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The Syrian Civil War:
The Campaign for Homs and Aleppo
by Isabel Nassief
March 2014
Institute for the Study of War
Title
• The Assad regime’s military position is stronger as of January 2014 than it was
a year ago.
• The Syrian regime has benefited from Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia and from
the formalization of pro-regime militias under the National Defense Forces.
• The opposition has held the conflict in deadlock, conducting multiple,
sometimes competing campaigns of their own against the regime.
• The government offensive at al-Qusayr in April 2013 highlights the regime’s
strategy to defeat the opposition by isolating rebel systems from their supply
lines, attacking by fire, then clearing and holding terrain.
• In 2014 the regime has the ability to wage campaigns on multiple fronts
nearly simultaneously or in quick succession. This capacity is first and
foremost the result of additional manpower from Hezbollah and National
Defense Forces.
• Despite the regime’s apparent resurgence and the opposition’s enduring
challenges, the Assad Regime is not winning the Syrian civil war, and it does
not have the strength to win decisively in 2014.
Read More
Title
In the spring of 2013 the regime
lacked the necessary manpower to
conduct simultaneous operations on
multiple fronts against rebel groups
that were quickly making gains
throughout the north, south, and
Damascus countryside. The Syrian
Arab Army (SAA) had sustained more
losses than it could replenish. It relied
on air assets to resupply besieged
troops in its Aleppo and Idlib outposts
because it lacked overland logistical
lines connecting those outposts. The
regime had contracted its military
footprint to Damascus and Homs in
order to its secure supply lines while
rebels contested Homs, the lynchpin
of the regime’s logistics system that
connected Damascus to Aleppo and to
the coast.
Title
Beginning with the al-Qusayr
offensive in 2013, the regime
demonstrated the capacity
to overcome its manpower
deficit and inability to fight
simultaneously on multiple
fronts. It also illustrated the
regime’s strategy to defeat
the opposition by isolating
rebel systems from their
supply lines, attacking by fire,
then clearing and holding
terrain. The government
offensive at al-Qusayr in April
2013 highlights these
principal characteristics of
the regime’s new campaign
with the clear orientation of
regime assets to support a
decisive battle at al-Qusayr.
Title
Rebel systems emerged around distinct
supply hubs, allowing these systems to
operate with a degree of independence from
one another. Therefore, the regime’s
targeting of rebel system at al-Qusayr
relieved pressure on the regime’s central
corridor, but it did not defeat the opposition.
Title
Rebel groups have
developed a number of
robust support zones
due to access to a
variety of supply lines,
primarily passing
through the Turkish
border. These groups
tend to fight for
localized objectives.
Title
Homs and its environs form
a crucial logistical choke
point for the regime,
providing access to the
coastal cities of Tartus and
Latakia
Title
In the days before the fall of
al-Qusayr, reports indicated
that pro-regime forces had
begun a swift advance towards
Aleppo in lieu of regime force
consolidation in positions
surrounding al-Qusayr. The
regime had decided to move
forces from Homs to
Aleppo without consolidating
its gains after the fall of al-
Qusayr for one of two reasons:
either the situation in Aleppo
(due to rebel activity,
geopolitical considerations, or
a combination of the two)
compelled the regime shift its
focus or, buoyed by
Hezbollah’s decisive entry into
the war, the regime chose to
pursue an operational
objective of fighting on two
fronts. Regardless, the
regime’s return to Homs in late
June demonstrates its inability
to launch sequential
campaigns without
operational pause in the
summer of 2013.
Title
Through the end of 2013, airstrikes and
bombardments have continued in Homs city
with no major gains by either side. The
regime continues to besiege the remaining
rebel-held neighborhoods in Homs, using its
siege and starve tactic to defeat rebels
within the city and neutralize their ability to
mobilize. Denying the rebels access to al
Qusayr and Tal Kalakh and separating their
area of control in Homs’ Old City had
effectively disrupted rebels’ ability to launch
large operations in Homs province.
Title
Complementing its tactical proficiency,
throughout the summer ISIS established
areas of control in key terrain in northern
and eastern Syria along the Turkish border,
with a significant presence in towns such
as Atmeh, al-Bab, Azaz, Manbij, and
Jarablus. ISIS’s aggressive encroachment
of border areas throughout 2013 affected
the support zones of rebel systems
throughout Idlib and Aleppo by disrupting
their supply routes in many cases.
Title
In August 2013, the regime’s attention shifted largely to Damascus as rebels pressed their gains in the capital city. At the same
time, rebel groups attempted to open a new front in “Operation Liberation of the Coast” targeting rural towns in Jebel al-Akrad
near Latakia. Within two days regime forces launched counteroffensives and claimed to recapture a number of these villages,
and by August 18th the regime made a major advance and claimed to have retaken all rebel positions in northern Latakia.
Despite an apparent military defeat, the initial rebel success in Latakia demonstrated the increasing capacity and strength of
Salafi and Salafi-jihadist groups in Syria relative to the FSA and many SMC-affiliated opposition groups.
Title
In late September the
regime launched an
offensive to isolate then
destroy rebel positions in the
south-eastern countryside in
order to secure the alternate
Hama-Aleppo supply route
which had been disrupted by
rebel fighters. Soon after the
fall of as-Safira Col. Akidi, the
Supreme Military Council’s
top leader in Aleppo and the
head of the FSA-affiliated
Safira Operations Room
issued a scathing video
statement in which he
accused the National
Coalition of failing to support
his command adequately
and blamed a number of
rebel groups for seeking to
hold captured territory
rather than coming to
defend as-Safira itself
Title
After the fall of Safira, the regime
escalated its operations in Aleppo
city concentrating its efforts on
seizing Base 80 and securing the
road between as-Safira and
Nayrab Airbase. The regime’s
second focal point was the
villages of Tal Aran and Tal Hassel
located on the road between as-
Safira and Nayrab airbase.
Title
In mid-December 2013 the
regime began a barrel
bombing campaign which
targeted the civilian
population of Aleppo
following the regime’s
stalled effort to advance
into Aleppo city. The
regime used barrel bombs
in order to clear the city
without committing large
numbers of ground troops,
a tactic seen repeatedly
since 2012 as regime
forces tried to regain city
centers. The December
barrel bombing campaign
further highlights the
regime’s strategic changes
as it not only targeted the
city center but also towns
in key rebel support zones
throughout Aleppo such as
Manbij, Daret Izza, and
Anandan
Title
Straddling Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley to
the west, the Qalamoun area lies on
Syria’s strategic central corridor
connecting Damascus to Homs. Like al-
Qusayr, the towns in the rugged and
mountainous terrain of Qalamoun are
crucial to both rebel and regime
interests. For the regime, Qalamoun
connects the capital to Assad’s coastal
strongholds in Tartous and Latakia.
Qalamoun also provides the rebels with
cross-border access to supplies from
Lebanon.
Title
The rebel-supportive town of
Arsal, Lebanon, serves as a
safe haven and acts as a
launching point from which to
attack regime positions on
the northern outskirts of
Damascus. Rebel groups have
operated with relative
impunity in the towns scatted
throughout the Qalamoun
Mountains since the middle
of 2012
Title
The Qalamoun offensive began in earnest on November 15, 2013, when the regime intensified its pursuit of its objective of
severing rebel logistics by concentrating bombardments, which had occurred in the Qalamoun region throughout the summer,
on the town of Qara. In the first half of December, the regime seized control of an-Nabek and much of Yabroud and has
continued heavy shelling throughout Qalamoun particularly on the towns of Deir Attiyeh, an-Nabek, and Yabroud. In response,
rebels brought the fight closer to northern Damascus suburb of Adra where most of the fighting has continued through January
2014.
Title
The regime in 2014 has the ability to fight on multiple fronts nearly simultaneously or in quick succession, and for the first time in the war it
is not limited to fighting on one front at a time. This capacity is first and foremost the result of additional manpower from Hezbollah and
National Defense Forces. In addition, the specialized light infantry capabilities that Hezbollah has brought have greatly mitigated the
weaknesses of the Syrian Arab Army, which relied heavily on artillery and armor rather than infantry throughout 2012. Furthermore,
Hezbollah and Iran have added improved advisory efforts that mitigate command and control difficulties, not just in the integration of the
new forces but throughout the SAA as a whole. In addition, the regime has gained the ability to design as well as execute multiple, sequential
and simultaneous operations, aided perhaps by the increase in reliable command and control elements including advisors.
Title
For more, visit understandingwar.org.
For more, visit
www.understandingwar.org
@TheStudyofWar www.facebook.com/InstituteForTheStudyofWar

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The Syrian Civil War: The Campaign for Homs and Aleppo

  • 1. The Syrian Civil War: The Campaign for Homs and Aleppo by Isabel Nassief March 2014 Institute for the Study of War
  • 2. Title • The Assad regime’s military position is stronger as of January 2014 than it was a year ago. • The Syrian regime has benefited from Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia and from the formalization of pro-regime militias under the National Defense Forces. • The opposition has held the conflict in deadlock, conducting multiple, sometimes competing campaigns of their own against the regime. • The government offensive at al-Qusayr in April 2013 highlights the regime’s strategy to defeat the opposition by isolating rebel systems from their supply lines, attacking by fire, then clearing and holding terrain. • In 2014 the regime has the ability to wage campaigns on multiple fronts nearly simultaneously or in quick succession. This capacity is first and foremost the result of additional manpower from Hezbollah and National Defense Forces. • Despite the regime’s apparent resurgence and the opposition’s enduring challenges, the Assad Regime is not winning the Syrian civil war, and it does not have the strength to win decisively in 2014. Read More
  • 3. Title In the spring of 2013 the regime lacked the necessary manpower to conduct simultaneous operations on multiple fronts against rebel groups that were quickly making gains throughout the north, south, and Damascus countryside. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had sustained more losses than it could replenish. It relied on air assets to resupply besieged troops in its Aleppo and Idlib outposts because it lacked overland logistical lines connecting those outposts. The regime had contracted its military footprint to Damascus and Homs in order to its secure supply lines while rebels contested Homs, the lynchpin of the regime’s logistics system that connected Damascus to Aleppo and to the coast.
  • 4. Title Beginning with the al-Qusayr offensive in 2013, the regime demonstrated the capacity to overcome its manpower deficit and inability to fight simultaneously on multiple fronts. It also illustrated the regime’s strategy to defeat the opposition by isolating rebel systems from their supply lines, attacking by fire, then clearing and holding terrain. The government offensive at al-Qusayr in April 2013 highlights these principal characteristics of the regime’s new campaign with the clear orientation of regime assets to support a decisive battle at al-Qusayr.
  • 5. Title Rebel systems emerged around distinct supply hubs, allowing these systems to operate with a degree of independence from one another. Therefore, the regime’s targeting of rebel system at al-Qusayr relieved pressure on the regime’s central corridor, but it did not defeat the opposition.
  • 6. Title Rebel groups have developed a number of robust support zones due to access to a variety of supply lines, primarily passing through the Turkish border. These groups tend to fight for localized objectives.
  • 7. Title Homs and its environs form a crucial logistical choke point for the regime, providing access to the coastal cities of Tartus and Latakia
  • 8. Title In the days before the fall of al-Qusayr, reports indicated that pro-regime forces had begun a swift advance towards Aleppo in lieu of regime force consolidation in positions surrounding al-Qusayr. The regime had decided to move forces from Homs to Aleppo without consolidating its gains after the fall of al- Qusayr for one of two reasons: either the situation in Aleppo (due to rebel activity, geopolitical considerations, or a combination of the two) compelled the regime shift its focus or, buoyed by Hezbollah’s decisive entry into the war, the regime chose to pursue an operational objective of fighting on two fronts. Regardless, the regime’s return to Homs in late June demonstrates its inability to launch sequential campaigns without operational pause in the summer of 2013.
  • 9. Title Through the end of 2013, airstrikes and bombardments have continued in Homs city with no major gains by either side. The regime continues to besiege the remaining rebel-held neighborhoods in Homs, using its siege and starve tactic to defeat rebels within the city and neutralize their ability to mobilize. Denying the rebels access to al Qusayr and Tal Kalakh and separating their area of control in Homs’ Old City had effectively disrupted rebels’ ability to launch large operations in Homs province.
  • 10. Title Complementing its tactical proficiency, throughout the summer ISIS established areas of control in key terrain in northern and eastern Syria along the Turkish border, with a significant presence in towns such as Atmeh, al-Bab, Azaz, Manbij, and Jarablus. ISIS’s aggressive encroachment of border areas throughout 2013 affected the support zones of rebel systems throughout Idlib and Aleppo by disrupting their supply routes in many cases.
  • 11. Title In August 2013, the regime’s attention shifted largely to Damascus as rebels pressed their gains in the capital city. At the same time, rebel groups attempted to open a new front in “Operation Liberation of the Coast” targeting rural towns in Jebel al-Akrad near Latakia. Within two days regime forces launched counteroffensives and claimed to recapture a number of these villages, and by August 18th the regime made a major advance and claimed to have retaken all rebel positions in northern Latakia. Despite an apparent military defeat, the initial rebel success in Latakia demonstrated the increasing capacity and strength of Salafi and Salafi-jihadist groups in Syria relative to the FSA and many SMC-affiliated opposition groups.
  • 12. Title In late September the regime launched an offensive to isolate then destroy rebel positions in the south-eastern countryside in order to secure the alternate Hama-Aleppo supply route which had been disrupted by rebel fighters. Soon after the fall of as-Safira Col. Akidi, the Supreme Military Council’s top leader in Aleppo and the head of the FSA-affiliated Safira Operations Room issued a scathing video statement in which he accused the National Coalition of failing to support his command adequately and blamed a number of rebel groups for seeking to hold captured territory rather than coming to defend as-Safira itself
  • 13. Title After the fall of Safira, the regime escalated its operations in Aleppo city concentrating its efforts on seizing Base 80 and securing the road between as-Safira and Nayrab Airbase. The regime’s second focal point was the villages of Tal Aran and Tal Hassel located on the road between as- Safira and Nayrab airbase.
  • 14. Title In mid-December 2013 the regime began a barrel bombing campaign which targeted the civilian population of Aleppo following the regime’s stalled effort to advance into Aleppo city. The regime used barrel bombs in order to clear the city without committing large numbers of ground troops, a tactic seen repeatedly since 2012 as regime forces tried to regain city centers. The December barrel bombing campaign further highlights the regime’s strategic changes as it not only targeted the city center but also towns in key rebel support zones throughout Aleppo such as Manbij, Daret Izza, and Anandan
  • 15. Title Straddling Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley to the west, the Qalamoun area lies on Syria’s strategic central corridor connecting Damascus to Homs. Like al- Qusayr, the towns in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Qalamoun are crucial to both rebel and regime interests. For the regime, Qalamoun connects the capital to Assad’s coastal strongholds in Tartous and Latakia. Qalamoun also provides the rebels with cross-border access to supplies from Lebanon.
  • 16. Title The rebel-supportive town of Arsal, Lebanon, serves as a safe haven and acts as a launching point from which to attack regime positions on the northern outskirts of Damascus. Rebel groups have operated with relative impunity in the towns scatted throughout the Qalamoun Mountains since the middle of 2012
  • 17. Title The Qalamoun offensive began in earnest on November 15, 2013, when the regime intensified its pursuit of its objective of severing rebel logistics by concentrating bombardments, which had occurred in the Qalamoun region throughout the summer, on the town of Qara. In the first half of December, the regime seized control of an-Nabek and much of Yabroud and has continued heavy shelling throughout Qalamoun particularly on the towns of Deir Attiyeh, an-Nabek, and Yabroud. In response, rebels brought the fight closer to northern Damascus suburb of Adra where most of the fighting has continued through January 2014.
  • 18. Title The regime in 2014 has the ability to fight on multiple fronts nearly simultaneously or in quick succession, and for the first time in the war it is not limited to fighting on one front at a time. This capacity is first and foremost the result of additional manpower from Hezbollah and National Defense Forces. In addition, the specialized light infantry capabilities that Hezbollah has brought have greatly mitigated the weaknesses of the Syrian Arab Army, which relied heavily on artillery and armor rather than infantry throughout 2012. Furthermore, Hezbollah and Iran have added improved advisory efforts that mitigate command and control difficulties, not just in the integration of the new forces but throughout the SAA as a whole. In addition, the regime has gained the ability to design as well as execute multiple, sequential and simultaneous operations, aided perhaps by the increase in reliable command and control elements including advisors.
  • 19. Title For more, visit understandingwar.org.
  • 20. For more, visit www.understandingwar.org @TheStudyofWar www.facebook.com/InstituteForTheStudyofWar

Notas do Editor

  1. In the spring of 2013 the regime lacked the necessary manpower to conduct simultaneous operations on multiple fronts against rebel groups that were quickly making gains throughout the north, south, and Damascus countryside. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had sustained more losses than it could replenish. It relied on air assets to resupply besieged troops in its  Aleppo and Idlib outposts because it lacked overland logistical lines connecting those outposts. The regime had contracted its military footprint to Damascus and Homs in order to its secure supply lines while rebels contested Homs, the lynchpin of the regime’s logistics system that connected Damascus to Aleppo and to the coast.
  2. Beginning with the al-Qusayr offensive in 2013, the regime demonstrated the capacity toovercome its manpower deficit and inability to fight simultaneously on multiple fronts. It alsoillustrated the regime’s strategy to defeat the opposition by isolating rebel systems from theirsupply lines, attacking by fire, then clearing and holding terrain. The government offensive atal-Qusayr in April 2013 highlights these principal characteristics of the regime’s new campaignwith the clear orientation of regime assets to support a decisive battle at al-Qusayr.
  3. Rebel systems emerged arounddistinct supply hubs, allowing these systems to operate witha degree of independence from one another. Therefore,the regime’s targeting of rebel system at al-Qusayrrelieved pressure on the regime’s central corridor, butit did not defeat the opposition.
  4. Rebel groups have developed a number of robust support zones due to access to a variety of supply lines, primarily passing through the Turkish border. These groups tend to fight for localized objectives.
  5. Homs and its environs form a crucial logistical choke point for the regime, providing access to the coastal cities of Tartus and Latakia
  6. In the days before the fall of al-Qusayr, reports indicatedthat pro-regime forces had begun a swift advancetowards Aleppo in lieu of regime force consolidationin positions surrounding al-Qusayr. The regime had decided to move forces from Homs toAleppo without consolidating its gains after the fall ofal-Qusayr for one of two reasons: either the situation inAleppo (due to rebel activity, geopolitical considerations,or a combination of the two) compelled the regime shift itsfocus or, buoyed by Hezbollah’s decisive entry into thewar, the regime chose to pursue an operational objectiveof fighting on two fronts. Regardless, the regime’s returnto Homs in late June demonstrates its inability to launchsequential campaigns without operational pause in thesummer of 2013.
  7. Through the end of 2013, airstrikes and bombardmentshave continued in Homs city with no major gainsby either side. The regime continues to besiege theremaining rebel-held neighborhoods in Homs, usingits siege and starve tactic to defeat rebels within the cityand neutralize their ability to mobilize. Denying therebels access to al-Qusayr and Tal Kalakh and separatingtheir area of control in Homs’ Old City had effectivelydisrupted rebels’ ability to launch large operations inHoms province.
  8. Complementing its tactical proficiency, throughout thesummer ISIS established areas of control in key terrainin northern and eastern Syria along the Turkish border,with a significant presence in towns such as Atmeh, al-Bab, Azaz, Manbij, and Jarablus. ISIS’s aggressiveencroachment of border areas throughout 2013 affectedthe support zones of rebel systems throughout Idlib andAleppo by disrupting their supply routes in many cases.
  9. In August 2013, the regime’s attention shifted largely to Damascus as rebels pressed their gains in the capital city. At the same time, rebel groups attempted to open a new front in “Operation Liberation of the Coast” targeting rural towns in Jebel al-Akrad near Latakia. Within two days regime forces launched counteroffensivesand claimed to recapture a number of these villages, andby August 18th the regime made a major advance andclaimed to have retaken all rebel positions in northernLatakia. Despite an apparent military defeat, the initial rebelsuccess in Latakia demonstrated the increasing capacityand strength of Salafi and Salafi-jihadist groups in Syriarelative to the FSA and many SMC-affiliated oppositiongroups.
  10. In late September the regime launched an offensive toisolate then destroy rebel positions in the south-easterncountryside in order to secure the alternate Hama-Aleppo supply route which had been disrupted by rebelfighters. Soon after the fall of as-Safira Col. Akidi, the SupremeMilitary Council’s top leader in Aleppo and the headof the FSA-affiliated Safira Operations Room issueda scathing video statement in which he accused theNational Coalition of failing to support his commandadequately and blamed a number of rebel groups forseeking to hold captured territory rather than comingto defend as-Safira itself
  11. After the fall of Safira, the regime escalated its operationsin Aleppo city concentrating its efforts on seizing Base80 and securing the road between as-Safira and NayrabAirbase. The regime’s second focal point was the villages of TalAran and Tal Hassel located on the road between as-Safira and Nayrab airbase.
  12. In mid-December 2013 the regime began a barrelbombing campaign which targeted the civilianpopulation of Aleppo following the regime’s stalledeffort to advance into Aleppo city. The regime used barrelbombs in order to clear the city without committing largenumbers of ground troops, a tactic seen repeatedly since2012 as regime forces tried to regain city centers. The December barrelbombing campaign further highlights the regime’sstrategic changes as it not only targeted the city centerbut also towns in key rebel support zones throughoutAleppo such as Manbij, DaretIzza, and Anandan
  13. In 2014, the regime’s Aleppo offensive continued and byJanuary 15th the Syrian regime made the largest territorialgains in at least two months in Aleppo city, taking“complete control” over the Naqqarin, Zarzour, Taanehand Subeihieh areas in eastern Aleppo near NayrabAirport Base. These areas, especially Naqqarin, wereheavily contested in the regime’s previous offensive, butrebels had managed to secure the neighborhoods againstadvancing regime troops
  14. Straddling Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley to the west, theQalamoun area lies on Syria’s strategic central corridorconnecting Damascus to Homs. Like al-Qusayr, the townsin the rugged and mountainous terrain of Qalamounare crucial to both rebel and regime interests. Forthe regime, Qalamoun connects the capital to Assad’scoastal strongholds in Tartous and Latakia. Qalamounalso provides the rebels with cross-border access tosupplies from Lebanon.
  15. The rebel-supportive townof Arsal, Lebanon, serves as a safe haven and acts as alaunching point from which to attack regime positionson the northern outskirts of Damascus. Rebel groupshave operated with relative impunity in the towns scattedthroughout the Qalamoun Mountains since the middleof 2012
  16. The Qalamoun offensive began in earnest on November15, 2013, when the regime intensified its pursuit of itsobjective of severing rebel logistics by concentratingbombardments, which had occurred in the Qalamounregion throughout the summer, on the town of Qara. In the first half of December, the regime seized controlof an-Nabek and much of Yabroud and has continuedheavy shelling throughout Qalamoun particularly onthe towns of DeirAttiyeh, an-Nabek, and Yabroud.In response, rebels brought the fight closer to northernDamascus suburb of Adra where most of the fighting hascontinued through January 2014.
  17. The regime in 2014 has the ability to fight on multiplefronts nearly simultaneously or in quick succession, andfor the first time in the war it is not limited to fightingon one front at a time. This capacity is first and foremostthe result of additional manpower from Hezbollah andNational Defense Forces. In addition, the specialized lightinfantry capabilities that Hezbollah has brought have greatlymitigated the weaknesses of the Syrian Arab Army, whichrelied heavily on artillery and armor rather than infantrythroughout 2012. Furthermore, Hezbollah and Iran haveadded improved advisory efforts that mitigate commandand control difficulties, not just in the integration of thenew forces but throughout the SAA as a whole. In addition,the regime has gained the ability to design as well as executemultiple, sequential and simultaneous operations, aidedperhaps by the increase in reliable command and controlelements including advisors.