for the 70 million-strong Tamil
community and its political leaders in
Tamil Nadu in southern India, where the
growing commercial hub of Chennai is
situated, forced the government’s hand.
China has proved to be an unlikely
saviour for Sinhalese nationalists and
their Buddhist allies. Chinese weapons
ranging from small arms, artillery, tanks
and the F-7 fighter bomber gave the
Sri Lankan army its killer edge over its
Tamil opponents. Besides arms, Chinese
diplomacy – and in particular, its veto in
the UN Security Council – has ensured the
Sri Lankan military could crush the Tigers
by guaranteeing there would be no further
international interference in the post-war
reckoning. The arrangement has been
extremely satisfactory for the Chinese and
Sinhalese nationalists.
Sri Lanka lies on the major shipping lanes
between China and the vital oil fields of
the Middle East: the essential trade routes
that ensure the growth of the Chinese
economy. As part of the ‘string of pearls’
strategy, Chinese naval strategists and
political leaders have taken a keen interest
in the geopolitics of Sri Lanka. Over one
billion dollars has been invested in the
sleepy fishing port of Hambantota on Sri
Lanka’s southern coast, as a refuelling and
transit point for Chinese commercial, and
perhaps military, vessels.
In May 2009, the Sri Lankan government
achieved a stunning military success
that few in the international community
thought possible. Victory over the elusive
LTTE ended a vicious civil war, but it
did not alleviate the root causes of that
conflict. The marginalisation and blatant
discrimination against Tamils and other
minorities continues to this day. Elements
of the sangha and the JHU have fuelled a
growing division of Sri Lanka on ethnic
lines, and even advocated the view that
there is no ‘ethnic’ problem. Rather, a ‘law
and order’ problem has been eliminated
with the destruction of the LTTE. This
ethnic triumphalism will not result in
genuinepeaceontheisland.Onlyapolitical
settlement that guarantees the rights of all
Sri Lankans with a more equitable power-
sharing system will be able to do so.
James Farquharson is in his third year of a
Bachelor of Arts, majoring in International
History.
The party’s platform
combined elements of Theravada
Buddhist morality and virtue,
Sinhalese nationalism and
an uncompromising attitude
towards minority rights.
SuriaThonawanikviaFotopedia(CCBY-SA3.0)

22. 20TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
In 1998, Recep Erdoğan was imprisoned,
forced to resign as Mayor of Istanbul, and
banned from reentering Turkish politics.
His sole crime had been threatening the
strictly secular order of Turkey’s Republic
by reading a poem that celebrated Islam in
Turkish life. In his political exile, Erdoğan
recast himself as a social conservative
rather than Islamist-lite, and by 2003 had
become Prime Minister.
Erdoğan’s now successive elections
to Parliament have confronted and
challenged Turkey’s traditional political
elite, the Kemalists, on the definition
of what modern Turkey will look like.
Under Erdoğan’s administration, Islamist
values and communities have emerged
to challenge and diversify the notion of
what it means to be Turkish. Significantly,
a particular indicator of the erosion of
Turkey’s secular values is the presence of
veiled women in Turkey’s political and
social landscape. The veil, as a symbol of
revived religiosity, challenges notions of
whether a Turkish citizen can affirm values
of secularism whilst displaying an obvious
religious identity.
Turkish Political Culture: The Myth
versus the Reality
In 1922, Kemal Atatürk formed the
modern Republic of Turkey and separated
the Mosque from the State immediately.
Religious life and symbols associated with
Islamic worship were solely confined to the
Mosque. Islam was to play no part in the
politics of Atatürk’s Turkey.
In practice, the state did not separate from
the Mosque as much as take control of
it. In 1924, the Republic established the
Dianyet (or the Presidency of Religious
Affairs). Islam became an institute within
a secular nation, and a Turkish religious
identity was created to allow for the
simultaneous worship of Allah and the
Republic. Modern Latin alphabet-based
Turkish, not traditional Arabic or even
Ottoman Turkish, became the language
of religious instruction. This mandated
change of language severed Turkish Islam
from the past, and more easily allowed the
Kemalists to define and control the nature
of the Turkish religious identity within the
secular republic.
This religious identity that had been
married to Turkish nationalism was
the underpinning mythos of the new
Republic, and became first personified by
the Republic’s female citizen. Accordingly,
Atatürk’s first act to liberate an Islamic
society from Islam was to ban the veil.
Since 1923, Turkish women who wear the
veil have faced immediate expulsion from
universities, Parliament, public hospitals,
public sector employment and Turkey’s
social elite. In short, institutionalized
disadvantage became the punishment of
choice for those who wear the veil. For
that reason, the unveiled woman versus
the veiled woman has become a symbolic
dichotomy revealing current political
tensions in Turkey.
The Veil
To Elif Shafak, the veiled woman is an
‘other’ within Turkish society. She is
perceived as an entity from Turkey’s rural
landscape, characterized as weak-willed,
uneducated and from a lower socio-
economic status. But importantly, through
the veil this ‘other’ is also a visible challenge
to the legitimacy of the state in its ability to
control and mandate appropriate modes of
Manna Mostaghim discusses the battle for Turkey’s (secular) soul.
The [veil] is also a visible
challenge to the legitimacy of
the state in its ability to control
and mandate appropriate modes
of religious behaviour within
Turkey.
The Re-veiling of a
New Turkish Woman
DavidDennisviaFotopedia(CCBY-SA2.0)
20 March 2013 | TheSydneyGlobalist

23. 21TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
religious behaviour within Turkey.
Both Kemalists and Islamists regard the
veil as the ‘flag’ of the Islamist campaign
against the secular Republic. Increasingly
paranoid Kemalist newspapers (such as
the Hürriyet, Vatan and Bianet) report that
this ‘flag’ is ever more present in Turkey’s
landscape. But how many women actually
wear the veil in Turkey?
A 2008 survey by Çarkoğlu and Toprak
found that 60.3 per cent of the female
population wear the veil, demonstrating
an actual decline of veiled women under
Erdoğan’s leadership. But Kemalists seem
to prefer to exploit political tension by
using the veiled woman as a projection
of all that is wrong with the Islamist
political ideology, claiming that, if the
veil is allowed to flourish, so too will
other regressive Islamist values. This
fear has so far allowed discrimination
faced by veiled women to continue.
In his last election campaign Erdoğan
pledged, however, that he would seek to
reduce discrimination faced by veiled
women. In 2007, a statute was passed
that banned universities from expelling
students wearing the veil. Yet the statute
was ruled to be unconstitutional, and
overturned in 2008. Erdoğan, despite the
worst fears of the Kemalists, was unable to
overcome the secular system that they fear
he will destroy.
In any event, to regard the veil’s presence
(orabsence)asthemainissueistomisjudge
whyitisimportant.InErdoğan’sTurkey,the
veil is a conspicuous indicator of political
allegiance in Turkey’s population. This
has meant that women have also become
an identifiable focal point of reaction to
opposing political ideologies.
The Changing Relationship with the Veil
In the clash between Kemalists and
Islamists, established measures for
public female behaviour have become
more vague. The navigation of a Turkish
woman in public life – whether she is
veiled or unveiled – forces her to engage
with two sets of social gender norms.
Social punishment for diverging from
those values has become arbitrary, since a
woman becomes a potential victim due to
the confluence of her fashion choices and
the political allegiances of those around
her. The Turkish female has, in essence,
been robbed of political autonomy, and is
only allowed to express political opinion
via her prescribed dress code.
This has been demonstrated by impudent
attacks on women in public spaces. In
2008, supports of a Kemalist-affiliated
party attacked the veiled Kıymet Özgü,
as she attempted to get on an election
bus of the party’s mayoral candidate. The
conservative newspaper Zaman depicted
this as an assault in which she was targeted
for her identifiable allegiance with Islamist
values due to the fact she was veiled.
Secularist newspapers like the Hurriyet
exposed her actions as intentional baiting
of the staunchly Kemalist party, the CHP.
In contrast, Nurcan İbrahimoğlu was
attacked in 2011 for “corrupting the morals
of the people” due to her “inappropriate
clothing” choice of volleyball shorts. In
Kemalist newspapers, she was portrayed as
a victim of misapplied violence produced
by Islamist values, and a figure for
Kemalists to rally around. In contrast, the
conservative Zaman depicted İbrahimoğlu
as an untrustworthy source and as part of
a media campaign by Kemalists to decry a
falsesignifierofaninventedIslamistagenda.
These examples demonstrate that women
are personifying the narratives of partisan
political ideology, with both veiled and
non-veiled woman having their individual
autonomy sacrificed for the political
tension between Kemalists and Islamists.
Women are therefore being confined to
their own communities, as Turkish public
spaces are becoming too fraught with
political tension.
Turkey versus Iran
For Oliver Roy, the veiling of women was
seenasthefirststepintoIran’sdescentintoa
theocracy. Like Turkey, Iran had once been
a nation that sought to establish programs
of reform in efforts to align itself with the
norms of post-enlightenment countries.
Today it is a conservative and tyrannical
theocracy. Accordingly, a common chant
by Kemalists is that “Turkey will not
become another Iran”. Kemalists believe
that there will be an inevitable descent into
religious extremism if the question of the
veil is opened to negotiation.
Ironically though, the Kemalists have
contributed actively to a process that is
allowing for the creation of an ‘Iran’ inside
of Turkey. Veiled women excluded from
wider Turkish society have had to turn
to Islamist communities for services that
are otherwise offered by the government
to their non-veiled counterparts. With
their own hospitals, schools, universities
and businesses, the Islamist communities
have provided a viable, alternative
infrastructure. The Islamist community
has in effect been able to sponsor the veiled
woman’s existence by negating the effects
of institutionalised disadvantage.
Moreover, these communities have
produced women that overcome
the characterisation of the ‘other’.
Islamist sponsored communities have
produced female doctors, lawyers and
businesswomen who have demanded
a greater role in defining the Islamist
agenda for Turkish women. In becoming
self-sustaining, the Islamist community
may not be able to overcome the secular
system’s understanding of appropriate
Turkish womanhood. But they may be
able to diversify the understanding of
what constitutes a Turkish woman – and,
therefore, Turkish citizenship within a
secular Republic.
The Veil and Ermine Erdoğan
The first lady of the Turkish Republic,
Ermine Erdoğan, wears a veil. It is she who
perhaps crystallizes the increasing tension
surrounding the veil in Turkish public and
political life. In an open letter by Kemalists,
27 female members of Parliament
wrote to the Turkish First Lady asking
her not to accompany her husband on
international trips. The letter characterised
her veil as an unsuitable representation
of the Turkish woman, and the Kemalist
Republic on the international stage.
But the international community has
already tacitly and expressly acknowledged
Ms Erdoğan as a representative of the
Turkish female. Awarded the Prix de la
Fondation by the Crans Montana Forum,
an international award bestowed upon
individuals who advocate for international
cooperation and democracy, she was
praised as a significant advocate for gender
equality. Despite claims of Kemalists that
she represents a regression in the rights
of Turkish women by appearing with the
veil in public, Ermine Erdoğan acts as an
ultimate symbol and identification of the
Islamist agenda in diversifying notions of
Turkish citizenship.
The Republic has not fully relinquished the
principle of secularism. But the current
battle over the question of secularism and
the veil demonstrates the double standard
employed in the expression of religiosity
in Turkey while simultaneously revealing
the Republic’s deep political and socio-
economicschisms.Thecasualtyinthebattle
for Turkey’s ‘soul’ has been women – as they
have been denied a status as autonomous
beings, and have become forums in which
a political divide can exploit their presence.
Manna Mostaghim is in her second year of a
Juris Doctor at the Sydney Law School.
The Islamist community has
in effect been able to sponsor
the veiled woman’s existence
by negating the effects of
institutionalised disadvantage.

24. 22TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
“history is fables agreed upon” Voltaire
The threat of Iran’s disputed nuclear
weapons programme has come to
dominate the study of international
relations, which time and again portrays
the Islamic Republic as an irrational state
threatening the wider region. Yet the
devastating history of the West’s encounter
with Iran and its involvement in Iranian
internal affairs is oft forgotten despite the
fact that it continues to cast a shadow over
the Western-Iranian relationship.
In 1953, British and American intelligence
services orchestrated a coup d’état against
Iran’s popular Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadegh who in nationalising British
petroleum holdings suspended the West’s
exploitation of Iran’s oil by returning it to
his people. For scholars such as Stephen
Kinzer, the 1979 Embassy takeover
was partially a response to American
intervention in Iranian affairs, which came
to “define all subsequent Iranian history,
reshaping the world in ways that are only
now becoming clear.”
Enter the new Hollywood film Argo. Set in
the turmoils of revolutionary Iran, the 2012
Best Picture-winning film touches upon
this complex history and has the potential
to contribute to a more constructive
discourse about Iran’s place in the world.
In 1979, before the term ‘Islamic militant’
entered our vernacular, a group of Iranian
studentsoccupiedtheAmericanEmbassyin
Iran, demanding that the Shah be returned
for trial. Several American officials were
taken hostage, yet six managed to escape
and sought shelter in the official residence
of the Canadian Ambassador.
Directed by Ben Affleck, Argo is a
dramatisation of the joint CIA-Canadian
operation to extract these six American
Embassy officials from Iran. Based on
classified material released in 1997, the
film is told from the perspective of CIA
extractor Tony Mendez who devises a plan
to help the officials escape by disguising
them as a Canadian film crew on a location
scout for a science fiction film.
Argo is a brilliantly produced, fast-paced
political thriller with a nail biting, though
somewhat fictionalised, ending. The film’s
effective use of a grainy lens combined
with archival footage helps to re-create
the setting of a tumultuous nation gripped
by revolutionary fervour. In telling the
previously untold story of the CIA’s
successful extraction, Affleck sheds light on
what was widely regarded to be the greatest
disaster in US foreign policy history.
The film’s triumph comes in its first five
minutes, where it attempts to contextualise
the political mayhem which the embassy
officials find themselves thrust into. In
providing the audience with a short history
of modern Iran – from the overthrow of
its democratically elected Prime Minister,
Mossadegh to the ruthlessness of the
Western-installed Mohammad Reza Shah
Pahlavi – Argo presents a more nuanced
image of a nation oft-portrayed in the
media as fanatical and unfoundedly hostile
towards the U.S.
Though it briefly touches upon the
Anglo-American intervention and the
Shah’s decadence as he “tortured the
entire population,” the film fails to enable
audiences to empathise with the plight of
the Iranian people. Despite the recurrent
use of Farsi, English subtitles are never used
to allow Western audiences to understand
the Iranian characters, most of whom are
found shouting, protesting or engaging
in violent acts in sharp juxtaposition
to the American officials. This is best
epitomised in the Bazaar scene where an
older man begins to shout at one of the
female American officials (he is in fact
complaining in Farsi that his son had been
shot by the Shah’s men using an American
firearm). Moreover, the film often sacrifices
historical accuracies for suspense and has
arguably underplayed the role of Canadian
officials, outraging the then Canadian
Ambassador to Iran, Sir John Graham.
The dehumanisation of Iranians is
a stark reminder that Argo is no
historical documentary but a dramatised
interpretation of a highly contentious
political event. With this important point
in mind, the film is still a must-see, as it
gives audiences a thrilling glimpse into
the deeply ordered chaos that comes
to characterise revolutionary times. If
nothing else, Argo is a hopeful yet subtle
sign of a slowly shifting discourse on the
rich and diverse Iranian nation.
Raihana Haidary is currently in her fourth
year at the University of Sydney, completing
Honours in Government and International
Relations.
Argo: a Hollywood lesson
in US-Iranian history?
Raihana Haidary assesses the real impact of the film Argo on modern
perceptions of Iran.
22 March 2013 | TheSydneyGlobalist

25. 23TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013

26. 24TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
THE LAND oF
JASMINERICE
Thousands of Buddhist monks joined
in a pilgrimage covering 500 kilometres
across Bangkok and the surrounding
province.
A local artist’s interpretation of
meditating Buddha at the Bangkok
Art and Culture Centre
A daily morning food offering
to a Buddhist monk at a local
food market near Wat Suthat
Thepphawararam.
24 March 2013 | TheSydneyGlobalist

27. 25TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
Apiwat Pradmuang captures his journey through Buddhist Thailand.
A young Thai girl heading toward the village rice
farms in Isaan. Villagers in small villages tend
to group together to help out with the manual
labour of gathering rice.
Mounted monk during a daily morning
offering at Wat Pra Archa Tong in
Chiang Rai.
A young novice monk at the daily
morning offering (alms giving) at Wat
Phrathat Doi Suthep in Chiang Mai.
Sunset on Wat Arun, the Temple of Dawn.
Buddhism has always run deep in Thai tradition and custom, and affects every aspect
of life in the country. Approximately 95 per cent of the Thai population is Buddhist.
Young men are often ordained as monks for a period of time – some because they are
willing to sacrifice their time in return for good karma. Living as a monk, even for only
a few months, is considered an important part of a young Thai man’s life. Monks are not
permitted to handle money, listen to music, or work. However, the rules are being slowly
relaxed as Thai society modernises.
Suffering, Buddha taught, is caused by desires, craving, and the human ego. Through
self-awakening and following the “Noble Eightfold Path”, Buddhists believe that a person
can achieve a mental state free from suffering and ego, called “Nirvana”. The exact time
Buddhism was introduced to Thailand is disputed, but in the 13th Century, during the
Sukhothai Kingdom, Buddhism became Thailand’s official religion. During this period,
Hinduism from Cambodia heavily influenced Thai Buddhism, and contemporary
Buddhist rituals and temples reflect that influence. The religion, to this day, remains a
fundamental face of the nation.

28. 26TheSydneyGlobalist | March 2013
In August 2012, a young Pakistani
girl, Rimsha Masih, was arrested and
charged with desecrating the Qur’an,
after a neighbour claimed he saw her with
burnt pages of the holy text in her bag. The
allegation of blasphemy against 14 year
old Masih, who is reported to have Down
syndrome, caught the attention of media
worldwide.
Yet her case is not an anomaly in Pakistan,
where accusations of blasphemy are used
for silencing political foes, oppressing
religious minorities and exacting personal
vendettas. The march of extremism in
the world’s second largest Muslim nation,
the only one with nuclear weapons, and
on whose support the United States has
depended in Afghanistan, is a clear cause
for concern for the stability of Central Asia.
Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan
Pakistan’s blasphemy laws date back to
1860, when, in an attempt to calm the
subcontinent’s fractious religious groups,
the British administration codified 295A
of the Indian Penal Code, which punished
hate speech and insults or attempts to
insult the religion or the religious beliefs of
any citizen. Pakistan inherited these laws
after the partition of India in 1947. Upon
partition, Pakistan struggled to assert a
cohesive identity. Pakistan’s leaders used
religious sentiment as an instrument to
strengthen Pakistan’s identity and unify
Pakistan’s diverse citizenry. In 1956, with
the introduction of its first constitution,
Pakistan was officially renamed the ‘Islamic
Republic of Pakistan’. Since then, the
evolution of Islamic politics and an Islamic
national identity has been consistently
encouraged and, at times, enforced by state
policy.
While the 1956 constitution avoided
reference to Shari’a as the authoritative
sourceofIslamiclaw,theulama–composed
of the learned Islamic elite and a class of
less educated mullahs – vigorously pressed
for its introduction. As the political history
of Pakistan oscillated between coups and
elections, the influence of the ulama grew
and the program for the legal Islamisation
of society gained momentum.
It took the military dictatorship of General
Zia u-Haq, who seized power in 1977, for
this dream of the ulama to come to fruition.
General Zia, who found inspiration in the
WahhabistdenominationofIslampreached
in Saudi Arabia, made Islamisation of
the law a primary objective. In 1980, the
Federal Shariat Court was created, having
the jurisdiction to examine and void any
law that was repugnant to Islam. The ulama
now had constitutional legitimacy and a
religious court to advance their program.
In establishing the Shariat Court, General
Zia effectively enfranchised the power of
a class of relatively uneducated mullahs.
Beginning in 1980, a number of clauses
were added to the chapter of religious
offences in the Pakistan Penal Code,
including one which declared, ‘[W]hoever
by words, either spoken, or written, or by
visible representation, or by any imputation,
innuendo, or insinuation, directly or
indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the
Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be
punished with death, or imprisonment, and
shall also be liable to a fine.’ The Shariat
Court found this provision too mild, and
shortly afterwards the lesser penalty of life
imprisonment was voided.
Blasphemy in Shari’a
Under the dominant strain of classical
Islamic law, or Shari’a, there are three
primary categories of crime, hadd, ta’zir
and quisas. Hadd offences are defined
as ‘claims of God’ and constitute fixed
punishments from which no deviation is
allowed. Traditionally, these punishments
were meted out very rarely, and the process
of determining guilt was very exacting.
Most crimes are enforced by discretionary
(ta’zir) punishments, or in the case of
homicide or battery, by retaliation (quisas).
Apostasy, which is a hadd crime, is
particularly heinous under Shari’a . As it is
seen as being akin to treason, it is a capital
offence. Unlike apostasy, blasphemy is a
ta’zir offence and the degree of punishment
is at the discretion of the judge. However,
by writing the prohibition against
blasphemy directly into the penal code,
the Shariat Court removed the tradition of
discretionary punishment.
The March of Extremism
While General Zia’s extremism worried
the West, the U.S. was a staunch sponsor
of Zia’s military regime and a major ally
of Pakistan’s conservative military. The
Reagan Administration declared Zia’s
The March of
Extremism
Sarah Copland examines the rise of extremism in Pakistan, embodied in the country’s
controversial blasphemy laws.
Jonmartin0 via Flickr (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)
26 March 2013 | TheSydneyGlobalist