IDIS Early Warning Report January - March 2010

EARLY
WARNING
REPORT
January - March 2010

Institute for Development
and Social Initiatives
(IDIS) „Viitorul”

Igor Munteanu Leonid Litra Veaceslav Berbeca Alexandru Fala

Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) „Viitorul”

EARLY WARNING REPORT
January - March 2010

Igor Munteanu
Leonid Litra
Veaceslav Berbeca
Alexandru Fala

This report was prepared with financial support offered by BTD
(Balkan Trust for Democracy) and Think Tank Fund al.
Expressed opinions are those of authors. Neither the Administration
of IDIS „Viitorul”, nor the Administrative Council of the Institute
for Development and Social Initiatives „Viitorul” bears any
responsibility for the estimates and opinions presented in the very
publication.
Any use of information or opinions of the author of this Study
should make a reference to IDIS „Viitorul”.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

REGIONAL: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

THE MOLDOVAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER - A TEST FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA? VEACESLAV BERBECA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

FOCUS: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

OPINIONS OF EXPERTS AND POLICYMAKERS FROM UKRAINE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA ON THE MOLDOVAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER,
VEACESLAV BERBECA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

POLITICAL: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

POLITICAL PARTIES IN 2010: BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS IGOR MUNTEANU . 28

ALARM SIGNAL: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

THE CONFLICTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMRAT AND CHISINAU AND
THE EFFECT OF ELECTIONS LEONID LITRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

ECONOMY: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

THE “ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM” - AN ADJUSTMENT TO THE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ALEXANDRU FALA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

SOCIAL: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

SOCIAL SECTOR - DEVELOPMENTS WITH INCONCLUSIVE EFFECTS
ALEXANDRU FALA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

AUDIOVISUAL SECTOR IN MOLDOVA - BETWEEN CRISIS AND RENEWAL,
CORNEL CIUREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

E A R LY W A R N I N G R E P O R T
JA N uA R Y - M A R c h 2 0 10

ABSTRAcT
In the second publication of the Crisis Prevention Report, we
included articles that approach very topical subjects for the Republic of
Moldova. The issue of borders between the Republic of Moldova and
Ukraine, the relationship between Chisinau and Comrat, establishment
of a committee of scientists to convict the Communism, amendment
of the Electoral Code and amendment of the Constitution, moral
crisis of the audiovisual system and the economic recovery program
of the Government - these are the topics mostly approached in this
compilation. All these subjects were selected due to their crisis-
generating potential and the stress they regularly induce into the
society. The main objective was to describe the alarming situations,
occurred in the Moldovan society and place the discussions within a
rational framework as to help find proper solutions.
The crises we are talking about in this issue are different in
terms of substance, but they risk dissolving the Moldovan society,
whose skeleton is quite fragile. We also speak about the crisis in the
negotiations between two neighboring countries, Ukraine and the
Republic of Moldova, which could worsen significantly Moldova’s
situation on the internal and external arena, and also about the crisis
between center and periphery, generated by the tense state of the
relationship between Chisinau and Comrat. At the same time, special
attention is paid to the moral crisis arising in relation to communism
conviction and the situation of the audiovisual. The stagnation in the
social area also reaches the critical point and it can’t be ignored in the
present compilation.

6


REGIONAL:
THE MOLDOVAN-UKRAINIAN
BORDER - A TEST FOR THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE REPUBLIC
OF MOLDOVA?
VeaceslaV BerBeca

The collapse of the USSR left a hard “heritage” to the former soviet
countries related to the delimitation of their borders. During the
existence of the Soviet Union, the borders between the union countries
were mostly conventional, determining the jurisdiction of the local
authorities over some localities or goods. After the USSR implosion,
the newly independent states had to start a border delimitation and
demarcation process. If the border between the Republic of Moldova
and Romania is well-defined and doesn’t cause any intense internal
debates, as the border between these to countries is the result of the
territorial demarcation between the USSR and Romania, established by
the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, then the demarcation of the Moldovan-
Ukrainian border poses a series of issues. These problems are generated
by the way how several infrastructure and other types of projects were
developed and managed on the territory of the former soviet countries
(Reni-Odessa highway, Dnestrovsk hydroelectric power station). It is
obvious that when these projects started, nobody took into account
the possibility of USSR collapse and that is why they didn’t consider
the place where they were located and built in order to streamline the
implementation of the projects.
The Moldovan-Ukrainian border is 1222 km long, being
divided into three sectors: from North-West, from Criva, Briceni
raion, on Prut river it lasts for 300 km till East; then 450 km in the
central sector, Transnistria sector; and subsequently it goes down from
Palanca to Giurgiulesti - a 470 km long sector.1
Consequently, since their independence, Ukraine and the
1 www.mfa.gov.md/interviuri-md/478726/, Relations between the Republic of Moldova and
Ukraine: Vision of the Moldovan Diplomacy

7


Republic of Moldova had to start the border demarcation process and
adopt the legal regime on the recognition of the property of both states.
The demarcation of borders and establishment of the property
legal regime has been a concern of all Governments since 1998. The
border treaty was based on the negotiation protocol between the
delegations of Ukrainian and Moldovan Government in 1998, at
Kiev, signed by the Moldovan Prime-Minister Ion Ciubuc and his
Ukrainian counterpart Valeriy Pustovoitenko. But we have recently
seen strong debates on this topic between the ruling parties and the
opposition. Unfortunately, we find out that the border demarcation,
a technical process, turned out to be a topic with harsh blaming and
accusation between the opposition and the ruling party.
This primarily refers to the sector of Reni-Odessa highway in
the region of the Moldovan locality of Palanca. There were developed
and implemented almost all measures to regulate the legal status of
this highway segment from Palanca locality.
The Treaty between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on
the State Border was signed on 18 August 1999. This paper sets out
the terms and principles underlying the establishment of state border
between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. At the same time, an
Additional Protocol to the Treaty between the Republic of Moldova and
Ukraine on the State Border was signed with respect to the transfer of the
Odessa-Reni highway segment in the region of the Moldovan locality
of Palanca, and the land it passes, under Ukrainian ownership and on
the exploitation regime. Article 1 of the Protocol stipulates that the
Republic of Moldova shall transfer the Odessa-Reni highway segment,
in the region of the Moldovan locality of Palanca, and the land it passes,
under Ukrainian ownership.2 Article 4.1 provides that “the inhabitants
of Palanca locality that drive vehicles on the territory adjacent to the
transferred sector shall drive on the exit road to the mentioned sector at
the km 57+400”.3 And Article 4.3 stipulates that “border, customs, and
other types of controls, which are performed when crossing the state
border, shall not be performed on the transferred sector”4
The Treaty between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on
2 Additional Protocol to the Treaty between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the State
Border, with respect to the transfer of the Odessa-Reni highway segment in the region of the Mol-
dovan locality of Palanca, and the land it passes under Ukrainian ownership and on the exploitation
regime.
3 idem
4 idem

8


the State Border and the Additional Protocol, which is integral part
of the Treaty, was ratified by Law no 348-XV of 12 July 2001 by the
Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, with the votes of 73 MPs.
The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova conditioned then the
ratification of the Treaty on the state border on the signature of the
Regulations on the Exploitation of the Odessa-Reni highway segment
in the region of Palanca locality, as well by Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada
ratification of an agreement signed in 1994 on the mutual recognition
of property situated on their territory, given the fact that the Republic
of Moldova owns several objects on Ukrainian territory5.
The Republic of Moldova transferred on 11 February 2002 to
the Ukraine the Odessa-Reni highway segment from km 51+200 until
km 58+970 in the neighborhood of Palanca locality, plus the adjacent
territory with the average width (including the road bed) of 23 m
against the signature of the Minister of Transport and Communications
during that period, Anatol Cuptov.6 It still has to be decided on the
boundaries of borders and record it with the cadastre bodies.
As mentioned before, the border delimitation was a difficult
process, which was needed because during USSR the borders between
republics were conventional, i.e. some benchmarks were established,
but the border wasn’t accurately established and wasn’t related to a
certain locality. Thus, another debated topic for the parties is a plot
of land of a few hundred meters that have not been demarcated yet
in Giurgiulesti. All the discussions started with the idea where the
border between countries should be established on this territory. The
Ukrainian authorities, at all negotiation rounds, make reference to
an Order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of
4 November 1940, which provides that Prut river is the point that
separates the two republics. In this way, the Ukrainians prove that
they do not agree with the requests of the Moldovan party, which,
according to the Ukrainian officials, requested that Ukraine gave up
on 1800 meters from the mouth of the Prut river, because in 1940 the
mouth of the respective river and, respectively, the border between the
countries, were situated at that point.7 According to the Ukrainians,
5 Victoria Boian, in Evolution of the External Policy of the Republic of Moldova (1998-2008),
Chisinau, Cartdidact, 2009, p.41.
6 Act on the transfer by the Republic of Moldova to the Ukraine the Odessa-Reni highway seg-
ment from km 51+200 until km 58+970 in the neighborhood of Palanca locality dated 11 February
2002.
7 Dmitriy Tkatch: “All the work on the demarcation of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border is based
on a compromise”, http://zn.ua/1000/17535/

9


the establishment of the border between the SSRU and SSRM in 1940
is confirmed only by the list of the main points where the border line
passes, a decision that wasn’t supported by maps.8
Finally, after the working visit of the Moldovan premier
Ion Ciubuc to Kiev, on 4 August 1998, a Protocol was signed on
the negotiations between the Government delegations of Ukraine
and Moldova. After negotiations, there was reached an agreement
to establish the draft border line in Giurgiulesti on the existing line,
using for delimitation the arable land until the channel of Danube
River, passing through the point situated on the bank of Danube river,
at 430 m distance from the border pillar no 1355/36.9 Although this
agreement was reached more than 11 years ago, the parties have not
yet agreed on the demarcation of the border in this area. According
to the officials of the Republic of Moldova, “the most sensitive areas
that are still unsettled include a segment of a few hundred meters not
demarcated yet at Giurgiulesti and Palanca crossing point. We should
find there compromise solutions and finish the demarcation process,
so that - and it is very important - Moldova has the 430 m access to
the Danube river, confirmed by border pillars, which is essential for
the proper functioning of the Giurgiulesti port and terminal”.10
The demarcation process was almost finished in the North,
except for the point of Dnestrovsk hydroelectric power station and
dam on the Nistru river, in Ocnita raion, Naslavcea village. For several
years, the Dnestrovsk hydroelectric power station has been a litigation
subject between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. In 1983, the
construction of Dnestrovsk Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power Plant
(PSHPP) had started on the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic. In line with the Law of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
no 142-XII of 3 August 1990, the Dnestrovsk PSHPP was declared
to be property of the Ukrainian people. After the demarcation of the
Moldovan-Ukrainian state border, which finished in 1999, the border
demarcation line was drawn in the middle of the water dam of the
hydroenergetic center of the Dnestrovsk hydroelectric power station,
fact confirmed by the Ukrainian party within the joint Moldovan-

8 idem.
9 Negotiation protocol between the Ukrainian and Moldovan Government delegations, 4 August
1998, Kiev
10 www.mfa.gov.md/interviuri-md/478726/, Relations between the Republic of Mol-
dova and Ukraine: Vision of the Moldovan Diplomacy

10


Ukrainian committee for border demarcation.11 The dispute concerns
the legal status of the part of the Dnestrovsk hydro-energetic center
water dam, claimed by Ukraine, which is situated on the right bank
of the Nistru river, having a 17 ha area of the Republic of Moldova,
which were offered by the MSSR to the USSR. In July 2003, the
Republic of Moldova established a border post in the neighborhood
of the Dnestrovsk Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power Plant and
this annoyed Ukraine. This hydro-energetic center is very important
for Ukraine, as it is expected to be the greatest station of this type in
Europe, with an annual capacity of 2.7 billion kWh.12 This station
must work for Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and, probably, for Russia.
After some discussion between the authorities of the two
countries, it was concluded that the regulation of the ownership
relations related to the Dnestrovsk station will be negotiated together
with other issues related to the demarcation of Moldovan-Ukrainian
state border.13
On 1 February 2010, the Prime-Minister of the Republic
of Moldova, Vlad Filat, and the Prime-Minister of Ukraine, Yulia
Timoshenko, signed at Kiev a Protocol amending the Agreement
on Mutual Recognition of Rights and Regulation of Ownership
Relationships of 11 August 1994, a paper that, according to the two
officials, started the demarcation of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border on
the Transnistria segment.14 Later there will exist other three protocols
that will be related to particular cases, such as the Dnestrovsk problem.
All these three issues have the potential to generate crises. The
problem related to the transfer of the highway and the land plot where
it is situated in the region of Palanca caused the most acute debates
in the society. There are many causes that generate these debates:
constitutionality of the additional protocol on the transfer of the
highway and the underlying territory, imperfection of the envisaged
paper and anticipated elections in this year.
The Christian-Democratic People’s Party (CDPP) appealed
the constitutionality of the border agreement with Ukraine in the
11 http://eco.md/article/6646/, Interview with HE Sergey Pirojkov: “The Ukrainian party doesn’t
know anything about the existence of the alleged requirements of the Moldovan Government rela-
ted to the provision of a share of Dnestrovsk PSHPP”
12 http://zn.ua/2000/2600/68850/, Tatyana Parkhomchuk, Dnestrovsk PSHPP: Moldovan vers
libres on the Ukrainian energetics, no 11 (791) 20-26 March 2010.
13 Victoria Boian, in Evolution of the External Policy of the Republic of Moldova (1998-2008),
Chisinau, Cartdidact, 2009, p.44.
14 www.timpul.md/article/2010/02/01/6233

11


Constitutional Court back in August 2001, resuming the appeal of
this document in late 2009. The invoked reasons state that the “border
agreement and the additional protocol to it infringe Article 3(1) of
the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, which sanctifies the
inalienable character of the national territory, as well as Articles 8(2)
and 142(1) of the Constitution”. The Ombudsman Tamara Plamadeala,
filed two cases (09.12.2009 and 15.01.2010) to the Constitutional
Court on Palanca case. According to her, the fundamental right of the
Moldovan citizens to move freely on the entire territory of the country
was infringed by authorities by signing the Border Agreement with
Ukraine, and the inhabitants of Palanca village, Stefan Voda raion,
are discriminated, if compared to the other citizens of the Republic
of Moldova. Mrs. Plamadeala says that the inhabitants of this locality
must have permits to be able to go to their plot of land and that
the highway is patrolled by Moldovan border guards who restrain the
access of villagers.
Although the Moldovan officials explained that it is wrong to
use the term concession of territory and that this sector is Ukraine’s
property on the territory of the Republic of Moldova15, the transfer
of the land plot crossed by this highway could generate internal
discontents, invoking reasons of “conceding national territories” and
“failure to promote the national interests of the Republic of Moldova”.
Tension could arise in the society particularly because of the transfer
of 8 km of highway in the region of Palanca village, perceived as a
concession of “the national land”.
Secondly, the problems that could arise in relation to the
highway segment near Palanca transferred to Ukraine depend on the
interpretation of the Additional Protocol to the Treaty between the
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the State Border. The second
paragraph of Article 1 of the Protocol provides that the “transferred
sector shall be property of Ukraine on the territory of the Republic
of Moldova”. This means that Ukraine can use its property, observing
some conditions that result from the fact that it is situated on the
territory of the Republic of Moldova. But Article 6 of the Protocol
stipulates that “Ukrainian jurisdiction shall be applied on the
transferred sector”. A different interpretation could mean application

15 Eugen Revenco, Juridical Aspects of Border Organization, in „New Borders in South Eastern
Europe. The Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Romania” – IPP, Chisinau, Stiinta, 2002, pp. 105-106

12


of some measures that would disturb the Moldovan party. This article
is interpreted in different ways by the parties and contravenes Article
1.2. To remove any form of non-understanding, probably the parties
will have to agree on some amendments to the Protocol in the spirit
of good neighborhood and to ensure comfort for the citizens of both
countries. There was also launched the idea that the Republic of
Moldova will lose a part of its sovereignty if it transfers to Ukraine the
segment of highway and the land under it near Palanca village. The
Moldovan officials’ point of view is that the transfer of this highway
segment to Ukraine doesn’t imply a loss of the sovereignty, because the
underground under and the air over the highway are not transferred.
These debates obviously have an electoral nuance. Even if the
Agreement was negotiated by Alliance for Democracy and Reforms
(ADR) it was ratified by the communist majority in 2001. Speaking
about consistency in passing and enforcing decisions, the CPRM,
if they continued to rule, should have transferred to Ukraine the
section of 7.78 km under Odessa-Reni highway, as provided by the
inter-government agreements between the Republic of Moldova and
Ukraine in 2006. In such a way the behavior of CDPP can be explained
- during the time they were in alliance with the CPRM in 2005-
2009, they left in shadow this subject, although the infringements
they say are happening in Palanca village are not most recent. The
measures undertaken by the current government to close the topic
related to Palanca village are perceived by some parties as territorial
concession. In an electoral year, this could be used against the current
alliance. In this case, we should start with the idea that the solution to
denounce the treaty is inadmissible because contravenes to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Or, the unilateral denouncement
of the border treaty is a territorial claim.16
The Palanca highway case has negative effects over the external
side, especially in the relationship with Ukraine. The Ukrainian officials
and the public opinion, in particular, state that the Moldovan party
distorts deliberately the border demarcation and this is not included
into the good neighborhood concept, affirmed and sustained be the
parties. The Ukrainians blame the Republic of Moldova for non-
observance of the assumed commitments. Moreover, according to
the Ukrainians, the Republic of Moldova became a maritime country
16 http://ape.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=183&id=945

13


only because Ukraine transferred a plot of land at Giurgiulesti, needed
to build a port. And the construction of the Giurgiulesti terminal is,
according to several opinions in Ukraine, an economic and ecological
threat for the Reni port and other Ukrainian localities in this region.
The presence of these issues on the agenda of the bilateral
relationships could cause many problems to the Chisinau Government
on the central sector, i.e. in the Transnistria region. Kiev could play an
important role in this problem from several perspectives. First of all, the
role of Ukraine is fundamental to demarcate the border on this segment,
process which started in January 2010 by mounting of the first border
sign by the Petr Proroshenko and Iurie Leanca in the central sector of
the border between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, in Bolshaya
Koshnitsa village, Vinnytsia region. Because the Moldovan authorities do
not control this segment and the separatist regime from Tiraspol refuses
to participate in these works, the border demarcation on this sector can be
performed exclusively on the Ukraine’s territory. Secondly, the Moldova’s
European integration process can be affected if the Transnistrian conflict
is not settled. Ukraine could get involved more actively in this issue. For
instance, Ukraine does not allow the entry of goods from Transnistria
to its territory with the old customs stamp. According to the Ukrainian
press, this causes great economic losses to Ukraine, which supports the
Chisinau politics. Moreover, several opinions in Ukraine say that the
Republic of Moldova wants to settle the Transnistrian conflict with Kiev’s
efforts, but this contradicts the interest of this state in the region where
“one hundred thousand Ukrainian citizens” live. A major problem could
appear here, namely conditioning the support on the Transnistria issue on
the settlement of the Palanca case.
The attempt to force Chisinau to honor its obligations by
means that are not acceptable for the Republic of Moldova could
generate potential tensions. The Ukrainian experts state that there are
a number of tools to achieve this goal: from banning the exports of
some energy resources towards the Republic of Moldova to closing
the border for Moldovan merchandise that transit Ukraine. The
possibility to implement these measures means an economic collapse
for the Republic of Moldova.
The situation is different in case of Giurgiulesti port. Although
there are a number of people saying that the Republic of Moldova

14


had access to Danube17, the Ukrainians don’t recognize this, making
reference to an Order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR of 4 November 1940, which provides that Prut river is the
point that separates the two republics. This was invoked every time
by the Ukrainian party in the negotiations on border demarcation.
It is impossible to state the opposite in the absence of cartographic
proofs. In the Giurgiulesti case, although the border has not been
demarcated yet, a potential risk exists. The Ukrainians state that they
kept their word and transferred to the Moldovan party the over 400-
meter segment needed for the proper functioning of the port from
this locality. As a response, Kiev could undertake several measures we
mentioned above, in order to determine the Republic of Moldova to
honor its obligations.
Finally, with respect to the Dnestrovsk station, its operation
could be a huge danger for the Moldova’s population, as this
hydro-energetic station is obsolete. Other claims of the Republic of
Moldova towards Ukraine relate to the impact of this station over
the environmental state of the region. It is interesting that in Ukraine
there are also signals related to the danger of this water accumulation
energetic plant.18 This system has been under construction for almost
30 years and there are informal geologic researches that confirm
the existence of certain cracks in the dam. Because of the obsolete
equipment there are fears that after an accident the water could flood
the localities situated lower than the dam, if there are no barrages. If
in Ukraine Yampol and Mohyliv-Podilskyi towns are threatened by
such floods, in the Republic of Moldova this danger threatens the
localities situated lower than the dam, for example Soroca. The high
voltage lines also cause health problems for the villages in the vicinity
of this system.19
Finally, we can bring some examples from the European
countries with respect to territorial exchanges - called border
adjustments - aimed at settling the ownership or territorial problems
between the countries. The first example is the case of Czech Republic
and Slovakia who signed on 4 January 1996 an agreement that
stipulated the transfer of the line to adjust it to the infrastructure
17 http://zdg.md/politic/cedam-palanca-sau-renegociem-protocolul

15


system existing between the countries. There were performed 18
exchanges at the Czech-Slovak border, which meat an exchange of 425
ha of land based on severe mutuality.20 The border adjustments needed
a special bilateral treaty to be signed and a special constitutional act to
be passed by the Czech Republic.
Poland and Slovakia carried out in 2002 several border
adjustments. Both parties made transfers of 2 969 m2 between them.21
These property transfers included real estate, equipment, installations,
and machinery.
France and Switzerland signed on 25 February 1953 three
conventions that affected their common border. The extremely small
adjustments introduced by the convention aimed at aligning the
border, removing dual jurisdiction from some roads or ways and place
only in one country some associated buildings or institutions.22 They
also changed the principle used for the creation of border on Geneva
lake, from a median line to a series of straight lines, harmonizing the
original median line.

20 http://isp.org.pl/files/3057934520561074001118043909.pdf
21 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish%E2%80%93Czechoslovak_border_conflicts
22 International Boundary Study No. 11 – October 18, 1961, France – Switzerland Boundary (Coun-
try Codes: FR-SZ). The Geographer Office of the Geographer Bureau of Intelligence and Research

16


Conclusions

1. Although more than 8 years passed since the ratification of the Treaty
between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the State Border,
the border between these two countries hasn’t been demarcated yet.
There are several sensitive points - Dnestrovsk, Palanca, Giurgiulesti
and the Transnistrian sector - because of which the demarcation
hasn’t been finished yet.
2. The border demarcation takes place under a great internal pressure
caused by the results of the arrangements between the states with
respect to the legal regime of the Odessa-Reni highway in the
region of Palanca village and of an over 430 m strip of land near
Giurgiulesti. The border demarcation is too politized, although this
should be a technical process;
3. The public opinion in Ukraine criticizes the Moldovan authorities
for their failure to fulfill the obligations assumed by signing the
Treaty on Border and the Additional Protocol. Because of this, some
severe measures are proposed against the Republic of Moldova to
make it honor its commitments.
4. The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova conditioned the
ratification of the Treaty on the state border on the signature of
the Regulations on the Exploitation of the Odessa-Reni highway
segment in the region of Palanca locality, as well by Ukraine’s
Verkhovna Rada ratification of an agreement signed in 1994 on
the mutual recognition of property situated on their territory, given
the fact that the Republic of Moldova owns several objects on the
Ukrainian territory. But a significant part of the Moldovan property
on the territory of Ukraine was already privatized.
5. The listed problems, especially the Dnestrovsk and Palanca cases
have potential to generate crises for the Republic of Moldova. We
mean political, economic, ecological and humanitarian problems.
6. The Moldovan authorities should start a dialog with the society
in order to depolitize the border demarcation, because it damages
this performance. The “zero-sum game” approaches should be
excluded from the discussions. Even if Ukraine is an important
actor to solve the Transnistrian conflict and demarcate the
border in the central region, the negotiations should take place

17


in the atmosphere of good neighborhood and mutual respect
and this means avoiding intransigent approaches under the
border demarcation by problems having major importance.

Recommendations

1. The Republic of Moldova has to fulfill the commitments
assumed by signing the Treaty on Border and the Additional
Protocol in order to avoid potential disagreements with Ukraine.
But the transfer of the ownership over the portion of highway
near Palanca locality should be conditioned on the demarcation
of the border at Giurgiulesti in the favor of the Republic of
Moldova.
2. With respect to the Palanca problem, the Chisinau Government
must explain the situation related to the transfer to Ukraine
of the land under the highway. Because the Treaty on Border
and the Additional Protocol are interpreted by the parties in
different ways, it is necessary to introduce more details in the
Intergovernmental Agreement on the exploitation of the Odessa-
Reni highway segment in the region of Palanca village, as well
of the underlying land. In particular, to decrease the tension
related to this issue, the authorities should satisfy the desires of
Palanca inhabitants and eliminate the barriers so that they could
cross the highway and have access to the plots of lands that
belong to their village.
3. There could also be specified what portion of the land under
the highway is transferred to the Ukrainian party, for them to
be able to repair the road. The transfer of this segment doesn’t
mean the transfer of the underground, which belongs to the
Republic of Moldova. The central authorities should explain to
the society what is the factual state of things in Palanca case.
The Government must explain what is transferred, under what
terms and which are the risks of non-performing the assumed
commitments.
4. It is necessary to create comfortable conditions for Palanca
inhabitants when crossing the highway to their plots of land. It

18


relates, in particular, to establishing a speed limit for the motor
vehicles on the highway.
5. Given the fact that there are several commercial objects along
this highway and the welfare of Palanca inhabitants depends on
them, it is necessary to ensure their existence and development
after the settlement of the Palanca issue.
6. The border demarcation in the area of Dnestrovsk dam
should be performed only when an environmental impact and
construction’s safety assessment is conducted. There are concerns
that the operation of this station will have a negative impact on
the water of the Nistru river. There is also the risk of flooding
the localities situated lower than the Dnestrovsk dam. The
Republic of Moldova could ask Ukraine to pay for continuing
to use about 18 ha of land.
7. The border demarcation and defining ownership relations in
the area of Dnestrovsk dam should be separated from border
demarcation in Giurgiulesti, because the same issue should
not be negotiated twice. The intergovernment protocol of
1998 approaches in package the highway segment in Palanca
region and the land portion at Giurgiulesti. The subject must be
approached depending on the legal status of the property of the
Republic of Moldova on the Ukrainian territory.

19


FOcuS:
OPINIONS OF EXPERTS AND
POLICYMAKERS FROM UKRAINE
AND THE REPUBLIC OF
MOLDOVA ON THE MOLDOVAN-
UKRAINIAN BORDER
VeaceslaV BerBeca

There are 3 types of news in the Ukrainian mass-media related
to the demarcation of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.
First, these are the news whose primary goal is to provide
information about the meetings and negotiation between the parties.
As an example of the most recent news we can mention the one of 18
December 2009 on the beginning of the border demarcation process
between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova on the Transnistria
segment.23 This news informs on the meeting of the Ukrainian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Petr Poroshenko with his Moldovan counterpart
Iurie Leanca in Chisinau 17 December 2009 on completion of the
demarcation of Moldovan-Ukrainian border and starting the border
demarcation on the central (Transnistrian) sector. News on installing
the first border sign on the common border of both states is included
to the same category. It refers to the installation of the first border
pillar by Poroshenko and Leanca in the central sector of the border
between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in Bolshaya Koshnitsa
village, Vinnytsia region.24 We also can remind the declaration of Petr
Poroshenko of 11 February 2010 that the Palanca road segment will
transferred in the near future.25 And the delay of this process is an
infringement of the treaty on border by the RM.
The second type of news refers to the comments in the Ukrainian
mass media on the content and results of the negotiation between
parties. These are usually criticizing the Government for the way the
23 http://delo.ua/vlast/mezdynarodnaya-politika/ukraina-nachnet-demarkaciju-granicy-s-mol-
dovoj-pridnestrovskogo-uchastka-135461/
24 http://ukranews.com/ru/news/ukraine/2010/01/29/11054
25 http://gazeta.ua/index.php?id=326828

20


Moldovan-Ukrainian border demarcation is managed and thought.
The authors of these comments sometimes make harsh accusations
against the negotiators. The accusations vary from incriminating lack
of competence to inactivity to betrayal of the national interests. At
the same time we can find in these comments serious accusations
addressed to the Moldovan authorities for not observing the assumed
commitments after the ratification of the Treaty between the Republic
of Moldova and Ukraine on the State Border in 2001. We can also see
intransigent approaches that go beyond the limit of mutual respect.
They refer to attitudes that stimulate to use blackmail tools against the
Republic of Moldova. We will make reference just to some of them
that are particularly interesting for Moldova due to how this issue is
approached.
One of the first comments of this type is entitled “Ukraine-
Moldova: pitfall for demarcators” is written by Alena Getmanchuk.26
This comment is a kind of response to the actions of the border guards
of the Republic of Moldova of 17 July 2003 - installation of a border
pillar on the territory of Dnestrovsk dam on the right bank of Nistru
river. The main idea of the article is that the ownership claims of the
Republic of Moldova authorities are unjustified and the establishment
of a border guard point at this object contradicts the principles of good
neighborhood between the countries. The author of the article states
that the Republic of Moldova neither contributed to the funding of
this enterprise, nor will it be able to provide material support to this
object as it is too expensive for the RM budget.27
Another interesting comment is “Trojan horse from Moldova”
published on 10 October 2006 by Alexander Manacinski. The author
identifies political, economic and environmental risks related to the
construction of the Giurgiulesi port.28
All these risks are the result of excessive amiability of the
Ukrainian party with respect to the demarcation of the border with the
RM, which obtained an important sector on the bank of the Danube;
the Ukraine’s MFA, starting important maneuvers around NATO and
EU lost totally the game to Chisinau.29
In the article “The Pre-Danube Region” of 20 January 2007

26 http://zn.ua/1000/1600/43477/
27 http://zn.ua/1000/1600/43477/
28 http://defense-ua.com/rus/hotnews/?id=20843
29 http://defense-ua.com/rus/hotnews/?id=20843

21


the author emphasizes the idea that RM started building the oil
terminal at Giurgiulesti on a plot of land with uncertain legal status.30
Moreover, even during the negotiation process a decision was made
to transfer to the RM a 24 ha land plot on a 430 m length on the
Danube bank in the region of Giurgiulesti village in exchange for the
Odessa-Reni highway segment in Palanca village of the Republic of
Moldova. All actions undertaken by the RM in this region endanger
the economic and environmental safety of the Reni port. All these
take place because of Ukrainian Government’s inactivity in the issue
of border demarcation with RM, which received a strategic land plot
on Danube bank.31
Another interesting article is “How the Ukrainians gave
to Moldovans a part of the Motherland and received nothing
instead” written by Antonina Bondareva and Lana Samohvalova on
24 September 2007. The authors of the article claim that Ukraine,
making a territorial exchange with the Republic of Moldova, besides
conceding easily a part of its territory, opened to its neighbor access to
sea obtaining nothing instead.32 The RM did not honor its obligations
related to the transfer to Ukraine of Odessa-Reni highway segment in
the region of the Moldovan locality of Palanca. And the Giurgiulesti
port, due to its multifunctional character is a threat to the Reni port. In
the end, the authors reach the conclusion that unilateral denouncement
of the Treaty is impossible, but it is possible to force Chisinau to fulfill
the assumed commitments. They explain that there are a number
of tools to solve this goal: from banning the export of some energy
resources to closing the border for Moldovan merchandise that transit
the Ukrainian territory.
Another example relates to the response of councilors of Izmail
City Council from Odessa region. They addressed the President,
the Chaiperson of Verkhovna Rada with respect to the intents of
the Republic of Moldova to receive some additional hectares from
Ukraine in the water area of Danube to finish the construction of the
Giurgiulesti complex. The Government is blamed for easy concessions
and inactivity with respect to demarcation of the border with the
Republic of Moldova, which obtained a strategic area of land on the
Danube bank.
30 http://forum.proua.com/index.php?showtopic=3786
31 http://forum.proua.com/index.php?showtopic=3786
32 http://unian.net/rus/news/news-213615.html

22


The result of the round table “What are we going to do with
Moldova?” is very suggestive to understand the attitude of journalists
and researchers towards the demarcation of Moldovan-Ukrainian
border. The round table was held on 5 May 2009 by “Glavred”
publication and was attended by several experts took part. One of
the participants in this round table, Vitaly Kulik, Director of the
Research Center for Civil Society Problems, identified 3 problems in
the territorial relationships between the Ukraine and the Republic of
Moldova: a) the problem related to the exchange of territory at Palanca
and Giurgiulesti, which wasn’t finished because of the Moldovan
authorities; b) the problem related to the Novodnestrovsk power
station, with respect to which the Moldovan authorities are not willing
to reach a compromise with Ukraine; c) the refusal of the Moldovan
party to perform the border demarcation together with Ukraine.33
According to Kulik, Kiev promotes a concession policy towards
Chisinau and this concession practice results from the Ukrainians’
euro-idiocy. By this he meant that Ukraine introduced many severe
measures against Transnistria in order to have a good image at Brussels.
But these measures harm the economic and political interests of Kiev
in this region. Another participant, Vladimir Lupashko, expert in
the issue of the Republic of Moldova, qualifies the Ukraine’s foreign
policy towards the neighbor, during the last years, as catastrophic and
incompetent.34 His conclusion is that Ukraine should develop another
type of relations with Transnistria and use this problem to solve the
case of highway segment in Palanca.
Another interesting comment also belongs to Vitaly Kulik
“Ukraine-Moldova: relationships taking account of elections” of
14-20 November 2008 in the „Зеркало недели” (Mirror of the
Week) weekly newspaper. The author concludes that the Moldovan
authorities, despite the assumed commitment to solve the difficult
issues at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, delayed and obstructed this
process.35 The failure to settle the Palanca case and Novodnestrovsk
power station prove that Ukraine has bad experience in solving
“packages” of problems with the Moldovan party.36 At last, the most
recent comment of Tatyana Parhomchuk “Dnestrovsk Storage Power

33 http://ukrrudprom.ua/digest/CHto_nam_delat_s_Moldovoy.html?print
34 http://ukrrudprom.ua/digest/CHto_nam_delat_s_Moldovoy.html?print
35 http://zn.ua/1000/1600/67735/
36 http://zn.ua/1000/1600/67735/

23


Station- Moldovan vers libres on the Ukrainian energetics”, no
11 (791) 20-26 March 2010 in „Зеркало недели” (Mirror of the
Week) weekly newspaper presents a non-dissembled position with the
hope that the forces that dispute the ownership over Dnestrovsk hydro-
energetic center will find enough arguments to influence the position
even of an independent country (the Republic of Moldova).37
Finally the third type of information is the one focusing on
certain aspects of the activity of institutions enabled to negotiate the
border demarcation. It also refers to the response of these institutions
to accusations of incompetence or betrayal of the Ukraine’s national
interests. This kind of news usually belongs to Ukraine’s MFA. We
can take for instance the interview “All the work on demarcation
of Ukrainian-Moldovan border is based on compromise” of
Dmitry Tkaci, Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for the
weekly newspaper „Зеркало недели” of 25-31 July 1998. Thus,
Tkaci explains that the border demarcation takes place as a result
of the fact that during the USSR, the borders among republics had
a conventional character.38 In other words, some benchmarks were
established and the border was not well-defined and not related to
a certain locality. Tkaci states that “all the work on demarcation of
Ukrainian-Moldovan border is based on compromise; it is a mutual
concession process, as it was in case of Basarabeasca settlement”.39 As a
conclusion, he stated that “even if those who do not know all nuances
of diplomacy and demarcation process think that this is, first of all,
a political exercise, actually it is a very delicate process, but bearing a
technical character”.
Another material of this kind is the response of Ukrainian
MFA towards the accusations incriminating that they don’t take
into account the national interests when demarcating the border
with the RM. In their answer, the Ukrainian MFA stated that the
activity of committee on border demarcation with RM in 1995-1999
resulted in a clarification and demarcation of border on the basis
of mutual concessions and compromise in cases where divergences
arose, especially in the region of Palanca and Giurgiulesti localities.40
According to this press release, Ukraine met all its obligations, while

37 http://zn.ua/2000/2600/68850
38 http://zn.ua/1000/17535/
39 http://zn.ua/1000/17535/
40 http://unian.net/files/1190812895.doc

24


the Republic of Moldova has not solved yet the issue of transferring
the highway sector in the region of Palanca.
It is interesting that the mass media of both parties criticized
seriously the Governments of their country. Although the discontent
and vituperation of the Ukrainian and Moldovan Governments by
mass media has different causes, but the same conclusion - the national
interest are not protected.
The Moldovan authorities are blamed for concession,
alienation of the Moldovan territory. It is usually incriminated the
infringement of the constitutional norm related to the inalienability
of the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The authorities are also
accused that were not able to prove that the Republic of Moldova had
access to Danube on an almost 1000-meter segment and the phrase
exchange of territory in case of Giurgiulesti is flummery. It is more of
an emotive approach.
The criticism addressed by Ukrainian mass media to the central
Government has a more pragmatic approach. The Kiev authorities
are accused that after the exchange of territory, Ukraine obtained
nothing because the Government of the Republic of Moldova did not
respect the assumed commitments. The Government is also criticized
for the fact that, by transferring to the Republic of Moldova the
430-meter segment at the Danube, it transformed Moldova into a
maritime country. And the construction of the port and oil terminal
in Giurgiulesti would endanger the economic and environmental
status of this region of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Government is also
blamed for making several concessions to the Republic of Moldova in
the Transnistra case, harming the national interests of Ukraine. The
Ukrainian Government is also accused of too easy concessions made
to the Republic of Moldova.

Opinions of policymakers and journalists
from the Republic of Moldova

The opinions of the Moldovan elite regarding the demarcation
of the state border are divided into three parts. On one hand we have
the representatives of the current Government, who is negotiating
with Ukraine to finish the border demarcation. On the other hand,

25


we have the opinion of the opposition that criticizes vehemently any
action of the Government. At last, the third group is represented by
experts in Law, journalists, who opt for a freezing or renegotiation of
the Additional Protocol.
The official position of the current Government is to implement
the commitments assumed by signing and ratifying the treaty and its
additional protocol. Prime-minister Filat mentioned several times
that “Moldova must observe the agreements previously signed”. The
Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs states that “in relation to the
Palanca case, we should find compromise solutions and finish the
demarcation process, so that - and it is very important- Moldova has
the 430-meter access to Danube river, confirmed by border pillars,
which is essential for the proper functioning of the Giurgiulesti port
and terminal”.41
The most bitter critics are the CPRM representatives, who, in
fact, ratified the Treaty and the Additional Protocol. But the critics
are made without offering any solutions. Generally, the accusations
refer to “concession of Moldova’s territory” or that the actions of the
Government would harm the interests of the Republic of Moldova. For
example, the former First Deputy Prime Minister, former Minister of
Economy, Igor Dodon, thinks that if Vladimir Filat signs the Protocol
recognizing the Ukrainian ownership over the Novodnestrovsk
hydroelectric power station, which is also situated on Moldova’s
territory, it will be very difficult to protect our own interest in the
demarcation of border in Giurgiulesti.42 Grigore Petrenco, communist
MP, does not know “if ti is good and necessarily needed to amend the
Additional Protocol to the Treaty” but he is certain that “the documents
ratified by the Parliament in 2001 foresee the transfer into Ukraine’s
ownership only of the highway, not also of the land under it - this is
what Ukraine wishes now and the current Government is going to do.
The concession of land under the highway means in fact annulment of
Moldova’s sovereignty over this territory”.43 Vlad Cubreacov, member
of CDPP states that “the Border Treaty with Ukraine contradicts the
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, principles on the integrity
and inalienable nature of the national land’.44
41 www.mfa.gov.md/interviuri-md/478726/, Relations between the Republic of Moldova and
Ukraine: Vision of the Moldovan Diplomacy
42 http://.omg.md/Content.aspx?id=6821&lang=1
43 http://.zdg.md/politic/cedam-palanca-sau-renegociem-protocolul
44 http://politicom.moldova.org/news/vlad-cubreacov-filat-da-palanca-ucrainei-204612-rom.

26


The third category are those who opt for the preservation
or renegotiation of the Additional Protocol. Thus, Anatol Petrencu,
historian, states that “we should concede nothing. The declarations
that the concessions at Palanca are a reward for Ukraine for the 430-
meter at Danube are pure speculations. The Ukraine adopted the
principle “ask for impossible in order to obtain the maximum” against
Moldova. What Lucinschi and then Voronin did is a crime, because
they signed and ratified a concession of property that belongs by law
to the Republic of Moldova. And if the current Government signs the
Transfer-Acceptance Statement, they will become accomplices of the
same crime. The Protocol still can and must be renegotiated”.45
The editor Petru Bogatu says that “the attempt of the current
Government to transfer fast into Ukraine’s property the land plot
adjacent to the 7.77 km segment of the Odesa-Reni highway bears
huge risks. A conflict of interests is involved and it cannot be solved
now. Under these circumstances the problem should be frozen. Any
other solution will have a high cost for the Alliance and democracy in
the Republic of Moldova”.46
As a conclusion, we can say that the attitude of the Government
is to find a compromise with the Ukrainian party and observe the
commitments assumed with respect to the signed documents. There
are also opinions that opt for the renegotiation of the Treaty and
Additional Protocol. But this can happen, according to article 9 of the
Protocol, only with the mutual agreement of the parties. In this case
we can say that the renegotiation of the Treaty depends on Ukraine’s
attitude towards such a process. With respect to the preservation of
the existing situation, it should be mentioned that such an attitude
bears some risks. Ukraine could resort to some measures of economic
constraint or could be reticent with respect to the Transnistrian issue.
Such an approach should be discussed with Ukraine.

html
45 http://.zdg.md/politic/cedam-palanca-sau-renegociem-protocolul
46 http://bogatu.voceabasarabiei.net/

27


POLITIcAL:
POLITICAL PARTIES IN 2010:
BETWEEN SCYLLA AND
CHARYBDIS
Igor Munteanu

The Political Crisis as a Litmus Paper for the
Rule of Law in the RM

Several Western authors regard the political parties as the
weakness of democracy47, stating that namely their internal weaknesses,
low capacity and inactivity worsened during the last 2 decades the major
deficiencies of the political transition: from the state party, socialist
or soviet regime towards the pluralist democracy. In the Republic of
Moldova the parties also had these deficiencies as birthmarks. The
deep agitation and political conflicts of 2009 affected the political
parties, who previously complained to the European institutions on
the difficult environment they have to cope with and the barriers they
face. During the past 5 years they brought the following examples:
the provisions of the Electoral Code on the too high threshold for
the electoral competitors and the multiple oppression exerted by the
authorities (Police, Ministry of Justice) that are loyal to the ruling
party (CPRM). In 2008, the Parliament took a decision to introduce
new amendments to the electoral legislation, passing in January 2008
the interdiction to form electoral blocks and raising the electoral
threshold from 4% to 5% without an impact analysis and any proper
internal or external consultations. The arguments presented by the
policymakers who promoted the amendment to the Electoral Code in
2008 convinced neither the political opposition of that time, nor the
European authorities, who recommended even at the end of 2007 to
diminish the electoral threshold and introduce more flexibility in the
rigid provisions.
47 Thomas Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies,
Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006

28


Nevertheless, only at the end of April 2009, PACE passed a new
resolution on the functioning of democratic institutions in Moldova
(Resolution no 1666), stimulated by the harsh confrontations between
CPRM and the opposition in April, marked by outrageous cases of
violence and torture. In its Resolution, the PACE appraised accurately
the electoral process, marked by incidents and extreme violence,
restrictions to the freedom of expression and assembly, which prevented
the opposition from communicating its ideas and programs to the
electorate. The Resolution urges the local authorities to investigate
judicially the events and to call to account the guilty persons, but
also urges authorities to resume reform the electoral legislation, in co-
operation with the European Commission for Democracy through
Law (Venice Commission), in order to lower the electoral threshold
for political parties, thus opening up the political process for more
pluralism; freedom of expression and immediately review the voters’
lists in order to establish them definitively, introducing an obligation
for regular review for the CEC, and improve them until they can
abolish in future supplementary lists; put in place mechanisms and
procedures enabling the many Moldovan citizens residing abroad to
exercise effectively their voting rights.
The difficult transfer of power to the AEI created some
deficiencies in the fulfillment of the aforementioned priorities in the
Government Program, i.e. the restoration of the political relationship
with the Council of Europe authorities, especially taking into account
the fact that the Committee for the investigation of violence of April
2009 did not manage to finish by the end of 2009 the report requested
by the Parliament. The first 100 days of the new Government overlap
with the first frictions between the initial plan and the cruel reality
of concurrent priorities for the Government. Some of the AEI
leaders think that they should search for a solution to amend the
RM Constitution, in particular Article 78, which provides for the
dissolution of the Parliament if the head of the state is not elected
after the 2nd ballot, while others would like a strengthening of the
held positions, with or without elections. The waves of MPs’ defection
from the CPRM stimulated the AEI leaders to agree upon a common
position related to the constitutional reform.
In December 2009, the current President of the RM, M.

29


Ghimpu, issued a Decree to set up a Committee responsible for
preparation of proposals for a wide amendment of RM Constitution,
constitutional reform. The establishment of this Committee creates
the illusion of an ideal technical solution at the first stage, but leaves
open all possible options of the type of the political regime promoted
by the new Constitution. The indecision and more and more visible
differences among the 4 components of the AEI nourished a certain
doubt of the public and of the European partners related to the
fact that this constitutional reform could have positive results for
the Republic of Moldova48, taking into account the fragility of the
democratic institutions from Chisinau, after the transfer of power in
September-November 2009, but also the extremely short period for
the proper organization and information of the public on the stakes
of this referendum. The Venice Commission insists on amending
Article 78, which could be possible settled in the RM Parliament, but
with few chances to succeed in the context of the bipolar relationship
between the CPRM and AEI, interwoven with a thin segment of
independent candidates. Although it doesn’t refer exactly to the
constitutional text, prepared by the Commission, we can suppose
that the European authorities (CoE) will insist on implementing the
provisions that oblige the RM President to initiate the Parliament
dissolution procedure as a result of the repeated failure to elect the head
of the state, but within a reasonable period. However, the comment
of the Venice Commission cannot be treated only in negative terms
because, although it asks the Parliament to be more reserved towards
a constitutional referendum, the main message is rather sustaining
the general effort related to a comprehensive constitutional effort,
ensuring the Moldovan authorities with all the support they could
need during the upcoming months. Taking into account all pros
and cons presented during the numerous debates on this topic, the
arguments of the Venice Commission count a lot for the liberal-
democratic Government, that can’t afford the risk to obtain the
approval of a new Constitution with the price of burning the bridges
to the European political institutions. This generates hesitations,
contradictory discussions and influence of some underwater current
on the actions and responses of AEI, as well as the people’s attitude

48 Venice Commission adopts opinion on when to dissolve the parliament of Moldova, Strasbo-
urg, 15.03.2010

30


towards the direct election of the head of state or their resistance to
a return to presidential system of Government.
But there are also other sensitive problems and issues for the
RM political parties, such as those that compromised the rightfulness
of the electoral process in 2009. With respect to this, we should
mention the bifurcation of a list of problems, depending on the
observer’s system of references: the parties are now interested more
in the electoral threshold, elimination of the ban to form electoral
blocks, even in the absorption of the overseas votes, while the civil
society seems to be much more concerned with the transparency of
the political funding, reflection of the electoral campaigns in mass
media, use of administrative resources, but also with the accuracy of
electoral lists. These dissonances, justified somehow by the interests
and mandates of organizations, could be noticed quite clearly in
March, during some public discussions.

Intentions to amend the Electoral Code and
related expectations

On 10 March 2010, a special Committee for the improvement of the
electoral legal framework, in cooperation with the Central Electoral
Commission and UNDP support made public a series of proposals
on amendments and addenda to the Electoral Code, in line with
the Parliament Decision (no 39-XVIII of 15 October 2009). Thus
these proposals meet a number of recommendations and resolutions
of the CoE, OSCE/ODIHR, as well other international and local
organizations. Among the most important news proposed by the
authors of the Electoral Support to Moldova Project, the following
could be identified:

- Annul the ban on electoral blocks;
- Introduce special regulations on overseas voting (open
additional polls);
- Annul some restrictions of the right to elect and to be
elected;
- Provide specialized training for the electoral staff by means of

31


an Ongoing Training Center;
- Create the voter registers and electoral lists, under authority
of CEC;
- Limit the use of administrative resources during the electoral
campaign;
- Regulate more accurately the rights and duties of electoral
observers;
- Electioneering and reflection of elections in the mass media;
- Adjust the regulations on the organization and conduct of
referendums (national and local).

The authors of amendments indicated sincerely some visible
flaws they could not approach due to costs or unclarity of the political
will. Thus, the assurance of electoral participation by electronic vote
is a nice and attractive goal, but too expensive in CEC opinion.
Before the contrary is proven, the initiative on amendment and
addenda to the Electoral Code does not include any cost assessment
or exact proposals on implementation of digital signature and remote
voting (electronic or by mail) in the electoral process. The package of
proposals doesn’t even include special references on the change of the
current electoral system and this is because the relevant policymakers
from the Parliament of the RM did not decide unanimously on some
major changes of the electoral process, whose choice is one of the most
important decisions in a democracy.
The new amendments aim at allowing the opening of new
polls on the premises of diplomatic missions, as well as in other places,
depending on the needs assessed in advance by the Government. At
the same time, the authors suggest to keep the voting restrictions with
respect to the people convicted to imprisonment by definitive court
ruling for particularly or exceptionally severe crimes, who execute
their sanction, as well as people deprived by this right by a definitive
court ruling (Article 13), obliging the candidates to declare, when
registering, that they have no restriction to be employed in positions
of highest importance. The package of suggestions also contains the
idea, which CEC likes mostly, to create an ongoing training center
in electoral area (Article 26/1), which would educate the resources
needed nationally when forming sector or district electoral sections

32


in due time; as well as amendment of the Electoral Code with some
provisions related to the development and management of the State
Voter Register (Article 38/1), update the electoral lists (Article 39) on
the basis of the respective register, which thus becomes an exclusive
authority of the CEC.
The proposals also envisage the tools intended to limit the
use of administrative resources, i.e. by including deputy-ministers
in the list of persons that stop their activity since are registered as
candidates and the establishment of restrictions on the use of public
goods during electoral campaigns. For sure, these provisions will
not stop the temptation of any ruling Government to use what
they control, respectively every additional interdiction should be
accompanied by proper sanctions and monitoring by the public and
stakeholders. The amendment package also includes the suggestion to
diminish the participation threshold for the organization and conduct
of referendums, implementing thus the specific recommendations
addressed to the Moldovan authorities and taking account of the
provisions of Code of Good Practice on Referendums (doc. CDL_AD-
2007-008), Guidelines for Constitutional Referendums at National
Level adopted by the Venice Commission at its 47th Plenary Meeting
(6-7 July 2001), because the current threshold contained by the
Electoral Code is considered to be an excessive demand for validating
the results of a referendum and the number of votes is considered to
be disproportionate in relation with the opportunity to consult the
population on diverse matters of national or local interest.
Thus we can state that in 2010, CEC and the Special
Parliamentary Committee plans to redress many of the accumulated
flaws of the current electoral legal framework, but to a lesser extent
in relation to political parties and essence of the electoral system.
Obviously, this finding does not diminish the expected impact of the
steps suggested by the authors focused on the improvement of general
regulations on elections, reacting thus to the criticism addressed to
the RM by various international organizations, by eliminating certain
practices and conditions that can distort the essence of the open, secret
and freely expressed vote. It is necessary to make some clarification
regarding the suggestions to diminish the electoral threshold:
The authors of the suggestions for Electoral Code amendment

33


recommend to diminish the threshold from 5% to 4% for a political
party, from 3% to 2% for independent candidates, raising the threshold
to 4% for electoral blocks. We should mention that the ban on the
electoral blocks eased the toughness of the restrictive provisions that
were establishing the electoral threshold depending on the number
of component parties. The European legal practice proves clearly that
there is no perfectly proportionate system. A certain number of votes
will always be needed to qualify a candidate or party as representative of
most votes expressed for the general or local elections and this is called
exclusion threshold and it exists in any electoral system. However,
most countries prefer a proportionate or joint system, ranging from
0.67% on Netherlands up to 10% in Turkey, 7% in Georgia, and 6%
in RM. The CoE states that have a joint electoral system use the 4 and
5% threshold and the countries with proportionate system - threshold
between 3 and 5%. Many countries use the exclusion threshold only
at electoral sector level (Spain) and others only at the national level
(Poland), or Sweden that applies them in both cases.
On several occasions, PACE expressed its position related to
the electoral threshold; e.g. the Resolution 1547 (2007) on state of
human rights and democracy in Europe, wherein it states that the
threshold higher than 3% during parliamentary elections cannot be
justified. The reason is that in a democratic country it is necessary
to encourage the expression of as many as possible opinions and
restriction of some groups of people in their inalienable right to be
represented contradicts the values of a democratic society. Further,
the Resolution 1547 recommends to the member states to diminish
the thresholds that exceed 3% for parliamentary elections. The CoE
Monitoring Committee in its 2008 report also formulated specific
recommendations saying that particular countries should diminish
the electoral threshold. Besides this exclusion threshold established
artificially by the electoral law, there are natural thresholds, also called
masked, effective or informal. These thresholds depend on the number
of representatives elected in a certain electoral district, but also on the
mandate assignment formula (d’Hondt, Saint-Lagu?, Hare), which
affect to the same extent both the small parties in obtaining their legal
representation and the legally established thresholds.
Though, if the amendments proposed with respect to the

34


electoral blocks and too high thresholds, training of electoral staff
and opening of new (itinerant) polls abroad have now a quasi-general
approval, it can be expected that the too strict regulation of broadcasting
time (Articles 64 and 64/1), including on some private channels, will
be qualified as inconvenient or even bad. Despite the stipulations
of the Informative Note on the draft law, some associations stated
that they will review them again, including with respect to: remote
voting, reflection of the campaign in mass media, regional parties,
and monitoring of the political resources. It is interesting to notice the
quite cold response of the parliamentary factions to the proposal to
annul the restriction to form electoral blocks; only the small parties or
those having major problems lately had enthusiastic attitude towards
it. But it is to be expected that this enthusiasm will burn down if
the Parliament decides to keep the 6% threshold for electoral block
formed of 2 and more constituents. It is enough to mention now that
only Our Moldova Aliance (OMA) leader proposed publicly in March
to its AEI partners to form a single electoral block in case of future
parliamentary elections.

Committee to study and evaluate the soviet
regime crimes: a beginning of lustration?

On 14 January, the Acting President of the RM set up a
Commeette to study and evaluate the totalitarian communist regime
in the Republic of Moldova, mandated to “evaluate the crimes of
the totalitarian regime” - a major backlog of the political class of the
Republic of Moldova. The Decree sets 1 June 2010 as the deadline
when the Presidential Committee shall submit a complete report
on the occurrence, functioning, and severity of communist regime
crimes, commuted made during 1917-1990, particularly based on
some papers preserved in the secret archives of the institutions of those
times (SIS, Ministry of Home Affairs, and CPSU archives).
The relatively short period and the possible political-legal
consequences kept alerted the mass media and a significant part
of the political parties, some of which used this pretext to accuse
the Acting President Mihai Ghimpu of trying to “destroy certain
political competitors” (CPRM) or “capitalize the political influence

35


on a purely academic matter”. The latter state that the totalitarian
regime crimes are known for a long time, even the Communist Party
ordered to break away from the crimes made by the famous secret
report of the General Secretary of CPSU N.S. Khrushchev, presented
during a secret meeting of the CPSU CC, before the XXth Congress
of the CPSU (25 February 1956), which meant the beginning of
the Thaw after the regime of Joseph Stalin. Later, this thaw helped
Khrushchev to remove the stalinists who outlast Stalin (Beria was
executed in 1953, V.Molotov and Gh.Malenkov were isolated by the
party management). The complete report appeared in mass media
only during M.Gorbachev’s perestroika, in March 1989, in Izvestia,
being noticed in 2007 by The Guardian as one of the few public
speeches that rocked the XXIst century. As a response, others could
mention for instance the Armenian genocide during the I Wold War,
whose adepts succeed after almost 100 years to convince the Western
countries (USA, Sweden, Netherlands, France), who accept the term
and, implicitly, its legal effects related to Turkey.
Though it would be inaccurate if we describe the creation
of the Committee as covered with gratitude signs from political
actors. The CPRM ideologists published in mass media they control
furious attacks against some members of this Committee49. Another
category of critical responses to the Commission relates to the
attitude towards some Committee members, territorial coverage
of the Committee (Transnistria is not included, as integrated
region after the formation of MASSR, in 1924, into the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic), the time frame (the period before the
establishment of the soviet regime is not included), and finally the
selective character of the evaluated period (exclusively the soviet
regime, not taking into account the crimes during the CPRM
ruling). Certainly, the context in which the Committee was set up
and the time concurrence with other political processes (failure to
elect the head of state, State Committee to review the Constitution,
initiative to adopt a new Constitution through a referendum)
resulted in a certain distortion of this measure’s message. There were
many who blamed the Committee as if it copied what had happened
many decades ago in other countries, calling the access to security
archives as elements that describe the beginning of a lustration and
49 Timpul, 24 February 2010, Who is disturbed by Cojocaru Committee?

36


healing process, needed for the entire society. Other voices told that
the value of this evaluation exceeds the strictly scientific frame and
that in both RM and Ukraine a political-legal qualification of the
old regime consequences is needed, which would underlie a speedy
and necessary desovietization in moral and political terms. Those
who welcomed the establishment of this Committee mentioned
the tardiness of this initiative - almost 2 decades after the Baltics
finished this chapter and almost 5 years after Ukraine included the
Holodomor into the most horrible crimes against the Ukrainian
ethnicity, committed by the stalinist soviet regime. Our intention is
to analyze the legal and political effects of some decisions, which will
crown the 6-month mandate of the Committee, from the perspective
of early elections in 2010.
The issuance of the Decree on the Committee to Study
and Evaluate the Totalitarian Communist Regime coincides with
the change of the political regime and termination of the almost
immovable hegemony of CPRM, whose leaders never abandoned
the rhetoric and their (ideological and political) succession of the
soviet regime. Objectively, the Parliament’s Evaluation Report
will clear even more the muddy waters of the transition from the
unipersonalism of PCRM leaders to the cohabitation of AEI leaders.
The report submitted by the Committe will become the first act
of supreme legislative authority related to the poisonous USSR
heritage, which was rejected by the Declaration of Independence, but
further tolerated by the successive implants of leaders and practices
borrowed from that regime. Although we know why the Committee
was created, it is not that clear yet what the final report will bring.
Thus, if in Romania the model of anti-communist revolution was the
Latvian 1989 revolution, the solution found were oriented towards
denying any form of rightfulness for the soviet regime, in Ukraine the
authorities adopted acts through definitive court rulings, convicting
the leaders of soviet regime J. Stalin and V. Molotov of genocide,
mobilizing itself in the effort to promote an UN resolution which
would recognize the 1932-33 famine as a form of genocide against
the Ukrainian people. It is obvious that any report developed by
the current Committee needs an open and well-intentioned political
partner to assimilate the academia’s conclusions.

37


What institutional effects the Committee’s
Report could generate?

The Committee’s Report cannot objectively stop at validating
or re-validating posthumous the statistics of the victims or summary
procedures by which the soviet regime exterminated violently the
local population. The Committee will recommend to the authorities
some actions by means of which they could prevent the phylo-soviet
revisionism in schools and universities, in politics and administration,
i.e. in the public life, whose players should learn the lessons of the
past. In this respect, the (acting) RM President will repeat the pattern
of other presidents who summarized similar reports50 and approved
these conclusions through a political statement of RM Parliament.
An example of this kind is the Latvian legislator, which passed on
15 May 2004 a Declaration on Condemnation of the Totalitarian
Communist Occupation Regime, Instituted in Latvia by the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. Nevertheless, the political reality of RM
is more fluid and predictable under these circumstances that in other
states, which could serve as useful references from this perspective. It is
enough to relate the actions started by the Cojocaru Committee to the
time frame marked for the upcoming months by the constitutional
crisis, by the possible announcement of the early elections date, by the
possible negotiations in Parliament on the amendment of Article 78
of the Constitution, etc. in order to understand that RM is far behind
the states that condemned the totalitarian regimes.
The Commission members could open the access to secret
archives, creating a strong precedent against excessive classification and
preservation of some institutions in the style of soviet KGB. Although,
only the RM Parliament could decide on a wide lustration, justified by
the evidence collected by the Committee and accepted by politicians.
Another RM paradox relates to the fact that one of the
active actors of the system of political parties - CPRM - is the legal
successor and continuator of the soviet system logics, envisaged in the
Committee’s Report. Recognizing the direct or indirect responsibility
of CPRM for the soviet regime crimes, as a measure to rehabilitate the
political victims, culminating with the possible approval of a Lustration

50 Report of Presidential Commission for the Study of the Romanian Communist Dictatorship
(Tismaneanu Report), presented in the Romanian Parliament on 18 December 2006.

38


Law, which would sanction diverse elements of the old regime and
attract particular legal consequences. Hence, the declassification of
some secret service archives or approval of lustration norms can be
forwarded to the ECtHR even by persons who are now affiliated to
the CPRM, who could hope to use the current set of European norms
and conventions in order to protect themselves or avoid any legal or
moral accountability for the crimes committed many decades in a row
by an inhuman system.
It should be mentioned with respect to this that the lustration,
as official policy against the attempts of anti-democratic revenge
had many forms and generated diverse responses. Certain elements
or distinct models of lustration were previously applied in most
countries from Central Europe, with the purpose to disqualify the
participation in the public life of those who committed abuses during
the old regime, especially: informers, high-ranking activists, as well as
certain administrative officials. Some lustration forms were harsher
than others. The specialized literature draws our attention to the more
radical character of some decommunization reforms applied by Czech
Republic and Germany in comparison with more permissive variants
applied by Poland or Romania.
For instance, in Poland the communist crime concept is
applied to actions committed by employees of the communist state
between 17 September 1939 (date when the USSR invaded Poland)
and 31 December 1989 (collapse of the communist regime), and
it refers to the repression or infringement of human rights, either
speaking of a person or a group, or to other crimes defined in this
way by the Criminal Code. After 1989, this concept was actively used
since 1998 by the Foundation for Investigation of the Communist
Crimes51, replacing the term stalinist crimes, also used previously by
the Jaruzelski military regime. We’d like to mention that the respective
Foundation was established to investigate the crimes committed by
authorities against Polish people and nation, a concept that is similar
to Nazi crimes term52. The Polish Sejm established restrictions and
limitations, starting with 1 August 1990, for 40 years in murder
cases and 30 years for other crimes, qualifying them as crimes against

51 Ustawa z dnia 18 grudnia 1998 r. o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej - Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni
przeciwko Narodowi PolskiemuPDF (299 KB). Article 2.1. . Retrieved as of 8 May 2007.
52 Genowefa Rajman, ZBRODNIE KOMUNISTYCZNE W KONCEPCJI POLSKIEGO PRAWA KARNEGO,
Wojskowy Przegląd Prawniczy, Number 1 z 2006 r.

39


humanity, peace and war crimes, and they cannot be affected by
amnesty.
The crimes committed by the communist regimes are numerous
and include: eradication of persons declared as class enemies, eradication
of the bourgeoisie, and repression of people belonging to non-proletarian
classes or to national groups considered to be unfaithful to the regime.
In the specialized literature, these actions were qualified as deliberate
murders of non-combatant groups during peaceful times, applying
the politicide term, which defines thus the eradication of political or
economic groups through mass murders (for instance, the recorded
number of 50,000 deaths caused during 5 years or fewer). Frank
Wayman and Atsushi Tago argue that depending on the use of democide
(murders generated by state-supported policies) or politicide term
(eradication of groups perceived as political enemies) by differentiating
criteria, the further qualification may generate different results53. Helen
Fein called the repressions committed by the soviet regime genocide and
the murders in Cambodia - democide54.
Some authors use the term of red holocaust to define the extent
of soviet repressions. The mass deportation of counter-revolutionary
elements from MSSR and MASSR, called enemies of the nation, the
moving of huge population groups to concentration camps in Siberia
and Kazakhstan, mass execution by firing squad and extermination of
national elites, making people die of famine and political persecutions
are qualified to both aforementioned terms. Moreover, if the researchers
test the forced russification, followed by persecutions and expropriation
of former owners, this could impose the need to review the legislation on
retroceding the property taken by the soviet regime, meaning a justice
and victim rehabilitation act.

What political effects can the Committee
generate?

The decree issued by the President M. Ghimpu makes clear references
to a series of PACE resolutions on measures to dismantle the heritage of
53 Wayman, Frank; Tago, Atsushi (2005), “Explaining the Onset of Mass Killing:The Effect of War,
Regime Type, and Economic Deprivation on Democide and Politicide, 1949–1987”, International Stu-
dies Association
54 Fein, Helen (1993). Genocide: a sociological perspective. Sage Publication. p. 75. ISBN
9780803988293. http://books.google.com/books?id=n4TaAAAAMAAJ&q=%22Soviet+and+Commu
nist+Genocides%22&dq=%22Soviet+and+Communist+Genocides%22&client=firefox-a&cd=1.

40


former communist totalitarian systems (1096 of 1996) and on need for
international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes
(1481 of 2006). There are also some older PACE recommendations,
including: Recommendation 325 (1962) on methods of communist
colonialism in Central and Eastern Europe (this paper was passed on 20
September 1962 on the basis of Doc. 1494 - Report of the Committee
on Non-represented Nations) and Recommendation 357 (1963) on
contacts with peoples of Central and Eastern Europe under Communist
rule (this paper was passed during the session of 8-9 May 1963, on the
basis of Doc. 1529 of the Committee on Non-represented Nations).
Of the newest relevant acts in this area, we can mention the Resolution
of the European Parliament of 2 April 2009 on European conscience
and totalitarianism55, Prague Declaration on European Consciences and
Communism of 3 June 200856 passed by the Senate of the Parliament
of the Czech Republic, as well as the Vilnius Declaration of the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly with respect to condemnation of Stalinism and
Nazism (3 July 2009)57.
The synthetic effect of many of these resolutions equalizes
the Stalinism with Nazism, which are equally guilty of genocides,
unprecedented violations of the human rights and freedoms, war
crimes and crimes against humanity, urging the member states to stop
xenophobia and aggressive nationalism, asking for more respect towards
the integrity of human rights and civil freedoms. It is also important
that in all these cases, most signatories of these political condemnation
papers recommend to the CoE and OSCE member states to align against
all totalitarian regimes, regardless of the ideology they promoted, to stop
giving glory to totalitarian regimes, including the performance of public
demonstrations in order to glorify the Nazi or Stalinist past.
It is easy to suppose that in case of the RM, the political appraisal
of the crimes and atrocities committed by the communist regime will
also hit directly the CPRM as political actor, who still hopes to get
back ruling in future without paying the cost of its previous and recent
illegalities. The RM Parliament will approve the report submitted by
55 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090325+ITEM-
010+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN
56 Prague Declaration on European Consciences and Communism, June 3, 2008, Senate of the
Parliament of the Czech Republic - http://praguedeclaration.org/
57 The complete title of the OSCE Declaration is Divided Europe Reunited, which was adopted
on 29 June at Vilnius. Out of the about 320 members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 320
members of the Parliament participated in it; only 8 voted against the resolution and only 4 of them
abstained.

41


the Committee, investing a symbolic and moral recovery value into
this gesture, which could further lead to regular efforts to desovietize
the institutions and the society. Though, the Committee is not a law
court and the report it will submit to the RM Parliament in June 2010
will only establish a political and moral assessment of some previous
crimes of the soviet regime, and culminate with a declaration on the
condemnation of the totalitarian regime and, implicitly, of all those who
inspire themselves from and have ideological roots in the structure of
that horrible political regime. Nevertheless, the political-legal assessment
of the soviet regime crimes can rise suggestions on the abolishment of
some parties that practice extremist ideologies, but this can happen only
if the claimer could bring evidence that a certain party, by its activity,
infringes the norms and principles guaranteed by European conventions
and ECtHR. A clarification is needed in this respect, related to the
European practice and precedents of outlawing extremist parties, the
single tool able to guide the actions of competent political authorities
that observe the rule of law.
The European institutions are generally very cautious with
respect to interdiction of political parties. On the one hand this is
explained by the protection ensured by the European Convention on
Human Rights for political and civil freedoms and, on the other hand,
by the risk of providing some lawless regimes with serious tools to limit
the political pluralism. Article 11 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states that (1) Everyone has
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association
with others including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests and (2) No restrictions shall be placed on the
exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions
on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, police or
Government administration58.
But there are also another type of cases. In February 2010, a

58 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted on 01
November 1950, Published on the official edition
“International Treaties”, 1998, volume 1, p. 341.The Convention entered into force on 3 September
1953 and it is in force for RM since 12 September 1997.

42

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