ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY: TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION

by
Ginandjar Kartasasmita

National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Tokyo, Japan
2012

THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO

• a country of 240 million (as of 2010),
• an archipelago strung 5000 kilometers along the equator.
• more than 13,000 islands, 5,000 are inhabited.
• more than 200 ethnic groups and 350 languages and dialects.
• 85 to 90% are Muslims.
Day2_GRIPS 2012 www.ginandjar.com 2

Release of Political
Prisoners International
Multi Party Acknowledgement
Freedom of
Speech • Strong Parliament
• Constitutional
Political Human Rights Court
Gus Dur
Rule of Law • Robust Civil
Habibie Society
Good Governance
• Free Press
Decentralization Megawati SBY
Early Stage of
Economic Recovery
Fall of Reversed
New Order Economic Constitutional Return of
Reform 1999 2004 Democratic
Downturn Election Amendments Election Government Economic Stability
Early Stage of Return of Growth
Economic
Recovery Return of Poverty
Reduction
Foundation for
Sustainable
Economic Growth
Fight Against
Corruption
Independence of
Economic Monetary Regional
Authority Autonomy
Dismantling
Monopolies Peace in
Free and Fair •Aceh
Competition •Papua

Good Corporate
Governance

Active Formal
Opposition

Externally
Induced

SBY vs MEGAWATI
Economic
Dynamic Response
Economic
& 2008 2010 SBY
Political Crisis Election Reelected
Condition
Political
Response

Dissatisfied
Public

Nostalgia for
Original 1945
Constitution

Call for 5th
Amendment


CONTENTS
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
– THE PRE‐COLONIAL KINGDOMS
– DUTCH COLONIALISM
– RISE OF INDONESIA’S NATIONALISM
– CONSTRUCTION OF INDEPENDENCE
– BIRTH OF A NATION
– WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 1945 ‐ 1949
– RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENCE
– AN ATTEMPT AT LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
– THE TURBULENT YEARS
– GUIDED DEMOCRACY
– THE CONFRONTATION AGAINST THE WEST
– SUKARNO: THE ROMANTIC REVOLUTIONARY
– THE END OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND THE RISE OF THE NEW
ORDER

5

CONTENTS

INDONESIA UNDER THE NEW ORDER
– POLITICAL SYSTEM UNDER THE NEW ORDER
– TO WHAT EXTENT WAS INDONESIA A DEMOCRACY ?
– “FUSION” OF POLITICAL PARTY (1973)
– DEMOCRATIC OR NON‐DEMOCRATIC?
– WHAT KEPT THE REGIME IN POWER SO LONG?
– DEVELOPMENT TRILOGY
– POLITICAL STABILITY
– ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EQUITY
– WHAT WENT WRONG?
– A RENEWED MANDATE: WASTED OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE
– THE FLASH POINT
– THE FINAL CURTAIN
– CONCLUSION

6

CONTENTS
 ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY
 HABIBIE GOVERNMENT
– INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING
– THE LEGITIMACY DILEMMA
– MPR SESSION
– MPR SPECIAL SESSION
– OPPOSITION AGAINST HABIBIE
– HABIBIE’S POLITICAL PILLARS
– COMMUNAL STRIFE
– LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY
– POLITICAL PARTIES AND GENERAL ELECTION 1999
– SOME OF THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL LAWS
– IRONICALLY
– THE PITFALLS
– EAST TIMOR
– BANK BALI CASE
– THE END OF THE BEGINNING
7

CONTENTS

ABDURRAHMAN WAHID GOVERNMENT
– DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
– THE EUPHORIA
– POLITICAL LIMBO
– DISHONORING THE DEAL
– ECONOMIC SLIPPAGE
– DEJA VU?
– CORRUPTION SCANDALS
– DEMOCRATIC REVERSAL
– IMPEACHMENT
MEGAWATI GOVERNMENT
– THE DOWNSIDE
– AUTHORITARIAN NOSTALGIA

8

CONTENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
– THE CONSTITUTION: A SACRED DOCUMENT?
– THE WEAKNESSES OF THE ORIGINAL UUD ‘45
– THE EVOLVING POLITICAL SYSTEM
– GOALS OF REFORM
– THE METHODOLOGICAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM
– THE MECHANICS OF REFORM AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
– THE AMENDMENT PROCESS
– THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1999
– THE SECOND AMENDMENT 2000
– THE THIRD AMENDMENT 2001
– THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 2002
– STRONG FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY

9

CONTENTS
 PRACTICING DEMOCRACY: The 2004 General
Elections: Significant Beginnings
– CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
– STATE INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE AMENDED CONSTITUTION
– REMAKING THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
– LEGISLATIVE ELECTION
– LEGISLATIVE ELECTION
– PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
– THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2004 ELECTION
– DIRECT REGIONAL ELECTIONS
 2009 GENERAL ELECTION
 DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: An Unfinished
Business
 LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
 POST‐SCRIPT
10

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

11

THE PRE‐COLONIAL KINGDOMS

 RULED BY SEVERAL HINDU/BUDDHIST
KINGDOMS.
 ESTABLISHED CONTACTS AND RELATIONS WITH
OTHER POWERS IN ASIA SUCH AS CHINA, INDIA,
AND CONTINENTAL SOUTH EAST ASIA .
 IN THE ISLAMIC ERA MOSTLY MUSLIM
KINGDOMS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE
ARCHIPELAGO.


DUTCH COLONIALISM

 FIRST CAME TO INDONESIA AT THE END OF THE
16TH CENTURY AS TRADERS, AND LATER AS
COLONIZERS.
 THE COLONIAL RULE WAS ESTABLISHED GRADUALLY,
ISLAND‐BY‐ISLAND, AFTER CONQUERING OR
TRICKING THE VARIOUS KINGDOMS TO
SUBSERVIENCE.
 BY PLAYING OFF INDIGENOUS KINGDOMS AGAINST
EACH OTHER AND EXPLOITING DIVISIONS AND
SCRAMBLES FOR POWER WITHIN THE ROYAL
HOUSEHOLDS.
 THE DUTCH RULED THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO
FOR AROUND THREE AND A HALF CENTURIES.

RISE OF INDONESIA’S NATIONALISM

 MAY 20, 1908 THE BIRTH OF AN INTELLECTUAL
ORGANIZATION BUDI UTOMO, COMMEMORATED
AS THE “NATIONAL AWAKENING DAY.”
 OCTOBER 28, 1928 DECLARATION OF THE YOUTH
OATH: ONE COUNTRY, ONE NATION, ONE
LANGUAGE: INDONESIA.
 IN WORLD WAR II, THE JAPANESE MILITARY DROVE
OUT THE DUTCH AND OCCUPIED INDONESIA AS THE
NEW COLONIAL RULER.


CONSTRUCTION OF INDEPENDENCE

 THE DEFEAT OF THE DUTCH AT THE HANDS OF AN
ASIAN POWER FUELED THE RISE OF INDIGENOUS
RESISTANCES.
 THE JAPANESE ALLOWED A COMMITTEE TO BE
ESTABLISHED TO “INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE.”
 WHAT PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION THE
INDEPENDENT INDONESIA STATE SHOULD BE BUILT?


 THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF INDONESIA’S
INDEPENDENCE AGREED ON PANCASILA AS THE
STATE PHILOSOPHY.
 PANCASILA: 1) BELIEF IN THE ONE AND ONLY
GOD; 2) JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY; 3) THE
UNITY OF INDONESIA; 4) DEMOCRACY; 5) SOCIAL
JUSTICE.


 THE JAKARTA CHARTER:
BELIEF IN ONE AND ONLY GOD AND ENSURING
THE FREEDOM OF WORSHIP, WITH AN
ADDITIONAL STIPULATION THAT THE ISLAMIC
SYARIAH (OR LAWS) SHOULD BE PRACTICED BY
ITS ADHERENTS.


BIRTH OF A NATION
 ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR AN INDEPENDENT
NATION HAD ALREADY EXISTED WHEN THE JAPANESE
SURRENDERED TO THE ALLIED POWERS.
 AUGUST 17 1945, SUKARNO AND HATTA ON BEHALF
OF THE PEOPLE, PROCLAIMED THE INDEPENDENCE OF
INDONESIA.
 AUGUST 18, 1945: THE PROMULGATION OF THE 1945
CONSTITUTION, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
GOVERNMENT WITH SUKARNO AS PRESIDENT AND
HATTA AS VICE PRESIDENT.
 INDONESIA UNDER THE 1945 CONSTITUTION: A
NATIONALIST, NON‐SECTARIAN, UNITARIAN REPUBLIC
WITH A PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
1945 ‐ 1949

 THE DUTCH REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THEIR FORMER COLONY.
 ASSISTED BY THEIR ALLIES PUT AN ATTEMPT TO
REESTABLISH CONTROL.
 THE FLEDGLING NATION HAD ALSO TO FACE
DOMESTIC CHALLENGES: MUSLIM EXTREMISTS
AND COMMUNIST REVOLT IN 1948.


RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENCE

 IN DECEMBER 1949, THE DUTCH FINALLY RECOGNIZED
THE INDEPENDENCE OF INDONESIA IN THE FORM OF
A FEDERATED REPUBLIC.
 AUGUST L950 THE FEDERAL STATE WAS ABOLISHED
AND THE UNITARIAN REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
REESTABLISHED.
 PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF 1950: A
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT HEADED
BY A PRIME MINISTER RESPONSIBLE TO A PARLIAMENT,
WHILE THE PRESIDENT WAS ONLY THE HEAD OF STATE
AND HAD ALMOST NO POLITICAL POWER.


AN ATTEMPT AT LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
 IN 1955 A FREE AND FAIR MULTIPARTY ELECTION IN THE FIRST
GENERAL ELECTION, TO ELECT THE PARLIAMENT AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY (KONSTITUANTE).
 THE WEAK SHORT‐LIVED GOVERNMENTS CREATED A
LEADERSHIP VACUUM AND INDECISIVENESS AT TIME WHEN
STRONG LEADERSHIP WAS NEEDED.
 IN 1957 THE GOVERNMENT DECLARED A STATE OF EMERGENCY
 THE KONSTITUANTE FAILED TO REACH THE NECESSARY
MAJORITY TO GET AN AGREEMENT ON A NEW CONSTITUTION.
 ON JULY 5TH, L959, THE PRESIDENT SUKARNO DISSOLVED THE
PARLIAMENT AND KONSTITUANTE WITH A PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE AND RESTORED THE 1945 CONSTITUTION.
 SUKARNO DECLARED THAT LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, HAD FAILED
IN INDONESIA AND HAD BROUGHT ONLY DISUNITY AND MISERY
TO THE PEOPLE.

THE TURBULENT YEARS
 CENTRAL AUTHORITY BEING CHALLENGED BY SEPARATIST
MOVEMENTS IN THE REGIONS.
 THE DARUL ISLAM CONTINUED TO POSE SECURITY
PROBLEMS.
 CONFLICT WITH THE FORMER COLONIAL MASTER HAD
RESUMED, AS THE DUTCH KEPT THEIR HOLD ON WEST
IRIAN.
 SINCE MOST WESTERN COUNTRIES SUPPORTED THE
DUTCH POSITION ON THE WEST IRIAN ISSUE, INDONESIA
TURNED TO THE EASTERN BLOC TO PROCURE THE
MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
 THE RISE OF THE MILITARY ROLE IN POLITICS: THE DUAL
FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY.

GUIDED DEMOCRACY

 SUKARNO PROCLAIMED “GUIDED DEMOCRACY” AS THE
SUITABLE SYSTEM FOR INDONESIA.
 THE PROVISIONAL MPR CONFERRED UPON SUKARNO
THE TITLE OF THE GREAT LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION,
WHICH IN EFFECT CARRIED MORE POWER THAN WHAT
THE MERE TITLE MAY SUGGEST.
 SUKARNO ENDED INDONESIA’S FIRST ATTEMPT AT
DEMOCRACY. INDONESIA NOW JOINED THE GROUP OF
COUNTRIES TO REVERSE FROM DEMOCRACY TO
AUTHORITARIANISM.


THE CONFRONTATION AGAINST THE WEST
 PRESIDENT SUKARNO WAS OPPOSED TO THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW MALAYSIAN STATE, AND
ACCUSED IT AS NO MORE THAN A WESTERN
NEOCOLONIAL PLOY.
 TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY CONFRONTATION, INDONESIA
BECAME MORE DEPENDENT ON ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
AID FROM THE SOVIET BLOC.
 SUKARNO DEVELOPED THE IDEA OF FORMING THE NEW
EMERGING FORCE AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO WESTERN‐
DOMINATED INTERNATIONAL POLITICS.
 ISOLATION FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD REACHED ITS
PEAK WHEN SUKARNO ANNOUNCED INDONESIA’S
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UNITED NATIONS IN JANUARY
1965.

SUKARNO: THE ROMANTIC REVOLUTIONARY

 THE ORDINARY INDONESIAN PEOPLE LOVED
SUKARNO
 HE WAS A MAN OF VISION, AN ARDENT
NATIONALIST ALBEIT A ROMANTIC IDEALIST.
 HE IMBUED AMONG THE PEOPLE THE PRIDE OF
BEING INDONESIAN AND SPENT ALL HIS ADULT LIFE
PROJECTING THE DIGNITY OF A NATION WITH LONG
HISTORY, CULTURE, AND TRADITION.
 HE WAS REGARDED IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD
AS A GREAT LEADER AND A WORLD STATESMAN


 INDONESIA UNDER SUKARNO TOOK A LEADING
ROLE IN ASIAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES SOLIDARITY
AND FIGHT AGAINST COLONIALISM
 SUKARNO TOGETHER WITH THIRD WORLD LEADERS
INITIATED THE NON‐ALIGNED MOVEMENT, WHICH
UNTIL TODAY STILL EXISTS
 BUT HIS MISGUIDED ECONOMIC POLICIES BASED ON
THE NOTION OF A “GUIDED ECONOMY” BROUGHT
CHAOS TO THE ECONOMY AND INCREASED
SUFFERING FOR THE COMMON PEOPLE


THE END OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND
THE RISE OF THE NEW ORDER
 ON SEPTEMBER 30TH 1965, AN ABORTED COUP
D’ETAT WAS ALLEGEDLY STAGED BY THE
COMMUNIST PARTY
 TWO MILITARY FIGURES ESCAPED FROM THE
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, GENERAL NASUTION AND
MAYOR GENERAL SUHARTO
 PROCEEDED TO MOBILIZE THE LOYAL MILITARY
FORCES, AND NEUTRALIZED THE UNITS THAT WERE
INVOLVED IN THE MUTINY.
 THE RIFT OF PRESIDENT SUKARNO AND THE
MILITARY CAME INTO THE OPEN.

 ON MAY 11TH 1966 PRESIDENT SUKARNO, UNDER
PRESSURE FROM THE MILITARY AND THE PUBLIC,
ISSUED A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO ACCEDE
AUTHORITY OF DAY‐TO‐DAY GOVERNMENT TO
GENERAL SUHARTO
 IN THE 1968 THE PROVISIONAL MPR DISMISSED
SUKARNO AS PRESIDENT AND APPOINTED GENERAL
SUHARTO AS HIS SUCCESSOR, HENCE RISE OF THE
NEW ORDER


INDONESIA UNDER
THE
NEW ORDER
29

MPR is manifestation of the
people sovereignty has the
People’s Consultative Assembly authority to:
(MPR)  Amend the Constitution.
 Elect the President and/or Vice
President.
 Impeach the President and/or
Vice‐President.
Parliament Regional Functional  Determine the State Policy
(DPR) Representatives Group Guidelines.

Elected directly Elected by Appointed:
by the people Regional Representative of mass
Assembly organization and Civil
Society


POLITICAL SYSTEM UNDER
THE NEW ORDER
 THE NEW ORDER REGIME RELIED HEAVILY ON A SET
OF STRUCTURES OF IDEAS BASED ON INDONESIAN
CULTURES, ESPECIALLY JAVANESE CULTURE.
 THE NEW ORDER CARRIED OVER THE “GUIDED
DEMOCRACY” PRINCIPLES OF THE PRECEDING REGIME,
THROUGH A MORE REFINED AND SUBTLE METHOD.
 THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR IDEOLOGY BECAME
“PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE”; ISLAMIC EXTREMISM
RANKED SECOND
 THE NEW ORDER TRIED TO DEFINE ITS POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY BETWEEN “WESTERN” INDIVIDUALISM AND
“EASTERN” COLLECTIVISM.

 IN THE “PANCASILA DEMOCRACY” SYSTEM, THE
WESTERN IDEA OF OPPOSITION WAS REJECTED.
 THE SUHARTO REGIME WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS
TO ESTABLISH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS
POLITICAL PARTIES, GENERAL ELECTIONS, AND
ELECTED PARLIAMENT.


TO WHAT EXTENT WAS INDONESIA A DEMOCRACY ?

 GOLKAR, THE RULING ‘PARTY’, WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1964
ORIGINALLY AS AN EXTENDED ARM OF THE MILITARY TO
COMBAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) THROUGH
POLITICAL MEANS.
 THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THE NEW ORDER WAS HELD IN
1971 PARTICIPATED BY NINE POLITICAL PARTIES AND
GOLKAR.
 IN 1973 THE “FUSION” WAS COMPLETED, IN WHICH THE
ISLAMIC PARTIES MERGED INTO PPP, AND THE NATIONALIST
AND CHRISTIAN PARTIES “FUSED” INTO PDI.
 IN EVERY GENERAL ELECTION FROM 1977 TO 1997 WAS
CONTESTED BY THESE THREE PARTIES.
 GOLKAR UNFAILINGLY WINNING EVERY ELECTION,
GARNERING AT LEAST TWO THIRD OF THE VOTES.

“FUSION” OF POLITICAL PARTY (1973)

GOLKAR

PPP: PDI:
NU PNI
Parkindo
Parmusi
Katolik
PSII IPKI
Perti Murba


DEMOCRATIC OR NON‐DEMOCRATIC?

 THE WAY THE SYSTEM WORKED DURING THE NEW ORDER
OBVIOUSLY DID NOT MEET THE BASIC PRINCIPLES REQUIRED
IN A DEMOCRACY IN TERMS OF POLITICAL PARTIES,
ELECTIONS AND REPRESENTATION AS ARGUED BY MOST
SCHOLARLY LITERATURE.
 THE EXISTENCE OF CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS AND INTEREST
GROUPS WAS HIGHLY REGULATED, AND ONLY THE ONES
THAT WERE ESTABLISHED OR RECOGNIZED BY THE
GOVERNMENT WERE ALLOWED TO EXIST, THESE INCLUDING
THE BUSINESS, LABOR, JOURNALIST, YOUTH, AND WOMEN
ORGANIZATIONS.
 THE ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION IS ONE OF THE
ESSENTIAL ARGUMENTS REFUTING THE NEW ORDER’S
CLAIM TO DEMOCRACY.

WHAT KEPT THE REGIME IN POWER SO LONG?

 IF INDONESIA WAS NOT A TRUE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT, WHAT KEPT THE SYSTEM IN POWER FOR SO
LONG AND WHAT WAS THE SOURCE OF ITS RESILIENCE?
 PABOTTINGI (1995: 225) REFLECTING THE VIEW OF MANY
ANALYSTS SUGGESTS THAT “…INCUMBENTS AND
SUPPORTERS OF THE NEW ORDER ARGUE ITS LEGITIMACY
ON TWO KEY GROUNDS: POLITICAL STABILITY AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.”
 THE ENDLESS POLITICAL STRIFE OF THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM OF
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND GUIDED DEMOCRACY
CREATED ACUTE POLITICAL INSTABILITY THAT RENDERED
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IMPOSSIBLE AND EVEN
THREATENED THE SURVIVAL OF THE STATE.


 HUNTINGTON ARGUES THAT MANY AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
INITIALLY JUSTIFY THEMSELVES BY WHAT HE CALLS A
“NEGATIVE LEGITIMACY,” BASING THEIR CLAIM OF LEGITIMACY
ON THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS AND PROMISING
THAT THE NEW REGIME IS COMBATING INTERNAL SUBVERSION,
REDUCING SOCIAL TURMOIL, REESTABLISHING LAW AND
ORDER, ELIMINATING CORRUPTION AND VENAL CIVILIAN
POLITICIANS, AND ENHANCING NATIONAL VALUES.
 THESE WERE THE EXACT RATIONALES THE NEW ORDER PUT
FORWARD WHEN IT EMERGED IN 1966 WITH THE SUPPORT OF
STUDENTS, INTELLECTUALS AND VARIOUS MASS AND
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS.
 AND INDEED THOSE OBSERVATIONS HELP EXPLAIN WHY THE
NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT UNDER SUHARTO HAD BEEN ABLE
TO STAY IN POWER FOR SO LONG: IT DELIVERED!
Day2_GRIPS www.ginandjar.com 37

 AT ITS INCEPTION THE NEW ORDER CONSIDERED ITSELF TO
BE A REFORMIST GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED BY POPULAR
MOVEMENTS OF STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS.  ITS
DRIVE HAD THREE MAIN THRUSTS: A RETURN TO THE 1945
CONSTITUTION; TO CREATE POLITICAL STABILITY; AND TO
AMELIORATE THE PEOPLE’S SUFFERING THROUGH
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
 THE NEW ORDER CREDO OF “THE DEVELOPMENT
TRILOGY,” REFERRED TO POLITICAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC
GROWTH, AND EQUITY.  THIS BECAME THE BATTLE CRY OF
THE NEW ORDER WITH EVERYTHING ELSE SUBORDINATED
TO IT.
 AND TO A FAIR DEGREE THE NEW ORDER ACHIEVED ITS
GOALS.

Day2_GRIPS www.ginandjar.com 38

DEVELOPMENT TRILOGY

Stability

Growth Equity


POLITICAL STABILITY

 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM HAD PRODUCED THE
INTENDED RESULT: POLITICAL STABILITY THAT HAD
ENDURED FOR THREE DECADES, SUSTAINING
ECONOMIC GROWTH WHICH IN TURN FURTHER
REINFORCED ITS CLAIM TO LEGITIMACY.


ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EQUITY

 POLITICAL STABILITY ASSURED, AND WITH
UNIFORMITY OF PURPOSE AND METHOD THE NEW
ORDER EARNESTLY EMBARKED ON ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, WHICH WAS WIDELY CONSIDERED
AS SUCCESSFUL USING VARIOUS STANDARD OF
MEASUREMENTS.
 AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN EXCESS OF 7% LED
TO A MORE THAN 10‐FOLD RISE IN INDONESIANS’
PER CAPITA INCOME AND A DECLINE IN THE
NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN POVERTY FROM AN
ESTIMATED 70% OF THE POPULATION IN THE L960S
TO AROUND 11% BY THE MID‐1990S.

 LIFE EXPECTANCY ROSE AND INFANT MORTALITY
DECLINED DRAMATICALLY.
 EIGHT OUT OF TEN OF THE POPULATION HAD
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE AND TWO OUT OF THREE
TO SAFE DRINKING WATER, SELF‐SUFFICIENCY IN
RICE PRODUCTION.


WHAT WENT WRONG?

 HUNTINGTON (1991: 54‐55) MAKES THE POINT
THAT THE LEGITIMACY OF AN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIME MIGHT BE UNDERMINED EVEN IF IT DOES
DELIVER ON ITS PROMISES.
 “BY ACHIEVING ITS PURPOSE, IT LOST ITS PURPOSE.
THIS REDUCED THE REASONS WHY THE PUBLIC
SHOULD SUPPORT THE REGIME, GIVEN OTHER
COSTS (E.G. LACK OF FREEDOM) CONNECTED WITH
THE REGIME”(1991: 55).
 HE POSITS THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR DEMOCRACY.


 HE CITES THE FAMOUS—ALBEIT MUCH CONTESTED‐‐
LIPSET HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP
OF WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: THE WEALTHY
COUNTRIES ARE DEMOCRATIC AND THE MOST
DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES ARE WEALTHY.
 HE ARGUES THAT: “IN POOR COUNTRIES
DEMOCRATIZATION IS UNLIKELY; IN RICH COUNTRIES IT
HAS ALREADY OCCURRED.
 IN BETWEEN THERE IS A POLITICAL TRANSITION ZONE;
COUNTRIES IN THAT PARTICULAR ECONOMIC STRATUM
ARE MOST LIKELY TO TRANSIT TO DEMOCRACY AND
MOST COUNTRIES THAT TRANSIT TO DEMOCRACY WILL
BE IN THAT STRATUM.” (1991: 60).


 HE MAINTAINS THAT A SOCIAL SCIENTIST WHO
WISHED TO PREDICT FUTURE DEMOCRATIZATION
“WOULD HAVE DONE REASONABLY WELL IF HE
SIMPLY FINGERED THE NON‐DEMOCRATIC
COUNTRIES IN THE $1,000‐$3,000 (GNP PER CAPITA)
TRANSITION ZONE” (1991: 63).
 FURTHER STUDIES, IN PARTICULAR AN EXTENSIVE
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DONE BY
PRZEWORSKY ET.AL. (2000: 92) HAS LENT SUPPORT
TO HUNTINGTON’S THRESHOLD ARGUMENT.


 IN HIS ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH TO THE MPR ON
MARCH 1, 1998, PRESIDENT SUHARTO (1998: 16)
REPORTED THAT IN1996, THE YEAR BEFORE THE
ECONOMIC CRISIS SWEPT INDONESIA, ITS GNP PER
CAPITA HAD REACHED $1,155.
 ACCORDING TO HUNTINGTON’S THEORY, AT THAT
STAGE INDONESIA HAD ENTERED THE TRANSITION
ZONE, WHICH MEANT THAT EVENTUALLY SOONER
OR LATER POLITICAL CHANGE WOULD HAPPEN.


 THREE DECADES OF DEVELOPMENT HAD
SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THE LEVEL AND REACH
OF EDUCATION ACROSS THE NATION AND SOCIAL
CLASSES.
 WITH EDUCATION CAME ENLIGHTENMENT AND
EMANCIPATION FROM CULTURAL RESTRICTION,
FREEING PEOPLE FROM THE SHACKLES OF OLD
INHIBITIONS AND TRADITIONS.
 WITH EDUCATION PEOPLE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE
WERE MORE NEEDS THAN JUST PRIMARY NEEDS OF
FOOD, CLOTHING AND SHELTER.


 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE BROUGHT ABOUT THE
OPENING UP NOT OF ONLY THE INDONESIAN MARKET TO
FOREIGN GOODS BUT ALSO THE INDONESIAN SOCIETY TO
FOREIGN IDEAS.
 WITH GLOBALIZATION CAME NOT ONLY THE INTEGRATION
OF MARKETS BUT ALSO THE INTRODUCTION AND
EVENTUAL INTEGRATION OF IDEAS.
 WITH THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING STANDARD
RESULTING FROM WIDESPREAD BENEFIT OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION A STRONG MIDDLE
CLASS HAD BEEN FORMED SOON TO BECOME THE BACK
BONE OF THE FORCES FOR POLITICAL EMANCIPATION AND
REFORM.

 THE SUPPOSED ULTIMATE VICTORY OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST
ALL OTHER SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT (SEE FUKUYAMA,
1992) HAS CHANGED THE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL ATTITUDES,
OR AT LEAST THE ELITE’S PERCEPTION, OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AS AN EVIL SYSTEM.
 THOUSANDS OF INDONESIANS WHO STUDIED AT FOREIGN
UNIVERSITIES, MOST OF THEM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES,
LEARNED FIRST HAND THE SOCIO‐CULTURAL VALUES THAT
HAS BEEN THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES THAT RESULTED IN THE
AFFLUENCE OF THE WESTERN SOCIETIES.
 THEY RETURNED HOME IMBUED WITH THE SPIRIT OF
FREEDOM, WHICH WAS A POTENT SOURCE OF INSPIRATION
AND MOTIVATION TO CHANGE.


 THE BREAKDOWN OF BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATION,
THE MAIN FORCE BEHIND GLOBALIZATION AND THE
DRIVE TOWARD A HIGHER DEGREE OF CIVILIZATION,
SWEPT INDONESIA WITH READILY AVAILABLE AND UP TO
DATE INFORMATION.
 IT FREED THE INDIVIDUALS FROM THE CONSTRAINTS OF
TIME AND SPACE.
 CENSORSHIP WAS NO LONGER RELEVANT, BECAUSE ONE
COULD ACCESS INFORMATION THROUGH THE INTERNET,
CNN OR CABLE TV, OR JUST TRAVEL.
 THE DIFFUSION OF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS BY THE END OF
THE 20TH CENTURY WAS UNSTOPPABLE.
 THE INFORMATION BERLIN WALL WAS CRUMBLING
DOWN.


 WHEN THE GOVERNMENT CLOSED DOWN THE
POPULAR INDONESIA MAGAZINE, TEMPO, BECAUSE
OF IT CRITICAL TONE, IT SIMPLY RESURFACED AS AN
INTERNET WEBSITE.
 PEOPLE CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE FALL OF NON‐
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
FORMER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, THE PHILIPPINES
AND KOREA.


 AT THE HEIGHT OF THE PRAISE FOR THE NEW
ORDER ACHIEVEMENT, MANY INDONESIAN
SCHOLARS AND CRITICS NOTED THE LACK OF
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS ONE OF THE MAJOR
CRITICISM OF THE NEW ORDER.
 THEY ARGUED THAT THE INDONESIAN ECONOMIC
SUCCESS HAD BENEFITED THE URBAN AND
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR WHILE (RELATIVELY)
MARGINALIZING THE RURAL AND TRADITIONAL
SECTORS.


 AN INDONESIAN SOCIAL SCIENTIST, PABOTTINGI,
NOTED THAT NEW ORDER ECONOMIC POLICIES AND
PRACTICES THAT HAD RESULTED IN “INORDINATE
DOMINANCE OF THE NON‐PRIBUMI IN THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY, PARTICULARLY IN THE URBAN
AND MODERN SECTOR”, AND OFFERS A PREDICTION
THAT THE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE PRIBUMI
AND THE NON‐PRIBUMI “COULD WELL BE THE
ACHILLES HEEL OF THE NEW ORDER”.


 WHILE ECONOMICALLY THE GOVERNMENT WAS
COMMITTED TO AND INTENTLY PURSUING OPEN
POLICIES, POLITICALLY THE GOVERNMENT KEPT A
TIGHT A GRIP.
 THE TIGHTENING CONTROL OVER POLICIES AND
DECISION MAKING PROCESSES IN THE HANDS OF
THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT ONLY STRENGTHENED
THE FORCES OF CHANGE WITHIN SOCIETY BUT ALSO
DISILLUSIONED HIS ORIGINAL AND TRADITIONAL
SUPPORTERS, EVEN THOSE WITHIN THE
GOVERNMENT.


 THE EMERGING ROLE OF ISLAM AS A FORCE OF
CHANGE SHOULD ALSO NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.
 UHLIN (1997:82) AGUES THAT MANY INDONESIAN
PRO‐DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS ARE MORE THAN
NOMINALLY MUSLIM AND THEY OFTEN USE ISLAMIC
DISCOURSES TO MOTIVATE THE STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRACY.


 AMONG THE SOCIAL FORCES THAT WERE POISED
AGAINST THE NEW ORDER, THE MOST CONSISTENT
AND MILITANT WERE THE STUDENTS.
 IN THE HISTORY OF THE NATION, EVEN BEFORE
INDEPENDENCE, THE INDONESIAN YOUTH AND
STUDENTS PLAYED PIVOTAL ROLE.
 THEY PARTICIPATED IN EVERY IMPORTANT EVENT IN
THE NATION COURSE OF HISTORY.


 THERE IS NO MAJOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN
INDONESIA THAT DID NOT INVOLVE THE YOUTH
AND STUDENTS.
 BY THE 1970S, STUDENT ACTIVISM HAD BEEN
DIRECTED AGAINST THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT.
 IN 1974 STUDENTS STAGED HUGE
DEMONSTRATIONS, AGAINST CORRUPTION AND
AGAINST JAPANESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT; MANY
OF THE LEADERS OF THE INCIDENT KNOWN AS
MALARI WERE TRIED AND JAILED.


 IN 1978 THERE WAS AGAIN A WAVE OF STUDENT
PROTESTS.
 STUDENT ACTIVISM CONTINUED INTO THE 1980S
AND 1990S SOME TAKING UP NATIONAL ISSUES LIKE
CORRUPTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY,
OTHERS LOCAL ISSUES, SUCH AS EVICTION OF
PEOPLE FROM AREAS DESIGNATED FOR
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
AND LABOR ISSUES RELATED TO THEIR AREA.


 ALTHOUGH THE STUDENT MOVEMENTS MOST OF
THE TIME WERE WIDELY SCATTERED, UNFOCUSED
AND UN‐COORDINATED AND WERE ISOLATED FROM
BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT, THEY WERE
SUCCESSFUL IN GALVANIZING THE SILENT MAJORITY
TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT CURRENT POLITICAL
ISSUES CONFRONTING THE NATION.
 UHLIN NOTES THAT THE STUDENT ACTIVISM OF THE
LATE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S HAS CONTRIBUTED
TO A RADICALIZATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC
OPPOSITION IN INDONESIA.


 WITH ALL THE CHANGING SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND
NORMS, AND THE FORCES ARRAYED AGAINST THE NEW
ORDER, FROM OUTSIDE AND WITHIN ITS OWN RANK, IT
WAS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE HUNTINGTON’S
PREDICTION WOULD BE REALIZED.
 IT WOULD, HOWEVER, STILL NEED A CATALYST TO
QUICKEN THE PACE OF CHANGE.
 THE ECONOMIC CRISIS WAS THE TRIGGER THAT WOULD
SET THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT EVENTUALLY LEAD TO
THE POLITICAL CHANGE.
 EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS LED HUNTINGTON (1991: 59)
TO BELIEVE THAT CRISES PRODUCED BY EITHER RAPID
GROWTH OR ECONOMIC RECESSION WEAKENED
AUTHORITARIANISM.


 EVENTS LEADING TO THE FALL OF THE NEW ORDER HAD
SHOWN THE SYMPTOMS OBSERVED BY HAGGARD AND
KAUFMAN (1999: 76) THAT ECONOMIC CRISES
UNDERMINE THE ‘AUTHORITARIAN BARGAINS’ FORGED
BETWEEN RULERS AND KEY SOCIOPOLITICAL
CONSTITUENTS.
 THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO TO SALVAGE HIS
GOVERNMENT AND TO WITHDRAW VOLUNTARILY
FOLLOWED THEIR GENERAL OBSERVATION THAT “THE
RESULTING ISOLATION (OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS) TENDS
TO FRAGMENT THE RULING ELITE FURTHER AND
REDUCE ITS CAPACITY TO NEGOTIATE FAVORABLE
TERMS OF EXIT” (IBID.).


 HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THE NEW
ORDER WAS FACED WITH SERIOUS CRISES.
 ALTHOUGH ARGUABLY THE 1997/98 CRISIS WAS THE
SEVEREST AND THE MOST DEVASTATING IN TERMS OF
ITS IMPACT ON THE GENERAL POPULACE‐‐ THE
NEGATIVE GROWTH OF ALMOST –15% RESULTING IN
THE REDUCTION OF REAL INCOME AND INCREASE IN
POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT‐‐ STILL OTHER NON‐
DEMOCRATIC (BY WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
STANDARDS) REGIMES IN THE SAME GEOGRAPHICAL
REGION SUCH AS MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE COULD
WEATHER THE CRISIS AND THEIR REGIMES SURVIVED
AND OUTLASTED THE CRISIS.


 MANY OF THE OPPOSING FORCES IDENTIFIED ABOVE
WERE LONG PRESENT, LATENT IN THE
UNDERCURRENT OF INDONESIAN POLITICS FOR
YEARS.
 BY THEMSELVES HOWEVER, THEY DID NOT PRESENT A
SUFFICIENT CHALLENGE CAPABLE OF ENDING
SUHARTO’S RULE.
 THE NEW ORDER’S CENTRALIZED POWER STRUCTURE
AND CAREFUL CONTROL OF POLITICAL COMPETITION
WOULD HAVE ENSURED THE SECURITY OF THE
PRESIDENT POSITION.
 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, IN THIS VIEW, HAS CERTAIN
INERTIA.


 BUT THE NEW ORDER DID FALL.
 MANY STUDIES HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN
THEREAFTER, ATTEMPTING TO FIND THE ANSWER
TO THE QUESTION OF WHY PRESIDENT SUHARTO
FAILED TO OVERCOME THIS PARTICULAR CRISIS.
 MANY OBSERVERS AGREE THAT FOR PRESIDENT
SUHARTO, WHO RESTED HIS CLAIM TO RULE ON HIS
ABILITY TO DELIVER ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE
ECONOMIC CRISIS DEEPLY UNDERMINED HIS
LEGITIMACY AND LEFT HIM AFTER SO MANY YEARS
IN POWER, AT LAST, VULNERABLE TO CREDIBLE
CHALLENGE FOR POWER.


 DURING THE 1997/98 CRISIS PRESIDENT SUHARTO
WAS DELIBERATING BETWEEN POLICY ACTIONS,
AND HIS INDECISIVENESS HAD CAUSED THE CRISIS
TO DEEPEN AND EVENTUALLY LED TO HIS FALL.
 IT WAS IN CONTRAST WITH THE DECISIVENESS
SHOWN BY MALAYSIA’S MAHATHIR AND THE
LEADERS OF SINGAPORE IN DEALING WITH THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.
 BRESNAN (1999) FOR ONE REMARKS THAT THE
PRESIDENT, “WHO HAD MADE MANY HARD
DECISIONS OVER THE PREVIOUS THREE DECADES,
WAS UNABLE TO DO SO IN 1998.”


 OBVIOUSLY THERE WAS AN INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSION TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS OCCURRING IN INDONESIA IN 1998.
 THE US AND IMF HAD OFTEN BEEN BLAME FOR THE
PROLONGED CRISIS THAT EVENTUALLY LED TO THE
FALL OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO.
 MANY OBSERVERS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE WEST
HAD DONE THEIR BEST IN ASSISTING THE
INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IN FIGHTING THE
CRISIS.


 SOME ANALYSTS, HOWEVER WOULD NOT DISCOUNT
THE ROLE THE US PLAY IN THE DOWNFALL OF
SUHARTO.
 ALTHOUGH FOR MANY YEARS INDONESIA ‐‐AS A
STAUNCH ANTI COMMUNIST NATION‐‐ HAD ALWAYS
BEEN ABLE TO COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF THE
WEST, BY THE MID 90’S INDONESIA’S RELATIONS WITH
THE WEST HAD SOMEWHAT SOURED.
 AFTER THE COLD WAR ENDED, WITHOUT A
COMMUNIST THREAT WESTERN DONOR COUNTRIES
WERE INCREASINGLY LESS CONCERNED ABOUT
BAILING OUT IN INEFFICIENT FOREIGN ECONOMIES
ESPECIALLY THAT ARE FACING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
PROBLEMS.

 MOUNTING CRITICISM ON THE WAY INDONESIA
HANDLED THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION AND THE
ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES HAD
PRECIPITATED STRINGENT CALLS IN THE US CONGRESS
TO LINK AID AND ASSISTANCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS
RECORDS.
 BEFORE THE CRISIS THERE WERE ALREADY FORCES, IN
FAVOR OF POLITICAL CHANGE, ARRAYED AGAINST THE
NEW ORDER REGIME.


 HOWEVER IN THE ABSENCE OF THE NECESSARY
CATALYST THOSE ELEMENTS WERE INERT, AND EVEN IF
CHANGE SHOULD HAPPEN IT COULD TAKE A LONG
WHILE, SUCH AS WHEN SUHARTO PASS AWAY OR
SUHARTO BECAME PHYSICALLY INCAPABLE TO LEAD.
 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS PROVIDED THE CATALYST THAT
SET OFF A PROCESS OF CHANGE.
 THE HALVING OF PER CAPITA INCOME TRANSLATED
INTO SOCIAL MISERY: UNEMPLOYMENT, HUNGER,
RIOTS, AND DEATH.


A RENEWED MANDATE:
WASTED OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE
 REFLECTED IN THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1997, SUHARTO
STILL HELD A STRONG GRIP ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
 HE WAS READY TO STEP DOWN AND SPENT THE REST OF
HIS LIFE IN RELIGIOUS PURSUIT IF THE PEOPLE REALLY DID
NOT WANT HIM ANYMORE
 MARCH 11TH, 1998 SUHARTO WAS INDEED RE‐ELECTED
FOR ANOTHER FIVE‐YEAR TERM BY THE MPR
 PAST PERFORMANCES OF DEVELOPMENT WAS NO
LONGER SEEN AS A PANACEA, WHILE A GROWING
NUMBER, INCLUDING MANY WHO WERE IN THE
GOVERNMENT, WERE ALREADY LOOKING FOR AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE EXISTING SYSTEM


 THE TIME HAD COME FOR POLITICAL REFORMS, BUT
CHANGING THE LEADERSHIP AT THE TIME OF CRISIS
WAS NOT REGARDED AS A GOOD IDEA
 SUHARTO’S CHOICE OF HABIBIE AS HIS VICE
PRESIDENT, APPOINTMENT OF HIS DAUGHTER AND
SOME CRONIES TO THE CABINET WAS MET WITH
WIDE SPREAD CRITICISM AND ACCUSATION OF
NEPOTISM
 AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A RENEWED START TO
REBUILD THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE AND
ENGAGED IN CONCERTED EFFORTS TO REGAIN
CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY WAS WASTED


THE FLASH POINT
 WHILE THE ECONOMY SHOWED SAME IMPROVEMENT, IN
THE POLITICAL FRONT, THE SITUATION DETERIORATED.
 SUHARTO HAD NO INTENTION TO UNDERTAKE REFORMS
AS THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION DEMANDED.
 HOWEVER, THE ELITES AND LEADERS OF THE VARIOUS
REFORM MOVEMENTS WERE STILL WARY OF SUHARTO’S
POWER.
 THE HIKE IN FUEL PRICES CHANGED EVERYTHING.
 THE CULMINATION OF POLITICAL CONFRONTATION WAS
REACHED WHEN IN EARLY MAY 1998 UNDER STRONG
PRESSURE FROM THE IMF, THE GOVERNMENT
ANNOUNCED A RISE IN FUEL PRICES, WITH THE
ACCOMPANYING CONSEQUENCES OF A RISE IN PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION FARES.

 DURING THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SECURITY
APPARATUS AND THE STUDENT ON MAY 12, FOUR
STUDENTS WERE SHOT TO DEAD (TRISAKTI INCIDENT).
 THE FLASH POINT WAS REACHED ON MAY 14TH 1998, IN
WHAT WAS THEN KNOWN AS THE MAY RIOTS.
 THE MAY 1998 RIOT HAD A PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE
ASIDE FROM THE INTENSITY OF THE VIOLENCE.
 THE RIOTS HAD DEVASTATING EFFECTS ON THE
SUHARTO GOVERNMENT.
 IT SET THE STAGE FOR THE ENDGAME OF THE POLITICAL
DRAMA.

Day2_GRIPS 2012 V www.ginandjar.com 73

THE FINAL CURTAIN
 MAY 17TH 1998 THE STUDENTS HAD PRACTICALLY
OCCUPIED THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING TO PRESSURE
PARLIAMENT TO ACT.
 THE CALL FOR REFORM AND FOR THE RESIGNATION OF
THE PRESIDENT GREW LOUDER AND WAS JOINED BY A
WIDER CIRCLE.
 THE SUPPORT FROM THE MILITARY, WHICH UP TO NOW
HAD BEEN THE FOUNDATION OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO’S
POLITICAL POWER, HAD ALSO BEGUN TO CRACK.
 MAY 18TH1998 THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARLIAMENT
ANNOUNCED THEIR COLLECTIVE OPINION THAT
SUHARTO HAD TO RESIGN.


 ON MAY 19TH AFTER MEETING WITH THE MODERATE
MUSLIM LEADERS PRESIDENT SUHARTO TOLD A PRESS
CONFERENCE ABOUT CALLING AN EARLIER GENERAL
ELECTION THAT WOULD FACILITATE HIS EARLIER
RESIGNATION, OF REPEALING THE POLITICAL LAWS THAT
HAD BEEN THE TARGET OF MANY OF THE REFORMERS’
DEMANDS AND THE CREATION OF A REFORM
COMMITTEE.
 HE ALSO STATED HIS INTENTION TO RESHUFFLE THE
CABINET AND FORM A REFORM CABINET.


 SOME MINISTERS REALIZED THAT THE STATUS QUO
COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED ANY LONGER.
 MAY 20TH 1998 THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES MET:
 TO REVIEW THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE
POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS, AND DECIDED THAT
 THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF THE
GRAVE SITUATION
 IF A POLITICAL SOLUTION COULD NOT BE REACHED
WITHIN A WEEK THE ECONOMY WOULD COLLAPSE
 FORMING A NEW CABINET WOULD NOT SOLVE THE
PROBLEM
 THEY WOULD UNANIMOUSLY DECLINE TO JOIN IN THE
NEW (REFORM) CABINET.


 SUHARTO ALSO FAILED TO GET THE SUPPORT FROM
PARLIAMENT LEADERS ON ESTABLISHING THE REFORM
COMMITTEE.
 LOSING THE SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY, THE CABINET,
THE PARLIAMENT, AND THE FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE
REFORM COMMITTEE, ON MAY 21ST 1998 PRESIDENT
SUHARTO RESIGNED HIS PRESIDENCY.
 VICE PRESIDENT BJ HABIBIE ASSUMED THE PRESIDENCY.
 THUS ENDED THE ERA OF THE NEW ORDER.


CONCLUSION
 WHILE THE ECONOMIC CRISIS UNDOUBTEDLY WAS THE
IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE POLITICAL UNREST THAT
ENDED SUHARTO’S LONG REIGN, THE FAILURE OF THE
NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH THE
POLITICAL WEAKNESSES OF THE SOCIETY CONTRIBUTED
TO ITS DEMISE.
 SUHARTO, WHO HAD SHOWN CONSIDERABLE
FLEXIBILITY IN AGREEING TO NUMEROUS ECONOMIC
REFORMS, ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY NOT ALL WERE
FULLY IMPLEMENTED, SHOWED LITTLE INCLINATION TO
FOLLOW THROUGH ON A PARALLEL REBUILDING OF THE
POLITICAL SYSTEM.


 WHETHER SUHARTO COULD HAVE WEATHERED THE
ECONOMIC CRISIS IF THE NEW ORDER REGIME HAD
EVOLVED INTO A MORE REPRESENTATIVE AND OPEN
POLITICAL SYSTEM WILL NEVER BE KNOWN.
 BUT THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE FAILURE TO
CREATE CHANNELS FOR POLITICAL DISSENT LAID
THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE DESIRE TO SEE THE
NEW ORDER REGIME END, EVEN IF THAT ENTAILED
A RISK OF OPEN CONFLICT BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY
AND THE ARMED FORCES.


 THE CRACKS IN THE RANKS OF THE NEW ORDER
HAD COME TO THE SURFACE, AS THE NEW ORDER
SUPPORTERS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE MILITARY
HAD GROWN ALIENATED BY THE WAY HE HANDLED
THE CRISIS, AND BY HIS INABILITY TO RECOGNIZE
THE WEAKNESSES IN THE GOVERNMENT’S POLICIES
AND INSTITUTIONS AND THE URGENT NEED TO
EMBARK ON REFORMS.


 IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE INABILITY OF PRESIDENT
SUHARTO TO BRING INDONESIA OUT OF THE CRISIS,
COMBINED WITH THE GROWING DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL AWARENESS THAT HIS RESPONSE
TO THE CRISIS—ECONOMIC AS WELL POLITICAL‐‐
WAS DIGGING THE COUNTRY INTO A DEEPER ABYSS,
DESTROYED THE HOBBESIAN COMPACT THAT HAD
KEPT THE COUNTRY UNITED AND POLITICALLY
STABLE ON THE PATH OF DEVELOPMENT.
 THE CONCLUSION: CRISIS FORCED A REWRITING OF
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.


ON THE ROAD
TO DEMOCRACY

82

 THE OBJECTIVES:
 AS THE COUNTRY WAS DEEP IN CRISIS, A CONTINUATION
OF POLICIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMY, SHOULD BE
MAINTAINED;
 IT HAD TO BE RID OF THE CHARACTERS WHOM PEOPLE
SAW AS THE PERSONIFICATION OF NEPOTISM;
 IT SHOULD REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF REFORM, AND
 BE BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA’S VARIOUS
SHADES OF INTERESTS AND POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS.


 THE AGENDA:
 FOREMOST IN THE POLITICAL AGENDA WAS THE
REPEAL OF THE MUCH‐REVILED POLITICAL LAWS THAT
WERE THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW ORDER
POLITICAL SYSTEM—THE LAWS ON POLITICAL PARTIES,
ELECTIONS, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES.
 ON THE ECONOMY, THE PRIORITY WAS TO ALLEVIATE
THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON THE POPULACE,
ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO WERE ECONOMICALLY WEAK,
AND TO GET THE ECONOMY ON ITS FEET AND MOVING
AGAIN.


INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING

 HABIBIE STARTED HIS PRESIDENCY AMIDST
WIDESPREAD MISGIVINGS.
 THE COUNTRY WAS IN DEEP POLITICAL TURMOIL.
 HIS CLAIM TO PRESIDENCY WAS QUESTIONED.
 THE RESIGNATION OF SUHARTO HAD NOT HALTED
THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROTESTS.
 MANY OPPONENTS OF THE NEW ORDER SHIFTED
THEIR ATTACKS TO TARGET HABIBIE.


 HIS BIOGRAPHER, BILVEER SINGH (2000),
ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HABIBIE BROUGHT WITH HIM
MANY NEGATIVE IMAGES OF A NEGATIVE RECORD,
“INCLUDING HIS PENCHANT FOR ’WASTEFUL MEGA‐
PROJECTS’, HIS POOR OR LACK OF UNDERSTANDING
ABOUT THE WORKINGS OF THE ECONOMY, HIS LACK
OF ACCEPTANCE BY ABRI (THE INDONESIAN MILITARY),
OF BEING A FRONT OR TOOL FOR ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM, AND PROBABLY WORST OF ALL,
OF BEING NOTHING MORE THAN A PAWN AND
PUPPET OF SUHARTO.”


THE LEGITIMACY DILEMMA

 HABIBIE’S PRESIDENCY FROM THE BEGINNING WAS
PLAGUED BY DOUBTERS OF ITS LEGITIMACY.
 ONE ARGUMENT AGAINST HABIBIE’S LEGITIMACY
WAS BASED ON A TECHNICALITY: THE WAY BY WHICH
THE TRANSFER OF THE PRESIDENCY WAS PERFORMED.
 OTHER MORE SERIOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST
HABIBIE TAKING OVER THE PRESIDENCY WERE BASED
ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS.


 IN LINE WITH THE MESSAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION
THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED HIS MANDATE FROM THE
MPR, AND THEREFORE IF HE RESIGNED, HE HAD TO
RETURN THE MANDATE TO THE SAME INSTITUTION—
THE MPR, WHICH WOULD THEN WITHDRAW THE
MANDATE AND GAVE IT TO A NEW PRESIDENT.
 OTHERS ARGUED THAT SUHARTO AND HABIBIE WAS A
“PACKAGE” ELECTED BY THE MPR—AND HABIBIE WAS
SUHARTO’S CHOICE FOR VICE PRESIDENT— WHEN
SUHARTO RESIGNED, HABIBIE SHOULD ALSO GO, AND
THE MPR SHOULD APPOINT A NEW PRESIDENT (AND
VICE PRESIDENT).


 ON THE OTHER HAND HABIBIES’ SUPORTERS ARGUED
THAT THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATED THAT SHOULD
THE PRESIDENT DIE OR RESIGN, BE REMOVED OR
DISABLED FROM EXECUTING THE DUTY OF THE
PRESIDENCY, THE VICE PRESIDENT SHOULD REPLACE
HIM UNTIL THE EXPIRY OF HIS TERM.
 THAT SHOULD MEAN THAT HABIBIE HAD THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HOLD THE PRESIDENCY
UNTIL 2003.


 WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, AMONG THE CABINET
MINISTERS, THERE WERE ALSO SOME DOUBTS AS TO
WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONTINUE
UNTIL THE FORMER PRESIDENT’S TERM ENDED.
 THEY WERE OF THE OPINION THAT THE PRESENT
GOVERNMENT WAS ONLY “TRANSITIONAL” AND A
FRESH GENERAL ELECTION SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN
TO ESTABLISH A NEW MANDATE FROM THE PEOPLE.
 IT WAS BASED NOT ON THE QUESTION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY BECAUSE THE
MESSAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION WAS VERY CLEAR,
BUT MORE ON POLITICAL AND MORAL GROUNDS.


 TO MANY OF HIS CRITICS IT WAS DIFFICULT TO
SEPARATE THE FIGURE OF HABIBIE AND SUHARTO, AND
THE ASCENSION OF HABIBIE TO PRESIDENCY COULD
ONLY HAPPEN BECAUSE OF THAT PARTICULAR
RELATIONSHIP.
 FOR HABIBIE TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM POLITICAL AND
MORAL LEGITIMACY, HE HAD TO GET THE MANDATE
FOR HIMSELF.
 MANY SAW THE EXISTING MPR AS LACKING THE
LEGITIMACY TO DECIDE ON WHO SHOULD BE THE NEXT
PRESIDENT, AS IT WAS THE SAME MPR THAT ELECTED
SUHARTO UNANIMOUSLY LESS THEN THREE MONTHS
BEFORE.
 THEREFORE, THEY ARGUED, A NEW ELECTION SHOULD
BE HELD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

 AFTER AN INTENSIVE BEHIND‐THE‐SCREEN POLITICAL
CONSULTATION, A CONSENSUS WITHIN THE
GOVERNMENT EMERGED THAT AN EARLY GENERAL
ELECTION SHOULD BE CALLED.
 THE DECISION TO CALL FOR AN EARLY ELECTION
HOWEVER HAD TO OVERCOME A LEGAL HURDLE.
 THE MPR HAD DECREED IN THE MARCH 1998
GENERAL SESSION THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
FIVE‐YEAR PRESIDENTIAL TERM, A GENERAL ELECTION
SHOULD BE HELD IN 2002 TO ELECT A NEW
PRESIDENT IN 2003.
 AND ONLY THE MPR COULD REVOKE AND AMEND AN
MPR DECREE.


MPR SESSION
 ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, THE MPR MEETS
IN:
 GENERAL SESSION
 SPECIAL SESSION
 DURING THE NEW ORDER, MPR MET ONLY ONCE IN
FIVE YEAR IN GENERAL SESSION TO ELECT THE
PRESIDENT.
 WITH REFORM, MPR MEETS EVERY YEAR IN ANNUAL
SESSION TO RECEIVE REPORTS FROM THE EXECUTIVE,
THE PARLIAMENT, THE SUPREME COURT, THE
SUPREME AUDIT BOARD, AND THE SUPREME
ADVISORY BOARD.


MPR SPECIAL SESSION
 THE MPR CONVENED A SPECIAL SESSION ON
NOVEMBER 10‐13, 1998
 THE MPR ISSUED DECREES ON:
1. THE RESCHEDULING OF THE ELECTIONS
2. TO REVOKE THE 1983 MPR DECREE, REQUIRING A
NATIONAL REFERENDUM TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION.
3. WITHDRAWING THE EXTRAORDINARY POWERS GIVEN TO
THE PRESIDENT,
4. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ON CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND
NEPOTISM —IN WHICH THE FORMER PRESIDENT WAS
SINGLED OUT—
5. REVOKING THE GUIDANCE FOR THE PROPAGATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PANCASILA OR P4.

6. LIMITING THE PRESIDENTIAL TERMS OF OFFICE—IN THE
UNAMENDED CONSTITUTION THERE WAS NO
LIMITATION—TO A MAXIMUM OF TWO TERMS. ON THE
ECONOMY, THE MPR ISSUED A NEW GUIDELINE ON
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY.
7. AN IMPORTANT DECREE THAT WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT
AND LONG‐TERM EFFECT ON THE COUNTRY’S
GOVERNANCE WAS A GUIDELINE ON REGIONAL
AUTONOMY AND DECENTRALIZATION, INCLUDING FISCAL
DECENTRALIZATION.
8. ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY, TO HAVE GRADUAL
WITHDRAWAL OF THE MILITARY FROM POLITICS.


 THE MPR DECISIONS SERVE AS CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE FOUNDATION
FOR DEMOCRATIZATION, IMPROVEMENT OF
GOVERNANCE, AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, INITIATED OR ENACTED BY THE HABIBIE
GOVERNMENT.


OPPOSITION AGAINST HABIBIE
 THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR MET AMIDST A
TENSE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, AS STUDENTS,
ENCOURAGED BY DIE‐HARD OPPONENTS OF HABIBIE
AMONG THE POLITICAL ELITE, WERE DEMANDING THAT
HABIBIE SHOULD BE BROUGHT DOWN.
 IN THE DAYS LEADING TO THE SPECIAL SESSION THE
CAPITAL WAS TRANSFORMED INTO A MILITARY
COMPLEX, WITH SECURITY APPARATUS MANNING
STRATEGIC SECTIONS OF THE CITY.
 TO SUPPORT THE MILITARY EFFORTS THE COMMANDER
OF THE ARMED FORCE, WIRANTO DECIDED TO RECRUIT
CIVILIANS AS VOLUNTEERS (PAMSWAKARSA).


 UNAVOIDABLY THESE GROUPS OF VIGILANTES WOULD
CLASH WITH STUDENTS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE
CITY, MAKING THE SITUATION EVEN TENSER.
 ON THE FINAL DAY OF THE MPR SESSION THINGS
CAME TO A HEAD.
 THE CARNAGE OCCURRED IN THE SEMANGGI AREA, IN
FRONT OF ATMAJAYA UNIVERSITY, A PRIVATE
CATHOLIC INSTITUTION, WHICH HAD BEEN A HOTBED
OF ANTI‐HABIBIE STUDENTS.


 IN THE CONFRONTATIONS THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE
AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 13, SHOTS WERE FIRED
AND AT THE END OF THE DAY 13 HAD DIED, AMONG
THEM WERE FOUR STUDENTS AND ONE MILITARY
PERSONNEL.
 HUNDREDS WERE INJURED, MANY NEEDING
HOSPITALIZATION.


 THE INCIDENT, WHICH CAME TO BE KNOWN AS THE
SEMANGGI TRAGEDY, LEFT ANOTHER SCAR ON THE
NATIONAL PSYCHE ALONGSIDE THE TRISAKTI TRAGEDY.
 ELSEWHERE A NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF
PAMSWAKRSA WERE LYNCHED BY ANGRY MOBS,
MANY IN A GRUESOME MANNER.
 AFTER THE MPR SESSION ENDED THE OPPOSITION
AGAINST HABIBIE HAD REDIRECTED ITS FOCUS TO THE
ELECTION THE FOLLOWING YEAR.
 THE UNSEATING OF HABIBIE HAD BECOME THE
AGENDA OF MANY POLITICIANS FROM VARIOUS
POLITICAL SPECTRA.


HABIBIE’S POLITICAL PILLARS
 HABIBIE RELIED ON THE SUPPORT OF THREE
POLITICAL FORCES: THE MILITARY, GOLKAR, AND
POLITICAL ISLAM.
 THE MILITARY UNDER GEN. WIRANTO (A FORMER ADC
TO PRESIDENT SUHARTO) WAS SUPPORTIVE OF
HABIBIE.
 BOTH OF THEM, BEING VERY CLOSE TO THE FORMER
PRESIDENT, NEEDED AND SUPPORTED EACH OTHER IN
THE ENSUING POLITICAL GAME.
 AT THE ONSET OF HIS PRESIDENCY HABIBIE HAD
VETOED THE OPPOSITION FROM HIS ADVISERS AND
SENIOR MILITARY FIGURES TO HAVING WIRANTO
CONTINUED IN THE TOP MILITARY POSITION.

 POLITICAL ISLAM WAS BASICALLY SYMPATHETIC TO
HABIBIE, REGARDED AS A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN
ABLE TO TURN THE TIDE OF LONG‐TIME PREJUDICE
AGAINST ISLAM IN INDONESIAN POLITICS.
 HIS POSITION AS THE CHAIRMAN OF ICMI HAD
HELPED IMPROVE THE STATURE OF MANY
PROFESSIONALS AND POLITICIANS WITH ISLAMIC
CREDENTIALS.
 AS ICMI GATHERED MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS FROM
VARIOUS BACKGROUNDS, HABIBIE’S SUPPORT
AMONG POLITICAL ISLAM HAD BECOME MORE
WIDESPREAD.


 THE OPPOSITION TO HABIBIE MOUNTED BY STUDENTS
BASED IN THE CAMPUS OF A CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY
ALSO HAD DRIVEN MANY MUSLIM STUDENTS TO
SUPPORT HABIBIE, OR AT LEAST CHOOSE NOT
PARTICIPATE IN THE MOVEMENT DIRECTED AGAINST
HABIBIE.
 UNLIKE THE UNITED FRONT AGAINST SUHARTO
SHOWN BY THE STUDENTS IN MAY 1998, THE
STUDENTS WERE NO LONGER AS UNITED WITH
REGARD TO HABIBIE.


COMMUNAL STRIFE

 IN THE MEANTIME, THE SECURITY APPARATUS HAD
TO DEAL WITH COMMUNAL STRIFE IN SEVERAL
REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY: IN EAST JAVA
(BANYUWANGI), MALUKU (AMBON), SOUTH
SULAWESI, AND WEST KALIMANTAN.


ACEH

 ANOTHER TROUBLE SPOT FLARED UP IN ACEH, THE
WESTERNMOST PROVINCE OF INDONESIA.
 ACEH HAD BEEN LONG SIMMERING IN CONFLICTS
BETWEEN SEPARATIST ELEMENTS OF THE
POPULATION AND THE GOVERNMENT FORCES.
 DURING THE NEW ORDER THE SEPARATIST
MOVEMENT WAS HARSHLY DEALT WITH THROUGH
MILITARY ACTION.


 AT THE END OF THE NEW ORDER, THE SITUATION HAD
BEEN PUT UNDER CONTROL AND THE REBEL
MOVEMENT HAD BECOME MORE OR LESS DORMANT,
ALTHOUGH THERE WERE STILL REMNANTS OF REBELS
UNDER THE NAME OF FREE ACEH MOVEMENT
(GERAKAN ACEH MERDEKA OR GAM).
 IN EARLY 1999, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION BEGAN TO
HEAT UP AGAIN.
 THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE UPSURGE OF
HOSTILITIES WAS A SERIES OF KIDNAPPINGS AND
KILLINGS OF SOLDIERS, SOME OF WHOM WERE ON
LEAVE.


 THE MILITARY MOUNTED AN OPERATION TO
RESPOND TO THE ATTACKS AND THE SITUATION
FURTHER ESCALATED.
 IN THE PROCESS MANY CIVILIANS BECAME
VICTIMS OF THE ENSUING VIOLENCE, PROVOKING
OUTCRIES OF BRUTALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES BY THE MILITARY.


 IN MARCH 1999, HABIBIE, ACCOMPANIED BY SENIOR
MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET AND THE COMMANDER OF THE
ARMED FORCES, VISITED THE PROVINCE AND INITIATED A
DIALOGUE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LOCAL
COMMUNITY AT THE GRAND MOSQUE OF THE CAPITAL OF
THE PROVINCE, BANDA ACEH.
 STUDENTS DEMANDED TO BE ALLOWED TO JOIN THE
DIALOGUE AND WERE PERMITTED. IN THE COURSE OF THE
HEATED DIALOGUE HABIBIE APOLOGIZED FOR THE EXCESSES
COMMITTED BY THE MILITARY IN THE PAST AND PROMISED
THAT SUCH THINGS WOULD NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. HE
PROMISED TO PROSECUTE ANY MEMBER OF THE SECURITY
FORCES THAT WAS INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS. HE PLEDGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD
PAY FOR THE REBURIAL OF THE VICTIMS OF THE MILITARY
OPERATIONS WHO HAD BEEN BURIED IN MASS GRAVES.

 POLITICAL PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED AND
FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE PROVINCE
WOULD BE INCREASED INCLUDING FUNDING
FOR FINANCIAL AID FOR VICTIMS OF PAST
MILITARY OPERATIONS.


 IN SEPTEMBER A LAW WAS PASSED THAT GAVE
ACEH A SPECIAL STATUS (LAW NO 44/1999).
 THE NEW LAW ON FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
(LAW NO 25/1999) PROVIDED THE PROVINCE
WITH A CERTAIN DEGREE OF AUTHORITY OVER,
AND SUBSTANTIAL RETURNS FROM, THEIR
NATURAL WEALTH, PARTICULARLY FROM THE GAS
FIELDS IN ARUN.


 THUS TWO OF THE MAIN GRIEVANCES, THE DEMAND
FOR SYARIAH LAW AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF
RESOURCES, HAD BEEN BASICALLY ADDRESSED.
 HOWEVER THE RELAXATION OF THE SECURITY
SITUATION WAS EXPLOITED BY GAM AS A WAY TO
EXPAND THEIR CONTROL OF THE TERRITORY AND
POPULATION.
 AT THE TIME HABIBIE LEFT OFFICE IN OCTOBER 1999,
THE CONFLICT IN ACEH HAD BEEN NOT RESOLVED.
 (THE ACEH CONFLICT WOULD ONLY BE RESOLVED AFTER
THE GOVERNMENT WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE AND
REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH GAM; THE HELSINKI
AGREEMENT SIGNED ON AUGUST 15, 2005 IN HELSINKI,
FINLAND)

PAPUA

 IRIAN JAYA (PAPUA) WAS ANOTHER HOT SPOT. THE
PROVINCE HAD BEEN PLAGUED BY SEPARATIST
MOVEMENTS DEMANDING INDEPENDENCE FOR
YEARS.
 AS IN ACEH, THIS SEPARATIST MOVEMENT WAS
TRIGGERED BY FEELINGS OF INJUSTICE SUFFERED BY
THE PEOPLE OF WEST IRIAN (PAPUANS), WHICH,
THOUGH WAS ONE OF THE NATURALLY RICHEST
PROVINCES OF INDONESIA, REMAINED THE MOST
BACKWARD IN THE WHOLE NATION.


 A LAW WAS LATER PASSED TO ALLOW FOR A SPECIAL
STATUS FOR THE PROVINCE OF PAPUA, INCLUDING
ECONOMIC PRIVILEGES (LAW NO. 21/2001).
 ON JULY 17, 2006 PAPUA WAS DIVIDED INTO 2
PROVINCES: PAPUA AND WESTERN IRIAN JAYA.


LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY

 THE RECOGNITION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE,
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT
 REVOKING THE MUCH HATED NEW ORDER POLITICAL
LAWS, AND ESTABLISH NEW LAW ON MULTIPARTY
POLITICAL SYSTEM, AND FREE GENERAL ELECTIONS.
 FREEING THE PRESS FROM GOVERNMENT CONTROL
AND CENSORSHIP.


 THE DUAL FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY WAS REVOKED
 THE POLICE WERE SEPARATED FROM THE MILITARY.
 BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS WERE GIVEN STRONG LEGAL
PROTECTION.
 “POLITICAL PRISONERS” WERE RELEASED FROM
DETENTION.
 EAST TIMORESE WERE GRANTED A REFERENDUM TO
DETERMINE THEIR OWN DESTINY.


 IN JULY 1999 A MULTIPARTY ELECTION WAS HELD. THE
ELECTION WAS  SUPERVISED BY AN ELECTORAL
COMMITTEE OF THE PARTICIPATING POLITICAL PARTIES
AND WATCHED  BY THOUSANDS OF FOREIGN
OBSERVERS.
 IT WAS UNIVERSALLY AGREED THAT THE ELECTION WAS
OPEN, FAIR AND CLEAN. THE RESULT REFLECTED THE
WILL OF THE PEOPLE AND THUS HERALDED THE RE‐
BIRTH OF DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA.


POLITICAL PARTIES AND GENERAL ELECTION 1999

No Parties Seats Vote (%)
1 PDIP 153 34
2 GOLKAR 120 22
3 PPP 58 13
4 PKB 51 11
5 PAN 34 7
6 PBB 13 2
7 PK 7 1
8 Others 26 10
9 ABRI 38
Total 462
Note: From 48 political parties participating, 21 parties represented


 DURING HABIBIE’S PRESIDENCY THE GOVERNMENT WORKED
TOGETHER WITH PARLIAMENT TO PRODUCE 67 LAWS THAT
FORMED THE LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE STRONG POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
DEMOCRATIC NATION WITH A MARKET ECONOMY.
 OF THE 67 LAWS 16 ARE ON THE ECONOMY, 32 ARE
POLITICAL LAWS AND 19 CONCERN HUMAN RIGHTS.
 FIVE OF THE LAWS ORIGINATED FROM THE PARLIAMENT, IN
ITSELF A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM POLITICAL
PRACTICES UNDER THE NEW ORDER, WHEN THE
PARLIAMENT PLAYED SECOND FIDDLE AND WAS REGARDED
AS MERE RUBBER‐STAMP TO THE GOVERNMENT.
 IT SHOWED THAT THE PARLIAMENT HAS BEGUN TO
ESTABLISH ITSELF AS THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN THE
COUNTRY.

SOME OF THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL LAWS

Law No 2/1999 on political parties
Law No 3/1999 on general election
Law No 4/1999 on the composition and status of the
People’s Consultative Assembly MPR,
the parliament DPR, and the regional
representative councils
Law No 5/1998 the convention against torture and
cruelty
Law No 9/1999 the right to freely speak, demonstrate or
strike
Law No 22/1999 on the decentralization of government
down to the district level


Some of the important political laws . . .

Law No 25/1999 on fiscal decentralization
Law No 26/1999 to revoke the 1963 anti-subversive
activities law
Law No 28/1999 on Clean Government
Law No 29/1999 the convention on abolition of all forms
of racial discriminations
Law No 35/1999 put the administration of the whole legal
system under the Supreme Court
Law No 39/1998 on Human Rights
Law No 40/1999 freedom of the press


 IT WAS APPARENT AND INCREASINGLY ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT IT WAS DURING HABIBIE’S ERA THAT THE
COUNTRY HAD RAPIDLY MOVED TOWARDS DEMOCRACY.
 SUCH A RAPID BURST OF LIBERALIZATION WOULD HAVE
BEEN HIGHLY UNLIKELY WERE THERE WAS NO CRISIS
AND SUHARTO STILL WAS PRESIDENT.
 THESE REFORMS HAVE COME FROM THE TOP, WHICH IS
NOT TO SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO YEARNING
FROM THE BOTTOM.
 YET MANY WOULD AGREE THAT INDONESIANS CIVIL
SOCIETY ENGAGED IN DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ACTIVISM HAVE ONLY VERY RECENTLY BECOME
SUFFICIENTLY ORGANIZED ENOUGH TO HAVE
SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE AT THE LEVEL OF POLICY.

 IT WAS DURING HABIBIE’S ADMINISTRATION THAT
MOST OF THE INITIATIVES THAT SIGNIFICANTLY
ACCELERATED INDONESIA’S DEMOCRATIZATION WERE
INITIATED.
 THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION HAD BEEN IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
RECOVERY, ONE REINFORCING THE OTHER ON THE WAY
UP, IN CONTRAST WITH THE SITUATION WHEN THE
CONFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISES
HAD BROUGHT THE COUNTRY DOWN DEEPER INTO THE
ABYSS.


IRONICALLY

HABIBIE, WHO INITIATED MOST OF THE BASIC
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS, FAILED TO
GET REELECTED IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION


THE PITFALLS

 THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE
 THE BANK BALI AFFAIR
 THE IMF DECIDED THAT FURTHER REVIEW OF ITS
PROGRAM SHOULD ONLY BE DONE AFTER THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

GSAPS‐2006‐Day2 www.ginandjar.com 125

EAST TIMOR
 AFTER TAKING OFFICE HABIBIE DECIDED TO BREAK THE
EAST TIMOR LOGJAM: THE SOLUTION OF THE EAST
TIMOR QUESTION HAD BECOME ONE OF THE
GOVERNMENT’S PRIORITIES.
 EVENTUALLY A CONSENSUS EMERGED WITHIN THE
GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW THE EAST TIMORESE TO HOLD
A REFERENDUM, OR IN THE POLITICAL JARGON AT THE
TIME, A “POPULAR CONSULTATION,” TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN A GREATER AUTONOMY WITH INDONESIA OR
OUTRIGHT INDEPENDENCE. THE REFERENDUM WAS TO
BE ADMINISTERED BY THE UNITED NATIONS.


 OMINOUSLY, BEFORE THE POPULAR CONSULTATION
THERE HAD BEEN CLASHES BETWEEN THE PRO‐
INTEGRATION AND ANTI‐INTEGRATION GROUPS.
THESE ARMED CLASHES HAD AFFECTED THE
CIVILIAN COMMUNITY AND RESULTED IN PEOPLE
BEING DISPLACED FROM THEIR HOMES, WHICH
CREATED A REFUGEE SITUATION.


 THE REFERENDUM WAS HELD ON 30 AUGUST. THE
PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR OVERWHELMINGLY CHOSE
INDEPENDENCE, WITH 78.5% OF THE VOTERS
CHOOSING INDEPENDENCE.
 ON 4 SEPTEMBER 1999, EAST TIMOR WAS HANDED
OVER TO THE UN AUTHORITIES, WHICH WOULD HELP
THE TERRITORY ORGANIZE ITSELF AS A SOVEREIGN AND
INDEPENDENT STATE. THE RESULT OF THE REFERENDUM
SHOCKED THE NATION AND INFURIATED MANY IN THE
MILITARY.
 AFTER ALL THE SACRIFICES AND SO MANY LIVES LOST, IT
WAS NOT EASY TO ACCEPT THAT EAST TIMOR SHOULD
BE RELEASED FROM THE FOLD OF THE REPUBLIC.

 THE REFERENDUM RESULTED IN AN INFLUX OF
REFUGEES WHO SUPPORTED THE INTEGRATION WITH
INDONESIA AND WERE AFRAID OF THEIR FATE IN THE
NEW INDEPENDENT COUNTRY DOMINATED BY THEIR
FORMER ENEMIES TO THE WESTERN PART OF THE
ISLAND OF TIMOR. TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE, IN AN
APPARENT CAMPAIGN TO GET EVEN WITH THOSE WHO
CHOSE TO SECEDE, THE LOCAL MILITARY UNIT AND
PARAMILITARY FORCES ENGAGED THEMSELVES IN A
DESTRUCTIVE RAMPAGE, DRAWING CONCERN AND
CRITICISM FROM THE WORLD.


 ON ONE HAND, HABIBIE WAS PRAISED FOR HIS
COURAGEOUS DECISION TO GRANT THE EAST TIMORESE
THE RIGHT TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FATE AND
HONORING HIS COMMITMENT TO RESPECT THE RESULT
OF THE REFERENDUM. ON THE OTHER HAND, HIS
GOVERNMENT WAS CONDEMNED BECAUSE OF THE
POST‐REFERENDUM CARNAGE. ALTHOUGH THE
COUNTRY WOULD BE FREED OF A LONG‐STANDING
SOURCE OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC BURDEN, DOMESTICALLY HIS DECISION
HAD BEEN USED BY HIS POLITICAL ENEMIES TO RALLY
MORE OPPOSITION AND TO STOP HIM FROM GETTING
REELECTED.


 IN THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC CONFERENCE (APEC) MEETING
IN NEW ZEALAND IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1999, AROUND THE TIME
OF THE CARNAGE IN EAST TIMOR FOLLOWING THE REFERENDUM,
US PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON TOLD THE COORDINATING MINISTER
OF THE ECONOMY, WHO WAS REPRESENTING INDONESIA IN THE
SUMMIT MEETING AS HABIBIE COULD NOT LEAVE THE COUNTRY
BECAUSE OF THE TENSE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, OF HIS
CONCERN FOR THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE REFERENDUM AND ADVISED THE
INDONESIAN MILITARY TO REFRAIN FROM USING FORCE AND TO
ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL PEACE KEEPING FORCE.
 THE SAME CONCERN FOR THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR WAS
ALSO CONVEYED TO HIM BY OTHER WORLD LEADERS WHO WERE
PRESENT, INCLUDING CHINA’S PRESIDENT JIANG CHEMIN,
JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER KEIZO OBUCHI, AND AUSTRALIAN
PRIME MINISTER JOHN HOWARD.

BANK BALI CASE

 ANOTHER BLOW CAME IN THE FORM OF WHAT WAS TO
BE KNOWN AS THE BANK BALI AFFAIR. IT INVOLVED THE
TRANSFER OF FUNDS OUT OF A BANK CONSIDERED TO
BE ONE OF THE POTENTIAL BANKS THAT WOULD
SURVIVE THE CRISIS, BANK BALI.
 PRESIDENT HABIBIE’S CLOSE CIRCLE WAS ALLEGED TO
BE INVOLVED IN THE CASE.


 THE EAST TIMOR POST‐REFERENDUM CARNAGE AND THE
BANK BALI AFFAIR SOURED RELATIONS BETWEEN HABIBIE,
THE IMF AND THE DONORS, CREATING CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT WERE REMINISCENT OF THE SITUATION DURING OF
SUHARTO’S FINAL WEEKS. THE TWO ISSUES HAD FROZEN
FURTHER DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE INDONESIAN
GOVERNMENT AND THE IMF. THE IMF DECIDED THAT
FURTHER REVIEW SHOULD ONLY BE DONE AFTER THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. IT WAS CLEAR IN CONVERSATIONS
BETWEEN THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR THE
ECONOMY AND US SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LARRY
SUMMERS THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS BEHIND THE
DECISION.


THE END OF THE BEGINNING

 OCTOBER 1, 1999 THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED MPR
STARTED ITS SESSION
 BY THE TIME THE MPR BEGAN ITS FIRST SESSION THE
CONTEST FOR PRESIDENCY WAS BETWEEN HABIBIE AND
MEGAWATI, WHO REPRESENTED THE TWO PARTIES WITH
THE BIGGEST ELECTORAL VOTE.
 HABIBIE HAD BEEN NOMINATED BY GOLKAR TO BE ITS
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.
 HOWEVER, AS THE ELECTION TIME DREW CLOSER, A
DIFFERENT POLITICAL CONFIGURATION EMERGED.


 FOR SOME TIME LEADERS FROM VARIOUS MUSLIM
ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN WAGING CAMPAIGNS
AGAINST MEGAWATI AND HER PARTY.
 BUT THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST MEGAWATI HERSELF
WAS PARTICULARLY FIERCE. IT FOCUSED ON THE
FACT THAT SHE WAS A WOMAN, AND IN THEIR
VIEW ISLAM DID NOT ALLOW A WOMAN TO LEAD A
NATION.


 ANOTHER ISSUE WAS HER RELIGIOSITY. PICTURES WERE
DISTRIBUTED SHOWING HER “PRAYING” IN A HINDU TEMPLE.
 SOME OF MEGAWATI’S EARLY SUPPORTERS DESERTED HER,
MOST NOTABLY ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, THE HEAD OF THE
POWERFUL MUSLIM ORGANIZATION NAHDATHUL ULAMA
(NU) AND FOUNDER OF THE PARTY PKB, WHO SAW AN
OPPORTUNITY BECOME A CANDIDATE HIMSELF.
 AMIDST THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING MEGAWATI AND
THE WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION TO HABIBIE AMONG THE
POPULACE AS WELL AS AMONG THE ORIGINAL REFORM
MOVEMENT, LEADERS OF THE MUSLIM PARTIES JOINED
FORCES IN AN ISLAMIC COALITION.


 THE COALITION WAS CALLED POROS TENGAH OR
CENTRAL AXIS.
 THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE WAS PREVENTING
MEGAWATI FROM BECOMING PRESIDENT, AS AT
THAT TIME MOST OF THE LEADERS OF THE CENTRAL
AXIS WERE SYMPATHETIC TO HABIBIE.
 HOWEVER THEY ALSO CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY
OF A THIRD ALTERNATIVE


 ON 14 OCTOBER HABIBIE DELIVERED HIS
ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH. HE REPORTED ON THE
CHALLENGES THAT HE HAD TO FACE WHEN HE TOOK
OVER THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PROGRESS THAT THE
COUNTRY HAD MADE DURING HIS STEWARDSHIP.
 HE ALSO REPORTED HIS DECISION TO ALLOW A
REFERENDUM IN EAST TIMOR AND ITS RESULTS, AND
RECOMMENDED THAT THE MPR REVOKE THE 1968
DECISION ON THE INTEGRATION OF EAST TIMOR AND
INDONESIA.


 HE ALSO REPORTED THAT THE INVESTIGATIONS OF
FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO BY THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL ABOUT ALLEGED ABUSES OF POWER DID NOT
FIND ANY INDICATION OF CRIMINAL WRONG DOING,
AND HENCE WERE STOPPED.
 ON THE 19TH THE MPR VOTED ON HABIBIE’S
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT.
 WITH A VOTE OF 355, MORE THAN HALF OF THE
MEMBERS OF MPR, HABIBIE’S ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
WAS REJECTED (AGAINST 322 WHO ACCEPTED IT).
 HABIBIE EFFECTIVELY WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE
PRESIDENTIAL RACE


 ON THE 20TH THE MPR TOOK THE VOTE FOR
PRESIDENT BETWEEN TWO CANDIDATES: MEGAWATI
AND ABDURRAHMAN WAHID.
 THE RESULT OF THE VOTE: WAHID RECEIVED 373 VOTES
AGAINST MEGAWATI’S 313 VOTES.
 ALTHOUGH MANY DOUBTED WAHID’S ABILITY TO LEAD
THE COUNTRY BECAUSE OF HIS PHYSICAL CONDITION,
THE VOTE WAS A REFLECTION OF A NUMBER OF
FACTORS.


 THE JOINED FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC PARTIES AND THE
ISLAMIC FACTIONS WITHIN GOLKAR AND THE
SUPPORTERS OF HABIBIE HAD DEFEATED THE
NATIONALIST COALITION OF PDI‐P AND NATIONALIST
FACTION WITHIN GOLKAR.
 THE REACTION AMONG PDI‐P RANK AND FILE TO THE
DEFEAT OF MEGAWATI WAS FEROCIOUS. RIOTS BROKE
OUT IN VARIOUS STRONGHOLDS OF PDI‐P, ESPECIALLY IN
JAKARTA, SOLO, BALI AND BATAM. THE WORST RIOTS
WERE IN BALI AND SOLO.


 AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THE MPR WAS TO
DECIDED WHO WOULD BE THE VICE PRESIDENT.
 BECAUSE OF HER DISAPPOINTMENT AT RESULT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, MEGAWATI AT FIRST DECLINED TO
BE NOMINATED AS VICE PRESIDENT.
 SHE WAS FURIOUS ABOUT HER DEFEAT AND SUSPECTED
THAT THE SAME COALITION WOULD DEFEAT HER AGAIN, AS
BY THE MORNING OF THE DAY OF THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION THE CENTRAL AXIS HAD COME OUT WITH THEIR
CANDIDATE, HAMZAH HAZ FROM PPP.
 AFTER INTENSIVE PERSUASION MEGAWATI FINALLY AGREED
TO RUN. MEGAWATI WON THE ELECTION, GARNERING 396
VOTES AGAINST HAMZAH HAZ’S 284 VOTES.


 WHEN THE MPR SESSIONS ENDED THE COUNTRY NEW
LEADERS HAD BEEN ELECTED DEMOCRATICALLY. THE
FIRST TIME IN INDONESIA’S HISTORY. DEMOCRACY HAD
TAKEN ITS HOLD.
 THE NEXT CHALLENGE WAS TO CONSOLIDATE THE GAIN,
TO MAKE IT ENDURE AND BRING TANGIBLE BENEFIT TO
THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLE.


ABDURRAHMAN WAHID GOVERNMENT

 THE ELECTION OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID TO THE
PRESIDENCY ITSELF CREATED ANOTHER LEGITIMACY
PROBLEM BECAUSE OF HIS PARTY’S LACK OF SUPPORT
SHOWN IN THE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL VOTES WON
AND THE FRAGILITY OF THE COALITION THAT PUT HIM
IN THE PRESIDENCY.
 THE COALITION WAS NOT BASED ON A “POSITIVE”
CONSENSUS OF HAVING LAUNCHED THE BEST
CANDIDATE FOR THE JOB, BUT ON A “NEGATIVE”
COMMON PLATFORM TO STOP MEGAWATI FROM
BECOMING PRESIDENT.


 DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF THE COALITION ACTED THIS
WAY FOR DIFFERENT REASONS. IT WAS A FRAGILE
COALITION THAT COULD EASILY BREAK WHEN THE
COMMON INTEREST WAS NO LONGER MAINTAINED.
 MEGAWATI’S ELECTION TO THE VICE PRESIDENCY
PARTIALLY SOLVED THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY.
 HAVING MEGAWATI, WHOSE PARTY HAD THE LARGEST
VOTE IN THE PARLIAMENT, AS HIS VICE PRESIDENT
PROVIDED ABDURRAHMAN WAHID’S PRESIDENCY WITH
THE NEEDED POLITICAL LEGITIMACY.
 FROM THE VERY BEGINNING IT WAS CLEAR THAT WAHID
OWED AND WOULD DEPEND A LOT ON MEGAWATI’S
SUPPORT TO BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY RULE IN A
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SETTING.


DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
 THE END OF THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT AND THE
ELECTION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BY DEMOCRATIC
MEANS COMPLETED THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY.
 DURING HIS PRESIDENCY THE PROCESS OF
DISMANTLING THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE
INSTALLATION OF A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT WAS
COMPLETED.
 IT MET WITH LINZ AND STEPAN’S STANDARD DEFINITION
OF WHEN A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IS COMPLETE.
 THE COUNTRY WAS ON THE WAY TO STRENGTHEN AND
CONSOLIDATE ITS DEMOCRACY.


THE EUPHORIA
 THE EMERGENCE OF THE WAHID‐MEGAWATI
GOVERNMENT WAS WELL RECEIVED DOMESTICALLY
AS WELL AS INTERNATIONALLY.
 EVEN THOSE WHO AT THE OUTSET WERE OPPOSED TO
ABDURRAHMAN WAHID’S ELECTION ACCEPTED THE
RESULT OF THE ELECTION AS THE BEST AS IT COULD
BE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
 THE COUNTRY CAME BACK TO NORMAL,
DEMONSTRATIONS STOPPED, STUDENTS RETURNED
TO SCHOOLS, THE WARRING FACTIONS LAY DOWN
THEIR ARMS.


 THERE WAS HIGH HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE COURSE THAT THE COUNTRY
WAS TAKING. IN CONTRAST TO HABIBIE, WAHID WAS
ENDOWED WITH SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CAPITAL AT
THE ONSET OF HIS PRESIDENCY.
 ABDURRAHMAN WAHID HAD MARGINAL POLITICAL
SUPPORT IN PARLIAMENT AND WITH THE POLITY AS
THE ELECTION RESULTS SHOWED.
 HE NEEDED THE SUPPORT OF THE LARGER PARTIES
THAT HAD LARGER POLITICAL CONSTITUENTS THAN
HE HAD.


 THIS RECOGNITION WAS REFLECTED IN THE WAY HE
FORMED HIS FIRST CABINET.
 SOME COMMENTATORS WERE CRITICAL OF THE
CABINET COMPOSITION, CLAIMING THAT IT DIDN’T
REFLECT PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE.
 ALTHOUGH HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE NU, THE LARGEST MUSLIM ORGANIZATION,
HIS SUPPORT WAS PARTICULARLY STRONG AMONG
SECULAR AND NON‐ISLAMIC CIVIL SOCIETY THAT HAD
LONG BEEN HIS POLITICAL HABITAT.
 HE WAS ALSO REVERED BY INTERNATIONAL NGOS FOR
HIS UNORTHODOX POLITICAL VIEWS, SUCH AS HIS
MODERATE (FOR SOME HIS PRO) VIEW ON ISRAEL.


 HIS EFFORT TO PUT THE MILITARY UNDER CIVILIAN
CONTROL ALSO WON HIM ACCOLADES, ESPECIALLY
AMONG INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS.
 HE APPOINTED A CIVILIAN TO BECOME THE MINISTER
OF DEFENSE, THE FIRST AFTER SO MANY YEARS.
 IT WAS ALSO A FIRST WHEN HE APPOINTED THE NAVY
CHIEF AS THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES,
THE TOP MILITARY POST THAT TRADITIONALLY HAD
BEEN RESERVED FOR THE ARMY.


 HIS IDEA FOR A SOLUTION TO THE ACEH PROBLEM
WAS TO AGREE TO THE REFERENDUM THAT WAS
DEMANDED BY THE GAM (INDEPENDENT ACEH
MOVEMENT).
 ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT FOLLOWED UP BY ACTUAL
MEASURES DUE TO STRONG OPPOSITION FROM THE
MILITARY AND MOST OF INDONESIA’S PUBLIC AS
WELL MANY ACEHNESE THEMSELVES, HIS STATEMENT
ON THE REFERENDUM STRENGTHENED HIS IMAGE,
ESPECIALLY AMONG THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND
OBSERVERS.


 HE ALSO MADE A STATEMENT ALLOWING THE
RAISING OF THE REBEL’S FLAG ON THE ANNIVERSARY
OF THE FOUNDING OF GAM ON 4 DECEMBER AS PART
OF THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. FURTHERMORE HE
INITIATED THE NEGOTIATION WITH GAM BROKERED
BY AN INTERNATIONAL NGO WITH A BASE IN GENEVA.
 HE HAD SHOWN LENIENCE TOWARD THE
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN IRIAN JAYA BY
AGREEING TO THE USE OF NAME PAPUA INSTEAD OF
IRIAN JAYA AND, AS IN ACEH, ALLOWING THE FLYING
OF THE PAPUAN FLAG THE BINTANG KEJORA (THE
MORNING STAR).


 WAHID ALSO ALLOWED THE ETHNIC CHINESE TO
CELEBRATE THEIR HOLIDAYS OPENLY, AS PART OF THE
COUNTRY’S HOLIDAYS.
 IN A DARING MOVE HE STATED THAT THE BAN ON THE
COMMUNIST PARTY AND COMMUNIST TEACHINGS
SHOULD BE LIFTED.
 THIS ENDEARED HIM EVEN MORE TO HIS ADMIRERS,
ESPECIALLY AMONG WESTERN OBSERVERS AND
NGO’S.


 ALTHOUGH HE WAS THE HEAD OF THE LARGEST
MUSLIM ORGANIZATION AND WAS AN ESTABLISHED
AND KNOWLEDGEABLE MUSLIM SCHOLAR, HE SET
AN EXAMPLE OF TOLERANCE IN RELIGIOUS
PRACTICE AND BEHAVIOR, INCLUDING THE BASIC
ONES SUCH AS THE FIVE‐TIME DAILY PRAYING AND
FIDELITY, AND RELIGIOUS SYNCRETISM.


POLITICAL LIMBO

 HOWEVER GOOD HIS INTENTIONS, WAHID’S
UNORTHODOX APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE
WOULD BRING HIM AND THE COUNTRY A LOT OF
TROUBLE.
 HIS DARING DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED
POLITICAL NORMS ENDEARED HIM TO SOME ELITES
AND FOREIGN ADMIRERS, BUT IT ALSO ERODED HIS
POLITICAL SUPPORT, WHICH, WITHOUT MEGAWATI,
WAS ON THIN ICE ANY WAY.


 ONE OF THE FIRST PUBLIC ROWS WAS OVER THE
ISSUE OF OPENING TRADE AND CULTURAL RELATIONS
WITH ISRAEL.
 ALTHOUGH THE RATIONALE GIVEN WAS APPEASING
THE JEWISH LOBBY THAT WAS DOMINANT IN WALL
STREET TO GET THEM TO HELP THE INDONESIAN
ECONOMY, IT ENCOUNTERED STRONG REACTION
FROM AMONG POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM
COMMUNITY IN GENERAL.
 STUDENTS FROM VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS STAGED
DEMONSTRATION ALL OVER THE COUNTRY.


ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY: TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION

ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY: TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION

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ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY: TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION