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Technical presentation at the SAR 2003 conference, Nancy (France), June 2003.
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Security applications with Java Card
1.
The key to
an open world ‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright © 2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. 30/06/3 Security applications with Java Card SAR 2003, Nancy Julien SIMON j.simon@oberthurcs.com
2.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Outline 1. Introduction 2. Java Card overview 3. WAP security 4. IP security 5. 802.11 security 6. Q&A
3.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Introduction Oberthur Card Systems § No. 1 supplier of MasterCard and Visa payment cards worldwide. § No. 3 supplier of 2G/3G cards worldwide. § First to apply Java technology to the SIM card (1998). § Please refer to www.oberthurcs.com for more information. Speaker § 3 years at OCS R&D. § Mobile Communications Development Manager. § In a previous life, lots of time spent in TCP/IP and kernel code (Mach / Chorus / *nix) : hence, a strong interest in computer (in)security…
4.
The key to
an open world ‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright © 2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. 30/06/3 Java Card overview Architecture Language, VM, API Security applications with Java Card
5.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Java Card § Software standard initiated by Sun Microsystems in October 1996. § JC is now maintained by the Java Card Forum. § JC defines an environment allowing Java applications to to run on a microprocessor smartcard : Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) : § Java Card is nice because : s It allows faster and easier development than native code. s It has all the benefits of OOD / OOP. s It is portable at source and binary level. s It allows applications to be loaded after the smartcard has been issued. § A well-designed Java Card is a very safe foundation : s Common Criteria EAL 4+ evaluation obtained by OCS in 2002. s State-of-the art cryptography, protected against SPA/DPA/DFA attacks.
6.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Java Card Runtime Environment § The JCRE includes : s The Java Card Virtual Machine, s The Java Card API, s A basic application installer. § It’s implemented in ROM by the smartcard issuer. § Its behavior is defined by the Java Card Runtime Environment Specification. § Versions : s 2.1 (May 2000). s 2.2 (May 2002).
7.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Java Card architecture Hardware Abstraction Layer Java Card Virtual Machine Java Card API Other API (GSM, etc) JCRE Applet 1 Applet 2 Applet 3 Microcontroller
8.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Language § JC supports most features of the Java language : s Packages, s Dynamic object creation (new), s Virtual methods, Inheritance, Interfaces, s Exceptions, s Etc. § The following types are not supported s char, s long, float and double, s Multi-dimensional arrays. § The int type is optional.
9.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Java Card Virtual Machine § The JCVM has a classic architecture : s It runs bytecode on an operand stack. s JC bytecode is a subset of Java bytecode s E.g. no int related bytecode : iload, istore, etc. § Compared to the JVM, the JCVM is very simplified : s No on-demand class loading : all required classes must present on the card. s No threads, etc. § The JVCM also has specific features (transactions, inter-applet communication). § The behavior of the JCVM is defined by the Java Card Virtual Machine Specification.
10.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Java Card 2.1 API § The JC 2.1 API includes four packages, defined by the Java Card 2.1 Application Programming Interfaces Specification. § java.lang : minimal Java classes. § javacard.framework : smartcard-related classes s Communication with the terminal, PIN handling, etc. § javacard.security & javacardx.crypto : security classes. s Keys : DES, 3DES, RSA et DSA. s Crypto objects : KeyPair, MessageDigest, Cipher and Signature. § Java Card 2.2 adds Java Card RMI, AES, ECC, garbage collection, etc.
11.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Java Card references § Java Card s Specs & JCDK : http://java.sun.com/javacard/ s Java Card Forum : http://www.javacardforum.org/ s « Java Card Technology For Smart Cards » , Addison-Wesley, 2000. § Cryptography s RSA Labs : http://www.rsalabs.com/ s « Cryptographie appliquée » (2ème édition), Bruce Schneier. s « Handbook of Applied Cryptography » http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/
12.
The key to
an open world ‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright © 2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. 30/06/3 WAP security WAP overview Wireless Identity Module (WIM) Smartcard WAP browsers
13.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Wireless Application Protocol § WAP 1.0 was released in 1998 and evolved into 1.3. § WAP 1.x doesn’t support standard Internet protocols and languages : a WAP gateway is required. WAE: Application Environment WSP: Session Protocol WTP: Transaction Protocol WTLS: Transaction Layer Security WDP: Datagram Protocol HTTP: Hyper Text Transfer Protocol SSL: Secure Sockets Layer TCP: Transmission Control Protocol IP: Internet Protocol
14.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 WAP architecture WAP Gateway Page encoder Page converter Protocol Adapters HTTP Web Server Content CGI Scripts etc. HTMLpages WMLpages WML = Wireless Markup Language HTML = Hyper Text Markup Language CGI = Common Gateway Interface ME = Mobile Equipment HTTP = Hyper Text Transfer Protocol WSP = Wireless Session Protocol WTP = Wireless Transaction Protocol ME WAP browser WSP/WTPConfig. files
15.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Wireless Identity Module § WAP communication is secured by the Wireless Transaction Layer Protocol (WTLS), which is “equivalent” to SSL. § WTLS relies on the Wireless Identity Module (WIM) to perform secure operations, such as : s Verification primitives (PIN operations). s Data Access primitives (Key/certificate storage in PKCS #15 files) s Cryptography primitives : Compute Digital Signature, Verify Signature, Hash, Decipher and various key primitives used to setup a WTLS session (Diffie- Hellman, etc). § The WAP browser also needs the WIM to perform the signText operation (application-level signature). § The WIM can be implemented as a Java Card applet.
16.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 WAP (in)security WML/HTML Web server WML/HTML Bytecode SSL TCP WDP GSM networkInternet WTLS There is no end-to-end security, because of the WTLS/SSL gateway. This is the infamous “WAP gap” problem. WAP 2.0 solves this by using standard Internet protocols (TLS). N
17.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 End-to-end security WML/HTML Web server WML/HTML Bytecode TCP/IP 03.48 GSM networkInternet Data is protected by the application, i.e. the bytecode is encrypted/decrypted by the WAP browser running on the (U)SIM card.
18.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 WAP with a smartcard browser SMS-C MESIM WAP Browser Config. files OTA server WAP gatewayProactive commands 03.40 / 03.48 transport
19.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Plug-in architecture § The core browser can be extended using plug-ins. § A plug-in is a normal SIM Toolkit applet. s It extends the WIB by adding new features : l Data storage, l Cryptography : the WAP gap must be closed ! s It may be installed at personalization time. s Plug-ins are usually small enough to be installed OTA. § Applet communication is possible with Java Card : s A plug-in registers to the WIB using a Shareable interface. s When the WIB receives the Plug-In command, it invokes the plug-in using another Shareable interface.
20.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 PKI plug-ins § A smartcard browser usually supports several Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) plug-ins. § Decryption : Asymmetric Decryption (AD) § Digital signature (text) : PKCS#1 (P1) § Digital signature with time stamp (text) : PKCS#7 (P7) § Digital signature and non-repudiation (data) : Fingerprint (FP)
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 A Band Of Browsers § SmartTrust Wireless Internet Browser (WIB) § SIM Alliance S@T browser. § 3GPP USAT Interpreter : s 21.112 & 31.11{2,3,4} Release 5 & 6 : architecture, protocol, core browser. s 31.113 Release 6 : plug-ins. § These browsers all support the WML standard (or at least a large subset of it) as well as proprietary extensions (S@TML, SmartTrust WML, etc). This is similar to the Netscape/IE situation.
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 WAP references § USAT Interpreter – http://www.3GPP.org/ § SIM Alliance – http://www.SIMAlliance.org § SmartTrust – http://www.SmartTrust.com § PKCS – http://www.RSALabs.com § WAP – http://www.OpenMobileAlliance.com/ § World Wide Web Consortium – http://www.w3.org/
23.
The key to
an open world ‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright © 2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. 30/06/3 IP Security IP in mobile networks Internet Key Exchange Diffie-Hellman with Java Card
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2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 IP in mobile networks
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 IPsec and smartcards IPsec tunnel TCP = Transmission Control Protocol HTTP = Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Internet apps TCP / HTTP Private network IPsec IKE setup IPsec processing Untrusted network Host
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Internet Key Exchange IKE defines two phases : 1. Creation of a secure channel between the IKE peers. a. Negotiation of the IKE Security Association : encryption algorithm, hash function, authentication method (pre-shared keys, RSA), Diffie-Hellman group. b. Generation of shared secrets with a Diffie-Hellman exchange. c. Mutual authentication and establishment of the secure IKE channel. 2. Creation of the IPsec security association. a. Using the secure IKE channel, negotiation of the IPsec Security Association : SPI, IPsec transform. b. Generation of the required keys either by deriving the Phase 1 secret, or by performing another Diffie-Hellman exchange.
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2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Diffie-Hellman for mathematicians § Diffie-Hellman (1976) is a widespread protocol for shared secret establishment. § P and α are two public numbers : α<P, P prime. Send αa mod P Send αb mod P Compute (αa mod P)b mod P. Pick b random. Compute αb mod P. Compute (αb mod P)a mod P. Pick a random. Compute αa mod P. Alice Bob Receive αb mod P. Receive αa mod P. Shared secrets are derived from (αab mod P) mod P (αb mod P)a mod P = (αa mod P)b mod P = (αab mod P) mod P
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Diffie-Hellman for the layman § DH may be implemented primitives from public key systems based on exponentiation (RSA, DSA) or elliptic curves (ECDSA). § DH is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack, so each peer should use a certificate to authenticate the other peer. Ca = ENCRYPT(α, Ka) Cb = ENCRYPT(α, Kb)Cipher Cb with Ka. Pick a random. Build key Ka: exp = a,mod = P. Cipher α with Ka. Alice Bob Pick b random. Build key Kb: exp = b,mod = P. Cipher α with Kb Cipher Ca with Kb.
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Diffie-Hellman with Java Card § JC 2.1 supports RSA, so DH can be implemented. § JC 2.2 introduces javacard.security.KeyAgreement, which is the base class for key agreement algorithms like DH. s At this point, the KeyAgreement API only supports ECC keys. s Main operation : generation of a shared secret using the caller’s Private Key and public data received from the peer. s public abstract short generateSecret( byte[] publicData, short publicOffset,short publicLength, byte[] secret, byte[] secretOffset)
30.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 IPsec references § RFC 2401 – Security Architecture For The Internet Protocol. § RFC 2402 – IP Authentication Header. § RFC 2406 – IP Encapsulating Security Payload. § RFC 2407 – The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP. § RFC 2408 – Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol. § RFC 2409 – The Internet Key Exchange. § RFC 2631 – Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method.
31.
The key to
an open world ‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright © 2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. 30/06/3 Wi-Fi 802.11 weaknesses Improvements to 802.11 security Implementing 802.11 security on a (U)SIM smartcard
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 802.11 (in)security § 802.11 security has been cracked. § A new protocol is introduced to support client authentication and distribution of session keys : the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). § EAP is a generic transport protocol for a large number of authentication and key distribution methods. § EAP can be integrated into PPP [RFC2284] or 802.2 [802.1X].
33.
‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Improving 802.11 security § Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) is a short-term solution (available now). s Authentication : 802.1X provides transport for EAP over LANs (EAPoL). s Encryption : the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) is based on RC-4 and uses 128-bit keys which are recycled every 10,000 packets. § 802.11i will be the long-term standard. s Authentication : 802.11i will maintain compatibility with WPA and building on 802.1x. s Encryption : 802.11i will introduce new authentication and confidentiality protocols based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) : l Counter CBC Mode Protocol (CCMP). l Wireless Robust Authenticated Protocol (WRAP).
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 802.11i security Wireless client EAPoL Wired networkWireless network Authentication methods Applications TCP-IP 802.11 802.1x CCMP How safe are the keys ? How good is the crypto ?
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Better 802.11 security Wired network JCRE EAP applet EAP on ISO7816 Wireless client EAPoL A smartcard and an authentication server. We’ve seen this before, haven’t we ? Applications TCP-IP 802.11 802.1x
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2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 EAP methods § EAP is a generic protocol : it relies on a variety of methods for authentication and key generation. § The following methods could be implemented on a smartcard to provide mutual authentication and key generation : 1. EAP-TLS [RFC2716] : Transaction Layer Security [RFC2246]. 2. EAP-SIM (IETF draft) : 2G authentication algorithms. 3. EAP-AKA (IETF draft) : 3G authentication algorithms. s EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA will be part of 3GPP {2,3}3.234 Release 6.
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 EAP commands § Four packet types : Request, Response, Success, Failure. § Request (authenticator èpeer) a. Identity : query the identity of the peer. b. Notification : send a displayable message to the peer (password expiration, etc). c. TLS / SIM / AKA : set the authentication method and data. § Response (peer è authenticator) a. Identity : send a peer identity to the authenticator. b. Notification: acknowledge message. c. TLS / SIM / AKA : send authentication value. d. NAK: decline authentication method and propose another one. § Success (authenticator èpeer) : authentication has succeeded. § Failure (authenticator èpeer) : authentication has failed.
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 EAP & 3GPP 3GPP Network UE WLAN Access Network (with or without an intermediate network) 3GPP AAA Server Packet Data GW In tran et / In tern et 3GPP PS services AAA = Authentication, Authorization and Accounting GW = Gateway PS = Packet-Switched UE = User Equipment WLAN = Wireless Local Access Network A wireless client may also use a 3GPP authentication server to connect to Internet services [23.234]. EAPoL EAPoL
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 EAP Java Card API § This API is being designed by the Java Card Forum and the WLAN Smart Card Consortium. § It allows Java Card developers to build applications that allow smart cards to be used as EAP authentication tokens. § It has been built in the context of WLAN end-user authentication, which relies on the EAP protocol. § In particular, this API has been built in the context of the APDU protocol defined in draft-urien-eap-smartcard-01.txt, titled EAP Support in Smart Cards. § It is an extension of the Java Card 2.2 API and relies on Java Card RMI. § All necessary cryptographic algorithms are supported by Java Card 2.2.
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 EAP Java Card API (1) EAPApplet EAPService EAPBasicService JCRE Authenticators JCRMI EAP on ISO7816 The Authenticator object performs the authentication itself : it is tied to an identity, a credential and an authentication method. The EAPBasicService object implements the EAP protocol and is registers to JCRMI through the EAPService interface. The EAPApplet object is a basic applet that handles EAP requests through a JCRMI service.
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 EAP Java Card API (2) EAPApplet EAPGlobalService JCRE JCRMI EAP on ISO7816 Applet Authenticator Applet Authenticator EAPBasicGlobalService An EAPApplet may be used to provide EAP services to normal applets. Inter-applet communication is performed through the Shareable interface. Java Card Firewall
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Wi-Fi references (1) § Wi-Fi Alliance – http://www.weca.net § IEEE 802.x – http://www.ieee802.org § IEEE 802.11 – ISO/IEC 8802-11: (1999) IEEE Standards for Information Technology - Telecommunications and Information Exchange between Systems - Local and Metropolitan Area Network - Specific Requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications. § IEEE 802.1x – IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port- Based Network Access Control. § IEEE 802.11i – Draft Supplement to Standard for Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems - LAN/MAN Specific Requirements - Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications - Specification for Enhanced Security (Draft 3.0, November 2002). § 3GPP – http://www.3gpp.org § 3GPP TS 23.234 v1.8.0 - 3GPP system to WLAN Interworking; System Description (Release 6)
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Wi-Fi references (2) § IETF – http://www.ietf.org § RFC 1661 – The Point-to-Point Protocol. § RFC 1994 – PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) § RFC 2138 – Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) § RFC 2246 – The TLS protocol, version 1.0 § RFC 2284 – PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol. § RFC 2716 – PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol. § draft-ietf-eap-rfc2284bis-03.txt – Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) § draft-aboba-pppext-key-problem-06.txt – EAP Keying Framework § draft-urien-eap-smartcard-01.txt – EAP support in smartcards § draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-10.txt – EAP SIM Authentication § draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-09.txt – EAP AKA Authentication § draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-17.txt – DIAMETER Base Protocol
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2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Conclusion § Java Card is a safe foundation for many network security applications. § And don’t forget E-commerce / identification applications… § As Java Card moves closer to the Java mainstream, new opportunities will arise (DRM, etc). WAP browser + PKI plug-ins (W)TLS (OMA & IETF) IPsec (IETF) 03.48 (3GPP) EAP (IETF)
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‹#›(SAR 2003)Copyright ©
2003 Oberthur Card Systems. All rights reserved. The key to an open world 30/06/2003 Q&A § Thank you very much for inviting me and for attending this presentation. § If you have any questions, I’ll do my best to answer them. § Feel free to get in touch !
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