Presentation on postdoc research for the Lund University project on hydropolitics in the Jordan River Basin, Lund University

1. Rethinking the Hydrological Cycle
Assessing the feasibility of hydropeacebuilding in the jordan river basin
Dr. Joshka
Wessels

2. Save the Planet !
• Do we own the planet or does the planet own us ?
• Does water unite (peace) or divide (war) ?
• How can we work together peacefully to save ourselves
without relying heavily on engineering ?

3. The Jordan River Basin

4. Main Challenges in the JRB
• Global climatic changes
• Regional depletion of groundwater
• No permanent agreements btwn riparians
• Contradicting agreements
• Dysfunctional water committees
• No relevance of the UNSC resolutions
• Negative impacts on watersheds, ecosystems and individual
livelihoods

5. The Conventional Hydrological Cycle

6. Anthropogenic disturbances
“Many human activities (e.g., aquifer depletion, wetland
drainage) serve to divert water to the ocean that would
otherwise have been stored on the continents. Dam
building, on the other hand, impound continental runoff that
would otherwise have been transported to and stored in the
ocean. The balance between these positive and negative
alterations can be used as a measure of net anthropogenic
disturbance to the global hydrologic cycle”.
Vörösmarty & Sahagian

7. TWM conflict resolution
• Various quantitative and qualitative methods for conflict
resolution in water resources management
• Focus on managerialism and a neoliberal game
theoretical approach
• Ignores the importance of cognitive dimensions of water
cooperation

8. TWM conflict resolution
• Identity, trust, empathy and perception of “the other” play
an essential role in the analysis of violence and conflict
resolution
• Recognizing each others grief and trauma
• Negative mental pictures
• Violent and assymetrical communication
• Prejudice

9. Neoliberalism
• Two paralell discourses critical towards neoliberalism and
rational choice:
– Peace & Conflict studies (Chandler, Rittberger,
Aggestam, Richmond)
– Water Management (Abraham, Adhikari, Boelens,
Mollinga, Selby)

10. Cognitive Theory vs. Rational Choice
• Ostrom’s (1990) emphasis on economic benefit of
cooperation and resource management
• Focus on technical and financial profit
• Dimensions of the challenges of “working together” –
humans as political beings
• Flaws and paradoxes

11. Cognitive Theory vs. Rational Choice
Eric Stern (1999, 2003) characteristics of decisionmaking in
environmental crisis:
•Threat to basic values
•Urgency
•Uncertainty

12. Cognitive Theory vs. Rational Choice
• Increased relevance of empathy
• Perception of “the other”
• Altruism vs. Selfishness
• Power and politics
• Context

13. Environmental Peacebuilding
“Environmental cooperation can be an effective catalyst for
reducing tensions, broadening cooperation, fostering
demilitarization and promoting peace”
(Dajani, 2011; Conca & Dabelko, 2002).

14. The Human Ecosystem

15. Perpetuation of Conflict
• Competition for resources (selfishness)
• Status quo perpetuated through competition to maintain a
hydro-hegemonic position
• Liberal peace building takes the politics out of water, into
the technocratic domain
• No chance for reconciliation or processing of past
traumas before restoring trust
• Consisting negative mental pictures and mistrust

16. Central question
What is the importance and role of identity, worldview and
perception-of-the-other in water cooperation and
management in the Jordan River Basin ?

17. The Jordan River Basin Game Exercise
(JRBBE)
A metaphor that distils main dimensions of ecological and
human processes in a conceptual model (Lankford, 2007)
“This game is real. It is so close to what we all experience
here in the Basin”
Player from Jordan

18. The Jordan River Basin Game Exercise
(JRBBE)
1) Setting design goals and values goals.
2) Develop rules, constraints, which support values
3) Design many play styles and subversion
4) Develop playable prototype
5) Playtests with diverse audiences
6) Verify values, revise goals
7) Repeat to 1.

19. The Jordan River Basin Game Exercise
(JRBBE)
• Optimal allocation: Palestine: 14 Lebanon: 11 Syria: 32
Jordan: 22 Israel: 21. To gain true water security and
satisfy their demands, the co-riparians should collaborate
in water resources (Mimi, & Sawalhi, 2003; Phillips et al.
2005).
• Total of 61 participants for average of 2,5 hours
• Class room environment, WWF Marseille 2012 and onsite in the JRB

20. The Jordan River Basin Game Exercise
(JRBBE)
JRBBE played by a group of visitors from World Water
Forum 6, Marseille, France. This is a try-out of a prototype
of the boardgame.
http://www.thewaterchannel.tv/en/videos/categories/viewvid
eo/1275/events/jordan-river-basin-game

21. The Jordan River Basin Game Exercise
(JRBBE)
– A: Sweden (SVET)
– B: Golan Heights (Syrians)
– C: Sweden (CMES)
– D: Bir Zeit University (Palestinians)
– E: Tel Aviv (Israelis)
– F: Ramallah (Negotiations Affairs Dept., PLO)
– G: Amman (Jordanians)

22. Endresults of JRRBE experiments

23. Map of religious, ethnic and national
core identities

24. Revised Hydrological Cycle

25. Conclusions
• Serious gaming as a methodology gives insight in cognitive
processes of human behaviour with regard to TWM.
• On-going dilemma of playing to win individually (national
interests, selfishness, unilateralism) or to win together
(transboundary water management, altruism, joint or
collective action ).
• Cognitive dimensions such as worldview, perception-of-theother and identity play a decisive role in water cooperation
decisionmaking and transboundary water management.
• An equitable hydropeace within the neoliberal paradigm is
highly unlikely. Peace cannot emerge in a solely technocratic
domain with a managerial focus on rational choice and
maximum profit.