1. Institute for
Development and
MOLDOVA’S FOREIGN POLICY STATEWATCH Social Initiatives
“Viitorul”
Issue 16, January 2011
THE POST-ELECTORAL BID
OF GEOPOLITICAL VISITS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Ion Tăbârţă
Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch represents a series of brief
NEXT TOPICS
analyses, written by local and foreign experts, dedicated to the TO BE COVERED:
most topical subjects related to the foreign policy of Moldova,
major developments in the Black Sea Region, cooperation with Liberalization
international organizations and peace building activities in the region. of the aviation
It aims to create a common platform for discussion and to bring
together experts, commentators, officials and diplomats who are
market
concerned with the perspectives of European Integration of Moldova. of Moldova
It is also pertaining to offer to Moldova’s diplomats and analysts a
valuable tribune for debating the most interesting and controversial
points of view that could help Moldova to find its path to EU.
A
t the parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova from
28 November 2010, no one from the electoral competitors has
gained the parliamentary majority necessary to form the govern-
ment. The post-electoral negotiations have highlighted two pos-
sible governmental alliances – of center-left (Communist Party-
Democratic Party) and center-right (Democratic Party-Liberal
Democratic Party-Liberal Party) – the balance to one of them
was to be inclined by the Democratic Party. Each of this two
governing alliances, alongside purely internal political aspects,
have also strong geopolitical connotations: the center-left being a pro-
Russian one and the center-right a pro-western one. In turn, the involved
geopolitical actors, each of them having its interests in Moldova, through
their visits in Chisinau have attempted to determine Moldovan parliamen-
tary parties to form a governing alliance in the Republic of Moldova that is
convenient for them.

2. 2 Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch
Between East and West
The geopolitical earthquake at the end of Cold War has led at reconfiguration of the two
main geopolitical areas existing in the post-war period – euro-Atlantic and euro-Asiatic. After
the Cold War, the delimitation line between these two geopolitical spaces has been moved from
Central Europe to the east of the continent, getting at the frontiers of Republic of Moldova.
The determinant concept of a multi-vectorial foreign policy of a Republic of Moldova is that
of permanent neutrality. The geopolitical balance established in Chisinau has constituted in the
nineties of the last century the line of the external behavior of the Republic of Moldova – being
easy pro-CIS during the agrarian governing, or being with pro-European nuances, in time of
Sturza’s government.
Republic of Moldova has been situated and is situated in what we can call “geopolitical
trap”. In the nineties, Russian Federation, besides Transnistrian conflict, did not have the necessary
leverage to impose itself geopolitically in Moldova. In his turn, the West manifested disinterest
towards eastern part of the European continent. Things have been changed at the beginning
of the XXI century. Enlargement of NATO and EU has brought Republic of Moldova in the zone
of proximity of these two western actors of main importance. The neighbourhood of Moldova
with EU and NATO has provoked increasing interest from European countries towards Chisinau.
Simultaneously, Russian Federation, after Putin’s arrival in power, has been strengthened as a
country that has led at the diversification of its influencing levers upon neighbouring countries. If
initially “geopolitical trap” in which have been caught Moldova has consisted in incapacity (Russia)
and disinterest (Occident), then, later, it has been transformed in capacity (Moscow) and interest
(Brussels and Washington).
The Moldovan communists, in the first stage after coming to power, wanted to break
Moldova’s geopolitical balancing, trying to bring Chisinau closer to euro-Asiatic space. The
Kremlin reacted at the pro-Russian policy of Moldovan communists through the elaboration of
Kozak Memorandum, which would have tied Chisinau with Moscow through “transnistrisition” of
Moldova.
In 2003, in the context of western geopolitical expansion to the east (including through
“color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine), the return of the Republic of Moldova in the geopolitical
euro-Asiatic area was difficult to be realized. Moldova’s foreign policy vector change – from east
to west, namely from Russia-Belarus Union to European Union – meant that Moldova came back
to its policy of regional balancing, which characterized Chisinau until 2001.
The Alliance for European Integration (AEI), unlike the Communists party that mimicked
the European course of Chisinau, surprising for many people made Moldova to have a remarkable
behavior in the dialog with Brussels. Moldova – “the success story” of the Eastern Partnership
became more visible on the background of a European recession of Ukraine. Through its actions,
government of AEI has created all conditions to remove again Republic of Moldova out of regional
geopolitical balance, for this time move being to the west.
Disputes of geopolitical visits
Republic of Moldova has come to be located at the confluence of two important geopolitical
areas – between a stronger Russia and a West in expansion. In these conditions, the geopolitical
bid in the November 28 elections has increased enormously.
The tone of Russian-Western geopolitical dispute was given by Russia through an
unannounced visit to Chisinau, on December 4-5, of the Chief of the presidential Administration from
Moscow, Sergei Naryshkin. Right from the airport the Russian official has operated with such notions
(problematic for Republic of Moldova in opinion of Naryshkin) like statehood, sovereignty, geopolitical
Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org

3. Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch 3
orientation. Further, he declared that only a functional government of the Republic of Moldova may
address these issues in the context of a strategic partnership between Russia and Moldova. The
functional government composition desired by Moscow in Moldova has been shown by Naryshkin
when at the residence of the Russian Embassy from Chisinau, he met with leaders of Communist
Party and Democratic Party, blatantly ignoring the Liberal Democrats, and the meeting with the leader
of Liberal Party – the interim president Mihai Ghimpu – has been more for formal reasons.
Shortly after the geopolitical “movement” of Russia, through working visit to Chisinau on
December 8, of Foreign Ministers of Poland, Radoslaw Sikorski and Sweden, Carl Bildt, followed
the Western response. The two European officials, the initiators of the Eastern Partnership,
declared that they came here not only on behaf of Poland and Sweden, but on behaf of the entire
European Union. Their message was very encouraging for Republic of Moldova, which is urged to
persevere in the Eastern Partnership and on its European course. Mentioning that the European
Union wants to see a rapid formation of a government which would allow the continuation of
reforms, they actually suggested that Brussels wants reiteration of AEI. Eloquent is the duration
of Sikorski and Bildt meetings with component parties of the potential alliance of center-left - only
15 minutes with representatives of Communists Party (with symbolic picture at the monument of
Lenin) and nearly an hour with the Democratic leaders.
Visit of Sikorski and Bildt to Chisinau was continued by those of Jerzy Buzek, President
of European Parliament, and Werner Hoyer, Minister of State at the Federal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Germany. The message of Buzek was clear as possible for the Moldovan political class:
“Republic of Moldova must remain on the European road which was choosed, this fact being of
imminent importance for the EU and for citizens of Republic of Moldova.” Visit of Hoyer in Chisinau
is a proof of the seriousness of Germany’s intentions on Republic of Moldova in talks with Russia
on European security reconfiguration.
The importance of Moldova
After the geopolitical disaster from the ’90s of the last century, Russia investes serious
efforts to regain lost positions. CIS is the first target in Russia’s geopolitical return. The “Color
revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine were interpreted by Russia as a geopolitical invasion of the
West in its vital space of protection. Once in 2003-2005 was defeated by the West in the “color
revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia (not being able to institutionalize CIS space) has
responded harsly, by extensively using the economic and energetic “weapons” against “rebel”
countries of the CIS. After its actions, Moscow has succeeded to annihilate GUAM and to return
geopolitically in Ukraine, but failed (despite military successes) sharply in Georgia.
For Moscow, its presence in Moldova means remaining of Russia as a real geopolitical
subject in the south-eastern Europe. Kremlin’s approach towards Moldova is percived from two
geopolitical scenarios: 1) if the Russian Federation wishes to remain present geopolitically in
South-East of Europe, then it must do everything possible not to leave Moldova, 2) if Russia is
leaving Moldova, then its place will be taken by the major Western geopolitical actors, mainly the
EU and possible NATO, something that Kremlin is not willing to do. The ambiguity of Russian
policy towards Moldova has been amplified by the suspicion of Moscow that Chisinau “plays”
permanently on two fronts.
In its relationship with Moldova, Russia does not want verbal guaranties as it was, in
general, until now. In the future, Moscow wants to conclude a large written strategic partnership
in geopolitical terms (political, economic, social and cultural). In its turn, Russian Federation
promises the Republic of Moldova significant economic benefits (reduced price for gas imports,
free way for wine and agricultural exports).
The geopolitical transformation in the early ‘90s of the last century has caused eastward
movement of both Western geopolitical subspaces – euro-Atlantic and euro-Continental. At
Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org

4. 4 Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch
the edge of centuries, NATO (euro-Atlantic expression) and EU (euro-Continental expression)
became neighbors of the CIS, which in geopolitical terms percived by Moscow means that the
West became the geopolitical neighbour of Russia.
At the moment, it seems like NATO decided to stop at the CIS borders. EU tries to act
innstitutionally in the CIS, by launching a series of policies aiming to bring to Europe more
stability and security on the eastern borders. The European Neighbourhood Policy, launched by
Brussels at the time of enlargement in 2004, covered a wider geographical area, referring to all
EU neighbors, not only to those from Europe. Later, in 2009, aiming to give a new dimension to
European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership, which refers directly
to the six European countries from CIS.
Both European institutional policies – European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern
Partnership - were not implemented until the end. Initially, the best behavior in the Eastern
Partnership has had Ukraine. After the election of Yanukovych as the head of state, the country
has made “a step backwards” on its European way. On the other hand, in 2010, Chisinau has
made significant progress in the dialogue with Brussels. The European achivements of Moldova
have shown that the Eastern Partnership is viable. Becasue of this reason, Moldova became
“cool” in Brussel, EU invested a lot in Moldova, including in the image chapter. To continue its
European way, EU offeres Moldova hundreds of million of euros and promises to remove visas
immediately after the meting of criteria required by Brussels.
In the European context, during 2010 we have assisted at an unprecedented dialogue
between EU (through Germany) and Russia. Brussels is ready to conclude a strategic partnership
(of modernization) with Russia which would also directly affect the states from the intermediary space
(Eastern Partnership states) between EU and Russia. However, the EU and Russia have different
views upon countries located geographically between them. In comparison with Russia which deals
with European countries of CIS as a whole of its geopolitical area, Brussels perceive the six countries
of the Eastern Partnership more as a security intermediary area between Russia and EU.
Conclusions
The post-election situation after 28 November in the Republic of Moldova is a conclusive
proof that political polarization got strong geopolitical connotations. Visits by foreign officials in
Chisinau in the post-election period suggest a few conclusions. The first is that Moldova matters
on the regional level. Major actors in Moldova are ready to provide certain privileges to achieve
their geopolitical goals in Moldova. The second (external conjuncture) refers to the substance of
Russian-German dialogue in 2010. By Naryskin’s visit to Chisinau, Russia gave a clear signal
to EU that Moldova can not move forward within Eastern Partnership without the permission of
Kremlin. A third (internal) is that the visit of foreign officials, although they created some confusion
among local political class, the decision to create the government alliance in Moldova was taken
in Chisinau and not decided out of Moldova.
This publication was produced by IDIS “Viitorul” with the financial support of Soros Foundation
Moldova and the National Endowment for Democracy. The opinions expressed in this publicati-
on reflect the author’s/authors’ position and don’t necessary represent the views of the donors.
Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org
Str. Iacob Hîncu 10/1, Chişinău MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax
office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org