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WP5	
  –	
  INFRASTRUCTURE	
  RESILIENCE	
  
AGAINST	
  ATTACKS	
  AND	
  FAULTS	
  
Diego	
  Kreutz	
  (FFCUL)	
  	
  
(joint	
  work:	
  FFCUL,	
  TUM,	
  UFAM	
  and	
  UFSC)	
  
	
  
SECFUNET	
  Final	
  Meeting	
  
Brussels,	
  11th	
  June	
  2014	
  
SECFUNET – Security for Future Networks

FP7-ICT-2011-EU-Brazil – STREP number 288349"
Objectives	
  (1/2)	
  
!
2!
Network Access
Service!
Network
Operating
System
Management
Applications
Network!
ControlPlane!
Network Data Plane!
FITS uses:
§  RADIUS for VMs AA
§  OpenID for user AA
§  OpenFlow controller
Objectives	
  (2/2)	
  
!
3!
Virtual Network 2!
Virtual Network 3!
Physical Infrastructure!
Virtual Network 1!
VerticalandHorizontal!
Control,Managementand!
MonitoringSystems!
Assure&
Monitor&
Config&
Assure&
Monitor&
Config&
State	
  of	
  Affairs	
  (OpenID	
  &	
  RADIUS)	
  
(current	
  scenario	
  and	
  our	
  goal)	
  
!
4!
Fault	
  tolerance	
  
Level	
  of	
  trust	
  
C1	
  
C2	
  
C3	
   C4	
  
C6	
  
C5	
  
Use	
  cases:	
  OpenID	
  &	
  RADIUS	
  
!
5!
Functional	
  Model	
  
Ø  Service-­‐oriented	
  architecture	
  of	
  components	
  
!
6!
Client / Secure
Component! AAI Replicas!
(mfR + 1)!
Service /
Application / Device!
(fS + 1)!
Gateway!
(AAI front-end)!
(fG + 1)!
AAI Secure !
Components (mfR + 1)!
Alternative Path!
Default Path! AAI Resilient Infra!
Functional	
  Model	
  
Ø  Fault	
  detection	
  mechanisms	
  
!
7!
ClientCw!
Back-end!
ServiceBz!
Target
ServiceIx!
Service
GatewayGy!
Timeout A! Timeout B!
Corrupted response !
from replica Tx!
Corrupted response !
from replica Gy!
Byzantine behavior!
from replica Bz!
Timeout C (e.g., OpenID)!
Towards	
  Intrusion	
  Tolerance	
  
1.  BFT	
  tools/protocols	
  
–  BFT-­‐SMaRt	
  (FCUL)	
  
–  IT-­‐VM	
  (UFSC)	
  
2.  Additional	
  mechanisms:	
  
–  Diversity	
  
–  Proactive-­‐reactive	
  recovery	
  
3.  Confidentiality:	
  a	
  limitation	
  of	
  BFT	
  systems	
  
–  Specific	
  components	
  are	
  required	
  to	
  ensure	
  
this	
  property	
  
!
8!
Diversity	
  in	
  the	
  OpenID	
  prototype	
  
!
9!
VM1!
Gateway 1!
VM1!
OpenID
BFT R1!
VM2!
Gateway 2!
Pair-wised TCP/IP Communications!
VMn!
Gateway N!…"
Hypervisor!
!
Secure
Element!
V"V"V"
Reliable Communication Channels!
VM2!
OpenID
BFT R1!
Hypervisor!
!
Secure
Element!
VM3!
OpenID
BFT R1!
Hypervisor!
!
Secure
Element!
VM4!
OpenID
BFT R1!
Hypervisor!
!
Secure
Element!
A	
  Trusted	
  Component	
  for	
  RADIUS	
  &	
  OpenID	
  
!
10!
TC#
PuCA#
KNAS# PrS#
KUser# ID#
USER Table!
!
<ID1> <…, Perm>MAC!
<ID2> <…, Perm>MAC!
<ID3> <…, Perm>MAC!
<ID4> <…, Perm>MAC!
…!
<IDn> <…, Perm>MAC!
DATA Table (NAS | Association)!
!
<NAS1 | Handler1> <…, EK1>!
<NAS2 | Handler2> <…, EK2>!
<NAS3 | Handler3> <…, EK3>!
<NAS4 | Handler4> <…, EK4>!
…!
<NASn | Handlern> <…, EKn>!
TLS#
EAP#
RADIUS#
Required methods:!
1.  HMAC!
2.  VerifySignRSA!
3.  SymmCipher!
4.  GenConfidential!
5.  SignRSA!
6.  GenAssocia;on#
7.  GenNonce#
BFT?SMaRT#
Authentication Service Replica!
KAssoc#
OpenID#
HTTP/HTTPS#
Trusted	
  Components	
  
!
11!
A trusted/secure component can be “any” device capable of ensuring !
the data and operation confidentiality of the target system/environment.!
Smart Cards! Tamper Resistant
a FPGA!
A Shielded!
Computer!
Virtual TPM!
(e.g. vTPM)!
Secure Hypervisor
(e.g. sHyper)!
Intel TXT & GSX
AMD SVM, …!
Deployment	
  trade-­‐offs	
  
!
12!
OpenID:	
  performance	
  
!
13!
Average Latency:
78.360ms!
Average Latency:
87.343ms!
Average Latency:
32.103ms!
OpenID:	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  faults	
  &	
  attacks	
  
!
14!
Type of execution/fault/attack 20
clients
40
clients
Fault-free execution 867.73 984.59
Constantly crashing OpenID reps 1009.86 1145.98
Attacking OpenID replicas (DoS) 956.46 1005.54
Constantly crashing OpenID gws 633.44 718.75
!
15!
Remarks	
  
(prototypes	
  &	
  evaluations	
  &	
  proposals)	
  
VirtualMachineMonitor!
Agreement Service!
Authentication Server!
Share Memory!
VM1!
IdP Proxy!
VM2!
IdP Proxy!
API!
Trusted Computing !
Base (TCB)!
R-­‐OpenID-­‐PR	
   R-­‐OpenID-­‐VR	
  R-­‐RADIUS	
  
Resilient	
  
Mon	
  Infra	
  
Fault-­‐tolerant	
  
OF-­‐C	
  
RT	
  
Kerberos	
  v5	
  
!
16!
Remarks	
  
(linking	
  our	
  tools	
  to	
  the	
  FITS	
  arch)	
  
End user
Physical Network
Virtual Network
!
17!
Remarks	
  (on-­‐going/future	
  work)	
  
Cloud-­‐of-­‐Clouds	
  Security	
  Services	
  (e.g.,	
  IdPaaS)	
  
!
18!
Remarks	
  (on-­‐going/future	
  work)	
  
Cloud-­‐of-­‐Clouds	
  Security	
  Services	
  (e.g.,	
  IdPaaS)	
  
!
19!
Diffusion	
  
0!
2!
4!
6!
8!
10!
CORE A*! CORE A! CORE B! OTHER!
Numberofpubs/work!
Venue Rank!
4
2
7
9
0!
5!
10!
15!
20!
25!
30!
35!
40!
Presential! Online! Tech/Other!
Numberofmeetings!
Type of meeting!
6
34 ~30
!
20!
Meetings,	
  on-­‐demand	
  tech	
  mini-­‐confs,	
  etc.	
  
(challenge:	
  technology	
  transfer	
  &	
  tech	
  sync)	
  

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Infrastructure Resilience against Attacks and Faults

  • 1. WP5  –  INFRASTRUCTURE  RESILIENCE   AGAINST  ATTACKS  AND  FAULTS   Diego  Kreutz  (FFCUL)     (joint  work:  FFCUL,  TUM,  UFAM  and  UFSC)     SECFUNET  Final  Meeting   Brussels,  11th  June  2014   SECFUNET – Security for Future Networks
 FP7-ICT-2011-EU-Brazil – STREP number 288349"
  • 2. Objectives  (1/2)   ! 2! Network Access Service! Network Operating System Management Applications Network! ControlPlane! Network Data Plane! FITS uses: §  RADIUS for VMs AA §  OpenID for user AA §  OpenFlow controller
  • 3. Objectives  (2/2)   ! 3! Virtual Network 2! Virtual Network 3! Physical Infrastructure! Virtual Network 1! VerticalandHorizontal! Control,Managementand! MonitoringSystems! Assure& Monitor& Config& Assure& Monitor& Config&
  • 4. State  of  Affairs  (OpenID  &  RADIUS)   (current  scenario  and  our  goal)   ! 4! Fault  tolerance   Level  of  trust   C1   C2   C3   C4   C6   C5  
  • 5. Use  cases:  OpenID  &  RADIUS   ! 5!
  • 6. Functional  Model   Ø  Service-­‐oriented  architecture  of  components   ! 6! Client / Secure Component! AAI Replicas! (mfR + 1)! Service / Application / Device! (fS + 1)! Gateway! (AAI front-end)! (fG + 1)! AAI Secure ! Components (mfR + 1)! Alternative Path! Default Path! AAI Resilient Infra!
  • 7. Functional  Model   Ø  Fault  detection  mechanisms   ! 7! ClientCw! Back-end! ServiceBz! Target ServiceIx! Service GatewayGy! Timeout A! Timeout B! Corrupted response ! from replica Tx! Corrupted response ! from replica Gy! Byzantine behavior! from replica Bz! Timeout C (e.g., OpenID)!
  • 8. Towards  Intrusion  Tolerance   1.  BFT  tools/protocols   –  BFT-­‐SMaRt  (FCUL)   –  IT-­‐VM  (UFSC)   2.  Additional  mechanisms:   –  Diversity   –  Proactive-­‐reactive  recovery   3.  Confidentiality:  a  limitation  of  BFT  systems   –  Specific  components  are  required  to  ensure   this  property   ! 8!
  • 9. Diversity  in  the  OpenID  prototype   ! 9! VM1! Gateway 1! VM1! OpenID BFT R1! VM2! Gateway 2! Pair-wised TCP/IP Communications! VMn! Gateway N!…" Hypervisor! ! Secure Element! V"V"V" Reliable Communication Channels! VM2! OpenID BFT R1! Hypervisor! ! Secure Element! VM3! OpenID BFT R1! Hypervisor! ! Secure Element! VM4! OpenID BFT R1! Hypervisor! ! Secure Element!
  • 10. A  Trusted  Component  for  RADIUS  &  OpenID   ! 10! TC# PuCA# KNAS# PrS# KUser# ID# USER Table! ! <ID1> <…, Perm>MAC! <ID2> <…, Perm>MAC! <ID3> <…, Perm>MAC! <ID4> <…, Perm>MAC! …! <IDn> <…, Perm>MAC! DATA Table (NAS | Association)! ! <NAS1 | Handler1> <…, EK1>! <NAS2 | Handler2> <…, EK2>! <NAS3 | Handler3> <…, EK3>! <NAS4 | Handler4> <…, EK4>! …! <NASn | Handlern> <…, EKn>! TLS# EAP# RADIUS# Required methods:! 1.  HMAC! 2.  VerifySignRSA! 3.  SymmCipher! 4.  GenConfidential! 5.  SignRSA! 6.  GenAssocia;on# 7.  GenNonce# BFT?SMaRT# Authentication Service Replica! KAssoc# OpenID# HTTP/HTTPS#
  • 11. Trusted  Components   ! 11! A trusted/secure component can be “any” device capable of ensuring ! the data and operation confidentiality of the target system/environment.! Smart Cards! Tamper Resistant a FPGA! A Shielded! Computer! Virtual TPM! (e.g. vTPM)! Secure Hypervisor (e.g. sHyper)! Intel TXT & GSX AMD SVM, …!
  • 13. OpenID:  performance   ! 13! Average Latency: 78.360ms! Average Latency: 87.343ms! Average Latency: 32.103ms!
  • 14. OpenID:  the  impact  of  faults  &  attacks   ! 14! Type of execution/fault/attack 20 clients 40 clients Fault-free execution 867.73 984.59 Constantly crashing OpenID reps 1009.86 1145.98 Attacking OpenID replicas (DoS) 956.46 1005.54 Constantly crashing OpenID gws 633.44 718.75
  • 15. ! 15! Remarks   (prototypes  &  evaluations  &  proposals)   VirtualMachineMonitor! Agreement Service! Authentication Server! Share Memory! VM1! IdP Proxy! VM2! IdP Proxy! API! Trusted Computing ! Base (TCB)! R-­‐OpenID-­‐PR   R-­‐OpenID-­‐VR  R-­‐RADIUS   Resilient   Mon  Infra   Fault-­‐tolerant   OF-­‐C   RT   Kerberos  v5  
  • 16. ! 16! Remarks   (linking  our  tools  to  the  FITS  arch)   End user Physical Network Virtual Network
  • 17. ! 17! Remarks  (on-­‐going/future  work)   Cloud-­‐of-­‐Clouds  Security  Services  (e.g.,  IdPaaS)  
  • 18. ! 18! Remarks  (on-­‐going/future  work)   Cloud-­‐of-­‐Clouds  Security  Services  (e.g.,  IdPaaS)  
  • 19. ! 19! Diffusion   0! 2! 4! 6! 8! 10! CORE A*! CORE A! CORE B! OTHER! Numberofpubs/work! Venue Rank! 4 2 7 9
  • 20. 0! 5! 10! 15! 20! 25! 30! 35! 40! Presential! Online! Tech/Other! Numberofmeetings! Type of meeting! 6 34 ~30 ! 20! Meetings,  on-­‐demand  tech  mini-­‐confs,  etc.   (challenge:  technology  transfer  &  tech  sync)