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History & Memory:
The Perpetual View
By Jake Steckel

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Most serious historians have, at one point or another, considered the role of memory in
their discipline. Memory is, after all, a subjective abstraction which constantly imposes itself on
the events of the world, in any time or place. When analysing the recorded history of various
human societies, memory is clearly a substance through which any relevant account of a given
period must be constructed. This conflict between reliability and purpose is one which remains
unresolved in a meaningful way. Of course, remembrance is an issue within contemporary
society as well, with regard to facing the past and its consequences; the depth of its role in
history and social development runs further than many realize. Through the burgeoning field of
memory studies, however, the challenges of recollection and history are being dealt with in new
and interesting ways. Indeed, by bringing together several key figures of memory theory, one can
trace the modes in which various forms of remembrance not only fuel cultural­social
development, but also shape the way history progresses according to their use. Upon noticing
this large­scale development, it becomes clear that not only are memory and history compatible;
despite their apparent conflicts, they are inseparable.
Memory study is a relatively young discipline which find its roots in the humanities and
social sciences, particularly history and sociology. Simply put, it primarily depends on ​collective
memory​, as defined by Maurice Halbwachs, and ​cultural memory​, as perceived by Jan Assmann. 1
The former concept, though rooted in earlier thought and observation, was the first formal
labeling of the process through which people form a locus of group identity by way of
remembering the past. In fact, the level of analysis to which Halbwachs holds memory, and
1
​Wulf Kansteiner (2002). “Finding Meaning In Memory: A Methodological Critique of Memory.” ​History and Theory, 42 (2)​,
181­182.

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personal relations with it, is profound in its own right. In his seminal work, ​On Collective
Memory​, he begins with the statement,
“We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives… Through them, as by a perpetual
relationship, our sense of identity is perpetuated.” 2
This notion is further explored by observing the consequence of personal memory in
“reconstructing the past.” This implies that people’s relationships within groups arise from their
memories as they exist in said social structures. The web of connections provides both a point of
origin and a pressure to create more imprints on the society in which the individual occupies a
place. This requires people to re­form memories, conceived within and connected to the milieu,
in order to contextualize their social environment and play an active role in everyday life. This is
how memory becomes collective.
However, a question arises from this when Halbwachs asks,
“Is it not strange then that society causes the mind to transfigure the past to the
point of yearning for it?” 3
Because some individuals instinctively retreats into memories of the past in order to escape the
society of physical life, this presents a challenge in what memories come to represent. It is
especially important not to make the mistake of viewing the “collective” as a simple collection of
singular memories; Halbwachs does not mean to examine memory as just individual strands in a
larger body, but the larger body of memory and how people exist within it. Furthermore, 4
Halbwachs makes the claim that, while collectives are inseparable, each has its own specific
memories and therefore a totality of collectives is not seen on some grand scale. Thus one
2
​Maurice Halbwachs (1992). ​On Collective Memory​. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 47.
3
​Halbwachs, 51.
4
​Kansteiner, 186.

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identity is differentiated from another based on its adherence to a specific set of values, one
having “us” qualities, and all others existing as “them.” The conclusion seems to be that, because
of the dual pressure of society to generate memory and the resultant instinct to retreat into it,
memory is given a level of sanctity in the mind of the individuals which make up society.
Therefore, memory becomes something which is both more important than, and preferable to,
events in everyday life.
Jan Assmann takes this theory and drives it further, seeing it as only going half­way when
stopped at what he calls ​communicative memory​. This is differentiated from the concept of 5
cultural memory​, which develops from collective memory to transcend the everyday and turn
into crystallized long­term culture. Communicative memory, Assmann says, is transmitted
through common transactions of knowledge, mainly oral tradition; these modes of contact are
precisely the ways in which collective memory is seen by Halbwachs to be perpetuated within
societies. In addition, this dynamic is seen to be present mainly in an early stage of societal
development, before solid foundations for a fixed cultural base are formed. Despite its
importance in the social dynamic previously described, this form of memory preservation is
presented as having a shelf life of no more than one­hundred years. This means that, ultimately,
the memories being shared in this way have very little longevity on their own. Assmann asserts
that only with the objectification of these memories, in the form of texts, rituals, monuments,
etc., does specific knowledge of remembrance find a solidified place in long term social
development. This process then leads to what is referred to as the “concretion of identity,” in 6
which a group or community develops familiarity with an objectified memory and it takes on
5
​Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka(1995). “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity.” ​New German Critique, 65, ​126.
6
​Assmann and Czaplicka, 128.

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cultural characteristics. Once it breaks the barrier of the socio­psychological realm and becomes
a tangible thing, the object retains the transcendent quality of memory while also being
interactive. The Polish poet, Czeslaw Milosz, beautifully articulated this effect when he noted,
“Even the most primeval tragedies of a people endure because they are given permanence
by proverbs, folk songs… and later they become the stuff of a nation’s literature.” 7
This inevitably leads the groups, which these traditions are a part of, to see the object as an
inspiration around which to unify and draw normative guidance from. Since the thing is a
product of the individual group members’ interactions with one another, the reinforcement of a
locus of identity forms strongly. Assmann notes Halbwachs’ silence surrounding this transition
and follows it, postulating that the concept of collective memory only goes so far as the
transference of short­term knowledge, before becoming history. While Assmann disagrees with
this assertion, cultural memory signifying the triumph of memory rather than its downfall in his
view, one cannot help but note that this transition also marks the ​beginning​ of history. As the
physical record of human events, with all the nuances that accompany such a thing, history can
be seen in this context as the very embodiment of memory in its most important form.
Accepting the connection laid out by Halbwachs and Assmann, it becomes necessary to
look at the progression of history in a broad sense, as the development of memory use in the
establishment of civilizations. Admittedly historicist in its approach, such a view might be
compared to the ​Geist​ of Hegel or the class­struggle of Marx, without the metaphysical
components which lend those authors’ philosophies a degree of spirituality. Given the massive
volume of historical sources, condensing is a necessary task in memory­based analysis of a
7
​Czeslaw Milosz (1968). ​Native Realm: A Search for Self Definition​. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc., 9.

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broader worldview; without oversimplifying, it can be broken down into several stages. Within
the context of memory, Pierre Nora provides a competent framework in which this can be done.
While he does not look at the psyche like Halbwachs, or employ the same intensity of analysis
that Assmann incorporates, Nora divides the progression of memory throughout history in three
phases: the pre­modern, the modern, and the post­modern. 8
While the pre­modern phase encompasses the early habits of societies, from the dawn of
cultural memory to its collapse in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the modern and
post­modern contain the breakdown of this dynamic, dealing more directly with why memory
issues are so prevalent in today’s global society. Nora establishes that “peasant culture” is the
basic root, again referring to the establishment of memory described earlier, of collective and
cultural memory. Because culture was established at the ground level, this peasant base 9
naturally held the majority of historical societies, and therefore assumed more fully the identities
of the objects into which they invested the legacy of their totality. Especially because such a
culture was immobile, and was rarely displaced barring some catastrophic event, the villages and
local communities not only interacted with their memories and culture. They were actually
environments of memory in and of themselves. It is only when the Industrial Revolution began to
escalate, Nora postulates, that these ways of preserving and utilizing cultural memory began to
fall apart. The mass migrations from rural localities to cities, and the development of newer
urban culture that lacked heritage or tradition, threatened the ability of the old order to survive. 10
It is this change which marks the transition from pre­modern to modern. The modern era of
8
​Kansteiner, 183.
9
​Pierre Nora (1989). “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire” ​Representations, 26, ​7.
10
​Nora, 14.

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memory crystallized as a result of the change in social organization and mobilization, following
the shift in socio­economic organization associated with industrial work and city living.
This caused a crisis among the various previous members of separate societies, operating
for the first time outside their cultural framework which had existed through hundreds if not
thousands of years. Out of such fundamental and dramatic shifts, nationalism became an
attractive option. Of course, in previous history, the concept of nationalism was all but absent,
and so narratives had to be established in order to lend credence to the ideology of “blood and
soil.” Distinction, with regard to neighboring regions which had previously developed ​very
different varieties of cultural memory, between other groups and the emerging idea of “ethnic”
and “culturally traditional” nationalism gave rise to a wave of nation­state establishment. This
trend, beginning in industrially developed areas such as France, Great Britain, and the United
States, took especially deep roots in the Italian peninsula and the remains of the Holy Roman
Empire in the nineteenth century. Acting as a basis on which multiple principalities and
kingdoms united under an invented solidarity, nationalism created a new society and communal
identity, which competed with the old for the heritage of its citizens. The “unifications” came on
the head of the ideologies which constructed their realization, particularly by emphasizing the
differences between societies and the insistence of superiority on the part of whoever the
audiences were within a certain area. In Eastern Europe, which was subject to imperial rule by its
Western neighbors, the fabrication of ethnic narratives also took root, albeit in a different way;
where other regions more or less developed nationalism as a response to massive shifts in
industrial and political contexts, in order to root the new social structure in an imitation of what
had been, Eastern Europeans came to use it as a tool through which the hegemony of powerful

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houses could be supplanted by so called “self­rule.” This was a primary cause of the First World
War, after which these projects resulted in the establishment of a patchwork of Slavic states.
While the trauma of the war deflated many of the tensions which nationalist ideology had
created, the re­emergence, and indeed the bolstering of such tensions, in the interwar period led
to another outburst of violence, with the rise of state fascism.
The final phase which Nora specifies, the post­modern, comes out of both the breakdown
of the base of original cultural memory and the resultant manipulation and fabrication of
memories as a means of political agenda. After the Second World War, with horrific atrocities 11
and sufferings having been enacted in the name of national (or in the case of the Soviet Union,
distinctly anti­national) ideology, the societies of the world began a gradual retreat from the
vogue of the nineteenth century. While the decolonization process saw nationalism rear its head
in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the so called “Third World,” this phase did not take on the same
characteristics, with industrialization having not occurred in these regions as heavily as it had in
the West. Instead, faced with the legacy of the break between society and its original
memory­based culture, the issue of how to go about reconciling the gaps between tradition and
civilization took priority; with regard to memorializing the Holocaust, this became especially
relevant. Technological innovations in the early twentieth century play a great role in every 12
way societies of the post­modern period dealt, and continue to deal, with this task; the
possibilities that cameras and recording devices presented shifted the context of memory forever.
Instead of needing to produce objects in which memories could find a totem, societies found
themselves with the previously unheard of ability to literally view the past at will. Instead of oral
11
​Nora, 15.
12
​Andreas Huyssen (2003). ​Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory​. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 14.

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traditions or iconography, tales of war and legends of heroism, people could simply access the
events themselves, directly, and then do with them as they wished. In today’s times, this is even
more applicable, and it is now clear that the original context in which cultural memory was
erected is no longer possible to return to, due to this series of fundamental changes.
So where do we go from here? Understanding the theoretical background, contextualized
in stages of origin and development, does not reconcile history and memory; if nothing else, one
finds apparent contradictions. Pierre Nora himself does not believe the two forces can be
reconciled, even going so far as to state that “ Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a
bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past.” While many, 13
including Assmann, would tend to agree with this statement, it is the main point of contention in
the disciplinary debate. History, I argue, is rather the accumulated character of progress, both
past and present, and the study of human events which have been its engine; memory is the fuel
which allows such progress to occur, with each new development building off what has been
achieved and memorialized in some form of societal enshrinement. This interpretation is
supported by other scholars, particularly in the form of what Amos Funkenstein labels ​historical
consciousness​; this is defined by him as “the degree of creative freedom in the use and
interpretation of the contents of collective memory.” Funkenstein gives the example of Hellenic 14
and early Jewish culture, as being informed by a perception of historic origins, by way of
literature and law. In a modern context, of course, one cannot explain the nation in the same way
these societies did; referring to a vague “mythic age” or scriptural fable will no longer suffice.
However, societies, particularly in the West, can trace their modern origins to the formation of
13
​Nora, 8.
14
​Amos Funkenstein (1989). “Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness.” ​History and Memory, 1 (1), ​11.

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the nation­state in a similar way. Do the national narratives, still in use throughout many
countries even today, not also take the shape of legend, obscured in artificial but grand tales that
have little actual basis? Funkenstein’s further example of Christianity’s need for both
differentiation and connection to Judaism, again, reflects this comparison; where the older Judaic
civilization had its concretion of identity in the shared emblem of the Old Testament, the
Christian development out of, but remaining connection to, this same tradition required linkage
in a superficial sense, despite being radically different. To follow the parallel to its conclusion, 15
the nation­state was the long awaited Messiah of ideological progression, and while it maintained
some connections to what came before, it fundamentally changed the basic structure of the
system which gave rise to it. So while historical consciousness is necessarily present, especially
in recognizing both the modernity and the artificiality of the modern nation as it pertains to
history and memory, it is even more so to separate ​historical memory​ from the discourse.
Despite its name, historical memory is more accurately described as a modern
manipulation of collective memory, through which use of educational institutions and
contemporary technology strive to make memory serve ideology. For example, many textbooks
present ‘history’ to students as though it were a linear narrative with a limited number of
interpretations, using selective primary source documents to further the goals of administrators
and block out alternative memories which exist in separate societies. In the United States this
phenomenon is especially prevalent, with primary school curriculum rarely touching on the
complex issues of Native American perspectives, the plight of minorities throughout the
expansion Westward, or the most basic mentions of the global South in the context of world
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​Funkenstein, 14.

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history. Instead, what is offered is selective use of individual memories in an attempt to engineer
the collective base on which younger generations construct their locus of national and cultural
identity. Edward Said takes note of the United States’ use of such selectivity at large when he
mentions the public controversy over an exhibit depicting the forced resettlement of Native
Americans in the 1860s, at the National Gallery of American Art; as Said notes, “Senator Ted
Stevens of Alaska decried the whole thing as an attack on America, even though he avowed that
he himself had not seen the exhibit.” This sort of attitude is emblematic of the overall result of 16
‘historical’ memory: a chauvinistic adherence to dogma, which welcomes neither those opinions
which challenge its supremacy, nor those that exist outside its boundaries. The National
Socialists made tremendously effective use of this tactic in the 1930s, with their presentation of
European history being deliberately exaggerated, even outright falsified, in order to instill a blind
belief in the “Herrenvolk” and absolute obedience to the German state. In both of these
examples, one cannot help note the nationalist character which drives the production of historical
memory; this is an integral aspect of why such memory exists to begin with. In this way, history
is definitely opposed to memory, as it does not seek anything but the fabrication of such in order
to lend itself legitimacy. This is simply not history.
The distinction between historical consciousness and historical memory is important,
because it helps to separate the harmful illusion of national history from the legitimate
considerations of history as a partner of memory. The dogmas inherent in historical memory are
precisely what Nora describes: solely focused on the past, with little of what existed before it
supporting its claims without manipulation. History, as an academic discipline, instead seeks to
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​Edward Said (2000). “Invention, Memory, and Place.” ​Critical Inquiry, 26 (2)​, 176.

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reconcile what has been with what is, in order to affect the present and the future. For example,
the vast majority of human societies, pre­eighteenth century, had very little in the way of
national considerations; Funkenstein notes this with Hellenic culture specifically, in how the
ancient Greeks, while taking pride in the ​polis​, did not consider “Greekness” to be a point of
pride. Were this the case, the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta need never have 17
occurred. The best example from the ancient world, however, lies in ancient Rome. This was a
society that frequently appropriated the cultures of the societies it conquered; from Egypt to
Pontus to Transalpine Gaul, religious traditions and former ‘barbarians’ were assimilated
regularly with each conquest, to create a melting pot of “Roman” identity. Indeed, the modern
nationalities of the emperors themselves, today, would vary from Spanish to Syrian to North
African. While the state identity was of the utmost importance, additional factors were minimally
important and virtually anyone could become Roman by receiving citizenship. The
Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania, as well as the Holy Roman Empire, also reflected
similar tendencies, often choosing what nationalists would consider “foreigners” to assume
higher political roles; with the latter example, even with the attached title of “King of the
Germans,” there were several French and Spanish emperors. The most important factor was,
rather, the shared legacies, be they of Christendom or state, as they pertained to similar memories
and the icons which put them all together.
But of course it would defeat the purpose of a discussion regarding history and memory
working together in the present, to talk solely about how they did this in the past. Returning to
the modern example of the Holocaust and its influence over memory today, there are several
17
​Funkenstein, 11.

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sites which present different ways in which remembrance still plays an important, if quite
different, role. As previously mentioned, the advent of advanced technology has allowed people
to fix memories in still or moving images, and to share these with incredible access and speed.
The result of this has been a constant stream of these images flickering in and out of the average
person’s view on a regular basis. While the ability to share information has brought the world
closer together, the collective attention span has decreased as a result; issues of importance, sites
of tragedy or horror, are trivialized amidst memes and news which eclipse mentions of the past
for all but those who seek it out. In Berlin, the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, for
example, is an imposing memorial, taking up a decent part of the city center’s real estate with
large stone columns which represent the lives of Jews lost at the hands of Nazism. Despite the
importance of the memory it represents, and the size of the monument itself, more often than not
tourists treat the area as a playground, running around the columns and climbing over them
rather than contemplating what they signify. The Panerai forest, a site of mass execution during
the Second World War, is hardly visited, even by people who live nearby and know what
occurred there. While there are initiatives which seek to revitalize this area as a place of memory,
an emblem of Europe’s darker recent past, the simple and sad fact is that few care enough to
participate in the interaction that once made cultural memory such a fixture in human society.
This modern apathy, the child of trauma from nationalist movements, and
closed­mindedness on the still­existing remnants of historical memory, is precisely what is
wrong with modern history ​and​ memory. This mix, the result of relatively recent events, opposes
both, and makes them all the more natural allies in the pursuit of instilling understanding of the
past, bringing people together through it so that they can identify with the culture they call their

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own. So what can be done to address this? Again, Milosz helps us to see the root of the problem
when he states, “How much the accident of our birthplace can separate us from the set of
opinions held elsewhere.” It is the emphasis on national boundaries and nationalities that keep 18
us apart; while collective and cultural memory vary from region to region, it is clear that the
present gulfs are not a result of their doing.
Therefore, it is necessary to undo the damage wrought by ideology on memory. This
must be achieved through the gradual breakdown of identities rooted in the harmful soil of
nationalism and historical ideology. In so doing, history itself may be seen with new eyes, and
the veil can be lifted from the splendor and folly of real human events. To take this story in is, in
turn, to engage it and remember. Ultimately, through touching the past and tapping into the
collected memories of ourselves and our neighbors, we might be able to, once again, reconcile
the past with our connection to it.
18
​Milosz, 9.

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Bibliography
Assmann, Jan and Czaplicka, John (1995). “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity.” ​New
German Critique, 65,
pp. 125­133.
Funkenstein, Amos (1989). “Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness.” ​History and
Memory, 1 (1), ​pp. 5­26.
Halbwach, Maurice (1992). ​On Collective Memory​. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
pp. 46­54.
Huyssen, Andreas (2003). ​Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory​.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Kansteiner, Wulf (2002). “Finding Meaning In Memory: A Methodological Critique of Memory
Studies.” ​History and Theory, 41 (2)​, pp. 179­197.
Milosz, Czeslaw (1968). ​Native Realm: A Search for Self­Definition​. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday & Company Inc, pp. 6­35.
Nora, Pierre (1989). “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire.” ​Representations,
26, Special Issue: Memory and Counter­memory, ​pp. 7­24.
Said, Edward W (2000). “Invention, Memory, and Place.” ​Critical Inquiry, 26 (2)​, pp. 175­
192.