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Made by Elder Nick Quan of Period 4
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3. No question has tantalized historians of the wartime period more than this
one. Did Roosevelt know the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor, and did 1
he deliberately allow the attack that took more than 2,000 American lives?

4. No question has tantalized historians of the wartime period more than this
one. Did Roosevelt know the Japanese were going to attack Pear Harbor, and did 1
he deliberately allow the attack that took more than 2,000 American lives?
There are two basic views about America’s entry into the war. The first say
that FDR was preoccupied with the war in Europe and didn’t want war with Japan.
American strategic thinking, perhaps reflecting Anglo-Saxon racism about Japanese
abilities, dismissed the Japanese military threat.
Hitler is a much
bigger threat
than Tojo. I
don’t need to
worry about
Japan.

5. No question has tantalized historians of the wartime period more than this
one. Did Roosevelt know the Japanese were going to attack Pear Harbor, and did 1
he deliberately allow the attack that took more than 2,000 American lives?
There are two basic views about America’s entry into the war. The first say
that FDR was preoccupied with the war in Europe and didn’t want war with Japan.
American strategic thinking, perhaps reflecting Anglo-Saxon racism about Japanese
abilities, dismissed the Japanese military threat.
The other says that FDR view Japan, allied to the German-Italian Axis, as
his entrée into the European war. This stand holds that FDR made a series of
calculation provocations that pushed Japan into war with America. The ultimate
conclusion to this view is that FDR knew of the imminent Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor and not only failed to prevent it, but welcomed it as the turning point that
would end isolationist obstruction of his war plans.
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7. Neither view is seamless, and the reality may lie in a combination of two, with
such factors as human frailty, overconfidence on both sides, and the tensions of a world 2
already at war thrown in. You might also cast a vote for historical inevitability. A
clash between Japan and the United States and other Western nations over control of
the economy and resources of the Far East and Pacific was bound to happen. A small
island with limited resources but great ambitions, Japan had to reach out to control its
destiny. That put it on a collision course with the Western nations that had established a
colonial presence in the Pacific and Asia, and had their own plans for exploiting that part
of the world.

8. Neither view is seamless, and the reality may lie in a combination of two, with
such factors as human frailty, overconfidence on both sides, and the tensions of a world 2
already at war thrown in. You might also cast a vote for historical inevitability. A
clash between Japan and the United States and other Western nations over control of
the economy and resources of the Far East and Pacific was bound to happen. A small
island with limited resources but great ambitions, Japan had to reach out to control its
destiny. That put it on a collision course with the Western nations that had established a
colonial presence in the Pacific and Asia, and had their own plans for exploiting that part
of the world.
With that in mind, there are certain facts that remain. Japanese-American
relations were bad in the 1930s, and worsened when the Japanese sank an American
warship, the Panay, on the Yangtze River late in 1937, a clear violation of all treaties and
an outright act of war. But America was not ready to go to war over a single ship.
Attempting to influence the outcome of China’s struggle against Japan, Roosevelt
loaned money to the Nationalists in China and began to ban exports to Japan of
certain goods that eventually included gasoline, scrap iron, and oil.
$
Loans money
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10. Were these provocations to force Japan into war, or sensible reactions to
Japanese aggression in China and elsewhere in Asia? Historical opinion divides on 3
this point. It is clear that moderation on either side might have prevailed. But in the
United States, the Secretary of State was demanding complete Japanese withdrawal
from their territorial conquests. At the same time in Japan, hawkish militants led by
General Hideki Tojo (1884-1948) had gained power. Moderation was tossed aside and
the two speeding engines continued on a runaway collision course.
Historical
Opinion

11. Were these provocations to force Japan into war, or sensible reactions to
Japanese aggression in China and elsewhere in Asia? Historical opinion divides on 3
this point. It is clear that moderation on either side might have prevailed. But in the
United States, the Secretary of State was demanding complete Japanese withdrawal
from their territorial conquests. At the same time in Japan, hawkish militants led by
General Hideki Tojo (1884-1948) had gained power. Moderation was tossed aside and
the two speeding engines continued on a runaway collision course.
By late in 1941, it was more than apparent that war was coming from Japan.
American and foreign diplomats in Japan dispatched frequent warnings about the
Japanese mood. And more significantly, the Japanese diplomatic coder had been
broken by American intelligence. Almost all messages between Tokyo and its
embassy in Washington were being intercepted and understood by Washington.
Embassy
Japan sends/
Agencies sends/
receives
intercept receives
messages
messages, messages
translates
and reads
them. Then
sends them
Japan to their
recipients. Embassy in Washington
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Intelligence Agencies

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13. There is no longer any doubt that some Americans knew that “Zero Hour,” as
the Japanese ambassador to Washington called the planned attack, was scheduled to 4
December 7. They even knew it would come at Pearl Harbor. According to John
Toland’s account of Pearl Harbor, Infamy, Americans had not only broken the Japanese
code, but the Dutch had done so as well, and their warnings had been passed on to
Washington. A British double agent code-named Tricycle had also sent explicit warnings
to the United States.

14. There is no longer any doubt that some Americans knew that “Zero Hour,” as
the Japanese ambassador to Washington called the planned attack, was scheduled to 4
December 7. They even knew it would come at Pearl Harbor. According to John
Toland’s account of Pearl Harbor, Infamy, Americans had not only broken the Japanese
code, but the Dutch had done so as well, and their warnings had been passed on to
Washington. A British double agent code-named Tricycle had also sent explicit warnings
to the United States.
Here is where human frailty and overconfidence, and even American racism
take over. Most American military minds expected a Japanese attack to come in the
Philippines, America’s major base in the Pacific; the American naval fortifications at
Pearl Harbor on Oahu were believed to be too strong to attack, as well as too far away
for the Japanese. The commanders there prepared for an attack by saboteurs, which
explains why the battleships were packed together in the harbor, surrounded defensively
by smaller vessels, and why planes were parked in neat rows in the middle of the airstrip
at Hickam Field, ready to be blasted by Japanese bombing runs.
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16. Many Americans, including Roosevelt, dismissed the Japanese as combat
pilots because they were all presumed to be “nearsighted.” The excellence of their eyes 5
and flying abilities came as an expensive surprise to the American military. There was
also a sense that any attack on Pearl Harbor would be easily repulsed. The Japanese
would get a bad spanking, and America would still get the war it wanted in Europe.
Whether or not the attack was invited and specific warnings were ignored, the complete
devastation of the American forces at Pearl Harbor was totally unexpected. Even today,
the tally of that attack is astonishing. Eighteen ships were sunk or seriously damaged,
including eight battleships. Of these eight, six were later salvaged. Nearly two hundred
airplanes were destroyed on the ground, and 2,403 people died that morning, nearly half
of them aboard the battleship Arizona, which took a bomb down its smokestack and
went to the bottom in minutes.

17. Many Americans, including Roosevelt, dismissed the Japanese as combat
pilots because they were all presumed to be “nearsighted.” The excellence of their eyes 5
and flying abilities came as an expensive surprise to the American military. There was
also a sense that any attack on Pearl Harbor would be easily repulsed. The Japanese
would get a bad spanking, and America would still get the war it wanted in Europe.
Whether or not the attack was invited and specific warnings were ignored, the complete
devastation of the American forces at Pearl Harbor was totally unexpected. Even today,
the tally of that attack is astonishing. Eighteen ships were sunk or seriously damaged,
including eight battleships. Of these eight, six were later salvaged. Nearly two hundred
airplanes were destroyed on the ground, and 2,403 people died that morning, nearly half
of them aboard the battleship Arizona, which took a bomb down its smokestack and
went to the bottom in minutes.
A day after the attack, Roosevelt delivered his war message to Congress. The
long-running battle between isolationists and interventionists was over.
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