Broadband Around the World final

City of New Orleans
Broadband Around
the World
Best Practices and Lessons Learned from Other Jurisdictions
Jennifer Terry
December 9, 2014
Revised January 12, 2016

2
Acknowledgments
This report was prepared for the City of New Orleans under the auspices of the US Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s Strong Cities, Strong Communities (SC2) Fellowship program. During
my two-year fellowship, I worked with staff in the City’s Department of Information Technology and
Innovation to develop a long-term Broadband Master Plan for the City. Pursuant to that project, I
conducted research into the importance of broadband, reasons why people lack broadband access, and
possible strategies to help bring broadband to people who currently do not have it.
This report, along with the companion report, “Broadband: The World's Newest Public Utility,”
documents the research findings.
I would like to thank my colleagues at the City of New Orleans for their assistance during this process.
The people who selflessly shared relevant information and willingly served as sounding boards for ideas
are too numerous to name.
I also want to thank the SC2 Fellowship Management team for their assistance in framing the research
and for keeping me on task to completion.
Sincerely,
Jennifer

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Introduction
As of January 2014, approximately 140 North American municipalities representing every region of the
United States and a few Canadian provinces had built a community owned broadband network, either
alone or in collaboration with the private or nonprofit sectors, or worked with the private sector to
improve the quality of broadband offered by the private sector. Some of these networks have been
operating since 1997; others began operations in 2013. Although the networks collectively offer a range
of services, including video (cable), data (internet), voice (telephone), smart grid, business services,
security, and videoconferencing, many offer data alone or offer data, video, and/or voice services only.1
With regard to business models, most of the communities have a municipal network, but a few employ a
public-private partnership model to serve businesses, institutions, and residents. About half of the
communities work with internet service providers (ISPs), local universities, school systems, mass transit
agencies, and their respective state governments to provide broadband service. The most common
technologies used are fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP), hybrid fiber coax (HFC), and wireless.2
These 140 municipalities decided to facilitate better broadband access because the maximum available
bandwidth in their communities was too slow and too expensive to meet their needs. In many instances,
when faced with this situation, municipal officials asked private-sector telecommunications providers to
upgrade their network and offered to assist firms. Often, these companies refused.
Because the internet access market is a natural monopoly, with very high initial costs for infrastructure,
this market requires long-term investment. Early profitability is unlikely and short-term losses are
normal.3
Therefore, for-profit telecommunications providers limit risk by concentrating service in the
geographic markets where they are most likely to make a profit. This concentration of services results in
subpar service in rural areas and poorer parts of urban areas.
In many instances, after telecommunications providers rebuffed initial offers to collaborate,
municipalities pursued other avenues. This report describes the efforts of approximately 40 municipal,
state, provincial, or national governments to increase the bandwidth and decrease the cost of
broadband in their jurisdictions. Most of the examples are from the United States, but the report
includes the experiences from Canada, Europe, and Asia as well.
The next sections of the report discuss factors one must understand when thinking about techniques to
improve the quality of broadband in the community, such as
 the various roles government entities play in the broadband market;
 the business models available to communities that build a telecom network;
 the governance structures commonly used by publicly owned networks;
 factors to consider when deciding to build a publicly owned network;
 observations of common experiences in communities that built their own networks; and
 best practices the most successful communities used when building their networks.
After these introductory sections provide context and background, the main body of the report includes
approximately 40 case studies describing the experiences of other communities as they pursued an
astounding range of options in their quest for better broadband.
1
“FTTH Search,” Broadband Communities Magazine, http://www.bbpmag.com/search.php?s0=1&cols=-co-st-an-se-ty-mu-su-
pa&st=&ve=&gr=&te=&se=&ty=-mun-ppr&qco=&qme=&qan=&qus=0&qmu=&qsu=&qpa=, accessed January 2014.
2
Ibid.
3
Eric Null, “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 9 (2013): 50.

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Government Roles Vis-à-Vis Broadband
Government entities can pursue a range of short-, mid-, and long-term strategies to improve their
residents’ access to broadband. By necessity, these strategies will take advantage of one or more of the
five roles that government can play with regard to broadband—user, rule-maker, financier,
infrastructure developer, or operator.
User
Similar to residents, businesses, and nonprofit organizations, government entities use broadband.
Likewise, governments have become dependent upon internet to run physical systems (e.g. connected
traffic lights, traffic cameras, and parking meters, etc.) and to help their employees conduct tasks
related to providing services to residents. Like other users, government often chafes at the high prices it
pays for broadband.
Unlike most users, government and large corporations can leverage the fact that they purchase a large
volume of data services to negotiate lower per unit prices. Although this helps government to decrease
the amount of money it spends on broadband, it does not usually help the community’s residents or
small and mid-sized businesses.
In the United States, government typically does not leverage its role as a broadband user (and its
associated purchasing power) to negotiate lower broadband prices for consumers. One exception
discussed in this report is Minneapolis, which contracted with US Internet to build and operate a wifi
network for the community. Minneapolis used its influence as the new network’s anchor tenant to
negotiate provisions to support affordable internet access for community members.
Usually, government is not contracting with a telecom to build a new network, and therefore cannot use
the influence of a network anchor tenant to negotiate better prices or other benefits for other network
users. Therefore, the number of situations in which government can use its role as broadband user to
generate better service and/or lower prices for the community at large or even specific members of the
community (e.g. lower-income people) is limited.
While government’s power as a user hinges upon its demand for services from telecoms, in its other
roles, government entities affect supply4
as described below.
Rule-maker
Like other organizations, government entities set rules about how their organizations and employees
may use broadband. Unlike other organizations, government also makes rules that affect access for the
larger community. In theory, a municipality that charges telecoms a high fee to use its right-of-way
(ROW), relative to ROW access fees charged by other municipalities, could increase the cost of building a
network in its community. If the telecom passes these costs to consumers, then prices for broadband in
that community could be more expensive than in other communities, thereby excluding some
community members from accessing broadband.
4
“Planning and Broadband: Infrastructure, Policy, and Sustainability,” American Planning Association PAS Report 569, July 2012, 25.

6
On the other hand, a government entity can use its rule-making role to improve its community’s
broadband. Normally, telecoms need to use publicly owned ROW to build their networks; furthermore,
telecoms usually pay fees to use the ROW. Governments acquiring fiber for community use sometimes
alter regulations to require telecoms to provide extra fiber for such use, rather than pay a fee when the
telecoms use public ROW. Governments negotiate such agreements when telecoms want to build or
upgrade networks.
Most telecoms try to include provisions to limit how a government can use its free fiber. Usually, these
stipulations prohibit a government from providing broadband access to the public at their homes and
businesses, regardless of whether residents and business owners pay to use the fiber or government
provides free service. For example, Verizon and Comcast extracted agreements from Washington, DC
not to sell service directly to businesses and residents when the companies agreed to allow the City to
use its conduit and poles for a municipally owned fiber network.
Government has more opportunity to negotiate agreements to improve broadband in communities by
taking advantage of its rule-making authority than through its purchasing power as a user. After all,
government can leverage rule-making authority with regard to all telecoms that operate in the
community, whereas it can deploy its power as a user only with telecoms with whom it has, or could
reasonably entertain, a direct business relationship.
Financier
When a community builds its own network, government often must obtain outside funding. Often, a
community works with private or nonprofit partners to build a community network, with the
government handling financing and the partners providing the expertise to construct and operate the
network. If the consortium needs to borrow money, the government entity will borrow so the group can
take advantage of the government’s ability to issue tax-free bonds. In such instances, because the
government entity assumes the risk of debt to pay for the project, it may be able to insist that its
partners create packages to provide reasonable bandwidth at affordable prices to low-income people,
or provide another community benefit.
Therefore, in situations in which a community collaborates with other entities, it can use its role as
financier to negotiate enhancements that increase the new network’s potential benefit to the
community. However, because government in the United States is unlikely to finance a network owned
and operated by another entity, government’s ability to leverage the financier role is limited to
situations in which a community is building its own network. Hence, when government undertakes the
role of network financier, it is because it also has assumed the role of infrastructure developer.
Infrastructure developer
Obviously, acting as its own infrastructure developer provides a community with the best opportunity to
build the type of network it needs. A community that plans its network and oversees construction can
specify its requirements for bandwidth, security, reliability, and so forth. Once the network becomes
operational, government can act on behalf of the community to determine prices for the different
service tiers. Even if the governmental entity hires a vendor to oversee daily operations, the government
can exert a lot of control over pricing and other aspects of network operations by specifying these items
in the vendor’s contract.

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Operator
If a government entity’s employees perform daily operational tasks for its community-owned network
rather than hiring a contractor, the government entity acts as the network operator and therefore
controls prices, bandwidth, etc. However, communities that hire contractors to operate their
community-owned network can influence parameters affecting network service and prices by including
service-level agreements and other requirements in vendor contracts. Communities that engage outside
vendors must ensure that their requirements allow the vendors to earn an adequate profit while
meeting community objectives.
Risks and Rewards
In summation, to influence the availability of broadband in a community as well as parameters of
available broadband service (e.g., price, bandwidth, reliability, etc.), government entities have many
roles available to them. However, these roles are not equal with respect to their potential to improve
broadband. The roles that allow communities the most direct impact on their broadband—operator,
infrastructure developer, and financier—also require communities to assume the most risk by
essentially becoming a telecom, even if that telecom only serves public sector users. The remaining roles
of user and rule-maker do not allow communities to control their broadband destinies; they also do not
require the same level of risk.
As demonstrated above, the roles are not mutually exclusive. Government entities in communities
without a community-owned network are internet users, and usually rule-makers as well. Governments
in communities with a community-owned network often serve as infrastructure developers, financiers,
and operators with regard to their networks. In addition, these governmental entities are broadband
users like many other organizations. Unlike other organizations, these government entities are users on
a network they also own and oversee. Furthermore, these government entities may exercise rule-
making authority vis-à-vis the community-owned network, in the sense that one department may run
the network while other departments oversee permits needed to construct or operate the network. As
shown by this non-exhaustive list, government often plays many roles simultaneously.
As shown by the various roles that government entities play in the broadband market, municipalities
have many possibilities to address this situation. Each option includes possible positive and negative
outcomes. The next section describes a few of these options.

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Business Models
Introduction
A municipality that builds a community-owned network can pursue several business models. Before
reviewing business models, it is important to examine how American municipalities commonly address
deplorable, overpriced service in their communities. They do nothing and maintain the status quo.
Status Quo
Municipalities pursuing this option hope private telecoms will upgrade their networks to meet 21st
century telecommunications needs. In other words, these municipalities do nothing to improve
broadband access in their communities. If the telecom does nothing on its own (the likely outcome),
then nothing changes and the community continues to have subpar internet service. Although the
community avoids risks associated with other options, the community assumes the risks associated with
having subpar internet service. These risks include but are not limited to
 a reduced ability to retain current residents and businesses in the community,
 a reduced ability to attract new residents and businesses to the community,
 declining wages and a stagnant economy, and
 lower health, education, and other outcomes for residents.
While incumbent telecoms try to focus public attention on the risks associated with a government entity
building a telecom network, they ignore the considerable risks associated with maintaining the status
quo. In broadband, as in life, there is always a risk associated with doing nothing.
Private Ownership
A municipality pursuing this option may convince a private-sector entity to build, own, and operate a
new network or expand/improve an existing network in its community. To entice internet service
providers (ISPs), a city may use tools at its disposal as a regulator, a customer, and an owner of valuable
assets to
 make it easier for telecoms to construct and/or operate a network, and
 increase demand for broadband to ensure ISPs a sufficient number of customers.
Specific tactics municipalities use include the following:
 written assurance of their role as network anchor client for a specific time period,
 access to rights-of-way and/or light poles,
 the right to lay fiber under streets or attach network infrastructure to other property, and
 help with relevant permitting processes.
For example, Austin, TX and Kansas City (KS and MO) each leveraged community-owned assets and
regulatory power to bring Google to their community as a new ISP offering fiber broadband. Raleigh-
Durham, NC and Winston-Salem, NC used community-owned assets and regulatory power to entice
AT&T, an existing ISP, to build a fiber network that could provide more bandwidth than AT&T’s existing
DSL network. Fort Wayne, IN worked with local anchor institutions to convince Verizon to bring FiOS
fiber service to their city.

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Less commonly, municipalities that are having difficulty managing an existing community-owned
network may sell it to a private-sector entity that would accept network ownership and operation, as
Provo, UT did with Google. Subsequent sections of this report highlight the efforts of Kansas City, Provo,
and Fort Wayne to secure fast, affordable broadband for their communities.
In other instances, municipalities try to encourage existing telecom firms to upgrade service with more
generous bandwidth and data limits and to reduce prices. Such service improvements may require
network enhancements. Regardless of whether municipalities work with existing ISPs or new providers,
municipalities want to entice all ISPs operating in the community to improve service and lower prices.
Municipalities seeking better broadband from a private firm often try to negotiate favorable terms for
themselves as a direct customer and, more rarely, for the community as a whole. For example, a
municipality may try to negotiate lower rates for themselves as anchor clients and for their employees
as residential subscribers. They may try to stipulate bandwidth offerings, data limits, and prices on the
network (iProvo after its sale to Google). Although the municipality does not control the network under
this scenario, the introduction of a new ISP could increase competition enough to give the municipality
power to negotiate with new and incumbent ISPs to improve service and reduce costs.
One major risk with this approach is that the private sector’s short-term profit focus may result in the
private firm abandoning the network before the municipality can realize the long-term benefits of the
negotiated arrangement.
Recent attempts by Austin, Kansas City, Provo, Raleigh-Durham, and Winston-Salem to improve
broadband access via privately owned broadband improvements may introduce enough competition to
improve broadband offerings and reduce prices in these cities. Unfortunately, at the time of the writing
of this report in November 2014, these projects are in the planning or early implementation phase.
Therefore, it is too soon to judge their long-term impact on broadband supply and access, although the
short-term impact seems beneficial for consumers.
What is clear is that these projects do little to reduce community dependence on the private sector.
Consequently, such projects represent a continuation of the status quo—even if the quality and price of
broadband improve in the short term.
Business Models for Publicly Owned Networks
The previous section outlined risks associated with maintaining the status quo and described ways that
municipalities attempt to work with ISPs to improve the quality and/or price of broadband in their
communities. This section concentrates on business models for publicly owned broadband networks,
and benefits and risks associated with each business model.
Public Ownership/Public Operation: Municipalities pursuing this option build, own, and operate a
broadband network. Within the public ownership/public operation model, institutional networks serve
public-sector customers such as government, K-12 schools, higher education, and libraries, while
municipal networks serve business and residential clients in addition to public-sector entities.
For municipalities, the main benefit of the public ownership/public operation model is that the
municipality can run its network entirely in the public interest, unlike a for-profit firm. Drawbacks
include the need to increase payroll to run a new service and the almost-certain need to acquire debt to
pay to build the network. This report discusses the experiences of many communities, including Bristol
(TN and VA); Chattanooga, TN; Burlington, VT; and Santa Monica, CA among others, in building and

10
operating a community-owned network. Of these communities, only Santa Monica built its network
without assuming debt.
Public Ownership/Private or Nonprofit Operation aka Public Private Partnership (PPP): Municipalities
that pursue this option contract with a private-sector or nonprofit wholesaler that sells service to retail
customers on a community-owned network. From the customer perspective, the wholesaler is their ISP,
even though the community owns the network that hosts the services.
This model benefits the municipality in that it retains control of the network itself while avoiding the
hassles of daily operations. This model benefits private firms by permitting them to avoid expensive
infrastructure investments.
Municipalities may prefer to contract with one or many wholesalers, depending on their needs. A
requirement that the network remain open to multiple service providers may reduce wholesaler
willingness to work with the municipality. If an interested wholesaler insists on being a monopoly
provider, the municipality can use its ownership of the network to insist the wholesaler provide a certain
level of service and/or prices that meet certain criteria. Likewise, if a wholesaler concedes to the
presence of competing wholesalers on the network, they will try to negotiate concessions. These
concessions could make this option less attractive to a municipality than operating the network itself.
From the municipality’s perspective, another drawback to this model is loss of municipal control over
the customer experience because the wholesaler ISPs run operations. This report discusses the
experiences of Chicago, IL; Provo, UT; Seattle, WA; and Utah’s UTOPIA network in working with the
private sector to operate a community-owned network. In addition, the report highlights cities that sell
service directly to customers and through wholesale intermediaries, such as Lafayette, LA; Santa
Monica, CA; South Bend, IN; and Tacoma, WA.
Nonprofit Ownership: A municipality can build a broadband network and sell it to a nonprofit entity to
operate, or otherwise arrange for a nonprofit entity to build and operate a network. The benefits and
drawbacks of this model are similar to those of a privately owned network.
Although a municipality might negotiate with a nonprofit to build and operate a network in its
community, it is unlikely that a municipality would build a network with the intention of selling it to
another entity, even a nonprofit, thereby losing ultimate control of the asset. Typically, when a
municipality sells its publicly owned network to another entity, the network has not met subscriber and
revenue targets, thereby eroding resident and politician support for the network.
Civic Wireless Model: A municipality can offer free wireless access to the public in public spaces;
typically, the city itself or a civic entity pays the cost of this service. The city or civic entity may own and
operate the network itself or may hire others to operate a network it owns. A third option is for the city
or civic entity to pay a private firm to offer free wireless services in public spaces on the private firm’s
network, similar to what New York City proposes to do via its partnership with CityBridge (as described
in this report). Although civic wireless networks can provide residents with access to broadband outside
the home, this model is insufficient to improve home broadband access for most residents.
Because home access is critical for people to become truly conversant with broadband, any option that
does not provide affordable access to broadband at home represents only a partial step in efforts to
provide adequate broadband access and reduce the “digital divide.”

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Governance: Publicly Owned Networks
Municipalities that decide to build and operate a publicly owned network need to select a governance
structure that determines what political entity will oversee the network and defines that political
entity’s role and responsibilities. Whereas a business model relates to what entity will handle the
technical and operational aspects of running the network and interfacing with customers, governance
refers to the political and financial considerations of overseeing the network. As with business models,
there are many governance options available depending on state and local laws and political conditions.
These include
 embedment in municipal government;
 establishment of separate municipal boards;
 establishment of special boards, authorities, and commissions;
 establishment of utility cooperatives; and
 creation of multi-government interlocal projects5
As expected, each governance structure includes multiple potential positive and negative impacts. The
communities included in this report opted for a variety of governance structures. For example, Santa
Monica, CA chose to embed its network operations in municipal government; the City’s information
technology department handled the design and construction of the municipal fiber network and
continues to handle daily network operations. Many other cities (including Bristol, VA and Lafayette, LA)
used an existing publicly owned utility to construct their community fiber networks, then created a new
entity to oversee the fiber network operations. Such networks are separate from the pre-existing
utilities or any other parts of city government. For these communities, creating a new organization with
its own board, rules, and regulations, offered the chance to simplify network governance by segregating
it from other areas of community life overseen by the public sector. The UTOPIA network in Utah and
the network serving Bristol, VA and surrounding counties are examples of multi-government interlocal
projects.
5
Casey Lide, “Connecting Your Community: Bringing Broadband to Town” (presentation at the Virginia Municipal League Annual Conference,
October 4, 2004): 7.

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Deciding to Build a Publicly Owned Network
The previous sections discussed the roles government plays with respect to the broadband market and
provided an overview of the types of business models and governance structures available to
government entities that build a government owned network. It is helpful to understand these factors
when thinking about the questions that every government entity must ask itself when considering
whether to build a government owned network.
Greenfield Municipalities
For “greenfield” municipalities (those without high-speed broadband internet access), it may be easier
to support municipal involvement in broadband provision. Because they will be providing new service,
rather than redundant service, they should be able to procure customers because people will not be
locked into contracts with an incumbent.
Likewise, they will not face opposition from a local incumbent telecom provider because there is no
local incumbent telecom provider. However, they may face opposition from telecoms that do not serve
their community. These telecoms will not want the community to build a successful network and
establish a precedent that does not support the telecom industry narrative that “government is not able
to construct and operate a telecom network.”
Greenfield municipalities may have an easier time than non-greenfield municipalities in portraying the
telecoms as an outside entity trying to interfere in the community. Without any prior involvement in the
community, residents may find it odd that a telecom suddenly expresses interest in their community
when it indicates the intent to build a network.
Brownfield Municipalities
“Brownfield” municipalities (those with existing broadband access) must answer many questions to
determine whether they should become involved in broadband provision.
 Is the price of broadband service expensive enough to justify overbuilding?
 Is existing broadband service inadequate enough to justify overbuilding?
“Brownfield” internet municipalities must develop a deep understanding of the high-speed internet
market in their area. To justify involvement, the municipality likely will require significant price
reductions and economic and social benefits. Incumbent internet service providers are also more likely
to launch legal challenges to “brownfield” municipalities. Municipal officials must be prepared to face
numerous technical, legal, political, and monetary challenges.6
Municipal Network vs. Institutional Network
If a municipality chooses to build and operate a broadband network, it must determine whom to serve.
Will it limit operations to municipal functions only? Many public sector entities build networks that only
serve publicly owned buildings and property. Other municipal networks provide the communications
capabilities to operate streetlights, traffic and/or safety cameras, or parking meters. Public safety
6
Null, “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 56–58.

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agencies like police, fire, and emergency medical services often use municipal networks for
communications. Sometimes, networks provide free wifi access to the public in publicly owned parks
and plazas.
All networks (both public and private) face design, technical, and sometimes political challenges
associated with pre-construction regulatory requirements. However, publicly owned networks that limit
public access to publicly owned buildings and open spaces, and limit network access outside those areas
to public employees and/or publicly owned equipment, usually experience fewer legal challenges.
These networks do not pose a significant threat to private telecommunications providers’ profits. In this
scenario, the ISP loses one very lucrative customer (the municipality), instead of multiple customers.
Legal challenges are therefore limited. Municipal broadband networks that choose to sell broadband to
customers directly, however, compete with private-sector telecommunications firms and thus incur
legal challenges more frequently.
Business Model Selection
Municipalities that sell service to customers can face many decisions about their business model. Will
the network pursue a wholesale model and sell broadband to intermediaries that resell services to end
users? Or will the network sell directly to customers? If it chooses this approach, will it limit itself to
business customers, residents, or serve both? Alternatively, will the municipality pursue a hybrid model
that involves the provision of both wholesale and retail services?
These questions are not merely academic. There are different factors to consider when providing
wholesale and retail broadband service.
 What type of service can the municipality provide per state laws?
 What types of service are in demand in their municipality or planned coverage area?
 What services will the municipality provide? Will it sell cable TV and/or voice services or limit
itself to data services only?
The riskier approach, competing with private-sector telecommunications providers, offers possible
benefits to consumers and the economy that make this method worthwhile for some public-sector
entities. The increased competition due to the availability of a municipal broadband alternative usually
results in lower prices and/or faster and more reliable service within the area with duplicative (public
and private) services. Other benefits cited by proponents include
 improved public-sector worker productivity and internal operations;
 reduction in number of people who can’t access the internet due to financial considerations;
 increased ability of local businesses to participate in national and international markets;
 expanded job market access for local workers who can work for employers in distant locations;
and
 expanded labor market access for local employers who can hire employees in distant locations.7
7
“Municipal Broadband,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Municipal_broadband, accessed September 2013.

14
Trends in Municipal Provision of Broadband
Clearly, there are other benefits not discussed. Nevertheless, one final benefit is worth mentioning.
Wresting control of broadband access, which has become a basic utility in developed nations, from
telecommunications firms allows a municipality to control its daily operations and plan its future.
Indeed, “city government ownership over [a broadband telecommunications] network means the city
controls the reins, can oversee the network, and can ensure that the network embodies the
government’s vision, including subscription rate, upgrades, and network neutrality.”8
Recognizing this
fact, many municipalities are issuing RFPs for broadband services. Among these are major cities,
including Baltimore, MD; Raleigh, NC; and Los Angeles, CA.
For communities that want to improve municipal provision of services via better broadband and/or
improve broadband access for underserved residents within their communities, provision of municipal
broadband is a “best practice” endorsed by the Federal Communications Commission in 2000.9
During the past 20 years, many small, rural municipalities have built and operated broadband networks
to benefit their government operations and their residents. Large cities, which received better service
from the private telecommunications firms, typically did not resort to building and operating their own
networks.
Besides the availability of better service from private providers in larger cities, a stronger distrust of
government among residents of large cities also may contribute to the relatively few attempts to build
and operate large municipal broadband networks. Because telecoms earn their highest returns in cities
where customers cluster together (thereby reducing infrastructure costs), these firms are more likely to
oppose municipal networks in cities. Officials there understand that they are more likely to face
stringent opposition if they attempt to build and operate a municipal broadband network than their
rural counterparts. The fear of this opposition has kept many large cities from attempting the same
outcome that approximately 300 smaller ones have accomplished—the construction and operation of a
municipally owned broadband network.10
In recent years, several larger cities have attempted to build and operate a municipal network as
discussed in this report, the remainder of which summarizes the experiences of various cities, states,
provinces, and nations that have built and operated a government broadband network.
Because many countries have average broadband speeds faster than the United States, this research
includes international examples, too. As of 2010, these included Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, Iceland,
Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Switzerland,
Romania, Latvia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.11
The next sections provide observations from the case studies, and examples of best practices, while the
final section summarizes the experiences of individual communities.
8
Null, “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 22.
9
“Municipal Broadband,” Wikipedia.
10
Emily Badger, “Why Are There No Big Cities with Municipal Broadband Networks?” Atlantic Cities Place Matters, March 4, 2013,
http://www.theatlanticcities.com/technology/2013/03/why-are-there-no-big-cities-municipal-broadband-networks/4857/, accessed
September 2013.
11
“Broadband Speeds,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2010/03/tech/map.broadband.speeds/index.html, accessed November 2013.

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Observations from Case Studies
Similar Commitment and Challenges, Different Decisions
Building a government-owned and/or operated broadband network is a long process.
It can take 10 years or longer to complete a publicly owned broadband network, due to need to
overcome technical, regulatory, political, legal, and other hurdles. This is true regardless of whether the
project involves fiber or various wireless technologies, and regardless of whether the government is a
local, state, provincial, or national government. The need for long-term commitment is consistent for
projects in North America, Europe, Asia, or Oceania.
Broadband networks overseas face similar challenges to those faced by their US counterparts.
Differing historical and current political realities have led to different decisions regarding regulation,
government subsidy, open access, and other factors in overseas networks. The result is an environment
that supports the development of financially viable high-speed broadband networks more readily than
the US environment. Therefore, other nations often enjoy faster average broadband speeds than the
United States. Even so, public- and private-sector entities overseas face similar obstacles as their US
counterparts because they must address technical, financial, regulatory, political, and legal challenges.
Overseas governments do more to promote broadband competition government entities in the
United States; their consumers benefit.
Although some nations built or subsidized the construction of broadband networks, many nations have
faster broadband because their national governments enacted legislation to force competition. These
nations faced and overcame challenges from incumbents because their leaders exercised political will.
For example, the UK broadband market used to be similar to the US market. British homes had two
options for broadband service: the incumbent telephone company, British Telecom (BT), or a cable
provider. Prices were high, service was slow, and Britain was falling behind its European neighbors in
international rankings of broadband service.12
Beginning in 2000, the government required BT to allow other broadband providers to deliver service
over its lines. BT resisted. However, 10 years later, the number of Britons served by multiple broadband
providers had increased from 12,000 to 6M. As of 2011, the post office and supermarket chains offer
broadband and a consortium of broadband providers had approached BT to request access to its
infrastructure to build their own fiber network.13
The Netherlands follows this pattern, too. The Dutch national government did not build a broadband
network. However, it created an environment that allowed the City of Amsterdam to collaborate with
private- and public-sector partners to build a fiber network. After a partial buyout by a private
partnership, the City of Amsterdam has only a minority share in the region’s fiber network. To
encourage competition, the Amsterdam network contracts with many wholesalers to provide service to
end users. Competition between these wholesalers results in better prices for Dutch consumers.
Like many European nations, both South Korea and Japan require internet service providers to allow
other ISPs to offer service via their networks for a fee. The result is that both Seoul and Tokyo have
12
Rick Karr, “Why is European broadband faster and cheaper? Blame the government,” Engadget, June 28, 2011,
http://www.engadget.com/2011/06/28/why-is-european-broadband-faster-and-cheaper-blame-the-governme/, accessed November 2013.
13
Ibid.

16
many major ISPs, while most American cities are served by two major ISPs. Singapore also has many ISPs
offering service on its two fiber networks.
The Municipal Experience
Municipalities are the level of government most likely to build a broadband network.
While nations and large political subdivisions like states or provinces often develop broadband plans
with lofty goals, they very rarely build networks. The most notable exception is Australia, which is
building a nationwide broadband network and Alberta, Canada, which is building a provincial broadband
network. National governments are more likely to devise policies that encourage the private sector to
provide adequate broadband than to build a national network. Nations that successfully encouraged
their private sector to improve broadband include Singapore, Japan, and South Korea.
The research revealed that municipal government is more likely to build a network to address residents’
broadband access deficiencies than state, provincial, or national government. Therefore, this report
contains many more case studies detailing actions taken by local government to address their
community broadband needs.
Municipalities with incumbent broadband providers face greater challenges in improving broadband.
Most American municipalities have internet service. The smallest communities may have access only to
dialup, but larger communities typically have access to cable or DSL broadband for residential
consumers. Access to fiber, the fastest broadband technology, typically is limited to business users able
to pay premium fees of several thousand dollars per month for access. Therefore, most municipalities
are “brownfield” markets where slower DSL and cable internet service is already available to residents.
Unfortunately, the bandwidth offered and the prices for the service are unappealing.
For these communities, the decision to “overbuild” private network(s) owned and operated by
incumbent(s) to provide a redundant community-owned option is one that requires a deep
understanding of their local high-speed internet market, as well as leaders who are willing to commit
political capital, staff time, and funding to the broadband project.
To justify involvement, the municipality likely will require significant price reductions and economic and
social benefits for its residents and businesses. Because incumbent internet service providers are more
likely to launch legal challenges to “brownfield” municipalities, these places must be prepared to
weather the political and monetary costs of lengthy legal challenges. As discussed herein, Lafayette, LA;
Bristol, VA; Burlington, VT; Chattanooga, TN; and Amsterdam in the Netherlands encountered legal
challenges during efforts to build and operate community fiber networks.
In a 2006 memorandum to a client, the Tennessee Broadband Coalition, the Baller Herbst Law Group, a
law firm specializing in broadband and telecommunications issues, stated that it had been involved in
most of the previous decade’s leading public communications projects. The memo then states, “In
almost all of these projects, the incumbent telephone and cable companies have rejected or ignored the
locality’s invitation to join in cooperative efforts that would benefit all concerned, and have instead
mounted massive media and lobbying campaigns [to oppose] the proposed public network. Often, the
incumbents have funded support from industry ‘experts’ and artificial ‘grassroots’ groups….”14
The incumbents’ campaigns have included “emotional appeals to private-enterprise ideology, flawed
statistics, complaints about supposedly unfair advantages that municipalities have over the private
14
Jim Baller and Casey Lide, “The Case for Public Fiber-to-the-User Systems,” (case study report, Washington, DC, March 4, 2006), 1.

17
sector, attacks on the motives and competency of public officials, and false or incomplete, misleading,
and irrelevant examples.”15
Brownfield municipalities and their residents also must understand that the operation of a community
network presents a new set of challenges and rewards beyond those encountered during planning and
construction. People must understand that the presence of a community network affects prices offered
by incumbent providers. They also should understand that the community network’s failure to generate
enough revenue may require infusions of tax dollars, depending on the financing model used. Should
the community network disappear, people should expect their bills to return to the duopoly levels.16
Smaller cities seem to experience more success building and operating a network; larger cities tend to
attract partnerships.
Based on the examples, smaller cities have been more successful completing and operating community
broadband networks than larger cities. Examples include Olds in Alberta, Canada; Burlington, VT; and
Bristol, VA. This may be due to a belief by people in small towns that the telecoms are less likely to
upgrade their service, so small towns truly must do it themselves. Likewise, once they encounter
determination to create a community-owned network, telecoms may be more willing to concede with a
small town than they are in a major city, where the telecom risks losing more customers.
Larger cities have been more successful attracting private-sector entities as partners, even if the
partnerships have varied in success. Cities that attracted private-sector partners include Fort Wayne,
Philadelphia, Kansas City, Chicago, Seattle, Austin, and Provo. Fort Wayne’s partnership with Verizon
improved broadband access for a short while, but the sale of Verizon’s fiber customers to another
carrier resulted in increased prices for high-speed internet in the city. Likewise, Philadelphia’s venture
with EarthLink failed because EarthLink did not earn acceptable returns on its investment and the
service was not fast or reliable enough to meet user needs.
Municipalities pursuing the public-private partnership model more recently have preferred to work with
well-capitalized firms that profess goals beyond profits. For example, both Google Fiber and Gigabit
Squared stated that they want to expand broadband access to those who lack it. As of June 2014,
Google’s partnerships with Austin, Provo, and Kansas City seemed to be viable efforts to provide
affordable high-speed broadband to residents of those cities. Unfortunately, Gigabit Squared’s
partnerships with Seattle and Chicago collapsed quickly, leaving those cities looking for new avenues to
improve affordable residential broadband access.
Working with Private Telecoms
Collaborating with the private sector requires acknowledgement of its profit motive.
One main benefit of collaboration with the private sector is that a municipality may be able to improve
the reliability and speed of broadband in its community without acquiring debt. However, the major
drawback of working with the private sector is that the government entity may not own the network,
and therefore still may lack the clout to impact broadband speed, reliability, and pricing in the target
area over the long term. While Fort Wayne’s collaboration with Verizon to obtain high-speed FiOS
initially seemed successful, the telecom’s subsequent decision to sell its FiOS customers to another
service provider left the city without high-speed broadband once again.
15
Ibid.
16
Christopher Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom: Some Lessons for Community Networks,” via Community Broadband Networks,
http://www.muninetworks.org/reports/learning-burlington-telecom-some-lessons-community-networks, August 2011, accessed January 2015,
11.

18
To encourage competition, communities can require their partners to allow other ISPs to use the
network. Both Corpus Christi and Philadelphia required their partner, EarthLink, to allow competitors to
use the network. However, this requirement, and other contract terms, prevented EarthLink from
earning an acceptable return on investment from either network. This situation ultimately doomed both
projects to failure. The pressure on private entities to make short-term profits is a huge challenge for
this model. Municipalities must acknowledge this profit motive when requesting concessions from
for-profit partners, especially if those partners have had to incur expenses to build a network.
On the other hand, if the municipal partner has undertaken the expense of building the network and the
private-sector partner is responsible only for operations, the community may be able to request more
from its partner.
Most communities focused on improving access for residents and businesses.
Calgary, Alberta, Canada, is unique among the communities studied in that it focused exclusively on
serving business customers. In California, Burbank and Santa Monica focused primarily on business
customers, but both communities provide free wireless broadband in some public places. However,
most communities focused on improving broadband access for both residents and businesses.
The presence of private-sector firms with a professed public mission like Google and Gigabit Squared
is changing expectations of what is acceptable broadband.
With firms like Google and Gigabit Squared collaborating with municipal government to provide
residents with faster internet at lower prices than currently available internet packages, these firms are
raising expectations for broadband service. Government officials contemplating action to improve their
communities’ broadband must consider current and future bandwidth offerings from these firms, as
well as the incumbent ISPs, when determining which strategies may be successful in improving
broadband for their residents and businesses.
The introduction of a municipal broadband network often improves the bandwidth and price of
broadband options in a community.
Research by the federal government’s General Accountability Office (GAO) suggests that the presence of
a municipal or federally funded broadband network in a community improves the broadband options for
that community’s consumers. The GAO compared bandwidth availability and pricing for 14 federally
funded or municipal broadband networks paid for without federal funding with other broadband
networks within the community and with broadband networks in nearby communities.17
In 9 out of 14 communities with a federally funded or municipal broadband network, the federally
funded or municipal network offered greater bandwidth than other networks in the same community
and networks in nearby communities. Prices charged by federally funded or municipal networks tended
to be slightly less than prices charged by comparable networks for similar speeds.18
For example, for 4 to
6 mbps of bandwidth, federally funded and municipally operated networks charged an average of $11
less per month than non-federally funded networks in the same community, and about $20 less per
month than networks in comparison communities.19
In every bandwidth category, more communities with a federally funded or municipal network had at
least one provider offering that level of bandwidth than communities without a federally funded or
municipal option. At levels of 51 mbps and higher, the GAO observed pronounced differences. Six
17
“Telecommunications: Federal Broadband Deployment Programs and Small Business,” GAO-14-203, US General Accountability Office,
February 2014, Executive Summary.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid., 14.

19
communities with a federally funded or municipal provider had at least one provider offering service at
that level. Only three communities without a federally funded or municipal provider had at least one
provider offering service at a level of 51 mbps or greater.20
Furthermore, in 9 out of 14 communities, the
federally funded or municipal network offered the highest advertised top speeds.21
Benefits of Community Broadband
The introduction of municipal broadband can spur incumbents to improve service and/or lower prices.
With the advent of Google’s gigabit fiber networks in Kansas City, Austin, Provo, and the announcement
of plans to lay fiber networks in nine other metro areas, incumbent internet service providers AT&T,
Cox, C Spire, and CenturyLink have announced plans to upgrade their networks in several metro areas.22
Likewise, in Tacoma, WA, the presence of muni-provider, Click, prompted incumbents Qwest and
Comcast to upgrade their networks. Furthermore, Comcast prices in Tacoma are approximately 50
percent of their prices in nearby Seattle, which lacks a municipal broadband provider.
Communities can derive significant economic benefits by building a municipal fiber network.
One benefit is that broadband subscribers realize significant cost savings regardless of whether they
switch to the new, less expensive municipal provider or pay lower prices to an incumbent eager to retain
customers. This leaves residents, businesses, nonprofits, and municipal government itself with extra
money to save or spend on other priorities. In many instances, people and organizations choose to
spend some of their savings. Generally, during the five years following deployment of a municipal
network, residents and businesses collectively save an amount equivalent to the amount of money
invested by the municipality in the network.23
Another benefit is that the municipality often attracts new
businesses. The summaries of Tacoma, WA and Bristol, VA explicitly discuss the economic benefits
municipal fiber networks generated for these communities.
In response to changes in consumer sentiment, smaller broadband providers concentrate on providing
data services rather than phone, data, and video packages.
Prior to 2012, conventional wisdom dictated that small broadband providers, including municipalities,
had to imitate large telecoms (e.g., AT&T, Cox, Comcast, Verizon, Time Warner Cable, etc.) and offer a
triple-play package consisting of phone (voice), data (internet), and video (cable TV) services to lure
customers. For most customers, the most important telecom service was cable television with its
specialty channels that offered either higher-quality or commercial-free programming.
Invariably, cable companies developed different packages. Each package offered a specific group of
channels; packages that included more channels, or included “premium” channels, often cost
significantly more than the lowest cost option. This resulted in customers paying money for channels
they did not watch to gain access to specific channels they did watch. When small operators or
municipalities built and operated a broadband network that served the public, they often offered triple-
play packages to lure customers with access to lower-cost cable.
The introduction and rapid expansion of online subscription services such as Hulu and Netflix, which
allow users to watch television over the internet, now allows television watchers to access favorite
20
Ibid, 12.
21
Ibid, 13.
22
Denise Linn, “Small Cities Don’t Need Google Fiber to Get Gigabit Connectivity,” Next City, June 25, 2014,
http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/google-fiber-cities-available-high-speed-internet-municipal-options, accessed January 2015
23
Eric Lampland, Lookout Point Communications, Interview, June 10, 2014.

20
shows without a cable subscription. As of 2014, an increasing number of customers no longer watch
broadcast or cable television, preferring to access television shows and other information on the
internet. For these customers, the most important telecom service is no longer cable television, but data
(internet) service. This change in consumer mentality means that smaller internet service providers,
including municipal networks, no longer have to offer triple-play packages to stay financially solvent.
Now, internet service providers can avoid the cost and hassle of negotiating with content providers.
For example, Ringgold Telephone Co. in Georgia and BTC Broadband in Bixby, Oklahoma no longer offer
television. Other companies are going part way. Suddenlink Communications is eliminating all Viacom
programming, including MTV and Nickelodeon.24
This development bodes well for communities that
want to build and operate a municipal network, as many will be able to take advantage of this trend and
avoid the difficulties and costs associated with developing and providing triple-play packages.
Municipalities can overcome challenges and be successful broadband internet providers. There is no
one-size-fits-all solution. Rather, there are many pathways to municipal broadband success.
This document summarizes the experiences of multiple cities (and a few states, provinces, and nations)
in expanding broadband access to residents and business. Municipalities have been successful using
many of the models described previously, and a few that were not. No formula guarantees success in all
contexts. Rather, each entity must carefully develop goals, create an action plan to reach those goals,
and then execute the plan, adapting to unforeseen circumstances. Each municipality must design the
network and develop the business model and governance structure that meet its needs.
24
“Small cable companies dropping TV in favor of Internet,” Speedmatters, October 2, 2014, http://www.speedmatters.org/blog/archive/small-
cable-companies-dropping-tv-in-favor-of-
internet/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=speedmatters&utm_campaign=20141006WeeklyUpdate.

21
Best Practices
Segment Broadband Expansion into Manageable Steps
Although the case study communities pursued various approaches to expand broadband, successful
projects exhibited common traits. First, successful communities decided upon goals and then developed
concrete steps to achieve the goals. In other words, they broke the project into manageable steps.
For example, Santa Monica, CA first pursued broadband to serve the needs of city government. It was
only after mastering the basics of building and running a network for its own use that Santa Monica
began to serve private customers—first, large businesses, and eventually mid-sized and small
businesses. Eventually, Santa Monica opted to provide free wifi in select areas, as well as service to
public housing complexes. Although Santa Monica ultimately decided to serve lower-income residents
and the public, these services are limited. The core mission of the Santa Monica network remains the
service of enterprise customers.
Likewise, Bristol, VA began its foray into broadband provision by serving the internet needs of
government. For Bristol, the second step was service expansion to business customers, followed by
service to residential customers. Once Bristol had successfully implemented community broadband
within the municipality, it then expanded service to surrounding counties.
Corpus Christi, TX began its broadband expansion by building a mesh wifi network for electronic meter
reading. Then, the city extended its use of the wifi network to other city government functions. The City
eventually decided to offer free wifi service to the public in parks, libraries, community centers, and
sports complexes.
In each of the examples above, the municipality chose to build and operate an institutional network
exclusively for government use first. Once the municipality was comfortable serving internal customers,
it expanded the network’s scope to serve businesses, residents, or both. Businesses often use a strategy
of gradual market expansion; smart municipalities adapt this tactic to their objectives. In this manner,
the publicly owned network can uncover and fix problems while serving internal customers (government
employees). This allows the network to have a better product/service when it finally expands to external
customers, who may have less tolerance for problems with service.
Ensure that Private-Sector Partners Have Adequate Resources
Although public entities built and operated the first successful municipal networks, recently many
municipalities have chosen to collaborate with a private-sector partner to bring additional financial and
technical resources to their projects. In doing so, governments also should structure projects to meet
both municipal and private-sector goals.
For example, during the mid 2000s, Philadelphia, Corpus Christi, and New Orleans each attempted to
provide free and/or low-cost wireless service via a public-private partnership with EarthLink.
Unfortunately, by 2008, all three networks had failed because EarthLink could not earn adequate profit
to justify its continued involvement in the projects.
More recently, Chicago and Seattle created partnerships with Gigabit Squared. By January 2014, the
Seattle Gigabit Squared project had failed. Observers cite Gigabit Squared’s apparent lack of technical

22
expertise and debt owed to the City as factors in the project’s failure.25
As of March 2014, the Chicago
Gigabit project was experiencing significant challenges, including allegations of misspent funds.26
Unlike the Gigabit Squared projects, Google’s partnerships with Kansas City (MO and KS), Austin, TX, and
Provo, UT to expand residential broadband access in those cities seem viable as of summer 2014. One
positive factor for the Google partnerships is the fact that Google has strong cash reserves, unlike
Gigabit Squared. Therefore, the Google partnerships are less dependent on other entities for funds
needed to sustain the project through its early, non-revenue generating phases.
The troubles of the EarthLink and Gigabit Squared ventures underscore the need for cities to vet their
partners carefully and to manage the terms under which they pursue broadband public–private
partnerships to allow all involved parties to achieve their objectives. Likewise, the newness of the
Google partnerships makes it impossible to render a final evaluation on this approach.
Therefore, while public–private partnerships may be a viable model for cities seeking to expand
broadband access, it is clear that project success depends on cities carefully vetting their partners,
defining key project terms, and managing the project to allow partners to earn enough profit while also
ensuring broadband access for a wider group of people.
Collaborate, Share Best Practices, and Promote Access to
Affordable Broadband
The research revealed that many jurisdictions have built and operated municipally owned broadband
with varying degrees of success. Furthermore, municipalities continue to pursue this option when faced
with incumbent providers that refuse to upgrade service to 21st
-century standards. Because
municipalities face many of the same challenges, it would be appropriate for municipalities to begin
collaborate with one another on common challenges. Municipalities at the early stages of the quest for
affordable broadband access can and should learn from cities with finished networks. Likewise,
municipalities face common legal challenges from incumbents. They may be able to work together to
oppose unfavorable legislation and draft and promote favorable legislation. They also may be able to
collaborate on efforts to build public support for municipal broadband.
For example, New Orleans could consider supporting New York State’s efforts to mandate minimum
internet speeds. Even if support is only a letter, it still signals the telecoms that it is unacceptable to
provide slow internet service that no longer meets customer needs. Opportunities for collaboration are
many and the time to begin is now.
Conclusion
The next section of the report describes the efforts of approximately 40 communities to improve the
quality and price of available broadband. Each case study contains
 a description of how the community pursued its broadband objectives,
 a summary of key lessons from the community’s experience, and
 contact information.
25
Colin Wood, “What Happened to Seattle’s Gigabit Network?” Government Technology, January 22, 2014,
http://www.govtech.com/network/What-Happened-to-Seattles-Gigabit-Network.html.
26
Sandra Guy, “State wants Gigabit Squared to return $2 million grant,” Chicago Sun-Times, March 27, 2014,
http://www.suntimes.com/26484032-420/state-wants-gigabit-squared-to-return-2-million-grant.html#.U1_hyFVdUZQ.

23
Case Study Summaries
Seattle, WA
The City of Seattle (2010 population 612,000) often opts to provide services when it feels private options
are lacking. In 1986, Seattle installed fiber for an internal telephone network because it was cheaper
than buying from the local provider. Lawsuits followed, but the court ruled that Seattle could build its
own telephone network, as long as it did not offer commercial telephone service.27
For the next 20
years, Seattle worked with the University of Washington, King County, Seattle Public Schools,
Washington State ferries, and other government agencies to build 500 miles of fiber. This network
serves government agencies, libraries, schools, colleges, and fire stations, etc.28
In 2004, Seattle began to focus on ensuring broadband access for homes and small businesses. The
mayor and city council commissioned a task force to determine how Seattle should ensure access to
broadband for its residents. In 2005, the task force recommended pursuing a fiber-to-the-premises
(FTTP) network as a long-term solution to providing the 100 mbps upload/download speeds that
residents and businesses would need in the future. The task force recommended that the city
government encourage private providers to build a network while preparing to build a network itself, if
the private sector would not do so.29
Because Washington state law requires municipal networks to use the wholesale model if they serve the
public, Seattle would need to work with a private firm in its efforts to bring faster broadband to
residents and businesses, regardless of whether it convinced a firm to build a network or built the
network itself and delegated operations to a firm.30
In 2006, Seattle invited Requests for Information (RFIs) from private providers to build a FTTP network.
Incentives included access to the city's available fiber, underground conduit, utility poles, and staff.
Private companies were interested in the network, but they did not provide financing information in
their RFIs.
In 2007, Seattle studied the financial feasibility of building a network itself and resident demand for city-
provided internet. The survey found that more than 60 percent of Seattle households would buy city-
provided fiber services, if offered at lower prices. At that time, the cost estimate to build a system was
$500M, with an estimated repayment period of 20 years.31
The study also analyzed three possible
business models for a city-owned network; each required different market shares to be successful:
 A network using the retail model would need 25 percent market share to be break even.
 A network using the wholesale model would need 33 percent market share to break even.
 A retail–wholesale hybrid network would allow the city to provide service for five to seven
years, and then open the network to other providers afterwards.32
27
Tina Trenkner, “Seattle Tackles Broadband,” Governing, August 2010, http://www.governing.com/topics/technology/seattle-tackles-
broadband.html, accessed September 2013.
28
Taylor Soper, “Mayor Mike McGinn announces plan to develop ‘ultra-fast broadband network,’” GeekWire, December 13, 2012,
http://www.geekwire.com/2012/live-mayor-mike-mcginn-announces-plan-develop-ultrafast-broadband-network/, accessed September 2013.
29
Trenkner, “Seattle Tackles Broadband.”
30
Christopher Mitchell, “Legislation alert: Washington State considers community broadband bill on ‘reclaim the media’,” Reclaim the Media,
January 1, 2012, http://www.reclaimthemedia.org/communications_rights/legislation_alert_washington_s1202, accessed September 2013.
31
Trenkner, “Seattle Tackles Broadband.”
32
Ibid.

24
As of 2010, three internet service providers offered Seattleites broadband with download speeds of 12,
20, and 50 mbps. Generally, the ISPs offer slower upload speeds. The ISPs claim that the demand for
high-speed internet is low, which contradicts what Seattleites said in a 2009 survey: 75 percent of
Seattle households have broadband, and 75 percent of those broadband households said they would
find faster internet speeds valuable.33
The City of Seattle also spoke with Seattle City Light and Seattle Public Utilities, the electric and sewage–
water utilities, respectively to learn about their interest in smart grid applications and smart metering.34
In 2005, Seattle launched a 5-year pilot program to provide free wifi in portions of the city. The total
estimated cost of the program was $115,000. That included $65,000 for equipment paid for by the
city's Department of Information Technology and the Office of Economic Development. The University
of Washington sponsored the service in the University District. Homesight and the Atlantic Street
Center funded the service in Columbia City.35
By May 2012, citing high maintenance costs, Seattle had shuttered the 7-year old SeattleWiFi, its free
community wireless network, which had served Columbia City, the University District, and four
downtown parks. The popular service had contributed to Columbia City’s revitalization.36
By May 2012,
Seattle also had leased a 4-block stretch of Pioneer Square conduit to Comcast, bringing fiber to more
than 50 new customers.37
In December 2012, Seattle announced an agreement with Gigabit Squared and the University of
Washington to operate a high-speed fiber network, dubbed Gigabit Seattle, via unused city fiber. The
project purpose was to generate public benefits, rather than to earn profit. The proposed project
involved fiber to the premises, a wireless cloud for mobile access in select neighborhoods, and
broadband connections to multi-family housing and offices in locations outside target neighborhoods.38
As originally contemplated, Gigabit Seattle fiber initially would pass 6,000 to 10,000 homes in 12
neighborhoods. The desired uptake rate was 8 to 12 percent of adjacent households. Gigabit Seattle
hoped to offer the service to 100,000 residents by the end of 2014.39
By October 2013, the Gigabit
Seattle website offered residential customers three plans:
Plan A:
 5 mbps download/1 mbps upload: No charge for 60 months
 5/1 mbps services are transferrable to new renters or owners
 After 60 months, renters or owners can convert to a 10 mbps download/10 mbps upload service
plan for only $10 per month
Plan B:
 100 mbps download/100 mbps upload for $45 per month
 No installation charge with one-year contract
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Kathy Mulady, “Seattle launches test of free Wi-Fi service,” SeattlePi, May 18, 2005, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Seattle-launches-
test-of-free-Wi-Fi-service-1173775.php, accessed September 2013.
36
Mari Sibley, “Seattle ends free Wi-Fi,” SmartPlanet, May 8, 2012, http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/thinking-tech/seattle-ends-free-wi-
fi/11546, accessed September 2013.
37
Goldy, “Mayor McGinn’s New Broadband Strategy Isn’t New,” Slog News & Arts, May 15, 2012,
http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2012/05/15/mayor-mcginns-new-broadband-strategy-isnt-new, accessed September 2013.
38
Soper, “Mayor Mike McGinn announces plan to develop ‘ultra-fast broadband network.”
39
Ibid.

25
Plan C:
 1000 download/1000 upload mbps for $80 per month
 No installation charge with one-year contract40
As of October 2013, Gigabit Seattle planned to begin service in 14 neighborhoods, selected in
conjunction with the city government and the University of Washington based on market research, and
aggregate demand from specific areas.41
Unfortunately, by January 2014, Seattle’s agreement with Gigabit Squared had ended, leaving the city
with $52K in debt from the firm. At that time, Gigabit had not built any part of the proposed network.
Research into Gigabit Squared by Seattle technology advocacy group, Upping Technology for
Underserved Neighborhoods (UPTUN), could not find evidence Gigabit Squared ever completed a
project. The firm’s expertise seemed concentrated in sales and venture capital rather than the technical
aspects of broadband according to UPTUN leader, Robert Kangas.42
Newly elected Seattle Mayor Ed Murray has stated that Seattle seeks other companies with a “more
realistic financing mechanism” to lease the fiber and move forward with the project. He also stated that
he views broadband as a utility and that the city should consider hybrid business models to improve
broadband affordability. Seattle’s interest in continuing the project with a different partner has
prompted a statement of interest from the CEO of Wave Broadband.43
Summary and Lessons Learned in Seattle
Seattle’s nascent collaboration with the University of Washington and Gigabit Squared to form a public–
private partnership that would serving residential and business customers via a retail model failed, just
as the city’s previous free wifi network failed. Many factors contribute to Seattle’s difficulty attracting
and retaining private partners, including
 Seattle’s inability to provide timely, accurate information about its fiber;
 regulations that make it hard for ISPs to install cabinets in the public right-of-way; and
 regulations that make it difficult to install fiber on existing utility poles.44
As of spring 2014, Seattle was in the process of adjusting its plans for broadband expansion.
Contact Information
Sabra Schneider, City of Seattle, Interim Chief Technology Officer
doitreceptionist@seattle.gov
206-684-0600
Tacoma, WA
In the late 1990s, Tacoma, WA (2010 population 198,397) decided to build a municipal broadband
network because its sole cable TV provider, TCI (now Comcast), and its phone provider, US West,
refused to upgrade their obsolete systems. TCI’s CEO at the time, a Tacoma native, traveled to Tacoma
to attempt to convince the city council not to pursue a municipal network. When he was unsuccessful,
40
Gigabit Seattle, http://gigabitseattle.com/residential/, accessed October 2013.
41
Gigabit Seattle, : http://gigabitseattle.com/areas/, accessed October 2013.
42
Colin Wood, “What Happened to Seattle’s Gigabit Network?” Government Technology, January 22, 2014,
http://www.govtech.com/network/What-Happened-to-Seattles-Gigabit-Network.html.
43
Emily Parkhurst, “Seattle’s fiber-network deal with Gigabit Squared is dead,” Puget Sound Business Journal, January 7, 2014,
http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/techflash/2014/01/seattles-fiber-deal-with-gigabit.html?page=all.
44
Susan Crawford, John Connolly, Melissa Nally, Travis West, “Community Fiber in Washington, D.C., Seattle, and San Francisco,” Research
Publication No. 2014-9, The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, May 27, 2014, 19-21.

26
he reportedly called them “stupid” and stormed out of the room. As Tacoma built its network, TCI used
the city’s design documents and construction schedules—which are required to be publicly available to
promote government transparency—to purchase materials that Tacoma needed, in order to delay the
building of the network. Even in the face of this harassment, the “Click!” network had its first cable
subscriber by 1998 and its first internet user by 1999.45
Click! is a division of Tacoma Power, which has provided the community’s electricity for more than 100
years. Three independent service providers—Rainier Connect, Advanced Stream, and Net-Venture—
offer up to 100 mbps broadband on the Click network.46
Rainier Connect offers cable and DSL
broadband internet, cable TV, and digital and analog phone service for residential customers; and cable
and DSL broadband internet for commercial customers.47
Advanced Stream and Net-Venture offer
similar services to business and residential customers. Low-income and senior customers get a 20
percent discount.48
As of 2012, Click! served approximately 18,000 customers out of a customer base of 110,000. Click!’s
inability to provide broadband directly to retail customers means that customers contract directly with
Click! for cable TV, but must contract with one of the three independent service providers to get
internet. This hybrid wholesale–retail arrangement results in Click!’s lack of a triple-play option (bundled
phone, cable, and internet), which is inconvenient to customers. This situation has prevented Click! from
attracting as many subscribers as it could have.49
Despite many challenges, Tacoma does benefit from its municipal network. Thanks to the presence of
the Click! alternatives, Comcast charges Tacoma customers half the amount they charge Seattle
customers,50
with Tacoma residents paying about $30 per month.51
Furthermore, Click! created the
market for high-speed internet in Tacoma, which spurred the incumbents, Qwest and Comcast, to
upgrade their networks, compete, and gain new revenue. Comcast later publicly thanked Tacoma Power
for its role in precipitating improvements that benefited Comcast’s bottom line.52
It seems apparent that
Click!’s presence resulted in faster and cheaper broadband offerings for Tacoma residents.
Other benefits include nearly $700K in annual savings by providing the internet to city government
buildings,53
and the location of 100 companies and 700 jobs in Tacoma during the 18 months following
the introduction of Click!54,55
Additionally, Click! established a mutually beneficial partnership with the Tacoma School of the Arts
(SOTA), which offers a curriculum centered on music, visual arts, and theater. Using a few pages of notes
containing key phrases and messages, SOTA songwriting students created a jingle to celebrate Click!’s
10th
anniversary. Impressed with the jingle, Click! asked SOTA students to create a video to go with it.
45
Matthew Halverson, “Disbanded: No Broadband Utility for Seattle,” Seattle Met, June 20, 2012, http://www.seattlemet.com/arts-and-
entertainment/articles/disbanded-no-broadband-utility-for-seattle-july-2012/, accessed September 2013.
46
lgonzalez, “Tacoma's Click! Introduces 100 Mbps; CenturyLink Lies to Steal Click! Business,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for
Local Self-Reliance, August 22, 2012, http://www.muninetworks.org/content/tacomas-click-introduces-100-mbps-centurylink-lies-steal-click-
business, accessed September 2013.
47
RanierConnect, http://www.rainierconnect.com, accessed September 2013.
48
christopher, “Schrier Stays in Seattle, Fiber Network to Follow?,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local Self-Reliance, July 12,
2010, http://www.muninetworks.org/content/10-years-later-tacoma-and-lagrange, accessed September 2013.
49
Halverson, “Disbanded: No Broadband Utility for Seattle.”
50
christopher, “Schrier Stays in Seattle, Fiber Network to Follow?”
51
52
53
54
55
Conversation with Carrie Harding, sales and marketing manager at Click!, March 21, 2014. According to Harding, the businesses community’s
dramatic response to the introduction of Click! in 1998 was partly because Click!’s 15- to 30-day wait for a new telephone line was a dramatic
improvement over the 12- to 18-month wait with the incumbent telephone provider.

27
Since then, SOTA students have provided music, artwork, and short films as content for Click!’s local on-
demand channel, and an adaption of Click!’s logo for its anniversary year. Click! benefited by getting
“exclusive, creative, local content to meet their business and marketing needs.” SOTA students gained
valuable experience working with clients and exposure to a much wider audience.56
Summary and Lessons Learned in Tacoma
Tacoma’s Click! is a wholesale provider for internet and a retail provider for cable. Click!’s presence has
led to faster and cheaper broadband for city residents and attracted new companies to the city. In
addition, Click! has provided direct savings to the city from being its own internet service provider, and
offered benefit to the community through its partnership with the School of the Arts.
Contact Information
Click!: 253-502-8900 or 1-800-752-6745
Tacoma Public Utilities253-502-8606
Commercial Customer Service: comsvcs@cityoftacoma.org
Chris Gleason, Community & Media Services Manager: 253-502-8222
Nora Doyle, Community Relations Specialist: 253-502- 8117
Burlington, VT
Burlington, VT (2012 population 42,282) offers broadband internet, telephone, and video to the
community via Burlington Telecom (BT).57
Burlington officials and activists had considered a community network long before they developed a
plan to build one. Dissatisfied with the services of the incumbent phone and cable companies, the local
public power company, Burlington Electric Department (BED), a initiated a public–private partnership
that was abandoned in 2001 when the private partner failed to fulfill its obligations. Burlington then
tapped Tim Nulty to build a city‐owned fiber-to‐the‐premises network. Nulty was a local with significant
experience, including stints as Chief Economist of the US Senate Commerce Committee and the US
House Energy and Commerce Committee, overseer for the World Bank’s telecom projects, and
telecommunications entrepreneur in Eastern Europe.58
By 2003, BT decreased city telecom expenses by replacing the leased broadband and voice lines of the
schools and city departments with city‐owned fiber. In 2006, BT began connecting its first residential
customers, quickly capturing 20 to 40 percent of subscribers in many neighborhoods. Lawsuits by hated
incumbent cable provider, Adelphia, did delay this milestone, costing BT money and preventing
adherence to its business plan. By August 2007, BT owed $33.5M to Citi Financial (Citi).59
During this time, Nulty was making agreements to expand service to nearby towns. The towns would
finance their fiber infrastructure and BT would provide the service. At this time, revenue covered
operations, but did not cover debt service or the capital costs of connecting new subscribers. When the
mayor ordered Nulty to cease plans to expand outside Burlington, he resigned.60
Consultants suggested that BT focus on commercial sales and marketing. Instead, BT focused on
upselling to existing customers. Due to the 2008 financial crisis, BT could not refinance its debt and
56
Mary Boone, “Tacoma’s Click! Forges Beneficial Partnership,” NATOA Journal, Spring 2009, 23–24.
57
Burlington Telecom, http://www.burlingtontelecom.net/, accessed September 2013.
58
Christopher Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom: Some Lessons for Community Networks,” Institute for Local Self-Reliance, August
2011, 2.
59
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 2–3, 10.
60
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 3.

28
became dependent on Burlington’s cash pool. To keep financial information out of the public eye, where
BT’s competitors could access it, the Board of Finance avoided discussing the financial difficulties with
the city council.61
By late 2009, it was public knowledge that BT had about $50M in debt ($33M to Citi and $17M to the
city). At this time, the administration requested approval for a $63M loan from Piper Jaffrey. The city
council declined the request and demanded an investigation.62
The investigation revealed that borrowing $17M from the City of Burlington for a period longer than 60
days violated BT’s Certificate of Public Good, the city charter, and Vermont state law. The investigation
also said that BT would not break even on its existing customer base. A consultant began to manage BT
and research ways to restructure the debt.63
Investigations by the state Department of Public Service and the FBI followed. However, the Chittenden
County prosecutor did not file charges due to uncertainty about meeting evidence burdens for trial.64
In early 2010, BT ceased making payments to Citi as required by the municipal lease agreement and
began to negotiate with Citi to amend the terms. When Burlington failed to appropriate funds for the
lease in FY 2011, the lease terminated. By cancelling the lease, BT no longer owed $33M to Citi.
However, BT also no longer had access to assets that allow it to operate a high-speed network. The
negative attention resulted in a decline in the number of subscribers.65
Around this time, BT increased its fees to Burlington. Whereas previously, it had charged Burlington the
amount it cost to provide service, Burlington Telecom increased charges to 90 percent of fair market
value.66
In 2012, faced with the prospect that BT could be sold to an out-of-state private owner, some Burlington
citizens began exploring options to turn the network into a for-profit cooperative. Keep BT Local collects
both equity and loan pledges.67
As of October 2013, according to their website, Keep BT Local had
received 51 percent of the $250K target for equity pledges and 68 percent of the target for loan pledges.
Members include individuals, families, and businesses. Keep BT Local aimed to meet its fundraising and
membership goals by February 2014.68
As of October 2013, BT’s website showed three high-speed internet plans for residents:
 40 mb for $84.99/month with 12 month commitment or $100/month with no commitment
 100 mb for $109.99/month with 12 month commitment or $149.99/month with no
commitment
 1 gb for $144.99/month with a 12 month commitment or $199.99/month with no
commitment69
In addition, BT offers other bundled and unbundled options for residents to customize service to their
needs, including a significantly reduced price ($9.99 or $19.99/month) for families with at least one child
in free or reduced-cost lunch programs.70
61
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 3–4.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
65
66
67
lgonzalez, “Burlington Telecom Coop Effort Moving Ahead,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local Self-Reliance, March 18,
2013, http://www.muninetworks.org/content/burlington-sells-burlington-telecom-continues-operate-network, accessed October 2013.
68
Keep BT Local, http://www.keepbtlocal.com/, accessed October 2013.
69
Burlington Telecom, http://www.burlingtontelecom.net/, accessed October 2013.

29
BT also offers bundled packages geared to the needs of business customers and landlords who want to
install broadband in their rental properties. Landlords with at least four properties pay a reduced rate
for service. However, they can charge tenants the regular rate and earn a profit by offering the service.71
Burlington Telecom also offers free wifi at hotspots throughout the city, local customer service and
technical support, a 2-hour installation window, and PC repair and service for residential and small
business customers.72
As of November 2014, Burlington had reached an agreement with Citi to resolve the bank’s $33M
lawsuit. Burlington and its law firm codefendant agreed to pay Citi $10.5M and a share of BT’s future
value. Burlington will pay its obligations using BT revenues, net cash flow, insurance, and bridge
financing from Blue Water LLC, a local firm that bought network for $6M. In return, Burlington agreed to
pay $560K annually for five years to lease the network. After five years, the City and Blue Water hope to
find a buyer for the network.73
Ideally, the future sale of the network will allow Blue Water to recoup its
investment and Burlington to pay its debt to Citi.
Summary and Lessons Learned in Burlington:
Burlington Telecom follows a retail model, providing direct service to the residents and businesses.
Despite numerous challenges, BT has positive attributes and offers many benefits to Burlington.
 Superior network: Because each subscriber has its own fiber strand to the distribution hub, the
head end can support 100,000 users—five times as many as it would serve if every Burlington
household subscribed.74
Therefore, BT has extra capacity and the ability to earn outside revenue.
 Revenue contribution to Burlington via payments in lieu of taxes: BT’s PILOT for 2008 to 2010
($837K) exceeded the total amount paid by Comcast and FairPoint ($298K), the private-sector
internet service providers.75
 Direct cost savings: Burlington spent approximately $1.5M less on telecommunications because
BT did not mark up the price of its services.
 Indirect savings to residents and businesses: BT’s entry into the broadband and cable markets
lowered costs for subscribers as the incumbents decreased prices to remain competitive.
 Multiplier effect: Because money earned by BT is spent locally, it circulates through the local
economy, benefiting more individuals and the city as a whole.
 Improved customer service helped businesses avoid problems with their internet: BT made a
commitment to Burlington. It hired locals who cared about the service they provided to their
neighbors. BT treated Burlington’s businesses as partners rather than customers.76
 Innovation: BT’s program for multi-property owners offers landlords a chance to earn more
money from their rental properties and helps to expand BT’s subscriber base. It also offers other
ancillary services like PC repair.
Importantly, other municipalities can learn many lessons from BT’s experience.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
lgonzalez, “Burlington Sells Burlington Telecom, Continues to Operate the Network,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local
Self-Reliance, December 9, 2014, http://muninetworks.org/content/burlington-sells-burlington-telecom-continues-operate-network.
74
75
Ibid.
76

30
 Define goals: Will the network serve residential or business customers or both? Serving
residents allows the network to compete against fewer incumbents than it does for commercial
clients. Once successful with residents, networks can pursue business customers.77
 Define success: Because community networks exist to promote the public good, these do not
have to earn a profit. New jobs generated and costs avoided are part of the public good.
However, these networks must meet costs and repay debts, so breaking even is important.
 Governance structure should insulate the network from daily local politics: BT’s head reported
to the clerk-treasurer, who reported to the mayor. This hindered BT officials from running the
organization. Typically, a separate public power utility oversees a community network.78
 Community networks need some relief from ordinary procurement and personnel policies: The
need to create a civil service position for a commission salesperson and obtain approval of the
position’s salary hurt BT’s ability to be entrepreneurial.79
 Be transparent: To keep information from incumbents, the administration did not share with the
city council, which was ill‐equipped to evaluate anything shared by the mayor.80
Due to public
records laws, incumbents had access to the information; the lax oversight allowed BT to
accumulate debt and violate state and local laws.
 Price service to cover operating costs and debt service: Rather than charge rates that covered
only costs, BT could have charged the City of Burlington slightly above cost. Likewise, although
customers decry promotional pricing, they respond to it. To provide transparency, BT did not
offer promotional pricing, unlike the incumbents, to its detriment.81
 Avoid over or understaffing to meet service and cash flow objectives.
 Use professional marketers and utilize local support: The first 20 to 40 percent of subscribers
switch to a municipal network because they hate incumbents and love the idea of a local option.
Attracting more customers requires creating a brand and selling the benefits of a local provider.
Great campaigns involve locals who love the network and understand its benefits as shown by
Keep BT Local’s efforts to prevent sale to an out-of-state firm.82
Responding to incumbents’
marketing requires revisiting strategy monthly or quarterly rather than annually.83
 Have a strong collections plan to deal with delinquent payers: In areas of high churn (e.g. college
campuses), many customers disappear without paying the bill.84
Contact Information
marketing@burlingtontelecom.net
802-540-0007 or 802-540-0000
Chattanooga, TN
In Chattanooga, TN (estimated 2013 population 171,279), Electric Power Board Fiber Optics, known as
EPB, offers electricity, phone, internet, video, fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP), and co-location services to
approximately 170,000 subscribers in the city of Chattanooga, nine Tennessee municipalities, and two
77
78
79
Ibid.
80
81
82
83
84

31
Georgia municipalities in a 600-square mile area.85
Project funding for the roughly $300M project
included a $111M stimulus grant and $200M in bond money.86,87,88
EPB originally offered electricity and later added fiber to connect its substations. The smart grid allows
EPB to reroute power instantly during storms, remotely start/end service at a location, send a precise
amount of voltage to a distribution line, and limit truck runs to locations experiencing a power outage.89
In pursuit of economic development goals, EPB originally tried to collaborate with the private sector to
expand fiber to homes and businesses. Because the return on investment was insufficient to entice
firms, EPB decided to offer phone, then internet, and finally FTTP without the telecoms’ involvement.90
In 2012, EPB offered maximum speeds of 1 gbps upload/download for $34.99 per month.91
As of
February 2014, EPB was advertising 1 gbps service at $70 per month on its website.92
Thanks to the expansion of EPB’s fiber network, Chattanooga and the surrounding area have
experienced significant economic and social benefits. By 2006, researchers estimated the value of EPB’s
network to Hamilton County as follows:
 Economic benefits (2006 dollars): $352.4M
 Social benefits (2006 dollars): $252.5M93
After deducting $167.1M in capital costs (2006 dollars), the net incremental value of the network was
$437.8M and an additional 2,638 jobs.94
Furthermore, the network has helped Chattanooga to attract
venture capital, which has grown from close to zero in 2009 to more than five organized funds with
more than $50M in investable capital in 2014.95
EPB and its partners in the FTTP project, the City of Chattanooga and the Lyndhurst Foundation, faced
significant challenges from incumbent providers. Tennessee’s cable industry trade group and Comcast
sued several times to delay the project. Comcast also aired 2,600 TV ads and created a website urging
citizens to ask their elected officials to vote against the plan. Instead, the Tennessee legislature passed
laws specifically allowing municipal electric companies to offer telecom services and laws allowing the
electricity division to loan money to the newly formed telecom division. These were the opposite of laws
passed in other states to limit the ability of public utilities to expand into telecommunications.96
As of June 2014, Tennessee law prohibited adjoining communities, some of which have no broadband
service, from joining Chattanooga’s network.97
85
Christopher Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light,” Institute for Local Self-Reliance, April 2012, http://ilsr.org/broadband-speed-light/.
86
James O’Toole, “Chattanooga’s super-fast publicly owned Internet,” CNN Money, May 20, 2014,
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/20/technology/innovation/chattanooga-internet/index.html?hpt=hp_t3.
87
Ian Hoppe, “Municipal priorities: Let’s talk about a fiber-optic network in Birmingham: opinion,” AL.com, August 30, 2014,
http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/08/municipal_priorities_lets_talk_1.html, accessed September 2, 2014.
88
Steven D, “Fastest Internet in US? It’s Chattanooga, TN, Thanks to Local and Fed $$$ (Ps. Big Cable Very Angry),” Daily Kos, August 30, 2014,
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/08/30/1325887/-Fastest-Internet-in-US-It-s-Chattanooga-TN-Thanks-to-Local-and-Fed-Ps-Big-Cable-Very-
Angry?detail=email.
89
Christopher Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light,” Institute for Local Self-Reliance, April 2012, http://ilsr.org/broadband-speed-light/.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
EPB, https://epbfi.com/gigsupport/, accessed February 2014.
93
Bento J. Lobo, PhD, Andy Novobilski, PhD, Soumen Ghosh, PhD, “The Impact of Broadband in Hamilton County, TN,” March 20, 2006, iii.
94
Ibid.
95
Steven D, “Fastest Internet in US? It’s Chattanooga, TN, Thanks to Local and Fed $$$ (Ps. Big Cable Very Angry),” Daily Kos, August 30, 2014,
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/08/30/1325887/-Fastest-Internet-in-US-It-s-Chattanooga-TN-Thanks-to-Local-and-Fed-Ps-Big-Cable-Very-
Angry?detail=email.
96
Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light.”
97
Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman, Official FCC Blog, June 10, 2014, http://www.fcc.gov/blog/removing-barriers-competitive-community-
broadband, accessed June 11, 2014.

32
Summary and Lessons Learned in Chattanooga
EPB follows a retail model, providing direct service to the residents and businesses.
 EPB made strategic decisions that contributed to its success. First, EPB Telecom & Broadband
operated as separate company to learn the technology and business aspects of the
telecommunications industry. EPB later applied lessons learned from its telecommunications
work to improve operations in other business units providing different services.98
 When expanding to a new area, EPB offered services first to businesses (which cluster in specific
areas) to cut costs and then expanded to serve residences. Therefore, EPB collected revenue
from higher-paying business customers to use to connect remaining customers.99
 EPB developed a strategy to build support for the project. Staff identified 23 business and
government leaders and scheduled the first meeting with the person most likely to oppose the
project. Staff also educated the EPB Board and discussed the project with the public during a
year-long community engagement process. EPB also described the worst-case scenario in terms
easily understandable to the public. They explained that if EPB wasted every penny borrowed,
approximately $200M,100
the average ratepayer would see a $2 to $3 per month increase. This
explanation helped residents accurately assess the risk involved with the project.101
 EPB supplies customers with yard signs saying “We’ve got the power! EPB Fiber‐Optics.” This
decision wisely includes customers in the marketing strategy.102
Direct benefits of the project include:
o $300M savings from reduced outages during the first 10 years of smart grid operations;
o Increased coverage in site-selection magazines;
o 2,600 new jobs and $350M in increased tax receipts from new employment now that
only Hong Kong’s network can match Chattanooga’s internet speed (talent,
entrepreneurs, and investors nationwide flock to Chattanooga rather than Seattle, San
Francisco, or New York where it may be costlier to launch a business);103,104
and
o Comcast’s $15M investment to provide Chattanooga with Xfinity video-on-demand and
internet, resulting in the unexpected consequence that a municipal fiber network has
spurred improvement of the competing private-sector options.105
Contact Information
423-648-1EPB (1372)
98
99
Ibid.
100
Charles M. Davidson and Michael J. Santorelli, “Head of the Class: Broadband in the United States,” (presentation at New York Law School’s
Advanced Communications Law & Policy Institute, Spring Forum, May 3, 2013), 9,
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/standcomm/scenvir/santorelli_may3.pdf.
101
102
103
104
“Broadband Drives Economic Development,” EfficientGov, February 18, 2014, http://efficientgov.com/blog/2014/02/18/broadband-drives-
economic-development/.
105

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