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IRANIAN NAVAL COMMANDERS
           Title


      Prior to the fall of the Shah, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy
      (IRIN) was Iran’s preeminent naval force and served to secure the
      country’s maritime borders. Following the Iranian Revolution,
      Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini built an armed
      force to protect the gains from the revolution as he distrusted the
      conventional armed forces and doubted their loyalty. In so doing,
      he created the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy
      (IRGCN) to guard the regime’s maritime interests. The IRIN was
      forced to share the waters of the Gulf with the newly-created
      naval arm of the Revolutionary Guard.

      This document profiles the commanders of the Iranian navies as
      featured in ISW’s Middle East Security Report 1, Iran’s Two
      Navies: A Maturing Maritime Strategy by Commander Joshua
      Himes, U.S. Navy.
GENERAL MOHAMAD ALI JAFARI


 “For a long time, the enemy has realized the vulnerability of the presence
 of its warships in the Persian Gulf, and apparently one of its military and
 operational strategies is that if it wants to take any military action against
 us, it will take these warships out of the Persian Gulf and station them
 near the Sea of Oman and Indian Ocean and launch operations against us
 from there. We are trying to increase our operational range capability and
 to gain access to the enemy vessels there, as well.”

     -IRGC Commander, General Mohamad Ali Jafari, April 2011




• General Mohamad Ali Jafari was appointed in September 2007 to lead the Revolutionary Guard.

• He is credited with refining Iran’s thinking on asymmetric warfare and containing soft power threats to the regime.
      o From 2005 to 2006, Jafari led a strategic research center that was responsible for innovative military strategies during a
          period when Iranian leadership was highly sensitive to perceived threats from the West.

• His appointment, which coincided with the IRGC’s transition from its original mission as defenders of clerical rule to its
  current role, likely explains the timing of the IRGCN’s rise to preeminence in the Gulf.
      o Lending credibility to this idea, Jafari focused on the theory of asymmetric defense and unconventional warfare in his
          initial speech as commander. In his speech, he expanded the concept of threats to the regime to include soft power
          threats of cultural and opposition movements.
GENERAL AHMAD VAHIDI



                                                                            •   General Ahmad Vahidi was selected in August 2009 to
                                                                                serve as minister of Defense following four years as
                                                                                deputy Minister of Defense.

                                                                            •   He rose through the ranks of the IRGC Qods Force,
                                                                                Iran’s primary asset for exporting the revolution.

                                                                            •   He is one of five Iranians sought by Interpol for his
                                                                                alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish
                                                                                center in Buenos Aires and was implicated in the 1996
                                                                                Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19
                                                                                U.S. servicemen.

                                                                            •   His selection as Defense Minister is widely considered
                                                                                one of many efforts by the IRGC to consolidate
                                                                                power and control of the country.


“Equipping the country’s Naval and Armed forces with advanced and
modern weaponry will bolster the stability and security of the region and
play an effective role in consolidating Iran’s deterrent power.”

      -Minister of Defense, General Ahmad Vahidi, Sept. 2010
ADMIRAL ALI FADAVI

•   Admiral Ali Fadavi was appointed commander of the
    IRGC Navy in early 2010. He previously led IRGCN
    forces near the end of the Iran-Iraq War, specifically
    during kinetic conflict with the U.S. Navy in which his
    forces sustained heavy losses.

•   He is reputed to be a hard-liner, driven by a desire to
    avenge humiliation from the Iran-Iraq War and the U.S.
    military’s accidental 1988 downing of an Iranian jetliner.

•   In interviews since he assumed command, he often alludes
    to that period of conflict and to U.S. maritime
    vulnerabilities. Fadavi has specifically cited the damage to
    USS Samuel B. Roberts by an Iranian mine on April 14,
    1988, and the resulting U.S. Navy attacks against Iran as an
    example of why larger capital ships are not useful,
    suggesting that he believes that the United States would
    not be able to tolerate a similar incident today.
                                                                   “The trend of modernization, equipment and change within the
•   He has repeatedly argued for a myriad of small but capable     IRGCN will continue at a higher speed until the specified goals of
    vessels as the key strategy to defend against larger U.S.      increased offensive and assault capability, improved effectiveness and
    ships.                                                         timeliness of response, and enhanced mobility, strength, and destruction
                                                                   capability of the IRGCN are attained.”
•   Fadavi also has a strong intelligence background, having
    previously served as the IRGC chief of Naval Intelligence.                -IRGCN Commander, Admiral Ali Fadavi, June 2010
REAR ADMIRAL HABIBOLLAH SAYYARI


                                                                             • Admiral Habibollah Sayyari was appointed as the IRIN
                                                                               commander on August 20, 2007.

                                                                             • His formative years were spent with Maritime Special
                                                                               Operations forces, and he was injured in combat by
                                                                               mortar fire while supporting Iranian efforts to break the
                                                                               siege of Abadan in 1981.

                                                                             • He preaches the value of the asymmetric approach,
                                                                               highlighting his perception of the limited value of U.S.
                                                                               naval assets: “Having a large spread of so much
                                                                               equipment has no basis because it just raises their [U.S.]
                                                                               vulnerability and makes them all the more of a sitting
                                                                               target for us.”
“The track record of our navy goes back 700 to 800 years. On the
day that our ships left the ports of the Persian Gulf and set sail out to    • He has championed the IRIN’s new strategic mission
the far reaches of Asia, these other countries—which today share a             following the 2007 reorganization, and he emphasizes
highly regarded reputation across the seas—did not even exist. Given           the importance of the maritime domain in expanding
our nation’s experience, capabilities and our youths’ skillful fingertips,     Iran’s influence.
why should we remain so far behind?”

  -IRIN Commander, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, Aug.
                                                    2010

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Iran's Two Navies-Iranian Naval Commanders

  • 1. IRANIAN NAVAL COMMANDERS Title Prior to the fall of the Shah, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) was Iran’s preeminent naval force and served to secure the country’s maritime borders. Following the Iranian Revolution, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini built an armed force to protect the gains from the revolution as he distrusted the conventional armed forces and doubted their loyalty. In so doing, he created the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) to guard the regime’s maritime interests. The IRIN was forced to share the waters of the Gulf with the newly-created naval arm of the Revolutionary Guard. This document profiles the commanders of the Iranian navies as featured in ISW’s Middle East Security Report 1, Iran’s Two Navies: A Maturing Maritime Strategy by Commander Joshua Himes, U.S. Navy.
  • 2. GENERAL MOHAMAD ALI JAFARI “For a long time, the enemy has realized the vulnerability of the presence of its warships in the Persian Gulf, and apparently one of its military and operational strategies is that if it wants to take any military action against us, it will take these warships out of the Persian Gulf and station them near the Sea of Oman and Indian Ocean and launch operations against us from there. We are trying to increase our operational range capability and to gain access to the enemy vessels there, as well.” -IRGC Commander, General Mohamad Ali Jafari, April 2011 • General Mohamad Ali Jafari was appointed in September 2007 to lead the Revolutionary Guard. • He is credited with refining Iran’s thinking on asymmetric warfare and containing soft power threats to the regime. o From 2005 to 2006, Jafari led a strategic research center that was responsible for innovative military strategies during a period when Iranian leadership was highly sensitive to perceived threats from the West. • His appointment, which coincided with the IRGC’s transition from its original mission as defenders of clerical rule to its current role, likely explains the timing of the IRGCN’s rise to preeminence in the Gulf. o Lending credibility to this idea, Jafari focused on the theory of asymmetric defense and unconventional warfare in his initial speech as commander. In his speech, he expanded the concept of threats to the regime to include soft power threats of cultural and opposition movements.
  • 3. GENERAL AHMAD VAHIDI • General Ahmad Vahidi was selected in August 2009 to serve as minister of Defense following four years as deputy Minister of Defense. • He rose through the ranks of the IRGC Qods Force, Iran’s primary asset for exporting the revolution. • He is one of five Iranians sought by Interpol for his alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish center in Buenos Aires and was implicated in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. servicemen. • His selection as Defense Minister is widely considered one of many efforts by the IRGC to consolidate power and control of the country. “Equipping the country’s Naval and Armed forces with advanced and modern weaponry will bolster the stability and security of the region and play an effective role in consolidating Iran’s deterrent power.” -Minister of Defense, General Ahmad Vahidi, Sept. 2010
  • 4. ADMIRAL ALI FADAVI • Admiral Ali Fadavi was appointed commander of the IRGC Navy in early 2010. He previously led IRGCN forces near the end of the Iran-Iraq War, specifically during kinetic conflict with the U.S. Navy in which his forces sustained heavy losses. • He is reputed to be a hard-liner, driven by a desire to avenge humiliation from the Iran-Iraq War and the U.S. military’s accidental 1988 downing of an Iranian jetliner. • In interviews since he assumed command, he often alludes to that period of conflict and to U.S. maritime vulnerabilities. Fadavi has specifically cited the damage to USS Samuel B. Roberts by an Iranian mine on April 14, 1988, and the resulting U.S. Navy attacks against Iran as an example of why larger capital ships are not useful, suggesting that he believes that the United States would not be able to tolerate a similar incident today. “The trend of modernization, equipment and change within the • He has repeatedly argued for a myriad of small but capable IRGCN will continue at a higher speed until the specified goals of vessels as the key strategy to defend against larger U.S. increased offensive and assault capability, improved effectiveness and ships. timeliness of response, and enhanced mobility, strength, and destruction capability of the IRGCN are attained.” • Fadavi also has a strong intelligence background, having previously served as the IRGC chief of Naval Intelligence. -IRGCN Commander, Admiral Ali Fadavi, June 2010
  • 5. REAR ADMIRAL HABIBOLLAH SAYYARI • Admiral Habibollah Sayyari was appointed as the IRIN commander on August 20, 2007. • His formative years were spent with Maritime Special Operations forces, and he was injured in combat by mortar fire while supporting Iranian efforts to break the siege of Abadan in 1981. • He preaches the value of the asymmetric approach, highlighting his perception of the limited value of U.S. naval assets: “Having a large spread of so much equipment has no basis because it just raises their [U.S.] vulnerability and makes them all the more of a sitting target for us.” “The track record of our navy goes back 700 to 800 years. On the day that our ships left the ports of the Persian Gulf and set sail out to • He has championed the IRIN’s new strategic mission the far reaches of Asia, these other countries—which today share a following the 2007 reorganization, and he emphasizes highly regarded reputation across the seas—did not even exist. Given the importance of the maritime domain in expanding our nation’s experience, capabilities and our youths’ skillful fingertips, Iran’s influence. why should we remain so far behind?” -IRIN Commander, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, Aug. 2010