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Arch bugs in BSS
Gleb Cherbov
Security Researcher
Digital Security (ERPScan)
Arch bugs in BSS

Banking

© 2002—2013, Digital Security

2
Arch bugs in BSS

Internet banking. Client side

© 2002—2013, Digital Security

3
Arch bugs in BSS

How it worx

WEB Server + App Server

DBMS

ABS

Operator
© 2002—2013, Digital Security

Operator’s environment
4
Arch bugs in BSS

How it worx

WEB Server + App Server

DBMS

ABS

Operator
© 2002—2013, Digital Security

Operator’s environment
5
Arch bugs in BSS

How it worx

WEB Server + App Server

DBMS

ABS

Operator
© 2002—2013, Digital Security

Operator’s environment
6
Arch bugs in BSS

How it worx

WEB Server + App Server

DBMS

ABS

Operator
© 2002—2013, Digital Security

Operator’s environment
7
Arch bugs in BSS

Select a target

WEB Server + App Server

DBMS

ABS

Operator
© 2002—2013, Digital Security

Operator’s environment
8
Arch bugs in BSS

Select a target

WEB Server + App Server

DBMS

ABS

Operator
© 2002—2013, Digital Security

Operator’s environment
9
Arch bugs in BSS

Select a target

WEB Server + App Server

DBMS

ABS

Operator
© 2002—2013, Digital Security

Operator’s environment
10
Arch bugs in BSS

Authentication

oper_login
oper_pass

Operator

© 2002—2013, Digital Security

dbo_admin
Operator’s
environment

DBMS

11
Arch bugs in BSS

Dbo_admin

• dbo_admin is the only account at DBMS
• dbo_admin has full access
• every operator can connect to DBMS directly
• oper auth on app side

© 2002—2013, Digital Security

12
Arch bugs in BSS

Lookin’ for a passwd

dbo_admin password is encrypted
and stored in a .cfg file near the app

© 2002—2013, Digital Security

13
Arch bugs in BSS

Quote

“it’s impossible to decrypt it”
(c) BSS support

© 2002—2013, Digital Security

14
Arch bugs in BSS

Let’s take a look

RSA modulus
RSA private exp
Unusual base64 alphabet
© 2002—2013, Digital Security

15
Arch bugs in BSS

Let’s take a look

Well… looks like base64?

© 2002—2013, Digital Security

16
Arch bugs in BSS

Also…

Innovative password storage
widely used in BSS products
With the same hardcoded RSA key

© 2002—2013, Digital Security

17
Arch bugs in BSS

Malware

WEB Server + App Server

DBMS

ABS
Get conf file
Decrypt dbo_admin pass
Wreak havoc
Operator
© 2002—2013, Digital Security

Operator’s environment
18
Arch bugs in BSS

Attack vector?

•Insider

•Targeted attack
•Malware

© 2002—2013, Digital Security

19
Arch bugs in BSS

Tricky data manipulations

© 2002—2013, Digital Security

20
Questions?

Digital Security in Moscow: +7 (495) 223-07-86
Digital Security in Saint Petersburg: +7 (812) 703-15-47
www.dsec.ru
www.erpscan.com
info@dsec.ru

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Gleb Cherbov - DBO Hacking — arch bugs in BSS

  • 1. Arch bugs in BSS Gleb Cherbov Security Researcher Digital Security (ERPScan)
  • 2. Arch bugs in BSS Banking © 2002—2013, Digital Security 2
  • 3. Arch bugs in BSS Internet banking. Client side © 2002—2013, Digital Security 3
  • 4. Arch bugs in BSS How it worx WEB Server + App Server DBMS ABS Operator © 2002—2013, Digital Security Operator’s environment 4
  • 5. Arch bugs in BSS How it worx WEB Server + App Server DBMS ABS Operator © 2002—2013, Digital Security Operator’s environment 5
  • 6. Arch bugs in BSS How it worx WEB Server + App Server DBMS ABS Operator © 2002—2013, Digital Security Operator’s environment 6
  • 7. Arch bugs in BSS How it worx WEB Server + App Server DBMS ABS Operator © 2002—2013, Digital Security Operator’s environment 7
  • 8. Arch bugs in BSS Select a target WEB Server + App Server DBMS ABS Operator © 2002—2013, Digital Security Operator’s environment 8
  • 9. Arch bugs in BSS Select a target WEB Server + App Server DBMS ABS Operator © 2002—2013, Digital Security Operator’s environment 9
  • 10. Arch bugs in BSS Select a target WEB Server + App Server DBMS ABS Operator © 2002—2013, Digital Security Operator’s environment 10
  • 11. Arch bugs in BSS Authentication oper_login oper_pass Operator © 2002—2013, Digital Security dbo_admin Operator’s environment DBMS 11
  • 12. Arch bugs in BSS Dbo_admin • dbo_admin is the only account at DBMS • dbo_admin has full access • every operator can connect to DBMS directly • oper auth on app side © 2002—2013, Digital Security 12
  • 13. Arch bugs in BSS Lookin’ for a passwd dbo_admin password is encrypted and stored in a .cfg file near the app © 2002—2013, Digital Security 13
  • 14. Arch bugs in BSS Quote “it’s impossible to decrypt it” (c) BSS support © 2002—2013, Digital Security 14
  • 15. Arch bugs in BSS Let’s take a look RSA modulus RSA private exp Unusual base64 alphabet © 2002—2013, Digital Security 15
  • 16. Arch bugs in BSS Let’s take a look Well… looks like base64? © 2002—2013, Digital Security 16
  • 17. Arch bugs in BSS Also… Innovative password storage widely used in BSS products With the same hardcoded RSA key © 2002—2013, Digital Security 17
  • 18. Arch bugs in BSS Malware WEB Server + App Server DBMS ABS Get conf file Decrypt dbo_admin pass Wreak havoc Operator © 2002—2013, Digital Security Operator’s environment 18
  • 19. Arch bugs in BSS Attack vector? •Insider •Targeted attack •Malware © 2002—2013, Digital Security 19
  • 20. Arch bugs in BSS Tricky data manipulations © 2002—2013, Digital Security 20
  • 21. Questions? Digital Security in Moscow: +7 (495) 223-07-86 Digital Security in Saint Petersburg: +7 (812) 703-15-47 www.dsec.ru www.erpscan.com info@dsec.ru