2. Agenda
Different financing mechanisms:
funding and pay-as-you-go
Advantages and disadvantages
Conditions favourable to funding
Design of funded schemes
investment/provider choices
administrative charges
guarantees
pay-out phase
Moving from pay-as-you-go to funding
3. Unfunded/pay-as-you-go schemes
Use contributions from current workers to pay
benefits to current retirees
This gives current workers “promises” in return
for contributions
Promises must be met by future generations
Promises have different legal weights countries:
from constitutional right to changeable promise
Main motivation of pay-as-you-go was earlier
benefit payout
4. An example: the United States
Real rate of return on contributions (%)
5. Prefunding
Contributions from current workers are used to
accumulate assets
These assets are used to pay benefits in the
future
Schemes can be partially funded
Benefits for current workers will be paid for by a mix
of accumulated assets and taxes/contributions paid
by future workers
6. Potential advantages of funding
Better able to deal with ageing of the population
Limits fiscal liabilities
Removes some labour-market distortions
Helps develop capital markets
Possibly increases savings and investment
Reduce politicisation of the pension system
Better rates of return on pension contributions
7. Rates of return: PAYG and funded
Sustainable rate of return on PAYG = growth of
labour force + increase in average earnings
can turn negative when labour force starts to shrink
Rate of return on funded = capital-market
return
historically, even with financial crises, this has been
greater than wage growth in developed countries
8. Distorted labour markets
PAYG schemes often:
encourage early retirement
are not portable between different jobs
are based on final salary, encouraging under-
reporting of earnings in early years
Funded schemes:
generally pay higher benefits to people who work
longer
are easily portable between different jobs
are based on contributions in each and every year
9. Politicisation of pensions
Politicisation can be a problem:
uncertainty in retirement benefits of current
pensioners and workers
potentially divisive political battles between those
who receive pensions and those who pay for them
Under PAYG, easy for governments to make
promises of future benefits
they will be out of office before the costs have to be
met
With funded schemes, higher benefits only
possible with higher contributions now
10. Capital-market development
PAYG schemes: can hinder capital-market
development if substitute for private savings for
retirement
Funded schemes tend to lead to greater variety
of financial-market instruments offered
Savings are usually intermediated through
financial markets
Some suggestion that this has a positive impact
on savings and economic growth
11. Ideal conditions for funding
Is the macroeconomy stable enough to offer
reasonably safe financial instruments?
Are sufficient financial instruments available?
option of foreign investment
but exchange-rate issues and political economy
Financial market regulation and supervision must
be strong
contributions to a funded pension are mandatory, unlike
other savings instruments
they are also longer-term savings
Administrative capacity: record-keeping, valuation
12. Investment risk
Funded schemes subject to investment risk
Important to distinguish time periods
long-term risks are not too large because rates of
return relatively stable
short-term risks can be large if the markets fall when
you want to retire
Measures to mitigate risks of financial crises
Important to remember risks with PAYG
political risk: a new government changes its mind
fiscal risk: there isn’t enough money to pay for
pensions (arrears)
13. Scale of investment risk
Percentile of distribution
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Market data
Rate of return 5.5 6.1 6.6 7.0 7.3 7.7 8.0 8.5 9.0
Replacement rate 54.8 63.7 72.3 80.2 86.9 96.7 104.9 120.4 138.6
Note
10% contribution
OECD average mortality rates
40-year term to age 65
50:50 equity:government-bond portfolio
14. Market and individual returns
Administrative charges
0.75-2.00% in accumulation stage
0.25-0.50% for annuity purchase
Tracking error
0.25-0.30% reduction in return
Agency and governance effects
Portfolio restrictions
Ageing might reduce future returns
15. Administrative charges
Complex charge structures
comparisons are difficult both
between countries and between
providers
A single measure of charges:
charge ratio: proportion of
accumulated balance
reduction in yield: proportion
of assets in fund at any one
time
16. Administrative charges
Complex charge structures
comparisons are difficult both
between countries and between
providers
A single measure of charges:
charge ratio: proportion of
accumulated balance
reduction in yield: proportion
of assets in fund at any one
time
Illustration:
assume 3.5% real return, 2%
wage growth and 40 year term
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Charge, % of assets
Charge,
% of accumulation
17. Percentile of distribution
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Market data
Rate of return 5.5 6.1 6.6 7.0 7.3 7.7 8.0 8.5 9.0
Replacement rate 54.8 63.7 72.3 80.2 86.9 96.7 104.9 120.4 138.6
Rescaled
Rate of return 3.2 3.8 4.3 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.7 6.2 6.7
Replacement rate 32.2 36.8 41.2 45.2 48.6 53.5 57.6 65.3 74.2
Scale of investment risk
Note
10% contribution
OECD average mortality rates
40-year term to age 65
50:50 equity:government-bond portfolio
18. Types of guarantee in overall
pension/tax systems
Portfolio of different kinds of pensions:
subject to investment risk:
DC plans in many OECD, LAC and ECA countries
not subject to investment risk:
DB/points in Costa Rica, Uruguay, Slovak Republic, Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Switzerland
NDC in Poland, Sweden
basic in Kosovo, Netherlands, New Zealand, new UK scheme
offset investment risk:
targeted, means-tested, minimum benefits in Australia,
Mexico, Hong Kong
Role of taxation
20. Australia
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Superannuation
guarantee
Replacement
rate
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
Deciles of distribution of investment returns
Age pension
21. Australia
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Replacement
rate
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
Deciles of distribution of investment returns
Superannuation
guarantee
Age pension
22. Other countries
Denmark Poland
10 25 50 75 90
Targeted and
basic
After taxes
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Percentile point of distribution of investment returns
Replacement rate
(% of gross earnings)
Defined
contribution
10 25 50 75 90
Public earnings-
related
After taxes
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Percentile point of distribution of investment returns
Replacement rate
(% of gross earnings)
Defined
contribution
Defined
contribution
Defined
contribution
Defined
contribution
23. Rate of return guarantees
Should meet pension principles, e.g.,
transparency, self-financing
Should enhance security and adequacy
Five key design issues:
fixed return (Switzerland, Iceland) or minimum
(Belgium, Germany)
real or nominal (Czech Republic, Germany)
level (often zero: CZR, DEU; 2% CHE; 3%+ BEL)
absolute (above) or relative (to other funds: Chile
Poland; or to benchmark return: Slovenia)
period covered (6 mnths SVK, 1 yr CZR, 3yrs CHL,
entire period of membership DEU)
24. Costs
Capital 2% Indexed Ongoing Floating
Guarantee 0%
nominal
2%
nominal
0%
real
0%
nominal
1yr interest
rate
Period Membership Membership Membership Annual Membership
Charges (%) 0.86% 3.33% 3.67% 6.08% 15.96%
Loss in
pension (%)
1.28% 4.98% 5.49% 7.14% 23.81%
25. Providing funded schemes 1
Many possible structures
single public agency (provident funds)
single pension fund, but privately managed (UK Nest)
a few private pension funds (Uruguay)
many private pension funds (Chile, Poland)
public and private pension funds (Mexico, Russia)
Investment choice
single portfolio per pension fund
multiple portfolios per pension fund
restrictions on who can own what type of portfolio
26. Paying out funded pensions
Annuity
pension balance transferred to insurance company
which provides regular payments
indexation?
survivors benefits?
Programmed withdrawal
balance divided by life expectancy determines
pension in any given year
remainder continues to earn interest
Lump sum
Combination of or choice among the above
27. Moving from PAYG to funding:
transition costs
If all or part of contributions of current workers
are diverted to funded accounts, how can
current pensions be paid?
Possibility of transition ‘double burden’
one generation pays for its own and its parents’
pensions
Also, current workers also have rights accrued
in the public, PAYG scheme
e.g. a 40-year old may have 20 years of contributions
in the PAYG scheme and needs compensating
28. Accrued rights
Existing pensioners: benefits continue to be paid
as before
Existing contributors:
maintain a pro-rated benefit from the PAYG scheme
‘recognition bonds’: value reflects accrued benefits,
bond can be accessed at retirement
How are accrued rights valued?
e.g., indexation, retirement age, accrual rates,
minimum pensions
29. Transition costs and design issues
Who is allowed to switch to the funded scheme?
option or mandatory?
age cut-offs?
Gradual increase in contribution rates to funded
scheme over time
Room to increase overall contribution rates?
‘add-on’ versus ‘carve-out’ funded scheme