2. • Financial markets: In central banks we trust (too much)
• Euro crisis: where we are and where we – might – go
• Euro area recovery: slow, fragile, multi speed
• ECB: When the toolbox is almost empty …
• Key take aways
________________
• Annex of tables
• Key forecasts
2
3. Equity Markets: Japan!
3
Financial markets
1990 2012 2003 07 2008 1990 2012 end 2012 01/05/2013 2013 low 2013 high
S&P 500 8 11 38 12 1,426 1,583 11.0 0.9 11.0
Euro STOXX 50 7 13 44 3 2,636 2,712 6.2 1.4 2.9
DAX* 10 23 40 14 7,612 7,914 6.1 1.8 4.0
Nikkei 3 14 42 5 10,395 13,694 31.7 1.7 31.7
MSCI EM (US $) 15 38 54 21 1,055 1,038 4.1 4.1 1.6
* Performance Index
current compared toIndexchange p.a. in % change over end
2012 in %
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
50
100
150
200
50
100
150
200
Index
1 Jan 2005=100
Euro STOXX vs S&P vs Nikkei
Euro STOXX
Nikkei 225
S&P 500
Index
1 Jan 2005=100
4. EUR govies: spreads narrowing
4
Financial markets
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
09 10 11 12 13
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
10y Government bond yields
spread vs German Bunds
100 bp100 bp
France
Italy
Spain
Ireland
Portugal
6. • Euro crisis: where we are and where we – might – go
– Why is Europe struggling so hard with the crisis?
– The “German view”
– Where are we now?
– Where do we go from here?
– Lessons form Cyprus for the Banking Union
6
7. Why is Europa struggling so hard with the crisis?
• It’s a complex crisis: debt (both public & private), economic structures, competitiveness,
banks, confidence, politics, institutions
• Euro area = designed by poli cians op mal currency area
• Euro = currency without a state
• Only the ECB can act quickly, 17 European governments cannot
• Big differences between countries / governments …
– … in economic and monetary policy ideas (”Latin” vs. ”Germanic“ view)
– … concerning the causes of the crisis and the right therapy (how much austerity?)
– … in the willingness to give up sovereignty / to shift power “to Europe”
– … in the vision for Europe: there simply is no (single) vision
• Below the European surface, there is still a lot of nationalism, as people’s attitudes are
shaped by national historical experience
7
Euro crisis
8. Monetary unions now and past
8
Euro crisis
Source: Nordea Markets and Roubini Global Economics
Political Union
Fiscal transfers
between
states
Hard budget
constraints for
member states
Centralized
control of money
supply by Central
Bank
Financial stability
function of
Central Bank Regime type Outcome
Latin Monetary Union
Orderly dissolution / move to Gold
Standard in 1926
Scandin. Monetary Union Semi orderly dissolution
Gold Standard Disorderly dissolution in the 1930s
Ruble Zone n/a
National
monetary union
Disorderly dissolution 1992/93
Argentina partial Peg Disorderly dissolution 2001
U.S. 1790 1850 Added hard budget constraints
U.S. 1850 1861 Civil War
U.S. 1861/65 1913 yes
Added partial centralization of CB's
control of MS
U.S. 1913 1935 partial no
Added finanical stability function
for the Fed founded in 1913
U.S. post 1935 Stable
European Monetary
Union
perhaps
Sui generis
17 states
one currency
more integration or
break up
Based on Roubini Global Economics (A How To Manual for an Amicable EZ Divorce)
Quasi fixed
exchange rate
National
monetary union
no
no
not yet yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
partial
no
9. The ”German view”: Do. your. homework.
(Note: There is no uniform ”German view” properly speaking. What outside Germany is called
“the German view” is probably the position the government and the Bundesbank agree upon):
• Crisis was primarily caused by excessive public debt
• “Austerity” is an unavoidable part of the solution, not part of the problem. No pain, no gain
• Austerity policy must be complemented by growth enhancing structural/supply side reforms
• Germany played no role in causing the crisis
• For many reasons – economic, financial, political and historical –, Germany is highly
interested in European integration and in a Euro area that works. Therefore, it contributes to
buying time for crisis countries to do their homework
• Any solution that might mean higher inflation in Germany is out of the question
9
Euro crisis / Germany
10. … and don’t ask for too many lifebelts
10
Euro crisis / Germany
Source: The Economist
11. Maastricht world vs. real world
The Maastricht world
• Fiscal self reliance, politicians con
strained by rules (stability and growth
pact/SGP, 1997) and market pressure
• No bail out
• Independent central bank, no
monetization of government debt
• EMU economies converge economically
and financially
• National policies fully sufficient to
counter any financial imbalances
11
Euro area
The real world in 2013
Market pressure didn’t work and
politicians ruined the SGP
Bail outs for Greece (2010 and 2012),
Ireland (2010), Portugal (2011), Spanish
banks (2012), and Cyprus (2013)
ECB dancing very close to finance
ministers
Large economic divergencies between
EMU countries, financial market
fragmented
Financial stability seen as a European
task Banking Union, but still a long
way to go
12. Euro crisis – where are we now?
• Break up: off the table – for now
• Firewall: ESM and ECB technically ready to act
• Confidence: returned to some degree, but still low
• Economy: in recession since, slow and multi speed recovery likely
• Rebalancing: still a long way to go; mostly driven by deficit countries
• Budget deficits: mostly shrinking at a slow pace
• Financial markets declining on the funding side, but still strong on the
fragmentation: lending side (interest rates, credit conditions)
• Banking Union: moving ahead very slowly
• Politics: ongoing debate on how much austerity is needed
12
Euro crisis
13. Euro area – where do we go from here?
13
Euro crisis
Closer integration or
break up?
EMU 17 minus GR, CY possible
Northern Euro
Meltdown
What about EU and
internal market?
Huge political and
economic costs
Political Union / Banking Union / Fiscal Union
(“more Europe”)
“Stability union”
based on competition,
with liability and control
going hand in hand,
the German view
“Transfer/
liability union”
based on solidarity,
the Mediterranean view
But how exactly? Economic reason may be on Germany’s
side. But political conditions and time
are not. The monetary union turns into
a “liability union”. Muddling through
continues.
Back to Maastricht
(national sovereignty, no bailout)
14. Lessons from Cyprus for the Banking Union
Although Cyprus is a very special case, there may be some lessons to draw:
• Bail in of a bank’s creditors is possible, tax payers do not have to save every troubled bank
• That may soften German resistance to a Banking Union
• Crisis underscored the need for a single supervisor not captured by national interests
• Common resolution mechanism: The ECB fills a part of that role by providing (or not)
emergency liquidity
• Needed: A credible – probably not national but European – system of deposit insurance
Euro crisis / Banking Union
14
Five elements of a European Banking Union
• single rulebook for banks – exits to a large extent
• single supervisory mechanism – currently discussed by European Parliament
• single resolution mechanism – proposal from European Commission later this year
• common fiscal backstop – ongoing discussion about bank recapitalisation by ESM
• common system for deposit insurance – seems to be off the table for the moment
15. • Euro area recovery: slow, fragile, multi speed
• A look at some Euro area countries
– Germany: back to growth from early 2013 on
– France: no easy way out of the gloom
– Italy in a dead end – any way out?
– Spain adapting to the post bubble environment
– Cyprus ... and Slovenia next?
• ECB: When the toolbox is almost empty …
15
16. A common currency, but very different paths
• The “crisis countries” …
• … and we left out Greece here
16
Euro crisis
• The more stable countries …
• … some of which are also in recession
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
08 09 10 11 12 13
85
90
95
100
105
85
90
95
100
105
IndexIndex Real GDP, Q1 2008 = 100
Cyprus
Spain
Ireland
Italy
Portugal
Slovenia
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
08 09 10 11 12 13
90
95
100
105
90
95
100
105
IndexReal GDP, Q1 2008 = 100Index
Belgium
Germany
Finland
France
Netherlands
Austria
17. Short term outlook: slow und bumpy recovery
• Euro area struggling to get out of
recession and the outlook is not rosy
• Here is why we still expect some growth
from H2 2013 on:
– Monetary policy will remain extremely
loose and the transmission mechanism
should work better over time
– Fiscal policy was highly restrictive last year
but is less so this year and probably next
– A weaker euro and healthy growth in the
US and many Emerging Markets should
provide tailwind to exports
– Structural reforms and efforts to regain
competitiveness will pay off – although we
have to admit that we don’t know exactly
when.
• GDP forecast (2013/14): 0.4% / 1.4%
17
Euro area
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
% q/qGDP growth% q/q
Germany
France
Italy
Spain
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
-12.5
-10.0
-7.5
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
-12.5
-10.0
-7.5
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
% y/yEuro area GDP% q/q annualised
18. M1 might be good indicator for the economy
• Yes, the recovery is fragile, but all hope is
not lost
• M1 = money to spend = currency in
circulation plus overnight deposits
• If former relationships have not
completely broken down …
• … M1 is compatible with a recovery …
• … and also with the idea that equity
markets have run a bit far, driven by
liquidity
18
Euro area
30
40
50
60
70
0
4
8
12
16
00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
P M I Compo-
site (rhs)
M 1 (3m moving average
6 months ahead)
% y/y IndexM1 and PMI Composite
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
-3
0
3
6
9
12
15
00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
Euro Stoxx 50 (rhs )
% y/y% y/y
M 1 (3m moving av., 6 months ahead)
M1 and the equity market
19. Which currency is weak?
19
Euro, US dollar
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
80
90
100
110
120
130
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
IndexExternal value of the euroEUR-USD
stronger EUR
Real effective exchange rate
Q1 1999=100 (rhs)
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
80
90
100
110
120
130
80
90
100
110
120
130
Index IndexReal broad effective USD
Stronger USD
Mean +/- std. deviation
20. Who needs a weaker currency?
20
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
07 08 09 10 11 12 13
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
Index Jan 2008 = 100
Manufacturing output
Index Jan 2008 = 100
USA
Euro area
Euro area vs. US
21. FX long term view: USD to strengthen vs. EUR
21
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
93
95
97
99
101
103
105
107 USD
Forecast
EMU real GDP relative to
US real GDP
Index 2005=100
EUR/USD, rhs
EUR/USD
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
10 11 12 13 14
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
USD EUR/USD USD
Note: The model is based on the EUR-US 2Y swap rate
differential (+). R = 0.69
Model forecast and
95% confidence interval
Model forecast
based on Nordea's
swap rate forecast
Actual
22. Why Germany is coping relatively well at the moment
• Export based growth model works as long
as Emerging Markets and US are growing
• No public or private debt excesses to
correct
• Fiscal policy has leeway not to get
restrictive now (and may be not later,
either)
• Low ECB policy rates passed through to
companies and consumers (monetary
transmission mechanism works)
• Stable labour market; new jobs are
created at low growth, but productivity
stagnates
• GDP forecast (2013/14): 0.7% / 2.1%
22
Germany
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
2
3
4
5
6
38
39
40
41
42
Mio. persons
Unemployed, rhs
Employed
Labour marketMio. persons
-40
-20
0
20
40
-20
-10
0
10
20
00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Exports
Capex spending
Ifo export expec-
tations (rhs)
% y/y Index
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
23. Short term outlook: back to growth in early 2013
• After a 0.6% drop in GDP in Q4, survey
data point towards a rebound in Q1
• Capex spending (down five quarters in a
row) likely to have stabilised
• Improvement in Southern Europe will
translate into German exports (as well as
capex sprending and employment)
• Main risks:
– Deepening of the crisis in southern Europe
– France sliding into a deep recession
• Long term challenges
– Low trend growth
– Unfavorable demography
– (Parts of the) banking sector
23
Germany
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
-2
-1
0
1
2
80
90
100
110
120
% q/q
Forecast
GDP and IFOIndex 2005=100
IFO,
business
expectations
GDP (rhs)
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
07 08 09 10 11 12 13
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
2010=100
Euro area
Total
Ex-Euro area
Export orders2010=100
24. A house price bubble in Germany? Well …
24
Source: Nordea Markets, OECD and Reuters Ecowin
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Index
1995=100
Germany
Denmark
Real home pricesIndex
1995=100
Norway
Sweden
Source: Nordea Markets, OECD and Reuters Ecowin
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
50
75
100
125
150
175
50
75
100
125
150
175
IndexIndex Home price-income ratio
Note: 100 = long term average
Denmark
Sweden
Norway
Germany
Germany
25. What Germans are (not) talking about
… talking about:
• Euro crisis:
”Money can’t buy you friends”
• Tax fraud
• Fair pay, working poor
• ”Energiewende”
• German dominance (in the
Champions League)
25
… not (a lot) talking about:
• Be happy
• Germany gains from the euro
crisis (low interest rate, weaker
euro, immigration)
• Does it make much sense to run
huge export and current account
surpluses?
• General election in September
Germany
26. Thoughts on the German election (22 September)
• Angela Merkel is popular, no strong mood for change
• But: Being popular doesn’t assure re election of CDU/FDP government
• A new party to watch: ”Alternative für Deutschland“ (anti euro)
• CDU/FDP in pole position; grand coalition and SPD/Green Party coalition
possible
• Where could an SPD led government make a difference?
– Economic policy (taxes, social security) less business friendly
– Management of the euro crisis ”more Europe”, less austerity
– Safe heaven status of Bunds don’t worry too much
26
Germany
27. If there were elections next Sunday …
27
Germany
Source: http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm
29. No easy way out of the gloom
• Nasty mix of cyclical and structural
problems
• Low share of manufacturing in gross value
added (only 10% compared to 16.8% in
Sweden or 23% in Germany
• Low profit margins in the industrial sector,
concentrated on low/medium value
added products, …
• … leading to a high price elasticity of
export and frequent calls for weaker euro
• Severe loss of global market shares
• Public debt issues, rating worries
• Large public sector but low efficiency of
government activity (eg in education)
• Expect no growth for 2013
29
France
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
40
60
80
100
120
140
% y/yGDP and business climateIndex
GDP, rhs
INSEE
business
climate
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
50
60
70
80
90
100
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1 % of GDP
Note: European
Commission forecast
General
government debt, rhs
Public finances% of GDP
General
government
budget balance
30. Italy: new government faces old problems
• Six consecutive quarters of declining
GDP…
• … which is now as high (or low) as it was
in 2001
• Italian voters clearly rejected austerity in
late February …
• … and it took two months to form a new
(grand coalition) government
• GDP to decline by another 1¼% this year,
with not much growth in 2014 either
30
Italy
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters EcoWin
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
-90
-80
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
-90
-80
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
Balance
Portugal
Greece
Consumer sentiment
Spain
Balance
Italy
Germany
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
-10.0
-7.5
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
-10.0
-7.5
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
EURbn
Ireland
Italy
Trade balance
Greece
EURbn
Portugal
Spain
Note: primitive seasonal adjustment
31. Spain adapting to the post bubble environment
• Typical case of a protracted ”balance sheet
recession”:
• Credit boom assets prices then the
bubble bursts private sector deleverages
savings consumption, investment
asset prices bad loans public
deficits
• Government debt rose from 36% of GDP in
2007 to 84% in 2012
• Public sector deficit still 10.6% in 2012
(mainly structural)
• As monetary policy doesn’t work, either
fiscal policy should give stimuli (if it can), or
recovery has to come from exports via
nominal or real deprecation
31
Spain
32. Spain: housing correction going on, exports brighter
• Downsizing of the housing sector began in
2008 – and it’s not over yet
• Construction investment down 45% since
2008 (GDP:only 7%)
• House prices increased by 145% from
2000 to 2007 and declined by only 17%
since
• Employment down 19% overall and 62%
in the oversized construction sector …
• … and it hasn’t bottomed out yet
• Exports the brighter spot, both goods and
services
• GDP forecast (2013/14): 1.5% / 0.9%
32
Spain
33. Slovenia – vulnerable but very different from Cyprus
• Banks are struggling with the second recession since 2009 and sinking house prices
• Bad loans: € 7 bn according to IMF, 20% of GDP
• Economy is likely to shrink by around 2% this year. So, no short term relief from this side
• Slovenia may need external help but it is very different from Cyprus:
– Small banking sector, less need for bank recapitalization (far below 10% of GDP)
– State as majority owner of the banking system has a strong interest in taking part in
capital increase
– Public debt only 53.7% of GDP (2012). Cyprus: 86.5%
– Economic structure much healthier than in Cyprus. Industry accounts for 30% of gross
value added
Conclusion:
• Should investors worry about Slovenia and follow events closely? Yes
• Will Slovenia be the next Cyprus? No
• As long as crisis management doesn’t get it completely wrong, it is more likely to be a, well,
“normal” case of crisis – and that would be bad enough
33
34. 0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
PMI composite
output
Index bpPMI and ECB policy changes
Change in ECB
main refi rate (rhs)
ECB “ready to act” but running out of options
• The latest rate cut will not change the economic outlook much …
• … and it will not ease fragmentation in bank lending
Monetary policy is increasingly ”pushing on a string”
34
ECB
35. Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0 %Medium term interest rates on small loans%
Germany
Spain
France
Netherlands
Italy
Fixing the monetary transmission mechanism – but how?
• Further measures to support lending to SMEs are likely, e.g.:
– further/cheaper liquidity to banks that lend more to SMEs
– softer rules on SME loans as collateral
• Don’t expect too much positive effect
35
ECB
36. Key take aways
36
• Anyone who claims that he knows exactly what will happen with the euro crisis
(and when) does not tell you the truth
• Slow and bumpy growth ahead for the Euro area
• Wide differences between Euro area economies and bond yields to persist
• ECB effective in avoiding disaster but with no silver bullet to kick start the economy
• Full Banking Union will not arrive quickly
• If growth does not return by 2014 at the latest, political capital risks getting
exhausted which would make a Euro area break up possible
• Euro weaker vs. the dollar over time
• Return of capital (not on capital) likely to stay on investors’ minds
Summary
44. The Euro area compared to USA, Japan, China
44
Annex tables
Source: Nordea Markets and Reuters Ecowin
Euro area USA Japan China
Population 2011 m 331.9 311.6 126.2 1,347.4
Nominal GDP 2011 bn € 9,425.3 10,842.1 4,233.9 5,247.6
in % of Eurozone GDP 2011 % 100.0 115.0 44.9 55.7
Nominal GDP per capita 2011 €1,000 28.4 34.8 33.6 3.9
in % of GDP Eurozone per capita 2011 % 100.0 122.5 118.2 13.7
Nominal GDP per capita (PPP) 2011 €1,000 24.3 34.8 25.0 6.0
in % of GDP Eurozone per capita 2011 % 100.0 143.2 102.8 24.8
Share in World GDP (nominal) 2011 % 18.7 21.6 8.4 10.5
Share in World GDP (PPP) 2011 % 14.2 19.1 5.6 14.3
Share in the real GDP
Private consumption 2011 % 56.4 70.9 59.1 35.4
Gross fixed capital formation 2011 % 19.0 12.8 19.5 44.8
Public comsumption 2011 % 21.4 19.0 19.6 12.8
Net exports 2011 % 0.1 3.1 2.6 5.6
Shares in gross value added
Agriculture 2011 % 1.7 * 1,2 * 1,2 10.1
Industry (including construction industry) 2011 % 25.5 * 20,0 * 28,1 46.8
Services 2011 % 72.8 * 78,8 * 70,7 43.1
Real GDP 2007 to 2011 % y/y, p.a. 0.5 0.5 0.1 10.7
Consumer prices 2008 to 2011 % y/y, p.a. 2.0 2.2 0.2 3.7
Unemployment rate 2009 to 2011 % 9.0 7.7 4.5 4.1
Government budget balance 2011 % of GDP 4.1 10.1 9.8 1.2
Government debt 2011 % of GDP 88.0 102.9 229.6 25.8
Current account balance 2011 % of GDP 0.2 3.1 2.1 2.8
Share of global exports 2011 % 13.6 8.3 4.6 10.7
Share of global imports 2011 % 13.3 12.4 4.6 9.5
* Data for 2010
49. Ease of Doing Business Index (2013)
49
Annex tables
Source: Nordea Markets and World Bank
Starting a
business
Dealing with
construction
permits
Getting
electricity
Registering
property
Getting
credit
Protecting
investors
Paying
taxes
Trading
across
borders
Enforcing
contracts
Resolving
insolvency
Germany 20 (19) 106 14 2 81 23 100 72 13 5 19
France 34 (29) 27 52 42 146 53 82 53 27 8 43
Italy 73 (87) 84 103 107 39 104 49 131 55 160 31
Spain 44 (44) 136 38 70 57 53 100 34 39 64 20
Netherlands 31 (31) 67 89 67 49 53 117 29 12 32 6
Belgium 33 (28) 44 57 82 176 70 19 75 29 18 7
Austria 29 (32) 134 75 24 34 23 100 77 26 7 12
Greece 78 (100) 146 31 59 150 83 117 56 62 87 50
Finland 11 (11) 49 34 21 24 40 70 23 6 9 5
Portugal 30 (30) 31 78 35 30 104 49 77 17 22 23
Ireland 15 (10) 10 106 95 53 12 6 6 28 63 9
Slovakia 46 (48) 83 46 100 8 23 117 100 98 69 38
Luxembourg 56 (50) 93 33 63 134 159 128 14 32 1 52
Slovenia 35 (37) 30 61 31 83 104 17 63 57 56 42
Cyprus 36 (40) 37 80 98 99 53 32 31 18 108 25
Estonia 21 (24) 47 35 53 14 40 70 50 7 31 72
Malta 102 ( ) 150 167 111 80 176 70 27 34 121 67
USA 4 (4) 13 17 19 25 4 6 69 22 6 16
UK 7 (7) 19 20 62 73 1 10 16 14 21 8
Japan 24 (20) 114 72 27 64 23 19 127 19 35 1
1 = best conditions; 185 = worst conditions among 185 countries surveyed by the World Bank
Reform improves conditions for doing business
Reform worsens conditions for doing business
Overall
Ranking 2013
(2012)
c a t e g o r i e s
50. Thank you!
Dr. Holger Sandte
Chief European Analyst
Global Research
+45 3333 1191
holger.sandte@nordea.com
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