Assuring the peace in south atlantic waters

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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE
CSC 27
MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES (MDS) THESIS
ASSURING THE PEACE IN SOUTH ATLANTIC WATERS.
A STANDING NAVAL FORCES SOUTH ATLANTIC. Utopia or possibility?
By Cdr Eduardo Ligio GANEAU (Argentine Navy)
This paper was written by a student has attended the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of
one of the requirements of the Master Degree in Defence Studies established by the Royal Mili-
tary College of Kingston, Canada. This paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts
and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does
not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of
Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released,
quoted or copied except with express permission of the Canadian Department of National De-
fence.
Este trabajo fue escrito por un estudiante que asistió al Colegio de las Fuerzas Armadas Cana-
dienses en cumplimiento de uno de los requisitos de la Maestría en Estudios de Defensa esta-
blecidos por el Royal Military College de Kingston, Canadá . Este es un documento escolar y
por lo tanto contiene hechos y opiniones que el autor solamente ha considerado como apropia-
dos y correctos para el tema. Éste no refleja necesariamente la política o la opinión de ninguna
agencia, incluyendo el Gobierno de Canadá y el Departamento de la Defensa Nacional. Este
trabajo no puede ser distribuido, reproducido o copiado, excepto con el expreso permiso del
Departamento Canadiense de la Defensa Nacional.
2004

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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 7
Mentality and perceptions……………………………………………………………………..……….8
SECTION 1
STRATEGIC SITUATION....................................................................................…......………....10
Generalities of the maritime environment..................................……………………….….……10
The South Atlantic Theatre............................................................……………………………...10
Geografic frame ..................................................................................………………………..…..10
Strategic frame…………………………………………………………………………………………...11
Littoral environment…………………………………..…………………………………………....….11
American littoral…………………………………………..…………………….………….……….……11
African littoral………………………………………………..………………….…………………......…11
Antartic front……………………………………………………………………………...………………13
Maritime environment………………………………………………………………….……...………14
Maritime shipping ……………………………………………………………….……………..……..…14
- The global maritime shipping environment………………………………………………..…….…..14
- Current trends in the global shipping industry………………………………………….………...…15
- Sea lines of communication………………………………………………………………......………17
Resources……………………………………………………………...………………………..……….18
- Renewal resources………………………………………………………………………………...…..18
Fisheries………………………………………………………………………………………..……….18
Fresh Water…………………………………………………………………………………….………21
- Non renewal resources…………………………………………………………………….....………21
The growing importance of sub-sea resources………...…………………………………...…….21
Oil, energy and geopolitics in the same coin……………………………………..….……………27
South Atlantic Region, the New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint……………………………..…28
Atlantic Equatorial Africa as new U.S. vital interest…………………………………..……..……29
A power projection space……………………………………………………………………………….31
Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………..….31
SECTION 2
INERNATIONAL LAW AND SECURITY IN SOUTH ATLANTIC.................…….…...….……....33
Security under United Nations organization (UN)………………………………………….…….33
The Law of the Sea Convention…………………………………………………………………..…34
Security as a concept of South Atlantic Rim common interest……………………………..…35
The Threats…………………………………………………………………………….……………..…36
Basic current threats (from a “continental” point of view)…………………………………….…..…36
Information Age Threats to Security…………………………………………………………..………36
Maritime threats……………………………………………………………………………….…...……37

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- Piracy……………………………………………………………………………………….…….…...37
- Terrorism at sea……………………………………………………………………….…….………..38
Security options……………………………………………………………………………………..…39
Collective security model………………………………………………………………….……………40
Co-operative security model………………………………….………………………………………...41
Security model by means of integration……………………………………………………………….42
Different intends involving countries of the South Atlantic Rim…………………….…….….42
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance – TIAR………………………………….……42
The South Atlantic Maritime Area – AMAS………………………………………..………………….44
South Atlantic Treaty Organization – OTAS………………………………………….…………..…..44
Zone Of Peace and Co-Operation of the South Atlantic – ZPCAS……………………………..….46
Actors in security of South Atlantic Rim…………………………….……….……….……….…..48
The ZPCAS littoral countries…………………………………………………………………………...48
- American Front Countries………………………………………………………………………….….48
- African Front Countries…………………………………………………………………………….….48
Another actors……………………………………………………………………………………………48
- United States of America………………………………………………………….………….…48
- NATO………………………………………………………………………………….…………..50
- Russia……………………………………………………………………………………………..52
- China………………………………………………………………………………...………...….54
- Europe………………………………………………………………………….……………...….56
- United Kingdom……………………………….………………………………………..……..…56
- France……………………………………………………………………………………...……..57
- Portugal…………………………...……………………………………………………......…….57
- Norway………………………………………………………………………………..........…….57
- Paraguay……………………………………………………………………………….……...…57
- Bolivia……………………………………………………………………………………………..57
- Chili……………………….…………………………………………………….…………………58
- Another countries………………………………………………………………………….…….58
Interaction....................................................................................................................................58
Summary……………………………………………………………………………….…………..……58
SECTION 3
DEVELOPING A STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC......……...........………...……………59
The root of the problem.............................................................................................................59
Why not to copy a NATO model?………………………………………………..……...…………..62
The NATO……………………………………………………………………………...……………..….64
The NATO model……………………………………………………………………..……..………….64
NATO naval organization………………………………………...………………….………………..66
A new structure for NATO…………………………………………………………..………………..68
The NATO example of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic……………..………………......…..69
The NATO example of the Striking Fleet Atlantic………………………………………….……..71
Merits of this Maritime Security Model……………………………………………………….…….73
Naval Co-operation in the South Atlantic Ocean…………………………………………………76
Summary...................…….....................................................................................................…. 81

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SECTION 4
THE CAPACITIES OF SEA POWER……...……………………………...….……………………….83
Advantages of sea power………………………….……………………………………………..…..83
Sea Denial and Operations Other Than War……………………………….…………………..…….84
- Presence and Deterrence…………………………………………….………….………..……85
- Peace Operations…………………………….……………………………………………….…86
- Humanitarian Operations……………………………………………..…………….…………..86
- Protection of Shipping and Freedom of Navigation………………………………..…….…..86
- Maritime Constabulary Tasks…………………………………………………….…………….86
- Environmental Operations……………………………………………………….……………..87
- Embargoes/Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)…………………………………………87
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)……………………………………..……..….87
Operations in Wartime…………………………………………………………………….………….…88
- Sea Control………………………………………..………………….………………….…..…..88
- Power Projection…………………………………………………….…………………..………88
- Tasks for Maritime Operations…………………….……………………………………...……89
Information Warfare……………………………………………………………………………….…….91
Tactical Environmental Support……………………………………..…………………………………92
Summary…………………………………………………………………………...………………..…..92
SECTION 6
FORCE PLANNING FOR NAVAL FORCES…………………………………………………………94
The spectrum of military conflict…………………………………………………………...……….94
A Strategic Risk Management in Defence……………………………………………….……….103
What can be done?: A Capability-Based Planning…………………………………...……..….105
Concept of operations for combined naval forces………………………………..….…..…….108
Capability goals for a combined naval force…………………………………………….………112
What levels of capacity?……………………………………………………………..……...………113
The force planning scenarios……………………………………………………………….……...117
The value-ranked capabilities………………………………………………………………..….…129
Summary………………………………………………………………………………..…………..….129
SECTION 6
THE STANDING NAVAL FORCE SOUTH ATLANTIC…………………….….……………….…131
Utopia of a Standing Naval Force South Atlantic?………………………………..….....……..131
The South Atlantic Rim Naval Forces……………………………………….…………………….131
What is missing?……………………………………………………………………….……………..136
Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………….137
CONCLUSIONS......................................…..................................................................………..138
ANNEX 1 – THE SOUTH ATLANTIC THEATRE………………...…………................………....144
ANNEX 2 – THE SOUTH ATLANTIC SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION………..………......146

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ANNEX 3 – SOUTH ATLANTIC STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE ………………….………....……147
ANNEX 4 – THE SOUTH ATLANTIC COMBINED / JOINT TASK LIST............……….….…. 148
ANNEX 5 – NAVAL FORCES OF SOUTH ATLANTIC….…………......................……….…….161
BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................…......................................…..…………164
***

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ASSURING THE PEACE IN SOUTH ATLANTIC WATERS.
A STANDING NAVAL FORCES SOUTH ATLANTIC. Utopia or possibility ?
INTRODUCTION
The South Atlantic Rim
The South Atlantic Rim1
is experiencing political and economic changes during last dec-
ades. The region holds enormous strategic and economic vital importance for the littoral coun-
tries and significant importance by same reasons for some another powers. Despite a history
with conflict and violence inside and/or between countries of West Africa and East South Ameri-
ca, the region seams to be more stable and peaceful than decades before.
However, there is an ominous and pervasive sense of uncertainty about the future. The
international terrorism, the necessity of natural resources, the destiny of Antarctica, the fragility
of democracies, the Malvinas/Falklands conflict, the evolution of the law of the sea, and some
others limits controversies, the existence of important sea lines of communications, the evolution
of economic growth and political changes are playing a significant role in determining a hegem-
ony to fill the power vacuum. As USA, France, United Kingdom, among others maintain and re-
inforce their presence, they exercise their political, economic and military influence.
Medium and small countries of the region, in some cases with insignificant navies, except
Brazil and major powers, seam sometimes to ignore the importance of navies to control the in-
fluence of the sea over the land life.
South Atlantic Ocean provides important sea lines of communication (SLOC´s) to all na-
tions in this rim and to some big powers. Economic, political and security interests of many south
Atlantic Rim nations intersect at sea. This intersection further suggests that the timing might be
right to examine forms of maritime cooperation. At present, except for a few bilateral or multilat-
eral treaties, there are no broadly recognized procedures, which can provide guidelines for the
conduct of maritime activities within the region.
Maritime security, an important dimension of regional security, could act as catalyst for
establishing a permanent South Atlantic Rim security regime. Maritime cooperation can serve as
a bridge to broader security cooperation among nations and also provides collective assurance
for all against a breakdown of international law and order.
Eastern South American and Western African countries have viewed themselves as dis-
tinct and competitive in their continental regions during history. Any significant increase in
strength by one of them has almost certain been to evoke an offsetting maneuver by others.
There is almost no pretense of collective security or cooperation based on shared domestic val-
ues, even on the part of the existing democracies. Cooperative security started in South America
last decade but there is still emphasis on equilibrium and preservation of national self-interest.
Traditional bilateral arrangements or limited multilateral forums as Organization of Ameri-
can Estates (OAE) and its Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA), Zone of
Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic, Tlatelolco Treaty, MERCOSUR, New Partnership
for African Development (NEPAD), Southern Africa and the Southern African Development
Community, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic and Mone-
1
For the purposes of this paper, the term South Atlantic Rim, describes all nations and /or continents whose shorelines are
washed by the South Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas.

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tary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA) and Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) serve only a marginal capacity in addressing economic, political and security issues.
It is well known that any proposal must be inserted inside the frame of United Nations and
might be the establishment of a preliminary step towards establishing a permanent South Atlan-
tic Rim security architecture by forging international linkages through maritime confidence build-
ing measures.
Mentality and perceptions
Two profoundly different views of the type of naval policy countries should adopt domi-
nate the debate in maritime and military’s affaires.
On one hand is the internationalist or ‘blue water’ philosophy. The other perspective is
essentially continental. Seeing only the need for a coast guard rely on the liberal democratic
ideal of a peaceful world in which reasonable men solve their differences by negotiation and,
thus, compromise. This argument is often persuasive, but invariably lacks depth in that it fails to
take due account of the unexpected, or the fact that not everyone is ‘reasonable’.
One problem with this view is that there is often absolutely no recognition of the traditional
naval role in diplomacy and crisis management. It is an entirely ‘continental’ perspective, lacking
an understanding of national or international maritime issues. This view is still widely supported,
by pro-army’s mentalities or by army’s influences so any future proposal to government for a
naval force structure and related employment strategy will almost certainly run the gauntlet of
criticism from those who do not understand the value of navies as extensions of state policy over
the sea and thus advocate their reduction or elimination. Thus, any future naval force plan has to
explain not only the return to countries on the investment, but also what will happen if those ca-
pabilities are not maintained.2
In this sense, continental alliances are more common than those built around a maritime
or oceanic environment. The proposal here, will be to analyse the convenience and possibility to
start building a South Atlantic naval organization starting by implementing a Standing Naval
Force South Atlantic (SNFSA).
***
2
HAYDON, Peter, Canadian Cdr.(R). “What Naval Capability Does Canada Needs?”, Canadian Military Journal Vol. 2, No. 1
Spring 2001.

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SECTION 1
STRATEGIC SITUATION
Generalities of the maritime environment
The following special characteristics of the sea must be highlighted in this basic but es-
sential start: flat surface (sea state, currents, tides), mass of the water (liquid mass, depth, tem-
perature, salinity, submarine life, currents), bottom (solid mass, relieve, composition, depth, life,
etc.), air space over the sea (gas mass, temperature, pressure, weather, life, etc.), coverage
(the sea covers 70 % of the earth’s surface), medium of efficient transport of large and heavy
items in long distances, increasingly exploitation of economic resources that holds and covers,
influence (approximately 70% of the world’s population lives within one hundred miles of a
coastline), special and evolutionary international law, and the called “freedom of the sea”3
The South Atlantic Theater
Geographic frame (See Annex 1)
The South Atlantic is framed to the north by an intercontinental strait of around 1,600 NM
between the South American coast in Natal, Brazil, and the African coast in Freetown, Sierra
Leona. There are different lines taken by authors as the northern limit but, to this paper, the limit
will be arbitrary draw between the northern point of the Brazilian coast in the limit with French
Guyana and the northern point of the coast of Senegal close to St.-Louis in the limit with Mauri-
tania. This criterion is along with the countries that compose the Zone of Peace and Cooperation
in the South Atlantic.
The western side of South Atlantic is the eastern South American coast as far as Cape
Horn with three access to the Pacific: the Drake passage, the Magellan strait and the Beagle
Channel. The eastern side is the western coast of the African continent until its end in the Agul-
has Cape. Antarctica is the southern coastal limit and it contributes to conforms the main pas-
sages both to the East toward the Indic Ocean and to the West toward the Pacific.
Strategic frame
Power, oil and food, among others, are usually source of conflict and South Atlantic has
specific relation with them. It’s purposed to follow the next more detailed analysis:
Littoral environment
American littoral
The American Front Countries are Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Brazil is the most power
member in the ZPCAS. Last decades has taken an important naval development and currently
has the main fleet in South Atlantic, including two aircraft carriers. Argentina has been a recog-
3
Canadian Forces College, “Naval Doctrine Manual, MCP 1”, p. 4-13/39.

9
nized power in South Atlantic last century but last two decades it’s naval power and maritime
influence significantly decreased because of it´s political and economical problems.
Warnings are being raised by some U.S. officials, news media and private individuals
about the growing threat in Latin America posed by violent Islamic extremist groups. In their
view, a new Islamic narco-terrorist threat is emerging as Islamism militants forge alliances with
local narco-terrorist groups like the rebels in Colombia.
However, while the risk exists that Islamic militants could attack U.S. and its allies assets
in the region, the threat may not be yet as great or immediate as some of the more extreme
alarmists claim. Buenos Aires in Argentina and Sao Paulo in Brazil are believed to have com-
bined populations of 3 million Islamists. Successful car bomb attacks in 1992 and 1994 against
the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina are attributed to
Hezbollah participation.4
African littoral
“Local and internal conflicts are the backdrop to trends and developments in the region.
Famine and poverty remain ever-present handicaps to greater peace and security. However, a
number of long-running conflicts have been resolved or brought close to resolution. In a sign of a
greater determination amongst regional countries to solve their own security problems, the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) although driven largely by political and economic
aims, has security elements referring to peacekeeping in its documentation.
It is likely that this will develop in three main areas: peacekeeping operations, crisis early
warning, and the non-proliferation of small arms. In a further development, military commenta-
tors in South Africa have discussed the creation of an Indigenous Military Peace-building Initia-
tive (IMPI), promoting the idea of a regional security forum for conflict resolution and prevention,
and also the restructuring and democratic control of armed forces. Both NEPAD and IMPI are at
a very early stage in their development. Given the partnership inherent in the NEPAD process,
Western countries involved may make any necessary investment conditional on democratic re-
forms, which may be unacceptable to some African partner countries.”5
Piracy and maritime security is a growing threat to the region. There are concerns about
security at ports and on merchant shipping specially focused in places where security is poor.
Despite attempts of the International Maritime Organization – a special working group of the UN
– to counter terrorism at sea by providing standardized, consistent framework for assessing the
risk to ships and port facilities and for taking security measures to counter these risks, such
measures are too costly for most governments in the region, and foreign aid is needed in order
for any such measures to be implemented.6
Cote d'Ivoire and Democratic Republic of Congo are turmoil-ridden African states that
garner little or no attention from the international community. Each of these countries suffers
from internal strife, but each has been largely ignored by the outside world -- unless you count
the presence of international peacekeepers, who have the uncanny knack of keeping the peace
in places where the peace is already pretty much kept. Each of these crises, and others as well,
4
Stratfor Agency. “Latin America: A Safe Haven for Al Qaeda?”. September 04, 2003, 2225 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz
5
Chipman, J.. The Military Balance 2002-2003, “Sub-Saharan Africa – Regional Trends”. The International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies (IISS). London, UK. 2002. p.1.
6
Ibid, p.1.

10
carries its own humanitarian calamities. There are important instability in Ivory Coast where are
common rebel uprising last time that hold the northern half of the country.7
Nigeria disputes over the ownership of offshore oil fields have created tension between
the Bight of Biafra states. Although Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria recently resolved their dispute
over territorial waters, a quarrel between Nigeria and Cameroon is ongoing and tensions
throughout the region have heightened following the development boom.
Nigeria placed its forces on high alert in 2000 after learning France was building an air
base near the disputed Bakassi peninsula. 8
Nigeria’s one of the world's leading oil exporters, with production of around 2.3 million
bbl/d of oil during 2001, and with net oil exports of around 2.0 million bbl/d, including around
885,000 bbl/d to the United States. Ongoing inter-ethnic tensions and persistent political and
ethnic strife in the Niger Delta region, including violence, kidnapping, sabotage and the seizure
of oil facilities, often disrupts Nigerian oil production.
In January 2001, the Nigerian navy announced plans to clamp down on arson attacks on
oil facilities following the loss of billions in oil revenues due to vandalism. The Federal govern-
ment also has ordered the navy to sink any ship conveying crude products that cannot be ac-
counted for. The government estimates that as much as 300,000 bbl/d of Nigerian crude is ille-
gally bunkered (freighted) out of the country. In December 2000, Nigeria reinstated the death
penalty for vandalism of pipelines and electricity infrastructure.
Equatorial Guinea is a burgeoning oil and natural gas power, has garnered attention as well,
receiving more than $5 billion in private foreign investment over the past five years and prompt-
ing the United States to reopen its embassy in October 2003.9
In 2000, the U.S. State Depart-
ment approved an application by Military Professional Resources Inc., a Virginia-based private
military training company, to assess Equatorial Guinea's coast guard requirements to protect its
offshore oil installations. The company also hopes to build and train the country's coast guard.10
Antarctic front
It belongs to the unique explored but not exploited continent. It’s far from the
other continental masses except from southern cone of South America. The exis-
tence of important renewal resources like krill, whales and other fish, fresh water,
birds and mammals make it of interest to the main powers. While Antarctic krill have
a circumpolar distribution, being found south of the Polar Front and north of the ice
edge, the assumed centres of high krill concentration are areas around South
Georgia and the Antarctic Peninsula.11
Antarctica has growing scientific interest along with the development of sci-
ences and technology. Not only states but also international companies are inter-
ested on it. In the meanwhile, the ecologic ONG defend Antarctic unpolution and
environmental conservation.12
7
Streatfor Agency. “Africa Net Assessment: Sub-Saharan Oil and Arms”. April 30, 2004, 1703 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz
8
Stratfor Agency. “China's Risky Business in Equatorial Guinea”. November 22, 2000 0000 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz
9
Stratfor Agency. “Africa Net Assessment: Sub-Saharan Oil and Arms”. ”. April 30, 2004 1703 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz
10
Stratfor Agency. “China's Risky Business in Equatorial Guinea”.November 22, 2000 0000 GMT. http://www.stratfor.biz
11
FAO. “Review of The State of World Fishery Resources: Marine Fisheries – Southern Oceans”. 1997. Http://www.fao.org/
DOCREP/003/W4248E/w4248e32
12
Bardi, Julio & Ass.. “100 Años de Orcadas y la Secretaría del Tratado Antártico-Parte 1” [ 100 Years of Orcadas and the
Secretary of the Antarctic Treaty]. Newsletter, Countura Política, Nª 1005, Año 21, Tomo 118. 2004.

11
Geological soundings in the Antarctic, reveals the presence of oil, gas, and
manganese with no international mechanism to control exploitation of the region.13
Charming of the earth is slowly growing and Antarctica deicing continues. Tourism is in-
creasing. The ozone layer has been steadily thinning since monitoring began in 1985. Nowhere
has this decrease been more dramatic than over the Antarctic - the hub of global wind currents.
As a consequence, Argentina and South Africa will face problems in the years to come, espe-
cially since agriculture, fishing and tourism are central to their economies.
Security in Antarctica is ruled by the international Antarctic Treaty. The
treaty, which entered into force in 1961, establishes Antarctica as a zone of peace
and bans all military activities, including the testing of weapons. However military
personnel and equipment may be used for scientific purposes. 14
Maritime environment
Maritime shipping
The following areas concerns to this issue:
- The global maritime shipping environment
Analyzing the importance of maritime shipping in the global economy, there is a continue
total annual growth in maritime trade. However, world shipments of tanker cargoes decreased.
Crude oil major loading areas include in second order to West Africa after Western Asia (Meddle
East).
Petrobras, the Brazilian oil company, announced that for the first time exports had ex-
ceeded imports. The discovery of oil in the Campos Basin, off the coast of Espiritu Santo, might
make this trend permanent. The pattern and volume of shipments are similar during last past
years with temporary fluctuations due to several reasons. Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) shipments
are worldwide slightly increasing.
Main dry cargo shipments of iron ore, coal, grains, bauxite/alumina and rock phosphate
are also increasing as the remaining ones. There is a booming production of steel, which with
Australia account for about two-thirds of world exports.
World grain shipments are suffering a decrease. One of the main loading areas is the
east coast of South America with almost 22 percent of world exports.
European Union (EU) countries and some Eastern European countries account for 54 per cent
of world bauxite imports and are supplied from West Africa.
Dry cargoes are increasingly being carried in containers along the liner trade routes. Con-
tainers flow along South Atlantic along north-south and intra-regional routes. In the routes linking
Europe to Africa, flows increase in spite of political upheavals in some countries of West Africa.
Routes linking Europe and North America with South America north ward flows are expanding at
a higher rate than southward ones due to currency depreciation and devaluation in some south
American countries that pushed up exports and contracted imports.
http://www.geostrategy.com.
13
Rodríguez, Silverio T. (LCdr Portuguese Marine Corps). “The Strategic Importance of the Portuguese Atlan-
tic Islands”. US Naval War College. CSC 1984.
14
Antactic Treaty, Article 1.

12
As transported cargo is modestly increasing, changes in the average world transport dis-
tance are minimal. However, there are indications of supplies of crude oil and dry cargoes mov-
ing shorter distances to destinations in Europe and Norh America. This reflects that there is
natural a tendency to find sources closer to these main markets.15
So, South Atlantic Rim coun-
tries are becoming more important, and in the same way the south-north routes.
- Current trends in the global shipping industry
The world fleet is expanding. The tonnage of oil tankers and bulk carriers is expanding,
too. The world fleet of fully cellular container ships continued to expand substantially. However, the fleet
of general cargo ships decreased.
The average age of the total world fleet is dropping to about 12.5 years and it reflects in-
creased scrapping of old tonnage and deliveries of new buildings. The total tonnage sold for
demolition increased last years. Developed countries have continued the trend of lowering the
average age of their fleet that has been apparent over the last few years. Container ships con-
tinued to be the youngest fleet.
Last deliveries reflected the steady trend towards larger vessels. The average size of
tankers was 128,600 deadweight tons. Another feature was the slightly smaller size of bulk car-
riers. The average deadweight tonnage had lowered to 62,400 in 2002. New buildings for other
types of vessels, including general cargo ships and container ships, increased both in number
and in deadweight tonnage. The trend towards larger vessels continues.
Aging of the fleet is also a changing subject. On 13 November 2002 the Aframax tanker
Prestige carrying 77,000 tons of heavy fuel sent a distress call after severe weather off the
north-west Spanish coast caused her to list. The accident polluted about 200 km of coast in
north-west Spain and weeks later also sections of the southern coast of France, causing major
economic and environmental damage. The 26-year old single-hull vessel had been on her way
from Latvia to Singapore.
The accident had important impacts. Questions were raised concerning the state port
control carried out by European countries in accordance with the Paris MOU. The fact that the Prestige
had not been inspected over the last twelve months in spite of visiting several ports for bunkering high-
lighted the practice of conducting such inspections only when vessels actually dock, as well as the low
rate of inspection in some countries.
The question of the need to have authorized places of refuge to counter the worst fea-
tures of marine accidents was raised again by the Prestige. In early 2001, coastal authorities
denied entry to the tanker Castor, which had developed extensive cracks after sailing in heavy
weather in the Mediterranean Sea with 29,500 tons of unleaded gasoline. The cargo was finally
transferred to another vessel at sea.
Moreover, two European countries, France and Spain, announced in early December a
unilateral measure based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) whereby sin-
gle hull tankers carrying heavy oils must sail outside their 200-mile exclusive economic zones.
By early January, Spain alone had expulsed seven vessels, while charters started to include
extended sailing routes to comply with the measure. Malta, one of the registries most affected by
the expulsions, complained of this sudden and muscular measure.
The main legal rights in the maritime environment are about immunity of warships, inno-
15
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat. Chapter 1. Review of Maritime
Transport, 2003. Geneva, 2003. p.1-18. http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2003_en.pdf

13
cent passage, coastal state rights and obligations, flag state responsibilities and protection
against piracy.
Naval Control of Shipping should make the protection of shipping in wartime.
The main threats in peacetime are terrorism and piracy. Navies and coast guards should
give protection to shipping. Both can produce crime at sea and can be state supported.
The main lessons learned here are about the necessity of acting with urgency, the com-
plexity of the action with regard to the application of law, the necessity of training for different
threats, and the difficulty of avoiding collateral damage with weapons effects.
It could be a potential impact on economic activity with disruption of trade. The role of
states must be to protect trade, prevent illegal trade, power projection and develop and apply
regulations. Sanctions can be applied. Purposes of sanctions are punishing of transgression,
deterrence, compelling changes in behaviour, restricting activities and signal resolve. Some ex-
amples are Palestine 1945-8, Cuban Missile Crisis, Beira Patrol 1965-74, Iraq – 1990-, Adriatic
1992-6.
By the other side, there could appear some sanction limitations as to be inadequate to
strategic goal, it could be insufficient forces, it must impact on impact correctly on target nation,
sanctions create antidotes, it’s possible to find actions of target country allies and it may produce
alienation of world commerce.
In case of blockades, they have to along with some principles: it’s limited to states en-
gaged in hostilities, an area and start date should be established, it applies to all, and there are
neutral rights. They must produce an impact on heavy traffic, there are big search and command
and control requirements, and there is a requirement for all-encompassing sanctions.
With regard to power projection, as very good example, it’s important to show the impor-
tance of sealift for the Falkland/Malvinas and Gulf Wars. The future shipping requirements will
be suitability, availability, contracts and costs.
In conclusion, shipping is a global, international industry, it’s difficult to protect, there are
important legal issues, there are iinadequate mandates to control and, overall, trade will get
through.16
- Sea lines of communication
Security and access to sea lines of communication (SLOCs) is of increasing importance,
as these sea lines are the maritime highways for vast flows critical to the rapidly growing pros-
perity not only of the countries of the South Atlantic Rim but also for other countries.
Threats to the security and access to SLOCs include both military concerns (conflicts be-
tween regional and extra-regional countries, international terrorism as well as sea mines) and
non-military concerns (natural disasters and accidents, piracy, and particularly “creeping jurisdic-
tion” of regional states).17
By its relative position in the globe, the South Atlantic “Mediterranean” position between
the North Atlantic, the Indic and the Pacific is important for the control of sea lines of communi-
cations transporting oil and other strategic resources. This would be much more important in
case of close of Panama and/or Suez Canals.
16
Thomas, Robert H.. Presentation “The Global Maritime Shipping Environment”, Canadian Forces College, CSC27, 19 Janu-
ary 2001.
17
Weeks, Stanley B. “Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Security and Access”, Policy Paper 33. Internet.

14
It’s important to consider, not only maritime sea lines, but also chock points. Maritime traf-
fic inside, to and from South Atlantic itself is not an important proportion of the global total. How-
ever, this is very important to the countries of the region because it is the main part of their inter-
national trade. Moreover, the recent growth in United States dependence on its Western Hemi-
sphere neighbors is an illustration of a “nearer-is-better” phenomenon and it grows the South
Atlantic importance.
There is another traffic that not touches any littoral but pass throughout the South Atlantic.
The main line in this case passes by the chock point south of Capes of Agulhas and Good Hope
in South Africa and is normally sailed by “Ultra Large Crude Carriers” (ULCCs) or more than
300,000 dead weight tons (DWT) and “Very Large Crude Carriers “ (VLCCs) from 200,000 to
300,000 DWT, usually called super tankers, with oil and charge from Middle East to Europe and
USA.
It’s important to remark that more than three-fifths of global oil is moved by sea and the
rest is done by pipelines. Tankers have made global (intercontinental) transport of oil possible
and they are low cost, efficient, and extremely flexible. “Suezmax” tankers between 180,000 and
125,000 DWT; “Aframax” tankers between 125,000 and 75,000 DWT; “Panamax” tankers of
aound 50,000 DWT; “Handymax” tankers of around 35,000 DWT; and “Handy Size” tankers of
30,000-20,000DWT can pass across the Suez Canal but they should take the “route of Cape” if
the other way is close by any reason.
The Drake Passage, chock point south of South America, has currently commercially very
less importance and it only could grow in case of Panama Canal closing. There is small traffic by
this way because only tankers bigger than “Panamax” would need to use this route. The Trans-
Panama Pipeline would let to transfer the oil between the Caribbean and the Pacific in case of
necessity. However, there is not choice for the U.S. aircraft carriers moving from one coast of
the country to the other for maintenance or strategic necessities. This is an example of how the
Drake means much more than a lot of people may show.
It’s possible to see the main lines of communication of South Atlantic in Annex 2.
Resources
- Renewal resources
. Fisheries:
They represent a substantial protein resource in a world where shortage of food is be-
coming an increasing challenge. Some riche fisheries in the region attract fishermen from other
nations that expertice a lack of resources as a result of overexploitation of their traditional fish-
ing grounds. This is a recipe for a clash of interests.
Fisheries and the living resources in South Atlantic represent an important resource of na-
tional wealth for some countries of the region. Moreover, fisheries have historically constituted
a necessary precondition for human settlement along the coast.18
Pollution, climate change and irresponsible fishing are all taking a toll on the world's ma-
rine resources.
Globally, reports FAO, 25 percent of major marine fish stocks are under exploited or
moderately exploited. Forty-seven percent are fully exploited and are therefore producing
18
Olsen , Kjell- Birger. “Norway-the Coastal State: Protein. Energy. Lines of Communication. Shipping”. NAVAL FORCES
Special Issue 7/2002. p. 9, 10.

15
catches that have reached, or are very close to, their maximum sustainable limits. Another 18
percent of stocks or species groups are overexploited, while 10 percent of stocks have become
significantly depleted or are recovering from depletion. 19
South Atlantic fisheries are a well-known source of food. Regional and foreign countries
use to fish in these areas and many conflicts usually arise based in illegal fishing inside ZEE or
protected zones. More over, legislation about the migration of some species of fish from inside
to outside the ZEE and vice versa grew another issue of possible dispute that has to be con-
sidered in the future. They are all areas of potential conflicts.
Despite the existence of many Regional Fishery Bodies (RFB) with influence in South At-
lantic as:
1- Management Bodies:
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas - ICCA
South Atlantic Fisheries Organization – SEAFO
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources - CCAMLR
2- Advisory Bodies:
Atlantic Africa Fisheries Commission - AAFC
Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic - CECAF
Regional Fisheries Advisory Committee for the Southwest Atlantic - CARPAS
Joint Permanent Commission for the Argentina/Uruguay Maritime Front – COFREMAR
Sub-Regional Commission on Fisheries (West Africa) - SRCF
Regional Fisheries Committee for the Gulf of Guinea - COREP
Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission - WECAFC
3- Scientific Body:
International Council for the Exploitation of the Sea – ICES20
,
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing occurs in all capture fisheries and includes a
range of illicit activities: fishing without permission or out of season; using outlawed types of
fishing gear; disregarding catch quotas; or non-reporting and underreporting catch weights and
species.
According to an FAO, IUU fishing is increasing in both intensity and scope, and is serious-
ly undermining national and regional efforts to sustainably manage fisheries.21
Regionally, the countries of North America, Europe and the Southwest Pacific have the
most national fishing boats operating outside their own national waters.
Africa is one of two regions with the greatest number of countries granting access to for-
eign flagged fishing vessels.
Argentina in South Atlantic is one of 22 countries of the world that accounted for over
80% of the world's total marine catch in 2002.22
A recent Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) survey conclud-
ed that while some controls are in place, fewer than 50% of countries are exerting effective
control over high-seas fishing vessels flying their flags. Moreover, “unreported high seas fishing
and the current lack of implementation of adequate reporting mechanisms by a large number of
19
FAO. “Excess capacity and illegal fishing: challenges to sustainable fisheries”. 2004. http://www.fao.org/
newsroom/en/focus/2004/47127/index.html
20
FAO, Marine Resources Service, Fishery Resources Division, Fisheries Dpt.. “Review of the State of World Fishery Resour-
ces: Marine Fisheries”. FAO Fisheries Circular No. 920 FIRM/C920(En) Rome, 1997. ISSN 0429-9329.
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/W4248E/W4248E00.
21
FAO “Illegal fishing and high-seas fisheries”. 2004. http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/focus/2004/47127/article_47140en
22
FAO. “Fishing capacity: global trends”. 2004. http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/focus/2004/47127/article_47136en

16
high seas fishing nations," the FAO study noted. 23
Therefore, effective monitoring and en-
forcement of South Atlantic littoral countries are key to effective fisheries management.
. Fresh Water:
Ice of Antarctic Continent, barriers and ice floes in the region are so far the biggest re-
serve of fresh water in the world. It has a growing importance of this resource in a world where
more countries are suffering more scarcities and shortages than before. High development and
increment in population make grow fresh water necessities.
- Non renewal resources
The growing importance of sub-sea resources.
In response to the growing potential of sub-sea resources, basic questions have arisen
about who has a right of access to sub-sea resources in the deep oceans, and how may this
right be enjoyed. The International Seabed Authority is the international agency established to
define, control and regulate all activities in the deep-sea bed and the ocean floor beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction as areas for the benefit of common humanity.
The main types of mineral deposits of potential economic value that occur on and be-
neath the seafloor in the extended continental shelf areas are: conventional hydrocarbons
(crude oil and natural gas), gas hydrates, placer deposit, phosphorite deposits, evaporite depos-
it, polymetallic sulphides (pms), and manganese and cobalt-rich nodules and crusts.
Extended “legal” continental shelf (ELCS) lie beyond 200 nautical mile jurisdiction of na-
tion states exclusive zones, and their limits are defined by the criteria established by the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 76, 1982.
Placer deposits comprising heavy minerals, gold and diamonds are limited to near-shore
areas and have negligible resource potential in the ELCS regions. Evaporite deposits occur on
many continental margins. However, they only overlap with ELCS regions off eastern North
America and western central Africa, where their resource is low.
The major resource potential within the ELCS regions is held in iron-manganese nodules
and crusts, conventional oil and gas and gas hydrates. In manganese nodules and crusts, four
elemental metals comprise the main components of commercial value: manganese, copper,
nickel and cobalt.
Technology developed in recent years has enabled direct observation and research on
the deep parts of the seafloor. There already is a capability for drilling for oil and gas in water
depths beyond 1,500 m, and this is expected to increase as future deep-water prospects are
realized (International Energy Agency, 1996). Similarly, exploration of deep seafloor using
manned submersibles and remotely operated vehicles has been highly rewarding scientifically.
The term (estimated) “resource” is used to describe the potential for materials to occur. It
comprises estimates of the potential occurrence and abundance of materials, regardless of their
feasible exploitation. It is not, and should not be taken as, an assessment of non-living reserves.
They can be subdivided into:
- “Para.marginal resources that are prospectively marketable materials recoverable at prices as
much as 1.5 times those prevailing now or possible with likely advances in technology”, and
23
Ibid FAO “Illegal fishing and high-seas fisheries”.

17
- “Sub-marginal resources that are materials recoverable at prices higher than 1.5 times those
prevailing now but that have some foreseeable use and prospective value”.
(Known) “Reserves” are, by definitions, proven deposits of known abundance and volume
with progress in exploration, advance in technology, and changes in economic conditions.
“Proven reserves of most minerals are relatively small when compared with the estimated
resources that may be found by future exploration or become recoverable as a result of techno-
logic advances or changes in economic conditions. This is particularly true for sub-sea re-
sources, because only a small part of the seabed has been explored and most of the resources
it contains are not yet economically recoverable”.24
Marine Placer deposits
The most economically important of these minerals are: cassiterite (tin), ilmenite (titani-
um), rutile (titanium), zircon (zirconium), chromite (chromium), monazite (thorium), magnetite
(iron), gold and diamonds.
In most placer deposits, economically valuable minerals have been mechanically concen-
trated in rivers along beaches, fan-aprons and river deltas. The majority of heavy mineral marine
placer deposits are intrinsically linked close to their geological sources and to near-shore or
shallow continental shelf environments. The majority of placer deposits are found along many
present shorelines.
The minerals rutile and ilmenite are the main sources of titanium and are or have been
mined from placer-derived deposits from beach sand in east South Africa and Brasil. Diamonds
are mined in beach and shelf sediments along the west coast of South Africa, and are used as
jewelry and for industrial cutting and grinding processes.
Placer deposits are limited to continental shelf regions less than 120 m deep.
Marine phosporite deposits
Phosphorite deposits are naturally occurring compounds containing phosphate in the form
of a cement binding sediments in tropical to sub-tropical regions. They tend to occur in waters of
medium depth.
Major localities include south and Southwestern Africa and the eastern margins of South Ameri-
ca. None of locations overlap with the extended continental shelf regions, except for a small por-
tion on the southeastern margin of Argentina.
The bulk of sub-sea phosphorite resources in ELCS regions must be classed as sub-
marginal and hence of little economic value.
Marine evaporite deposits
They are anhydrite and gypsum (calsium sulphates), common salt (sodium chloride), and
potash-bearing minerals. Important deposits of magnesium bearing salts are also deposited in
such basins.
It’s possible to find deposits in ELCS regions of the northeastern margin of Brazil and West Afri-
24
Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, “Global Non-Living Resources on the Extended Continental Shelf: Prospects at the Year
2000-ISA Technical Study: Nº 1”, Southampton Oceanography Centre, Empress Dock, Southampton, United Kingdon, 2000, p.
17.

18
ca.
Thick beds of a magnesium salt and tachydrite (calcium-magnesium hydrate) previously
known only in trace amounts, occur in areas associated with potash in the Sergipe salt basin
along the eastern coast of Brazil and in the Congo basin along the mid-south-western coast of
Africa.
All marine evaporite deposits must be regarded as sub-marginal resources but they can
be produced more cheaply in the future.
Marine polymetallic sulphides
“The majority of sub-sea polymetallic sulphides (PMS) are massive ore bodies containing
varying proportions of pyrrhotite, pyrite/marcasite, sphalerite/wurtzite, chalcopyrite, bornite, and
isocubanite. Some massive polymetallic sulphides located on spreading centres behind deep-
ocean trenches also contain galena (lead sulphide) and native gold. Other minor sulphides of tin,
cadmium, antimony, arsenic and mercury also occur in varying amounts at different localities.”25
“It’s unlikely that sub-sea PMS deposits, such as those located in international waters on
the Mid-Atlantic Ridge will become mining targets in the foreseeable future because of their
depth (greater than 2500m) and remote locations from shore. However, high gold and base-
metal grades, sites are located close to land, and in water depths less than 2000 m. Under those
circumstances, massive sulphide mining may become economically viable.”26
Marine manganese nodules and crusts
“They are concentrations of iron and manganese oxides, ranging from millimeters to tens
of centimeters in diameter. They can contain economically valuable concentrations of nickel,
copper and cobalt (together, making up to three weight percent). They include trace amounts of
molybdenum, platinum and other base metals.
The current known distribution of manganese nodules and crusts on the ocean floor is
based on information acquired by side scan sonars, drill cores, dredged samples, seafloor pho-
tos, video camera records and direct observation from submersibles”.27
“The major elements in dry nodules are oxygen, manganese, iron, silica, lesser amounts
of aluminum, calcium, sodium, and magnesium and trace elements of which nickel, copper, and
cobalt are the greatest economic interest.”28
“Cobalt bearing manganese-iron crusts cover thousand of square kilometres in the Atlan-
tic Ocean bearing manganese-iron crusts cover thousand of square kilometres in the Atlantic
Ocean and are found on the Blake Plateau, Sierra Leona Rise, and east flank of the Mid-Atlantic
Ridge.”29
“Nodules are sparsely and irregularly distributed through broad areas of the Atlantic.
Good possibilities for finding nodules in other areas near continental margins where they have
high Mn/Fe ratios include areas such as the southern and south-western African continental
margin.”30
25
Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 26
26
Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 27.
27
28
29
Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 33
30
Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p.35-36

19
The top ten countries, ranked in descending order, that have the greatest resource poten-
tial of nodules and crusts in their ELCS area: USA, Madagascar, Brazil, Antarctica, Argentina,
Japan, South Africa, Canada and India.
Argentina and South Africa have ELCS areas where, on average, high grades are found
and that may in future have selected locations exploited for manganese nodule and crust recov-
ery.
There are no considered viable resources over 10 kg/m2 within any of the ELCS areas,
and hence, at a regions scale, all nodules and crusts in these regions must be considered para-
marginal.
Marine hydrocarbon deposits
“Oil and gas are hydrocarbon deposits that occur naturally within thick sedimentary se-
quences. These are largely confined to the continental shelves, continental slopes, continental
rises, and small ocean basins.”31
“These areas are almost exclusively on the continental shelves
and contain sedimentary sequences greater than 1,000m in thickness.”32
“With the exception of
a small area off central western Africa, none of these areas lie within the ELCS regions.”33
The
remaining largest fields after those of Persian Gulf and North Sea include the ones located in
South America and West Africa.34
Technological improvements in recovery efficiency and greater access to deep-water ar-
eas are increasing the range of economically recoverable resources offshore. Favorable off-
shore conditions occur along Antarctica seaboard and the Atlantic seaboards of South America,
including Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, and western Africa.
“Hydrocarbon resources in the ELCS regions are mostly sub-marginal to para-marginal.
However, there is considerable potential for exploitation in the future when technology and eco-
nomic conditions make exploration, proving, and ultimately exploiting of these resources via-
ble.”35
Marine gas hydrate deposits
Gas hydrate is a crystalline compound composed of gas molecules, normally methane,
en-caged within water molecules to form a solid similar to ice. One volume of hydrate also stores
164 volumes of un-pressured methane-a measure of the value of the resource. Gas hydrates
occur widely in nature mainly beneath the seafloor in deep-sea sediments but also close to the
seabed in shallow arctic seas. The methane in gas hydrate forms naturally by organic decay in
the thick sediments normally found in the deep water adjacent to continental margins. The deep-
sea pressures (500m depth) and intra sediment temperatures (increasing with depth) determine
the gas hydrate stability.36
Known hydrates are found on the Atlantic margins of South America, especially at equa-
torial latitudes. Isolated occurrences are also found off Antarctica. High potential exists in Ant-
arctic, eastern margin of South America and the African margin.
31
32
33
34
35
36

20
Exploitation of gas hydrates has potential hazards, since the stability of hydrates has
been implicated in the stability history of continental slopes. Until the technology for safe exploi-
tation of hydrates is in place, all gas hydrate resources must be considered sub-marginal.37
In conclusion, the non-living resource potential within the extended legal continental shelf
(ELCS) lie beyond the 200 nautical mile jurisdiction of nation states´ exclusive economic zones,
and their outer limits are defined by the criteria established by the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, Article 76. Eight different types of non-living resources are assessed. The
major resource potential within the ELCS regions are held in iron-manganese nodules and
crusts, oil, gas and gas hydrates. Four elemental metals are the main components of value in
manganese nodules and crusts: manganese, copper, nickel, and cobalt.
“The value of the non-living resources in the ELCS regions depends on the technological
developments that will allow their extraction and production. Because of this, with perhaps the
exception of conventional gas and oil, and possibly gas hydrates, many resources on the ELCS
will remain uncompetitive with onshore resources” by now.38
Oil. Energy and geopolitics in the same coin.
Energy and geopolitics are often two sides of the same coin. Each affects the other both
directly and indirectly because of economic necessity, and the military and political tools used
either to ensure or disrupt regular energy supplies directly impact the political and economic sta-
tus of countries the world over. The end result is a complex web of relationships-economic, polit-
ical and military-where a minor quiver in a single strand can send vibrations throughout the
whole.
Oil has historically been a source of conflict and exploitation, reserves and potential in
land and offshore is very important in the South Atlantic region. Moreover, the Guinea Gulf is
currently an important source of oil and much economical interest grows around this area.
With the seeds planted for widespread oil exploration after both the 1973 OPEC embargo
and the 1991 Gulf War, significant advances in exploration and production technology have ac-
celerated success in finding alternative sources of crude. Those technological advances have
facilitated the discovery of vast oil reserves in many unforeseen geographic regions.
The shift of U.S. reliance away from Arabian Gulf oil resources becomes evident once
current data on reserves and production is reviewed. At the onset of the Gulf War in 1991, the
United States depended on the Arabian Gulf Region for 27.8% of its oil imports. That figure
alone justified the U.S. concern that instability in the region demanded fast, powerful, and deci-
sive U.S. action.
Since the Gulf War, aggressive exploration for alternatives to U.S. dependence on the
Arabian Gulf Region for petroleum needs have been both serious and successful. The process
of exploration and discovery outside of the Middle East has fostered a slow but steady shift in
the energy resource center of gravity away from the Arabian Gulf and toward the South Atlantic.
Angola is one of the two biggest non-OPEC movers and shakers with plans to raise pro-
duction levels by 1.0 million bdp by 2007.
37
Ibid Murton, Parsons, Hunter & Miles, p. 51-52.
38

21
The eastern South American shelf is one of the widest of the world, it has the potential to
be a very important source, and just there, Argentina and United Kingdom disputed their rights
over Malvinas/Falkland Islands.
South Atlantic Region, the New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint39
Long ignored by policy makers, the South Atlantic Region is just now emerging as a new
energy center of gravity. Specifically, the growing discoveries of energy reserves in Atlantic
Equatorial Africa combined with those of oil-rich South America can already be recognized as
vital U.S. interests.
It seems U.S. foreign and military policy have unintentionally overlooked the essential
need for stability particularly in Africa, stability that will ensure uninterrupted flow of energy re-
sources to the U.S. throughout the foreseeable future.
Significant discoveries in Latin America and Atlantic Equatorial Africa shed new light on
the strategic importance of the South Atlantic geographic region. Thus a shift in the U.S. energy
paradigm has been essential in order to bolster the reliability of these newly discovered sources
of energy. An Stratfor Agency report called “Iraq: Energy´s Rip Van Winkle” recently (2003) said:
“Finally, where the energy flows so will the U.S. Navy sail.”
At present, Atlantic Equatorial Africa provides the United States with approximately 1.3
mbd or 13.5% of its total oil imports. That figure equals or possibly exceeds current oil imports
from Saudi Arabia and almost seven times the amount imported from Kuwait.
Combining that percentage with imports from South America (excluding Mexico), South
Atlantic sources are now providing the United States with close to 45% of its imported oil. (Mexi-
co exports about 1.3 million b/d of crude oil to the U.S.). That figure is more than double the
amount of oil imported from the Arabian Gulf. The Gulf region, now supplying the United States
with approximately 18% of its oil imports, is steadily decreasing in its energy importance to the
United States.
Looking only at proven oil reserves, the combined total reserves in South America, includ-
ing Brazil, Columbia, Argentina, and Venezuela – are almost 85 billion barrels.
When the Atlantic Equatorial Africa figure of 25 billion barrels (a figure that continues to grow
exponentially with continued exploration) are combined with those of South America, the oil re-
serves in the South Atlantic region becomes an astonishing 110 billion barrels or more than 10%
of the world total. To put that figure in perspective, Iran and Kuwait have reserves of 93 bbl and
97 bbl respectively.
The steady development of energy resources in the South Atlantic is progressively allow-
ing the United States to become far less dependent on Arabian Gulf sources than it was a dec-
ade ago. With that shift of energy dependence comes a shift in the energy center of gravity and
so should come a shift in foreign and national military policy.
Latin American policy seems to continue concentrating on narcotics as the overriding re-
gional issue. The importance of South American energy resources along with the importance of
maintaining regional stability are recognized but understated.
39
Mitchel, Antony E. and Wihbey, Paul M..”South Atlantic Region Emerging as New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint”. Oil &
Gas Journal, Volume 96, Issue 26. June 29, 1998, p. 25-28.

22
Atlantic Equatorial Africa as new U.S. vital interest.
Oil producing Atlantic Equatorial Africa (Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guin-
ea) will be a region containing vital U.S. interests. An increased US regional interest has oc-
curred towards Africa largely as the result of increasing oil production in the region. In fact, Afri-
can oil will likely replace Middle Eastern supplies to the US by 2010.40
In addition to the vast oil
reserves previously mentioned, two other significant factors help in characterizing the im-
portance of U.S. national interest in Atlantic Equatorial Africa.
First, the energy potential of that region is not going unnoticed with other world powers.
For example, Congo’s fledgling oil industry, whose predominant customers are currently the
U.S. and France, is courting Asian consumers. Congo has participated in sales talks with Chi-
nese oil firms that are attempting to reduce their Middle East energy dependence. China is also
a major participant in an international consortium developing oil resources in southern Sudan
whose reserves may equal that of Libya.
Second, regional instability runs rampant. That has the potential to cause significant sup-
ply disruptions and imperil American lives and property. The London-based International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies recently reported that the greatest danger to progress in sub-Saharan
Africa is political instability and civil unrest. The importance of regional stability in this part of the
world will continue to grow as oil discoveries expand and production levels increase.
To reiterate, the South Atlantic Region, and especially Atlantic Equatorial Africa, is be-
coming a vital U.S. interest since it is emerging as a new energy center of gravity. It’s already
clear that U.S. is changing its engagement, presence, and investment in order to cultivate this
emerging market and secure regional stability.
The military dimensions of crisis response options and regional organization also had a
reassessment fot U.S.. Currently, the borders of the regional commanders-in-chief’s (CinC) are-
as of responsibility are anything but seamless. Africa falls under the responsibility of the United
States European Command (USEUCOM), while the South Atlantic Ocean falls under the re-
sponsibility of United States Atlantic Command (USACOM); all of Latin America is the responsi-
bility of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).
Africa has long been the unwanted stepchild of USEUCOM while USSOUTHCOM has
been almost totally focused on counter-narcotics operations, which is reflected in their organiza-
tion and structure. USACOM has supported USEUCOM and provided intermittent presence in
Atlantic Equatorial Africa through the occasional deployment of a Navy ship to “show-the-flag” in
West African ports. What is now needed is a clear and seamless organization that reflects the
new requirements of the region.
Additionally, there exists a need for decisive strategy with a goal of regional stability. Im-
plementing that strategy while at the same time redefining the boundaries of the CinC’s areas of
responsibility has the potential to foster even further investment that will continue regional ener-
gy development that is sure to benefit the U.S.
In conclusion, the shifting energy center of gravity should in no way cause the U.S. to for-
get regional friends and allies in the Persian Gulf. But, ignoring the rapidly developing econo-
mies of Atlantic Equatorial Africa would be a tragic mistake that will be exploited by other world
economic powers. Weaning U.S. from a dependence on Middle East oil is a smart and healthy
40
DP&M, VCDS, Canadian Forces. “Future Security Environment-Resource Conflict”. Canadian Forces, 2004.
http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda//milassess/2002/003f_e.asp

23
development, but there is an expense. Investment and engagement in Atlantic Equatorial Africa
can be considered a challenge for policy makers and industrialists but decision seems to be tak-
en.
As long as political instability exists, there is an unavoidable threat to American lives and
property. Current American strategy is based on an indecisive (low-profile) approach to a secu-
rity environment that can only be characterized as volatile. New security architecture might be
wished to reduce and eliminate current and potential threats to U.S. interests.
Engagement and conspicuous military forward presence are essential in order to enjoy
the benefits of the shift in the energy center of gravity. A seamless military area of responsibility
in the South Atlantic region with an east-west orientation vice the traditional north-south orienta-
tion could promote sound and consistent focus that supports vital U.S. interests. With that in
mind, one would reasonably conclude that planning as well as our perception of the importance
of policy and security strategy for the South Atlantic region requires immediate attention and ad-
justment. 41
A power projection space
Far away from the main global power centers it’s clearly visible that South Atlantic is for
foreign powers an easy, cheap and, so, convenient way to approach and influence over both
eastern South American and western African littorals showing power by different ways since
merit visits to gunship diplomacy or conducting power projection by the action of aircraft carriers
and amphibious operations.
In addition, main powers can use South Atlantic as place of forward and/or global de-
ployment of information sources and military assets to gain, keep or defend the control of inter-
esting zones. The law of the sea particularly allows accomplishing this function.
It’s been possible to estimate for different actors a synthesis of South Atlantic strategic
importance as showed in table of Annex 3.
In conclusion, the strategic importance of South Atlantic influences countries of the region
and others outside the rim. Its strategic value is based in the value of transported materials by
this ocean, the value of its renewal and not renewal resources, the importance of its access
passages and the possibility to influence from the sea over land.
Summary
This section provided the basic frame to understand the situation in the South Atlantic Rim.
Generalities of the maritime environment showed the special characteristics of the South
Atlantic environment, especially as part of the maritime hemisphere. The South Atlantic
theatre was described from a geographic and strategic point of view, identifying the dif-
ferences between the littorals of South America, Africa and the Antarctic from. The mari-
time environment in South Atlantic is important because of the shipping activities with
important sea lines of communication, the resources involved and as a power projection
space. South Atlantic Region is the New Strategic Oil Supply Flashpoint and Atlantic
Equatorial Africa is a becoming a new vital interest for U.S. and a number of very im-
41
Mitchell, Anthony E. and Wihbey, Paul Michael, “South Atlantic Region Emerging as New Strategic Oil Supply Flash-
point”, http//: www.jinsa.org

24
portant actors.
Next section will develop the influence of international law and security in the
South Atlantic Rim.
***

25
SECTION 2
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SECURITY IN SOUTH ATLANTIC
Security under United Nations organization (UN)
The Charter of United Nations Organization recognize the responsibility of Security Coun-
cil to determine the existence of threats to the peace and to decide about actions to be taken, as
follow:
“CHAPTER VII – Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of Aggression.
Article 39:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security”.
42
“Article 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action
as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”.
43
But it’s very important for the goal of this paper to show how the Charter mention the con-
venience of “regional arrangements” for performing “regional actions” in consistency with U.N.:
“CHAPTER VIII – Regional arrangements
Article 52:
1- Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing
with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for
regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2- The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall
make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or
by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3- The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such
regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by
reference from the Security Council”.
44
The Law of the Sea Convention
The sea services of South Atlantic Rim Nations must maintain their role in shaping global
rules and policies that affect international freedom of navigation and maritime mobility, two es-
42
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. Chapter VII, Art. 39, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html
43
Ibid, Art. 51
44
Ibid, Art. 52

26
sential elements of U.S. naval power. The Convention codifies access and transit rights for ships
and it is a comprehensive international legal framework governing the world’s oceans.
The Law of the Sea Convention is a complex document that touches on wide range of
U.S. maritime concerns. Since it was finalized in 1982, a primary U.S. interest in the Convention
has been to preserve essential navigational freedoms and thereby enhance the mobility of U.S.
naval power.
The Convention supports “anybody ability to operate around the globe, anytime, any-
where, allowing the navies to project power where and when needed. It guarantees, for exam-
ple, that ships and aircraft may transit straits that otherwise may have been closed by the territo-
rial claims of nearby states. More than 135 straits are affected, including the Magellan, in the
South American Cone.
The United States’ interest as a global naval power was behind its initial participation in
talks on the Convention as the United Nations conducted negotiations from 1973 to 1982. It’s
policy makers were concerned that transit and access rights of U.S. warships could be restricted
by the rising number of claims from other nations over territorial seas, fishing zones and offshore
high seas areas.
Today, the Law of the Sea Convention helps assure access to the largest maneuver
space on the planet — the sea — under authority of widely recognized and accepted law and
not the threat of force. However, U.S. didn’t signed the Convention, yet.
Much of U.S. government’s initial delay in ratification was linked to objections by many in-
dustrialized countries to sections related to deep seabed mining. However, changes to the Con-
vention in 1994 remedied each of the U.S. objections.
Despite its advantages, the Law of the Sea Convention remains controversial because of
widespread U.S. belief that it would adversely affect U.S. sovereignty, inhibit its intelligence
gathering activities or hamper the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) through which its
forces seek to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction.
Critics point to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, created to settle disputes,
as a threat to U.S. sovereignty. However, parties to the Convention are free to agree on any
method of dispute settlement they desire — and the U.S. will not select the Tribunal.
Fears to U.S. that ratification would diminish its collection of intelligence are linked to a
section of the Convention containing a list of activities that would deprive a vessel of the right of
innocent passage through territorial seas. These activities include the collection of certain types
of information and the requirement that submarines navigate on the surface. However, such ac-
tivity is not a violation of the Convention. Intelligence-gathering activities are not prohibited nor
adversely affected by the Convention.
The Bush Administration’s PSI — potentially a major weapon in the global war on terror-
ism — seeks the support of all nations in international efforts to board and search vessels sus-
pected of transporting weapons of mass destruction.
U.S. learned in Iraq that even its allies sometimes would block access to key battle areas.
Freedom of navigation cannot be contingent on the approval of nations along global sea lanes
and the Law of the Sea is a legal regimen for the world’s oceans that helps to guarantee world-
wide mobility for naval forces. The existence of this Law is an enough reason for South Atlantic
Rim Countries and navies to work together.

27
Security as a concept of South Atlantic Rim common interest
Security has been defined as “the absence of threats to a State-Nation”45
In another way, the UN has an inter-state point of view: “a condition in which the States
consider that there is no risk of a military attack, political pressure or economic coercion which
would prevent their own free development and progress”46
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) of United Nations was told
in a continued general debate that the terrorist attacks against the United States of September
11th, 2001 had shown that in the current century - with security challenges increasingly compli-
cated by the rapid development of science and technology and the steady deepening of eco-
nomic globalization - only international cooperation could bring about real security.47
In conclusion, the concept of regional, state and inter-state security, in the widest sense
can be understood as the situation resulting from the control of all threats, thereby ensuring that
the interests of the states or groups of associated states not be negatively affected and that the
objectives that they have determined be accomplished. It depends more and more of interna-
tional cooperation.
The threats
With this regard, threat is stated as “an array of circumstances which, when combined,
constitute a potential factor of true damage that may, under certain circumstances, come
about”48
.
Any model of current security has, at least, to consider the following threats:
Basic current threats (from a “continental” point of view).
- The organized crime, particularly drug trafficking or general narcotics activity, and money
laundering, which expedites the whitening of capital that is the product of criminal activities
and contributes to corruption.
- The international terrorism mainly carried out by Muslim fundamentalist terrorist organiza-
tions.
- Poverty, that is a source of instability in most African and Latin American countries, which en-
danger their capability to govern, therefore endangering democracy.49
- Warfare between states of the region.
- Foreign military interventions. 50
45
Nye, Joseph. “El Nuevo Poder Mundial. Actualización de la Política”. The New World Power. Updating of Politics. Buenos
Aires, Argentina. November 1991. 43
46
United Nations. “Los conceptos de Seguridad”. [The Security Concepts]. Document A/40/553. 1986. Introd. Paragraph 3,
205-209.
47
United Nations. “New Concept Of Security Needed Following 11 September Terrorist Attack”, Fifty-sixth General
Assembly, First Committee, 4th
Meeting (PM).
48
Bartolomé Mariano. “Las Amenazas Transnacionales”. [Transnational Threats] Revista Escuela Superior de Gendarmería
Nacional [Journal of the Higher School of National Police], Buenos Aires, 1999.
49
Ros, Fernando M. (Argentine Mj.), “The Inter-American Treaty Of Reciprocal Assistance, Is It Collapsed?”,
Canadian Forces College, CSC 28, Master Of Defence Studies (MDS) Thesis, p. 64-65.
50
Yaacov Vertzverger. “Risk Taking and Decision Making. Foreign Military Intervention Decisions”, Stanford University
Press, Stanford, California, USA, 1998.

28
Information Age Threats to Security 51
Threat Effect
Biological Death or debilitation of people, animals or plants on a grand scale, with
attendant economic and social collapse; also, systemic paralysis through
the contamination of critical facilities.
Cyber Destruction or corruption of government or private records or controls,
paralyzing critical infrastructure (water, electricity, finance, transportation,
etc.), and rendering response ineffective.
Nuclear Blast/heat/electro-magnetic effects on cities; military, critical infrastruc-
ture, leaving tens of thousands of casualties, paralyzing the economy,
and emptying cities by the threat of additional bombings.
Radiological Contamination to deny critical areas and produce chaos, as government
prevention measures prove ineffective.
Chemical Local damage, significant casualties, and widespread fear as citizens
realize their vulnerability; also contamination of specific high value tar-
gets.
Enhanced Con-
ventional Muni-
tions
Conventional violence (truck bombs, hijacked aircraft, etc.) designed by
size or scale to produce extraordinary effects (mass casualties, assassi-
nation, etc.)
c. Maritime threats
Piracy 52
Piracy at sea is becoming rampant. The total number of crew killed increased to 22 from 4
as compared to figures for the same period in 2003. Incidents of hijackings increased to 4 as
compared to three last year with incidents of crew being threatened increasing to 11 from 6.
On this regard, piracy prone areas and warnings in Eastern South Atlantic/West Africa
are: Abidjan, Conakry, Dakar, Douala, Lagos, Luanda, Onne, Tema and Warri.
In Western South Atlantic/Eastern South American waters:
Brasil: Belem, Santos
Colombia: Barranquilla.
Guyana: Georgetown.
Venezuela: Guanta, Puerto Cabello, Sucre.
Nigeria continues to show an alarming rise in the number of attacks at sea. 53
Piracy at-
tacks in Nigeria are ranked second highest with 10 attacks a year. Violence against crewmem-
bers continues to rise. The current report shows that 10 crewmembers were killed in Nigeria in
the first quarter of 2004.
Pirates are experts at boarding even fast-moving ships at sea and capturing a tanker at
sea is far easier than hijacking an aircraft. A hijacked tanker is potentially a threat to any mari-
time country. A major oil spill can devastate a country's fishing and tourism industry for years. A
51
Mc Intyre, Dave. “We Need to Study War Some More”, The Journal of International Security Affairs, Nº 3, Summer 2002, p.
7. http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html.
52
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), The World Business Organization. Http://www.iccwbo.org.html
53
Indonesia continues to record the highest number of attacks with 21 reported incidents in the first quarter of 2004.

29
cleanup operation can cost millions of dollars, an amount which poor countries can ill afford.
Piracy Maps54
Terrorism at seas
The International Terrorism has clearly chosen soft targets, preferable civilians, very vul-
nerable, low defended, to produce the biggest number of victims, generating panic to societies,
to influence over the wish of people.
It’s not new and always represented a way to break the determination of competitors us-
ing the terror. It was a common tactic by centuries in land environments. Since seventies last
century were common the air kidnapping and seizure of planes until we arrived to the catastro-
phe of September 11, 2001 and the humanitarian law became very vulnerable.
It’s predictable that terrorist will change the way to act and the maritime theatre has al-
ready been and may increment the possibility to be the environment of next terrorist operations.
As example, the attack to U.S. Destroyer COLE and, more recently, to the French oil tanker
LINBURG close to Yemen, causing many dead, wounded and big material and ecologic dam-
age.
However, the “maritime” terrorism is less probable in high seas. The press would probably
not cover the new and the attack would loose some sense. It’s more probable that these acts
could be near the coast or in the harbours. Al Qaeda would have a fleet of 15 to 50 merchant
ships sailing around the world under convenience flags and they could have carried explosives
used against USA embassies in Africa during 1998 and can be involved in international weap-
ons commerce.
The next targets could be touristy cruisers55
, super oil tankers and ships with toxic sub-
stances to produce ecological disasters or container ships carrying weapons of mass destruc-
54
ICC. http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/news_archives/2004/images/piracy_maps_may_04/Piracy_maps_May_04.asp
55
A cruise ship is capable of carrying approximately 3,000 passengers and 1,000 crewmembers.
Piracy and armed robbery - 1 Jan to 31 March 2004
Attacks in Africa
Piracy and armed robbery - 1 Jan to 31 March 2004
Attacks in Caribbean, South and Central America.

30
tion. Mines could be easily laid in the access of important harbours to block the commerce and
grow the panic. Offshore oil platforms, oil and gas marine pipes and oil reservoirs and petro-
chemical plants can be easily attacked.
Intentions of underwater attacks by “human torpedoes” and small submarines against
U.S. naval assets are commented in Gibraltar and Indonesia. “Micro-submarines” have been
found in Colombia and there could be others in any other part of the world. All nations can be
involved in this type of war.56
The conclusion is that far away from been safer in this unipolar world, globalisation era
and multithread environment, security has to be acquired by all means and assets at sea. In the
most elemental level, threats will be humans, ships, planes, submarines and any other asset
that could provide mobility, could carry people and weapons and could attack civilians or military
targets and disrupt peace in South Atlantic. They will impose different risks.
Hopefully, nobody won't see the day when navy frigates need to escort cruise ships
round-the-clock to safeguard against attacks at sea. But, short of a strong, counter-terrorism pol-
icy against not only terrorist groups, but against the nations that arm and safeguard them, es-
corting massive tourist ships may be the only means of defense against such attacks.
Security options
Since the creation of the State-Nations after the Peace of Westphalia, nations adopted
security systems based mainly on the development of a military apparatus capable of respond-
ing in last and worst instance to the threats facing them. Therefore, in most of security programs
the pre-eminence of the military factor over the remaining power factors is evident. Thus, in
some way, the concept of defence has been confused with the wider concept of security, being
the former just a mean for the consecution of the latter.
With the end of the cold war and the appearance of new threats have appeared new de-
signs of security models. The three main current options are:
Collective security model
It comprise a collective defence system and is based on the premise that peace may be
maintained, or war may be prevented, if a coalition of states agrees to confront an aggression by
the use of collective force as a last resort. It’s based on three principles: the identification of
common threats on the part of the states adopting the model, the sharing of at least one com-
mon interest (for example that of maintaining peace, or a certain level of peace), and the estab-
lishment of mechanisms and procedures that, in a consensual fashion, must be implemented
without further delay.
This solution can be a good solution to the security problem if:
- States subordinate their interests on foreign policy to the higher interest of security offered by
the model (It is well known that interests of states rarely coincide on a permanent basis, es-
pecially when the parties involved have totally diverse conditions of development, and there-
fore their objectives will be different.
56
Delamer Guillermo,. Paper “Terrorismo en el mar, ¿un nuevo escenario?” [Terrorism at sea, ¿a new scenary?], Centro de
Estudios Hemisféricos Alexis de Tocqueville [Center of Hemispheric Studies Alexis de Tocqueville],. Buenos Aires, 2004.
http://www.centrotocqueville.com.ar/html

31
- Threats are perceived in the same way defining the degree of dangerousness with the com-
mitment to assume similar risks in face of those threats and identifying the parties responsible
for it.
- Consensus is reached regarding the response required by the threat to be faced, and adopted
as such.
The model has the implicit need for interstate organizations to exert some powers that
state members in it have been delegated. It requires some transfer of state powers to interna-
tional authorities, thus constituting renunciation of their sovereignty”. This model seems not to be
proactive but dissuasion accomplishes this effect.
In conclusion, the collective model base it’s effect by showing the challenger or the ene-
my the power of a collective and stronger response persuading to act against the alliance. This
model shows it’s aptitude looking to a foreign threat of the region.
Co-operative security model
It’s based on the principle of transparency in the relations among the countries of the re-
gion through the establishment of measures of mutual trust or Reliance Building Measures
(RBM) with the purpose of preventing the immediate causes of the conflict, as well as the con-
flict itself, while, at the same time, defining the mechanisms that allow for the punishment of the
aggressor.
This model should not be interpreted as one of Non-Offensive model, due to the fact that
it includes military, political, economic and even human factors, according to the European Or-
ganization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE)57
.
It should include four measures:
- Co-operating states have the obligation to adopt the procedures and mechanisms leading to
the construction and strengthening of mutual trust (e.g. interchange of information on defence
expenditures, armed forces doctrinal tenets and equipment, realization of joint military exer-
cises, interchange of military personnel for upgrading and training, sharing of intelligence,
etc.).
- Adoption of procedures designed and measures for the solution of discrepancies and dispute
through friendly agreement alone (negotiation between parties, with or without the involve-
ment of third parties designated by common agreement, mediation, conciliation, and arbitra-
tion).
- Adoption of a mechanism that goes beyond the Inter-state relations of military nature and
strives for improvement to the relationships at the level of economic, scientific-technological
and even political co-operation.
- Lastly, it’s necessary to establish organizations that undertake permanent follow-up of coop-
eration and security, ones in which all co-operation members are represented and from which
the veracity of the adopted RBMs may be monitored.
This model prevents conflicts among countries of a region in base of reliance and coop-
eration to maintain the peaceful relations. 58
57
OSCE. “Cumbre de la Organización Para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa: La plataforma para la Seguridad Coope-
rativa.” [Summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: The platform for Cooperative Security].
Istambul, Turkey, November 19, 1999. (Section III).
58
Ros, Fernando M. “The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Is it Collapsed?, MDS Thesis, Canadian Forces
College, 2002, Third Section.

32
Security model by means of integration
The objective pursued, whether these are political, regional or continental in nature, is the
achievement and maintenance of peace.59
It proposes that peace may be reached as a conse-
quence of the development of measures of mutual trust and the conformation of supra-national
entities through which part of the sovereignty of the contracting states will be delegated.
In this mode, once the primary objective of maintaining peace has been obtained, the ef-
fects of integration in other fields, such as economics, scientific-technology, judicial and political
realms, will be experienced, making it possible to maintain and strengthen the peace achieved,
while also incrementing the development of the involved countries, which will ultimately act as a
dissuasive element against threats. 60
Different intends involving countries of the South Atlantic Rim
It’s possible to mention only few treaties on regional security involving countries of the
South Atlantic Rim, as follow:
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance - TIAR61
It came into effect on March 12, 1948 materializing aspirations of many American nations
with regard to the adoption of a security mechanism for the continent, as established in the
agreement reached at the Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Peace and Security of
the Continent, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in February 1947.
Article 3 of TIAR establishes in the first paragraph that “The High contracting parties
hereby agree that an armed attack on the part of any State against an American State shall be
considered an attack against all the American States, and consequently, each one of such Con-
tracting Members hereby pledge to help to fight such an attack, exercising the inherent right of
legitimate individual or collective defence, as recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations”62
TIAR conforms to the model of collective security and perceived threats at that time were:
the possibility of a war between the contracting countries, and aggression towards the continent
on part of the USSR, either by direct attack or through the diffusion of the communist ideals in
the American countries. The United States had the principle role in the definition of this last
threat.
The mechanisms determined by TIAR would not have been of use to solve the multiple
situations in which the security of the continent may have been threatened, according to the pro-
visions of the treaty, because they would not apply in the case of frequent interruptions of demo-
cratic governments, or because the United States acted unilaterally when it considered that its
interests were threatened, leaving the provisions of TIAR aside or only invoking its application at
the last minute, as a way of mitigating the lack of trust of the remaining contracting parties.
59
Deutsch, Karl W.. The Analysis of International Relations. First Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc, United States, 1968, p. 110-132.
60
Ros, Fernando M. “The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Is it Collapsed?, MDS Thesis, Canadian Forces
College, 2002, Third Section.
61
By its initials in Spanish
62
Organización de los Estados Americanos. “Artículo 3º del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca”.
http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-29.html. [Organization of the American States. Article 3 of the Inter-American
Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance], Rio de Janeiro, February 09, 1947.

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