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Leonardo	
  Nve	
  Egea	
  
Christian	
  Martorella	
  
            lnve@s21sec.com	
  
      cmartorella@s21sec.com	
  
                           	
  º	
  
1.	
  Because	
  I’m	
  sure	
  that	
  some	
  people	
  will	
  
         publish	
  more	
  attacks.	
  
	
  
2.	
  Because	
  there	
  are	
  previous	
  presentations	
  
         about	
  satellites.	
  
	
  	
  
¡  Warezzman	
  –	
  (in	
  2004	
  at	
  Undercon	
  VIII	
  first	
  
       Spanish	
  hacker	
  CON)	
  


¡  Jim	
  Geovedi	
  &	
  Raditya	
  Iryandi	
  
       (HITBSecConf2006)	
  
	
  
¡  Adam	
  Laurie	
  (Blackhat	
  2009	
  at	
  DC)	
  


¡  Leonardo	
  Nve	
  (S21sec	
  Blog	
  February	
  2009)	
  
¡  A	
  	
  satellite	
  	
  is	
  	
  a	
  	
  radio	
  frequency	
  	
  repeater	
  	
  	
  	
  
    that	
  	
  is	
  	
  	
  launched	
  	
  by	
  	
  a	
  	
  rocket	
  	
  and	
  	
  placed	
  	
  in	
  	
  
    orbit	
  	
  around	
  	
  	
  the	
  	
  earth.	
  
¡  Orbit	
  based	
  satellites	
  	
  
   §  Low	
  Earth	
  orbiting	
  (LEO)	
  
   §  Geostationary	
  orbit	
  (GEO)	
  
   §  Other:	
  Molniya,	
  High	
  (HEO),	
  etc.	
  
   	
  
¡  Function	
  based	
  satellites	
  
   §  Communications	
  
   §  Earth	
  observation	
  
   §  Other:	
  Scientifics,	
  ISS,	
  etc.	
  
¡  Satellite	
  GEO	
  
  §  UFO	
  (UHF	
  Follow	
  ON)	
  Military	
  
  §  Inmarsat	
  
  §  Meteorological	
  (Meteosat)	
  
  §  SCPC	
  /	
  Telephony	
  link	
  FDMA	
  
  	
  
¡  Standard	
  of	
  European	
  Telecommunications	
  
   Standards	
  Institute	
  (ETSI).	
  

¡  Defines	
  audio	
  	
  and	
  video	
  transmission,	
  and	
  
   data	
  connections.	
  

¡  DVB-­‐S	
  &	
  DVB-­‐S2	
  is	
  the	
  specification	
  for	
  
   satellite	
  communications.	
  
¡  Transponder:	
  	
  Like	
  channels	
  (in	
  Satellite	
  
  comms)	
  	
  
   §  Frecuency	
  (C	
  band	
  or	
  Ku).	
  Ex:	
  12.092Ghz	
  
   §  Polarization.	
  (horizontal/vertical)	
  
   §  Symbol	
  Rate.	
  Ex:	
  27500Kbps	
  
   §  FEC.	
  	
  
¡  Every	
  satellite	
  has	
  many	
  transponders	
  
  onboard	
  which	
  are	
  operating	
  on	
  different	
  
  frequencies	
  
 	
  Header	
                                   Body	
  
	
  0x47	
   Flags	
     PID	
        Flags	
      Adaptation	
  Field	
     Data	
  
	
  
Program	
  ID	
  (PID):	
  It	
  permits	
  different	
  programs	
  at	
  same	
  
     transponder	
  with	
  different	
  components	
  [Example	
  BBC1	
  
     PIDs:	
  600	
  (video),	
  601	
  (English	
  audio),	
  603	
  (subtitles),	
  4167	
  
     (teletext)]	
  
	
  
¡  Temporal	
  video	
  links.	
  

¡  Live	
  emissions,	
  sports,	
  news.	
  
	
  
¡  FTA	
  –	
  In	
  open	
  video.	
  
Captured NATO feeds
NATO COMINT official
¡  Is	
  widely	
  known	
  that	
  the	
  Department	
  of	
  
   Defense	
  (DoD)	
  and	
  some	
  US	
  defense	
  	
  
   contractors	
  use	
  satellites	
  and	
  	
  DVB	
  for	
  their	
  
   comms.	
  

¡  Let`s	
  see:	
  
	
  
http://telecom.esa.int/telecom/media/document/DVB-­‐RCS
     %20Networks%20for%20the%20US%20Defense%20Market
     %20(R3).pdf	
  
U.S COMINT official
¡  How	
  to	
  find	
  feeds:	
  


   §  Lists	
  of	
  channels	
  in	
  www	
  
   	
  
   §  Blind	
  Scan	
  


   §  Visual	
  representations	
  of	
  the	
  signal	
  	
  
¡  Dr	
  HANS	
  
   §  http://drhans.jinak.cz/news/index.php	
  
   	
  
¡  Zackyfiles	
  
   §  http://www.zackyfiles.com	
  (in	
  spanish)	
  


¡  Satplaza	
  
   §  http://www.satplaza.com	
  
¡  Two	
  scenarios	
  


  §  Satmodem	
  


  §  Satellite	
  Interactive	
  Terminal	
  (SIT)	
  or	
  Astromodem	
  
    	
  (DVB/RCS)	
  	
  
INTERNET	
  
CLIENT	
  


                            ISP	
  
DOWNLINK	
  




                  INTERNET	
  
     CLIENT	
  


                                 ISP	
  
DOWNLINK	
  




                  POTS/GPRS	
  
                  UPLINK	
  
                     INTERNET	
  
     CLIENT	
  

                  UPLINK	
  
                                    ISP	
  
DOWNLINK	
  




                  POTS/GPRS	
  
                  UPLINK	
  
                     INTERNET	
  
     CLIENT	
  

                  UPLINK	
  
                                    ISP	
  
DOWNLINK	
  
                                    ISP’s	
  UPLINK	
  



                  POTS/GPRS	
  
                  UPLINK	
  
                     INTERNET	
  
     CLIENT	
  

                  UPLINK	
  
                                                 ISP	
  
DVB Data - Astromodem

DOWNLINK	
  &	
  UPLINK	
                    ISP	
  DOWNLINK	
  &	
  UPLINK	
  




                              INTERNET	
  


         CLIENT	
                                                     ISP	
  
 
Anyone	
  with	
  coverage	
  can	
  SNIFF	
  
the	
  DVB	
  Data,	
  and	
  normally	
  it	
  is	
  
unencrypted.	
  
	
  
¡  What	
  do	
  you	
  need:	
  
   §  Skystar	
  2	
  DVB	
  Card	
  
   §  linuxtv-­‐dvb-­‐apps	
  	
  
   §  Wireshark	
  
   §  The	
  antenna	
  (Dish	
  +	
  LNB)	
  
   §  Data	
  to	
  point	
  it.	
  
 
I	
  bought	
  it	
  for	
  50€!!!	
  from	
  an	
  
PayTV	
  ex-­‐”hacker”	
  :P	
  	
  
(Including	
  a	
  set-­‐top	
  box	
  that	
  I	
  will	
  
not	
  use)	
  
Linux	
  has	
  the	
  modules	
  for	
  this	
  card	
  by	
  
default,	
  we	
  only	
  need	
  the	
  tools	
  to	
  manage	
  it:	
  
	
  
linuxtv-­‐dvb-­‐apps	
  
	
  
My	
  version	
  is	
  1.1.1	
  and	
  I	
  use	
  Fedora	
  (Not	
  too	
  
cool	
  to	
  use	
  Debian	
  :P).	
  
Once	
  the	
  antenna	
  and	
  the	
  card	
  are	
  installed	
  
and	
  linuxtv-­‐dvb-­‐apps	
  compiled	
  	
  and	
  installed,	
  
the	
  process	
  is:	
  
   1-­‐	
  Tune	
  the	
  DVB	
  Card	
  
   2-­‐	
  Find	
  a	
  PID	
  with	
  data	
  
   3-­‐	
  Create	
  an	
  Ethernet	
  interface	
  associated	
  to	
  that	
  
   PID	
  
We	
  can	
  repeat	
  2	
  to	
  3	
  any	
  times	
  we	
  want.	
  
1-­‐	
  Tune	
  the	
  DVB	
  Card	
  
       	
  
       2-­‐	
  Find	
  a	
  PID	
  with	
  data	
  
       	
  
       3-­‐	
  Create	
  an	
  Ethernet	
  interface	
  associated	
  to	
  that	
  
       PID	
  
	
  
Tune	
  DVB	
  Card	
  
The	
  tool	
  we	
  must	
  use	
  is	
  szap	
  and	
  we	
  need	
  the	
  
transponder’s	
  parameters	
  in	
  a	
  configuration	
  
file.	
  
	
  
For	
  example,	
  for	
  “Sirius-­‐4	
  Nordic	
  Beam":	
  
#	
  echo	
  “sirius4N:12322:v:0:27500:0:0:0"	
  >>	
  channels.conf	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
We	
  run	
  szap	
  with	
  the	
  channel	
  configuration	
  
file	
  and	
  the	
  transponder	
  we	
  want	
  use	
  (the	
  
configuration	
  file	
  can	
  have	
  more	
  than	
  one).	
  
	
  
#	
  szap	
  –c	
  channels.conf	
  sirius4N	
  
	
  
We	
  must	
  keep	
  it	
  running.	
  
	
  
The	
  transponder	
  parameters	
  can	
  be	
  found	
  
around	
  Internet.	
  

http://www.fastsatfinder.com/transponders.html	
  
	
  
1-­‐	
  Tune	
  the	
  DVB	
  Card	
  
       	
  
       2-­‐	
  Find	
  a	
  PID	
  with	
  data	
  
       	
  
       3-­‐	
  Create	
  an	
  Ethernet	
  interface	
  associated	
  to	
  that	
  
       PID	
  
	
  
¡ 	
  Find	
  a	
  PID	
  
	
  
#dvbsnoop	
  -­‐s	
  pidscan	
  
	
  
Search	
  for	
  data	
  section	
  on	
  results.	
  
1-­‐	
  Tune	
  the	
  DVB	
  Card	
  
       	
  
       2-­‐	
  Find	
  a	
  PID	
  with	
  data	
  
       	
  
       3-­‐	
  Create	
  an	
  Ethernet	
  interface	
  associated	
  to	
  
       that	
  PID	
  
	
  
¡ 	
  Create	
  an	
  interface	
  associated	
  to	
  a	
  PID	
  
	
  
#dvbnet	
  -­‐a	
  <adapter	
  number>	
  -­‐p	
  <PID>	
  

¡ 	
  Activate	
  it	
  
#ifconfig	
  dvb0_<iface	
  number>	
  up	
  
	
  
	
  
 
Back	
  to	
  de	
  pidscan	
  results	
  
Create	
  another	
  interface	
  
Wireshark	
  is	
  our	
  friend	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
16358	
  packets	
  in	
  10	
  seconds	
  
¡ 	
  We	
  can	
  have	
  more	
  than	
  one	
  PID	
  assigned	
  to	
  an	
  
interface,	
  this	
  will	
  be	
  very	
  useful.	
  
¡ 	
  Malicious	
  users	
  can:	
  
       § 	
  Catch	
  passwords.	
  
       § 	
  Catch	
  cookies	
  and	
  get	
  into	
  authenticated	
  HTTP	
  
       sessions.	
  
       § 	
  Read	
  emails	
  
       § 	
  Catch	
  sensitive	
  files	
  
       § 	
  Do	
  traffic	
  analysis	
  
       § 	
  Etc	
  ….	
  
	
  
Reminder:	
  	
  
     	
  In	
  satellite	
  communications	
  we	
  have	
  two	
  
scenarios:	
  
	
  
  A-­‐	
  Satmodem,	
  Only	
  Downlink	
  via	
  Satellite	
  
  	
  
  B-­‐	
  Astromodem,	
  Both	
  uplink	
  and	
  downlink	
  via	
  
  Satellite.	
  
 
We	
  can	
  only	
  sniff	
  the	
  downloaded	
  data.	
  We	
  
can	
  only	
  sniff	
  one	
  direction	
  in	
  a	
  connection.	
  
	
  
¡ 	
  DNS	
  Spoofing	
  

¡ 	
  TCP	
  hijacking	
  


¡ Attacking	
  GRE	
  
 
	
  
DNS	
  Spoofing	
  is	
  the	
  art	
  of	
  making	
  a	
  DNS	
  
entry	
  to	
  point	
  to	
  an	
  another	
  IP	
  than	
  it	
  would	
  
be	
  supposed	
  to	
  point	
  to.	
  (SecureSphere)	
  
¡ 	
  What	
  we	
  need	
  to	
  perform	
  this	
  attack?	
  
  § 	
  DNS	
  Request	
  ID	
  
  § 	
  Source	
  Port	
  
  § Source	
  IP	
  
  § Destination	
  IP	
  
  § Name/IP	
  asking	
  for	
  
  	
  
¡ 	
  It´s	
  trivial	
  to	
  see	
  that	
  if	
  we	
  sniff	
  a	
  DNS	
  
request	
  we	
  have	
  all	
  that	
  information	
  and	
  we	
  
can	
  spoof	
  the	
  answer.	
  
	
  
¡ 	
  Many	
  tools	
  around	
  do	
  this	
  job,	
  	
  the	
  only	
  
thing	
  we	
  also	
  need	
  is	
  to	
  be	
  faster	
  than	
  the	
  
real	
  DNS	
  server	
  ( jizz).	
  
¡ 	
  Why	
  is	
  this	
  attack	
  important?	
  
  § Think	
  in	
  phising	
        	
  	
  
  § 	
  With	
  this	
  attack,	
  uplink	
  sniff	
  can	
  be	
  possible	
  
     ▪ 	
  Rogue	
  WPAD	
  service	
  
     ▪ 	
  Sslstrip	
  can	
  be	
  use	
  to	
  avoid	
  SSL	
  connections.	
  
¡ 	
  DNS	
  Spoofing	
  

¡ 	
  TCP	
  hijacking	
  


¡ Attacking	
  GRE	
  
 	
  	
  	
  TCP	
  session	
  hijacking	
  is	
  when	
  a	
  hacker	
  takes	
  
                over	
  a	
  TCP	
  session	
  between	
  two	
  machines.	
  
                (ISS)	
  
Seq=S1	
  	
  	
  ACK=A1	
  	
  	
  Datalen=L1	
  



                     Seq=A1	
  	
  	
  ACK=S1+L1	
  	
  	
  Datalen=L2	
  


               Seq=S1+L1	
  	
  	
  ACK=A1+L2	
  	
  	
  Datalen=L3	
  
	
  
If	
  we	
  sniff	
  1	
  we	
  can	
  predict	
  Seq	
  and	
  Ack	
  of	
  2	
  and	
  
      we	
  can	
  send	
  the	
  payload	
  we	
  want	
  in	
  2	
  	
  
	
  
¡ 	
  Initially	
  we	
  can	
  only	
  have	
  a	
  false	
  connection	
  with	
  A.	
  

¡ 	
  In	
  certain	
  circumstances,	
  we	
  can	
  make	
  this	
  attack	
  
with	
  B,	
  when	
  L2	
  is	
  predictable.	
  

¡ Some	
  tools	
  for	
  doing	
  this:	
  
    § Hunt	
  
    § Shijack	
  
    § Scapy	
  
	
  
	
  	
  
¡ 	
  DNS	
  Spoofing	
  

¡ 	
  TCP	
  hijacking	
  


¡ Attacking	
  GRE	
  
¡ 	
  Generic	
  Routing	
  Encapsulation	
  	
  

¡ 	
  Point	
  to	
  point	
  tunneling	
  protocol	
  


¡ 13%	
  of	
  Satellite’s	
  data	
  traffic	
  in	
  our	
  
transponder	
  is	
  GRE	
  
 
This	
  chapter	
  is	
  based	
  on	
  Phenoelit’s	
  
discussion	
  paper	
  written	
  by	
  FX	
  applied	
  to	
  
satellite	
  scenario.	
  
	
  
Original	
  paper:	
  	
  
http://www.phenoelit-­‐us.org/irpas/gre.html	
  
HQ	
  




                     INTERNET	
  


                                               Remote	
  Office	
  
Remote	
  Office	
          Remote	
  Office	
  
Find	
  a	
  target:	
  
	
  
#tshark	
  –ni	
  dvb0_0	
  –R	
  gre	
  –w	
  capture.cap	
  
	
  
GRE	
  Packet	
  
IP	
  d	
   1	
  
        est	
                             IP	
  source	
  1	
  

       	
                       GRE	
  header	
  
Payload	
  IP	
  dest	
                   Payload	
  IP	
  source	
  
                            Payload	
  IP	
  Header	
  
                                       	
  
                               Payload	
  Data	
  
                                     	
  
                                     	
  
                                     	
  
¡ 	
  IP	
  dest	
  1	
  and	
  source	
  1	
  must	
  be	
  Internet	
  
reachable	
  	
  IPs	
  

¡ The	
  payload´s	
  IPs	
  used	
  to	
  be	
  internal.	
  
1.1.1.2	
                               1.1.1.1	
  
                        INTERNET	
  


        10.0.0.54	
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1.1.1.2	
                               1.1.1.1	
  
                        INTERNET	
  

                           (*)	
  

        10.0.0.54	
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(*)	
  GRE	
  Packet	
  
    	
  
1.1.1.1	
                                       1.1.1.2	
  

    	
                GRE	
  header	
  (32	
  bits	
  without	
  flags)	
  
10.0.0.5	
                                             10.0.0.54	
  
                                         Payload	
  IP	
  Header	
  
                                                    	
  
                                            Payload	
  Data	
  
                                                  	
  
                                                  	
  
                                                  	
  
(1)	
  
1.1.1.2	
                          1.1.1.1	
  




        10.0.0.54	
               10.0.0.5	
  
(1)	
  GRE	
  Packet	
  
    	
  
1.1.1.1	
                                       1.1.1.2	
  

    	
                GRE	
  header	
  (32	
  bits	
  without	
  flags)	
  
10.0.0.5	
                                             10.0.0.54	
  
                                         Payload	
  IP	
  Header	
  
                                                    	
  
                                            Payload	
  Data	
  
                                                  	
  
                                                  	
  
                                                  	
  
(1)	
  
1.1.1.2	
                          1.1.1.1	
  
                                                 (2)	
  




        10.0.0.54	
               10.0.0.5	
  
(2)	
  IP	
  Packet	
  
	
  10.0.0.5	
                   10.0.0.54	
  
                                 	
  
                          IP	
  header	
  
	
  
                              	
  
                             Data	
  
(1)	
  
1.1.1.2	
                          1.1.1.1	
  
                                                 (2,3)	
  




        10.0.0.54	
               10.0.0.5	
  
(3)	
  IP	
  Packet	
  
	
  10.0.0.54	
                    10.0.0.5	
  
                                  	
  
                          IP	
  header	
  2	
  
	
  
                                	
  
                              Data	
  2	
  
(4)	
  




                        (1)	
  
1.1.1.2	
                                    1.1.1.1	
  
                                                           (2,3)	
  




        10.0.0.54	
                         10.0.0.5	
  
(4)	
  GRE	
  Packet	
  
    	
  
1.1.1.2	
                                       1.1.1.1	
  

    	
                GRE	
  header	
  (32	
  bits	
  without	
  flags)	
  
10.0.0.54	
                                              10.0.0.5	
  
                                        Payload	
  IP	
  Header	
  2	
  
                                                    	
  
                                           Payload	
  Data	
  2	
  
                                                 	
  
                                                 	
  
                                                 	
  
At	
  Phenoelit´s	
  attack	
  payload’s	
  IP	
  source	
  is	
  our	
  public	
  IP.	
  This	
  
attack	
  lacks	
  	
  when	
  that	
  IP	
  isn´t	
  reachable	
  from	
  the	
  internal	
  
LAN	
  and	
  you	
  can	
  be	
  logged.	
  	
  
	
  
I	
  use	
  internal	
  IP	
  because	
  we	
  can	
  sniff	
  the	
  responses.	
  
	
  	
  
	
  
To	
  improve	
  the	
  attack,	
  find	
  a	
  internal	
  IP	
  not	
  used.	
  	
  
How	
  
To	
  
Scan	
  
NSA	
  
And	
  
Cannot	
  
Be	
  
Traced	
  
	
  
We	
  can	
  send	
  a	
  SYN	
  packet	
  with	
  any	
  
destination	
  IP	
  and	
  TCP	
  port	
  (spoofing	
  a	
  
satellite’s	
  routable	
  source	
  IP)	
  ,	
  and	
  we	
  can	
  
sniff	
  the	
  responses.	
  
	
  
We	
  can	
  analyze	
  the	
  responses.	
  
OR…	
  We	
  can	
  configure	
  our	
  linux	
  like	
  a	
  
satellite	
  connected	
  host.	
  
	
  
	
  
VERY	
  EASY!!!	
  
¡  What	
  we	
  need:	
  
   §  An	
  internet	
  connection	
  (Let’s	
  use	
  it	
  as	
  uplink)	
  with	
  
      any	
  technology	
  which	
  let	
  you	
  spoofing.	
  

   §  A	
  receiver,	
  a	
  card….	
  
¡  Let’s	
  rock!	
  
   §  Find	
  a	
  satellite	
  IP	
  not	
  used,	
  I	
  ping	
  IPs	
  next	
  to	
  
          another	
  sniffable	
  satellite	
  IP	
  to	
  find	
  a	
  non	
  
          responding	
  IP.	
  	
  We	
  must	
  sniff	
  our	
  ping	
  with	
  the	
  
          DVB	
  Card	
  (you	
  must	
  save	
  the	
  packets).	
  
   	
  
   §  This	
  will	
  be	
  our	
  IP!	
  
   	
  
¡  Configure	
  Linux	
  to	
  use	
  it.	
  

	
  
                       We	
  need	
  our	
  router	
  ‘s	
  MAC	
  
Configure	
  our	
  dvb	
  interface	
  to	
  receive	
  this	
  IP	
  
(I	
  suppose	
  that	
  you	
  have	
  configure	
  the	
  PID…)	
  

	
  The	
  IP	
  is	
  the	
  one	
  we	
  have	
  selected	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  
    ICMP	
  scan,	
  we	
  must	
  get	
  the	
  destination	
  MAC	
  
    sniffed.	
  
Here	
  we	
  get	
  	
  the	
  MAC	
  
address	
  	
  we	
  must	
  configure	
  
in	
  our	
  DVB	
  interface	
  
I	
  use	
  netmask	
  /32	
  to	
  avoid	
  routing	
  problems	
  
Now	
  we	
  can	
  configure	
  our	
  Internet	
  interface	
  
with	
  the	
  same	
  IP	
  and	
  configure	
  a	
  default	
  
route	
  with	
  a	
  false	
  router	
  setting	
  this	
  one	
  with	
  
a	
  static	
  MAC	
  (our	
  real	
  router’s	
  MAC).	
  
	
  
	
  
IT	
  WORKS!	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
This	
  is	
  all	
  !!!	
  	
  	
  
	
  
Some	
  things	
  you	
  must	
  remember:	
  
	
  
The	
  DNS	
  server	
  must	
  allow	
  request	
  from	
  any	
  
IP	
  or	
  you	
  must	
  use	
  the	
  satellite	
  ISP	
  DNS	
  
server.	
  
	
  
If	
  you	
  have	
  any	
  firewall	
  (iptables)	
  disable	
  it.	
  
	
  
All	
  the	
  things	
  you	
  make	
  can	
  be	
  sniffed	
  by	
  
others	
  users.	
  
Now	
  attacking	
  GRE	
  is	
  very	
  easy,	
  you	
  only	
  
need	
  to	
  configure	
  your	
  Linux	
  with	
  IP	
  of	
  one	
  of	
  
the	
  routers	
  (the	
  one	
  with	
  the	
  satellite	
  
connection)	
  and	
  configure	
  the	
  tunneling.	
  
	
  
http://www.google.es/search?
rlz=1C1GPEA_en___ES312&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-­‐8&q=configuring
+GRE+linux	
  	
  
¡  I’m	
  studying	
  the	
  different	
  methods	
  to	
  trace	
  
  illegal	
  users.	
  (I	
  only	
  have	
  a	
  few	
  ideas).	
  

¡  Now	
  I’m	
  studying	
  the	
  possibilities	
  of	
  sending	
  
  data	
  to	
  a	
  satellite	
  via	
  Astromodem	
  (DVB-­‐
  RCS).	
  This	
  investigation	
  looks	
  fine.	
  
¡  Satellite	
  communications	
  are	
  insecure.	
  

¡  It	
  can	
  be	
  sniffed.	
  


¡  A	
  lot	
  of	
  attacks	
  can	
  be	
  made,	
  I	
  just	
  talked	
  
   about	
  only	
  few	
  level	
  4	
  and	
  level	
  3	
  attacks.	
  
¡  With	
  this	
  technology	
  in	
  our	
  sky,	
  an	
  
   anonymous	
  connection	
  is	
  possible.	
  

¡  Many	
  kinds	
  of	
  Denial	
  of	
  Service	
  are	
  possible.	
  
Leonardo Nve Egea
Christian Martorella
    lnve@s21sec.com
  cmartorella@s21sec.com

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Playing in a Satellite environment

  • 1.       Leonardo  Nve  Egea   Christian  Martorella   lnve@s21sec.com   cmartorella@s21sec.com    º  
  • 2. 1.  Because  I’m  sure  that  some  people  will   publish  more  attacks.     2.  Because  there  are  previous  presentations   about  satellites.      
  • 3. ¡  Warezzman  –  (in  2004  at  Undercon  VIII  first   Spanish  hacker  CON)   ¡  Jim  Geovedi  &  Raditya  Iryandi   (HITBSecConf2006)     ¡  Adam  Laurie  (Blackhat  2009  at  DC)   ¡  Leonardo  Nve  (S21sec  Blog  February  2009)  
  • 4. ¡  A    satellite    is    a    radio  frequency    repeater         that    is      launched    by    a    rocket    and    placed    in     orbit    around      the    earth.  
  • 5. ¡  Orbit  based  satellites     §  Low  Earth  orbiting  (LEO)   §  Geostationary  orbit  (GEO)   §  Other:  Molniya,  High  (HEO),  etc.     ¡  Function  based  satellites   §  Communications   §  Earth  observation   §  Other:  Scientifics,  ISS,  etc.  
  • 6.
  • 7. ¡  Satellite  GEO   §  UFO  (UHF  Follow  ON)  Military   §  Inmarsat   §  Meteorological  (Meteosat)   §  SCPC  /  Telephony  link  FDMA    
  • 8.
  • 9. ¡  Standard  of  European  Telecommunications   Standards  Institute  (ETSI).   ¡  Defines  audio    and  video  transmission,  and   data  connections.   ¡  DVB-­‐S  &  DVB-­‐S2  is  the  specification  for   satellite  communications.  
  • 10. ¡  Transponder:    Like  channels  (in  Satellite   comms)     §  Frecuency  (C  band  or  Ku).  Ex:  12.092Ghz   §  Polarization.  (horizontal/vertical)   §  Symbol  Rate.  Ex:  27500Kbps   §  FEC.     ¡  Every  satellite  has  many  transponders   onboard  which  are  operating  on  different   frequencies  
  • 11.    Header   Body    0x47   Flags   PID   Flags   Adaptation  Field   Data     Program  ID  (PID):  It  permits  different  programs  at  same   transponder  with  different  components  [Example  BBC1   PIDs:  600  (video),  601  (English  audio),  603  (subtitles),  4167   (teletext)]    
  • 12. ¡  Temporal  video  links.   ¡  Live  emissions,  sports,  news.     ¡  FTA  –  In  open  video.  
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 17. ¡  Is  widely  known  that  the  Department  of   Defense  (DoD)  and  some  US  defense     contractors  use  satellites  and    DVB  for  their   comms.   ¡  Let`s  see:     http://telecom.esa.int/telecom/media/document/DVB-­‐RCS %20Networks%20for%20the%20US%20Defense%20Market %20(R3).pdf  
  • 18.
  • 20. ¡  How  to  find  feeds:   §  Lists  of  channels  in  www     §  Blind  Scan   §  Visual  representations  of  the  signal    
  • 21. ¡  Dr  HANS   §  http://drhans.jinak.cz/news/index.php     ¡  Zackyfiles   §  http://www.zackyfiles.com  (in  spanish)   ¡  Satplaza   §  http://www.satplaza.com  
  • 22. ¡  Two  scenarios   §  Satmodem   §  Satellite  Interactive  Terminal  (SIT)  or  Astromodem    (DVB/RCS)    
  • 24. DOWNLINK   INTERNET   CLIENT   ISP  
  • 25. DOWNLINK   POTS/GPRS   UPLINK   INTERNET   CLIENT   UPLINK   ISP  
  • 26. DOWNLINK   POTS/GPRS   UPLINK   INTERNET   CLIENT   UPLINK   ISP  
  • 27. DOWNLINK   ISP’s  UPLINK   POTS/GPRS   UPLINK   INTERNET   CLIENT   UPLINK   ISP  
  • 28. DVB Data - Astromodem DOWNLINK  &  UPLINK   ISP  DOWNLINK  &  UPLINK   INTERNET   CLIENT   ISP  
  • 29.
  • 30.   Anyone  with  coverage  can  SNIFF   the  DVB  Data,  and  normally  it  is   unencrypted.    
  • 31.
  • 32. ¡  What  do  you  need:   §  Skystar  2  DVB  Card   §  linuxtv-­‐dvb-­‐apps     §  Wireshark   §  The  antenna  (Dish  +  LNB)   §  Data  to  point  it.  
  • 33.   I  bought  it  for  50€!!!  from  an   PayTV  ex-­‐”hacker”  :P     (Including  a  set-­‐top  box  that  I  will   not  use)  
  • 34.
  • 35.
  • 36. Linux  has  the  modules  for  this  card  by   default,  we  only  need  the  tools  to  manage  it:     linuxtv-­‐dvb-­‐apps     My  version  is  1.1.1  and  I  use  Fedora  (Not  too   cool  to  use  Debian  :P).  
  • 37. Once  the  antenna  and  the  card  are  installed   and  linuxtv-­‐dvb-­‐apps  compiled    and  installed,   the  process  is:   1-­‐  Tune  the  DVB  Card   2-­‐  Find  a  PID  with  data   3-­‐  Create  an  Ethernet  interface  associated  to  that   PID   We  can  repeat  2  to  3  any  times  we  want.  
  • 38. 1-­‐  Tune  the  DVB  Card     2-­‐  Find  a  PID  with  data     3-­‐  Create  an  Ethernet  interface  associated  to  that   PID    
  • 39. Tune  DVB  Card   The  tool  we  must  use  is  szap  and  we  need  the   transponder’s  parameters  in  a  configuration   file.     For  example,  for  “Sirius-­‐4  Nordic  Beam":   #  echo  “sirius4N:12322:v:0:27500:0:0:0"  >>  channels.conf          
  • 40. We  run  szap  with  the  channel  configuration   file  and  the  transponder  we  want  use  (the   configuration  file  can  have  more  than  one).     #  szap  –c  channels.conf  sirius4N     We  must  keep  it  running.    
  • 41.
  • 42. The  transponder  parameters  can  be  found   around  Internet.   http://www.fastsatfinder.com/transponders.html    
  • 43. 1-­‐  Tune  the  DVB  Card     2-­‐  Find  a  PID  with  data     3-­‐  Create  an  Ethernet  interface  associated  to  that   PID    
  • 44. ¡   Find  a  PID     #dvbsnoop  -­‐s  pidscan     Search  for  data  section  on  results.  
  • 45.
  • 46. 1-­‐  Tune  the  DVB  Card     2-­‐  Find  a  PID  with  data     3-­‐  Create  an  Ethernet  interface  associated  to   that  PID    
  • 47. ¡   Create  an  interface  associated  to  a  PID     #dvbnet  -­‐a  <adapter  number>  -­‐p  <PID>   ¡   Activate  it   #ifconfig  dvb0_<iface  number>  up      
  • 48.
  • 49.   Back  to  de  pidscan  results  
  • 51. Wireshark  is  our  friend               16358  packets  in  10  seconds  
  • 52.
  • 53. ¡   We  can  have  more  than  one  PID  assigned  to  an   interface,  this  will  be  very  useful.   ¡   Malicious  users  can:   §   Catch  passwords.   §   Catch  cookies  and  get  into  authenticated  HTTP   sessions.   §   Read  emails   §   Catch  sensitive  files   §   Do  traffic  analysis   §   Etc  ….    
  • 54. Reminder:      In  satellite  communications  we  have  two   scenarios:     A-­‐  Satmodem,  Only  Downlink  via  Satellite     B-­‐  Astromodem,  Both  uplink  and  downlink  via   Satellite.  
  • 55.   We  can  only  sniff  the  downloaded  data.  We   can  only  sniff  one  direction  in  a  connection.    
  • 56. ¡   DNS  Spoofing   ¡   TCP  hijacking   ¡ Attacking  GRE  
  • 57.     DNS  Spoofing  is  the  art  of  making  a  DNS   entry  to  point  to  an  another  IP  than  it  would   be  supposed  to  point  to.  (SecureSphere)  
  • 58. ¡   What  we  need  to  perform  this  attack?   §   DNS  Request  ID   §   Source  Port   § Source  IP   § Destination  IP   § Name/IP  asking  for    
  • 59. ¡   It´s  trivial  to  see  that  if  we  sniff  a  DNS   request  we  have  all  that  information  and  we   can  spoof  the  answer.     ¡   Many  tools  around  do  this  job,    the  only   thing  we  also  need  is  to  be  faster  than  the   real  DNS  server  ( jizz).  
  • 60. ¡   Why  is  this  attack  important?   § Think  in  phising       §   With  this  attack,  uplink  sniff  can  be  possible   ▪   Rogue  WPAD  service   ▪   Sslstrip  can  be  use  to  avoid  SSL  connections.  
  • 61. ¡   DNS  Spoofing   ¡   TCP  hijacking   ¡ Attacking  GRE  
  • 62.        TCP  session  hijacking  is  when  a  hacker  takes   over  a  TCP  session  between  two  machines.   (ISS)  
  • 63. Seq=S1      ACK=A1      Datalen=L1   Seq=A1      ACK=S1+L1      Datalen=L2   Seq=S1+L1      ACK=A1+L2      Datalen=L3     If  we  sniff  1  we  can  predict  Seq  and  Ack  of  2  and   we  can  send  the  payload  we  want  in  2      
  • 64.
  • 65. ¡   Initially  we  can  only  have  a  false  connection  with  A.   ¡   In  certain  circumstances,  we  can  make  this  attack   with  B,  when  L2  is  predictable.   ¡ Some  tools  for  doing  this:   § Hunt   § Shijack   § Scapy        
  • 66. ¡   DNS  Spoofing   ¡   TCP  hijacking   ¡ Attacking  GRE  
  • 67. ¡   Generic  Routing  Encapsulation     ¡   Point  to  point  tunneling  protocol   ¡ 13%  of  Satellite’s  data  traffic  in  our   transponder  is  GRE  
  • 68.   This  chapter  is  based  on  Phenoelit’s   discussion  paper  written  by  FX  applied  to   satellite  scenario.     Original  paper:     http://www.phenoelit-­‐us.org/irpas/gre.html  
  • 69. HQ   INTERNET   Remote  Office   Remote  Office   Remote  Office  
  • 70. Find  a  target:     #tshark  –ni  dvb0_0  –R  gre  –w  capture.cap    
  • 71. GRE  Packet   IP  d   1   est   IP  source  1     GRE  header   Payload  IP  dest   Payload  IP  source   Payload  IP  Header     Payload  Data        
  • 72. ¡   IP  dest  1  and  source  1  must  be  Internet   reachable    IPs   ¡ The  payload´s  IPs  used  to  be  internal.  
  • 73. 1.1.1.2   1.1.1.1   INTERNET   10.0.0.54   10.0.0.5  
  • 74. 1.1.1.2   1.1.1.1   INTERNET   (*)   10.0.0.54   10.0.0.5  
  • 75. (*)  GRE  Packet     1.1.1.1   1.1.1.2     GRE  header  (32  bits  without  flags)   10.0.0.5   10.0.0.54   Payload  IP  Header     Payload  Data        
  • 76. (1)   1.1.1.2   1.1.1.1   10.0.0.54   10.0.0.5  
  • 77. (1)  GRE  Packet     1.1.1.1   1.1.1.2     GRE  header  (32  bits  without  flags)   10.0.0.5   10.0.0.54   Payload  IP  Header     Payload  Data        
  • 78. (1)   1.1.1.2   1.1.1.1   (2)   10.0.0.54   10.0.0.5  
  • 79. (2)  IP  Packet    10.0.0.5   10.0.0.54     IP  header       Data  
  • 80. (1)   1.1.1.2   1.1.1.1   (2,3)   10.0.0.54   10.0.0.5  
  • 81. (3)  IP  Packet    10.0.0.54   10.0.0.5     IP  header  2       Data  2  
  • 82. (4)   (1)   1.1.1.2   1.1.1.1   (2,3)   10.0.0.54   10.0.0.5  
  • 83. (4)  GRE  Packet     1.1.1.2   1.1.1.1     GRE  header  (32  bits  without  flags)   10.0.0.54   10.0.0.5   Payload  IP  Header  2     Payload  Data  2        
  • 84. At  Phenoelit´s  attack  payload’s  IP  source  is  our  public  IP.  This   attack  lacks    when  that  IP  isn´t  reachable  from  the  internal   LAN  and  you  can  be  logged.       I  use  internal  IP  because  we  can  sniff  the  responses.         To  improve  the  attack,  find  a  internal  IP  not  used.    
  • 85. How   To   Scan   NSA   And   Cannot   Be   Traced    
  • 86. We  can  send  a  SYN  packet  with  any   destination  IP  and  TCP  port  (spoofing  a   satellite’s  routable  source  IP)  ,  and  we  can   sniff  the  responses.     We  can  analyze  the  responses.  
  • 87. OR…  We  can  configure  our  linux  like  a   satellite  connected  host.       VERY  EASY!!!  
  • 88. ¡  What  we  need:   §  An  internet  connection  (Let’s  use  it  as  uplink)  with   any  technology  which  let  you  spoofing.   §  A  receiver,  a  card….  
  • 89. ¡  Let’s  rock!   §  Find  a  satellite  IP  not  used,  I  ping  IPs  next  to   another  sniffable  satellite  IP  to  find  a  non   responding  IP.    We  must  sniff  our  ping  with  the   DVB  Card  (you  must  save  the  packets).     §  This  will  be  our  IP!    
  • 90. ¡  Configure  Linux  to  use  it.     We  need  our  router  ‘s  MAC  
  • 91. Configure  our  dvb  interface  to  receive  this  IP   (I  suppose  that  you  have  configure  the  PID…)    The  IP  is  the  one  we  have  selected  and  in  the   ICMP  scan,  we  must  get  the  destination  MAC   sniffed.  
  • 92. Here  we  get    the  MAC   address    we  must  configure   in  our  DVB  interface  
  • 93. I  use  netmask  /32  to  avoid  routing  problems  
  • 94. Now  we  can  configure  our  Internet  interface   with  the  same  IP  and  configure  a  default   route  with  a  false  router  setting  this  one  with   a  static  MAC  (our  real  router’s  MAC).      
  • 95.
  • 96. IT  WORKS!                
  • 97. This  is  all  !!!         Some  things  you  must  remember:     The  DNS  server  must  allow  request  from  any   IP  or  you  must  use  the  satellite  ISP  DNS   server.    
  • 98. If  you  have  any  firewall  (iptables)  disable  it.     All  the  things  you  make  can  be  sniffed  by   others  users.  
  • 99. Now  attacking  GRE  is  very  easy,  you  only   need  to  configure  your  Linux  with  IP  of  one  of   the  routers  (the  one  with  the  satellite   connection)  and  configure  the  tunneling.     http://www.google.es/search? rlz=1C1GPEA_en___ES312&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-­‐8&q=configuring +GRE+linux    
  • 100. ¡  I’m  studying  the  different  methods  to  trace   illegal  users.  (I  only  have  a  few  ideas).   ¡  Now  I’m  studying  the  possibilities  of  sending   data  to  a  satellite  via  Astromodem  (DVB-­‐ RCS).  This  investigation  looks  fine.  
  • 101. ¡  Satellite  communications  are  insecure.   ¡  It  can  be  sniffed.   ¡  A  lot  of  attacks  can  be  made,  I  just  talked   about  only  few  level  4  and  level  3  attacks.  
  • 102. ¡  With  this  technology  in  our  sky,  an   anonymous  connection  is  possible.   ¡  Many  kinds  of  Denial  of  Service  are  possible.  
  • 103.
  • 104. Leonardo Nve Egea Christian Martorella lnve@s21sec.com cmartorella@s21sec.com