Fm 3-20.97 the-recce_and_brt_troop_draft

2D Coordinating Draft FM 3-20.9711
Field Manual HEADQUARTERS2
No 3-20.971 US ARMY ARMOR CENTER3
Fort Knox, KY 1 May 20014
5
6
RECONNAISSANCE TROOP7
Recce Troop and Brigade Reconnaissance Troop8
9
10
TABLE OF CONTENTS11
12
Page13
14
Preface ......................................................................................................... iii15
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................... 1-116
Operational Environment........................................................ 1-317
Organizations ....................................................................... 1-1418
Missions, Capabilities, and Limitations ................................... 1-2419
Responsibilities .................................................................... 1-2520
Chapter 2 BATTLE COMMAND............................................................. 2-121
Command and Control........................................................... 2-322
Command, Control, Communications, Computers,23
and Intelligence Architectures ............................................. 2-4624
Techniques of Tactical Control................................................ 2-5725
Command Guidance and Organizational Control ...................... 2-5726
Tactical Movement ................................................................ 2-6927
Chapter 3 RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE ................................... 3-128
Fundamentals....................................................................... 3-229
Reconnaissance Planning...................................................... 3-1330
Area Reconnaissance ........................................................... 3-3831
Route Reconnaissance.......................................................... 3-5332
Zone Reconnaissance........................................................... 3-5933
Surveillance Fundamentals, Capabilities,34
and Limitations .................................................................. 3-7035
Surveillance Planning, Methods, and36
Considerations................................................................... 3-7237
Chapter 4 SECURITY ........................................................................... 4-138
Fundamentals and Capabilities............................................... 4-239
Screen................................................................................. 4-840
Area and High-Value Asset Security....................................... 4-3541
Convoy Security.................................................................... 4-4042
43
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and44
their contractors only to protect technical or operational information that is for official45
government use. This determination was made on 12 March 2001. Other requests for this46
document will be referred to Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-C,47
Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5000.48
49
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will protect disclosure of contents or50
reconstruction of the document.51

FM 3-20.971 (2d Coord Draft)
ii
Chapter 5 OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS ....................................... 5-11
Direct Fire Planning............................................................ 5-12
Offense............................................................................. 5-123
Defend as an Economy of Force.......................................... 5-214
Tactical Road Marches....................................................... 5-455
Assembly Areas ................................................................ 5-496
Reconnaissance Handover.................................................. 5-537
Linkup Operations.............................................................. 5-568
Battle Handover and Passage of Lines ................................. 5-639
Covert Breach Operations ................................................... 5-7010
Target Acquisition .............................................................. 5-7111
NBC Defensive Operations.................................................. 5-7612
13
Chapter 6 COMBAT SUPPORT.......................................................... 6-114
Intelligence........................................................................ 6-115
Fire Support/Target Acquisition ........................................... 6-1616
Army Aviation .................................................................... 6-3617
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Platoon ........................... 6-6318
Multi-Sensor Platoon.......................................................... 6-6719
IBCT Infantry Rifle Company................................................ 6-7320
Mobile Gun System Platoon ............................................... 6-8321
Infantry Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon........................... 6-8622
Antitank Platoon/Company ................................................. 6-8823
NBC Reconnaissance ........................................................ 6-9224
IBCT Engineer Company..................................................... 6-9325
Air Defense ....................................................................... 6-9826
27
Chapter 7 URBAN OPERATIONS....................................................... 7-128
Understanding the Urban Environment.................................. 7-229
Planning............................................................................ 7-830
Execution.......................................................................... 7-1931
32
Chapter 8 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT........................................... 8-133
Fundamentals.................................................................... 8-134
Organization...................................................................... 8-635
Logistics ........................................................................... 8-1536
Personnel Service Support.................................................. 8-2837
Enemy Prisoners of War..................................................... 8-3238
39
Appendix A OPORD GUIDE ............................................................... A-140
Appendix B NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL41
OPERATIONS .............................................................. B-142
Appendix C FORCE PROTECTION ..................................................... C-143
Appendix D RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE44
PLAN........................................................................... D-145
Appendix E STABILITY OPERATIONS AND46
SUPPORT OPERATIONS.............................................. E-147
Appendix F AIRLIFT OPERATIONS..................................................... F-148
Appendix G COMMAND POST OPERATIONS ..................................... G-149
Glossary............................................................................................ Glossary-150
51
52

iii
PREFACE1
2
3
FM 3-20.971 describes the tactical employment and operations of4
reconnaissance troops of armored and mechanized infantry brigades (BRTs)5
and the recce troops of the Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target6
Acquisition (RSTA) squadrons. It specifically addresses operations for7
brigades organized under the Army of Excellence, the Limited Conversion8
Division force designs, and the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). FM 3-9
20.971 is the doctrinal foundation that governs the development of equipment,10
training, and structure for both types of reconnaissance troops.11
12
Because not all units are digitally equipped, this manual addresses analog13
and digital operations, technology applications, and equipment. Tactical14
fundamentals do not change with the fielding of new equipment; however, the15
integration of new equipment and organizations may require changes in16
related techniques and procedures. This manual provides guidance in the17
form of combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to exploit emerging Army18
and Joint capabilities.19
20
FM 3-20.971 is written for the recon troop commander and his key leaders21
within the troop. The manual reflects and supports the Army operations22
doctrine as stated in FM 3-0. Readers should be familiar with FM 3-91.3 [FM23
71-3], FM 3-20-97 [FM 17-97], FM 3-100.40 [FM 100-40], FM 3-71 [FM 71-24
100], FM 3-55 [FM 100-55], FM 102 [FM 101-5-1], and FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-25
98]. Examples and graphics are provided to illustrate principles and concepts,26
not to serve as prescriptive responses to tactical situations. This publication27
provides units with the doctrinal foundation to train leaders, guide tactical28
planning, and develop standing operating procedures (SOP). The publication29
applies to all reconnaissance troops in the active component (AC) and reserve30
component (NG/RC) force.31
32
Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer33
exclusively to men.34
35
US Army Armor Center is the proponent for this publication. Submit36
comments and recommended changes and the rational for those changes on37
DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to:38
Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-C, Fort Knox, KY39
40121-5000, or e-mail the DA Form 2028 to Chief, Cavalry Branch, from the40
Doctrine Division web site at41
http://147.238.100.101/center/dtdd/doctrine/armordoc.htm. (After accessing42
the web site, select “Organization” from the menu on the left side of the43
screen to reach the Cavalry Branch site.)44
45

1-1
CHAPTER 11
2
INTRODUCTION3
4
5
The significance of reconnaissance cannot be overstated. History and6
training show that the winner of the reconnaissance fight will usually be the7
winner of the subsequent battle. The maneuver commander requires accurate,8
complete, and timely reconnaissance for success. The degree to which he9
correctly understands the threat situation, his own force’s situation, and the10
terrain heavily influences his battlefield success. This issue has been11
characterized as see the terrain, see the threat, and see yourself. Emerging12
command and control systems do a great deal to help a commander know his13
own forces situation, but the burden of obtaining real time information about14
the threat and terrain falls on his tactical reconnaissance units.15
The need for reconnaissance in Army operations remains unchanged.16
The fundamentals of reconnaissance and security are unaltered; however, the17
organization, equipment and techniques of the troop are now based on the unit18
it supports. While the troop’s primary missions are reconnaissance and19
security, the reconnaissance troop may be called upon to execute a myriad of20
additional missions. These missions range from route and area security to21
convoy escort and checkpoint duties. A reconnaissance troop’s operational22
environment spans the full spectrum of operations—from smaller-scale23
contingency to major theater of war operations. Regardless of the24
environment or mission, the troop’s primary function is always the same: Be25
the eyes and ear of the maneuver commander and provide the necessary26
information to allow him to make timely and accurate decisions.27
CONTENTS28
Page29
SECTION I. Operational Environment.........................................1-330
SECTION II. Organizations...........................................................1-1431
SECTION III. Missions, Capabilities, and Limitations....................1-2432
SECTION IV. Responsibilities........................................................1-2533
34
35
Based on its commander’s intent and guidance, the troop conducts36
reconnaissance in support of other friendly forces to provide current, accurate37
information about the threat, terrain, weather, society, physical resources, and38
the infrastructure within a specified area of operations. This provides the39
follow-on forces with an opportunity to maneuver freely and rapidly to their40
objective. Reconnaissance troops perform three types of reconnaissance:41
route, zone, and area.42

1-2
Additionally, higher headquarters and the troop endeavor to link the1
purpose of reconnaissance to—2
• Answer commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR),3
and/or4
• Answer voids in the unit’s IPB through intelligence requirements (IR),5
and/or6
• Support targeting through target acquisition.7
8
As a part of the Army’s transformation process, the brigade9
reconnaissance troop (BRT) and the recce troop of the reconnaissance,10
surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron have filled the historic11
gap in reconnaissance. Both organizations are designed to provide their12
respective commanders an increased number of tools for executing13
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. Tactical14
unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV), artillery radars and observers, air defense15
radars, and satellite tracking systems all contribute to the effort. However, the16
brigade’s primary source of intelligence remains its organic reconnaissance17
units. Successful reconnaissance operations permit the brigade commander18
freedom of maneuver in order to concentrate combat power and apply assets19
deliberately at the decisive time and place of his choosing. Only through20
reconnaissance can he determine which routes are suitable for maneuver,21
where the threat is strong and weak, and where gaps exist.22
The purpose of this chapter is—23
• To depict the operational environment of the troop and its supported24
brigade.25
• To depict organizations of the reconnaissance troop.26
– Recce Troop: The Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target27
Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron (IAV and TUAV equipped).28
– Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT): The Limited Conversion29
Division (LCD) XXI Brigade (HMMWV equipped).30
• To outline missions each troop performs.31
• To establish responsibilities of key personnel in combat.32
33

1-3
SECTION l. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT1
2
DIMENSIONS3
Reconnaissance troops support brigade operations by conducting4
reconnaissance and security missions in5
an operational environment consisting of6
six dimensions. Each dimension affects7
how the brigade combines, sequences,8
and conducts military operations.9
Commanders tailor forces, employ10
diverse capabilities, and support11
different missions to succeed in this12
environment.13
14
Threat Dimension. Multiple threats to US interests exist. Adversaries15
will continue to seek every opportunity to gain an advantage over US and16
multinational forces. When countered, they will adapt to the changing17
conditions and pursue all available options to avoid destruction or defeat.18
This environment and its wide array of threats present significant challenges.19
Army forces must simultaneously defeat an adversary while protecting20
noncombatants and the infrastructure on which they depend.21
Political Dimension. Successful military operations in any form require22
that commanders have a clear sense of strategic policy goals and objectives.23
They must understand how the use of military force fits into the national24
security strategy and the desired military conditions required to meet policy25
objectives. In addition, commanders must be able to articulate this26
understanding in a clear, concise way to the US and international media. Each27
political decision during the conduct of operations has strategic, operational,28
and tactical implications. Likewise, each strategic, operational, and tactical29
action directly or indirectly impacts the political dimension.30
Unified Action Dimension. Combatant commanders synchronize air,31
land, sea, space, and special operations forces to accomplish missions.32
Brigades can expect to operate in a unified command structure both in a major33
theater of war (MTW) and more commonly in smaller-scale contingencies34
(SSC). The brigade may work with multinational and interagency partners in35
order to accomplish the full spectrum of missions assigned to them. Brigades36
committed to SSCs can expect to protect American lives and interests, support37
political initiatives, facilitate diplomacy, promote fundamental ideals, and38
disrupt illegal activities. Close coordination is the foundation of successful39
unified action.40
Land Combat Operations Dimension. Land combat continues to be the41
salient feature of combat and is the brigades’ primary function. Land combat42
Dimensions of the Operational
Environment
• Threat
• Political
• Unified Action
• Land Combat Operations
• Information
• Technology

1-4
usually involves destroying or defeating threat forces or taking land objectives1
that reduce the threat’s will to fight. Four characteristics distinguish land2
combat:3
• Scope. Land combat involves direct and indirect combat with a threat4
throughout the depth of an operational area. Commanders maneuver5
forces to seize and retain key and decisive terrain. They use maneuver,6
fires, and other elements of combat power to defeat or destroy threat7
forces.8
• Duration. Land combat is repetitive and continuous. This involves9
rendering a threat incapable or unwilling to conduct further action. It10
may require destroying it.11
• Terrain. Land combat takes place among a complex variety of natural12
and manmade features. Plans for land combat must account for the13
visibility and clutter provided by the terrain and the effects of weather14
and climate.15
• Permanence. Land combat frequently requires seizing or securing16
terrain. With control of terrain comes control of populations and17
productive capacity. Thus, land combat makes the temporary effects18
of other operations permanent.19
Information Dimension. Decisive operations historically have been20
enabled by information superiority. Information superiority provides21
commanders with accurate, timely information that enables them to make22
superior decisions and act faster than their adversaries. Information23
superiority, derived from ISR; information management; and information24
operations (IO), provide one common framework on how to plan, task, and25
control assets; how and where to report information; and how to use26
information. The information environment also includes information derived27
from nongovernmental individuals and organizations, such as the media, who28
produce and disseminate information that affects public opinion, which can29
alter the conduct of and perceived legitimacy of military operations.30
Technology Dimension. Technology enhances leader, unit, and soldier31
performance and impacts how Army forces plan, prepare, and execute full32
spectrum operations in peace, conflict, and war. Technology has significantly33
increased the ability to conduct ISR operations. It greatly enhances the ability34
to conduct battle command through modern telecommunications and micro35
processing. Munitions are increasingly lethal and target acquisition systems36
are more precise. The proliferation of advanced technology systems requires37
commanders to integrate the capabilities of highly modernized organizations38
and less-modernized and multinational units. Commanders must also realize39
that they do not have a monopoly on advanced technology. Even adversaries40
lacking any research and development program can purchase sophisticated41
systems in the global marketplace, and gain selected parity or superiority to42
US systems.43

1-5
Offensive operations aim at
destroying or defeating a threat.
Their purpose is to impose the will
of the US on the threat for
decisive victory.
Defensive operations defeat a
threat attack, buy time, economize
forces, or develop conditions
favorable for offensive operations.
Defensive operations alone
normally cannot achieve a
decision. Their purpose is to
create conditions for a
counteroffensive that regains the
initiative.
FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS1
Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability operations,2
and support operations. Offensive and defensive missions normally dominate3
MTWs and some SSCs. Stability and support missions are conducted in SSC4
operations and to a lesser extent in MTW. Missions in any environment5
require brigades to conduct or be prepared to conduct any combination of6
these primary operations. Reconnaissance troops assigned to brigades are7
trained and equipped to support these operations. While the Army’s heavy8
brigades are optimized for operations in an MTW, they retain the ability to9
conduct SSC operations. The interim brigade combat team (IBCT) is10
organized and equipped to rapidly deploy to SSC operations, but is capable of11
conducting MTW operations if reinforced.12
Characteristics of Major Theater of War13
Major theaters of war have the greatest potential of occurring in regions14
containing moderate to well-developed infrastructure (especially roads, rail,15
and bridges), complex and urban terrain with large urban areas, and diverse16
weather patterns. Humanitarian issues, such as overpopulation; resource17
shortages; natural disasters; and inadequate local, regional, and global18
response capabilities, complicate these operations in much the same way as19
they do in smaller-scale contingencies.20
Brigades will usually conduct only one21
type of operation at a time, and then transition22
to another type as the strategic and operational23
requirements change. The recce troop and the24
BRT conduct reconnaissance and security25
operations in support of their assigned26
brigade’s offensive or defensive operations. The type of mission will depend27
on the commander’s requirements. For example, the troop will be assigned a28
reconnaissance mission if the brigade needs information on the terrain and29
threat in the AO to set the conditions for an attack. The troop may be30
assigned a security mission if the brigade wants to ensure their mission31
preparations are not observed by the threat’s reconnaissance.32
Military threats in MTW usually contain33
advanced industrial-age forces, with some34
high technology niches, characterized by both35
heavy and mechanized forces as well as36
motorized/light infantry. These forces are37
mostly equipped with newer generation tanks38
and infantry fighting vehicles, and have39
significant numbers of MANPADs, ATGMs,40
missiles, rockets, artillery mortars, and mines.41
They possess an integrated air defense system42
and a robust military and civilian communications capability. In addition, they43

1-6
possess advanced fixed-/rotary-wing aviation assets. Most threats capable of1
initiating an MTW possess weapons capable of mass destruction. These2
threats are capable of long-term, sustained, high-tempo brigade/division-level3
operations. They can also conduct sustained unconventional combat4
operations and limited duration/objective attacks.5
The ability to conduct information operations is increasing among the6
various threat forces in MTW. Our opponents of the future will first read our7
doctrine and then engage us in areas we identify as our pillars and combat8
multipliers. They will seek ways to manipulate the commanders’ trust in the9
veracity of data, information, and knowledge. They will attempt to take away10
the collaboration that leads to situational understanding (a key component of11
information superiority). They will seek to disrupt just-in-time logistics by12
attacking knowledge workers and disrupting the time-phased force13
deployment synchronization, which will affect the operation’s lines of14
communications and aerial ports and seaports of debarkation. Present and15
future trends indicate the acquisition of more sophisticated and advanced16
technology; greater, more capable and secure C3; and increased use of urban17
areas for operating bases and for sanctuary. See Figure 1-1.18
19
Figure 1-1. Characteristics of war.20
21
22

1-7
Asymmetric threats seek and
strike weaknesses, attack in
areas in which they are strong,
count on intelligence and
deception, and work the fine
lines of psychological
operations (PSYOPS) and
deception. Asymmetric
operations are nonlinear and
cellular in an organizational
sense. Asymmetric operations
involve information
operations, weapons of mass
destruction, and indirect
attacks against soldiers,
knowledge workers and their
families.
Characteristics of Smaller-Scale Contingencies1
Historically, smaller-scale contingencies3
like those in Panama, Haiti, and Kosovo have5
occurred in regions with weak infrastructure7
(especially roads, rail, bridges), complex9
terrain with large urban areas, and diverse11
weather patterns. Humanitarian issues, such as13
overpopulation; resource shortages; natural15
disasters; and inadequate local, regional, and17
global response capabilities, complicate19
operations in these areas. Threats in these21
environments usually contain mid- to low-end23
industrial-age forces characterized by limited25
heavy forces, mainly equipped with small27
numbers of early generation tanks, and some29
mechanized but mostly motorized infantry.31
There is a pervasive presence of guerilla,33
terrorist, paramilitary, special purpose forces, special police, and militia34
organizations. These forces are equipped with MANPADs, ATGMs, mortars,35
mines, explosives, and machine guns. There are limited fixed- and rotary-36
wing aviation assets. These forces can be expected, however, to have robust37
communications utilizing conventional military devices augmented by38
commercial equipment such as cell phones. Asymmetric warfare is a perfect39
strategy for operating in this environment due to its operations, which are40
nonlinear and cellular in an organizational sense. Asymmetric foes will seek41
and strike weaknesses, attack in areas in which they are strong, count on42
intelligence and deception, en route and in the objective area. Asymmetric43
foes are weaker than US forces and seek off-sets against our military and44
technical prowess by using indirect approaches, attacking or manipulating our45
vulnerabilities, and often making use of low-tech strategies, techniques, and46
procedures to obtain temporary advantages.47
Threats that use an asymmetric strategy include terrorists, Serbian-type48
paramilitary forces, drug gangs, and criminal groups. These groups are not49
capable of long-term, sustained, high-tempo combat operations. They are50
capable of limited duration and limited objective brigade- and division-level51
operations; i.e., destruction of a weaker force, seizure of an area or region, or52
seizure of an urban center, often emphasizing the use of decentralized and53
distributed operations. They are also capable of conducting defensive operations54
in complex and urban terrain. Forces in this environment are adept at conducting55
long-term, sustained, unconventional terrorist and guerrilla operations. Present56
and future trends indicate the presence of more sophisticated and advanced57
technology; greater, more capable, and secure C3; increased use of urban areas as58
sanctuary for conventional capability and as operating bases; and tactics oriented59
on sophisticated ambush as a key operating focus. See Figure 1-2.60
61

1-8
Support operations employ Army
forces to assist civil authorities,
foreign or domestic, as they prepare
for or respond to crisis and relieve
suffering. Domestically, Army forces
respond only when directed by the
National Command Authority. Army
forces operate under the lead federal
agency, and comply with provisions of
US law.
Stability operations promote and
protect US national interests by
influencing the diplomatic, civil, and
military environments. Regional
security is supported by a balanced
approach that enhances regional
stability and economic prosperity
simultaneously. Army force presence
promotes a stable environment.
1
The characteristics of SSC, and to a lesser extent MTW, require the2
execution of stability operations and support operations. The troop’s primary3
responsibility is reconnaissance, but it must be prepared to conduct other4
missions in support of stability operations and support operations (see5
Appendix E).6
It is essential that stability operations not be confused with support7
operations, as these two actions have different and distinct types of missions8
and tasks. While the tasks are unique,9
they are not mutually exclusive and will10
often overlap. The one stability11
operation the brigade will most probably12
perform is peace operations. It is13
probable that many other types of14
stability missions will be integrated into15
peace operations, to include combat16
missions and nontraditional tasks (see17
Figure 1-3).18
19
Stability operations and support20
operations may precede and/or follow21
war, or occur simultaneously in the same22
theater. These actions may be conducted23
in conjunction with wartime operations24
to complement the achievement of25
Figure 1-2. Urban areas can become operational
bases for guerrilla operations.

1-9
strategic objectives, or they may support a commander’s forward-presence1
operations or a US ambassador’s country plan. They may even occur in the2
US. No matter where stability operations and support operations are3
conducted and regardless of context, they are designed to promote regional4
stability, maintain or achieve democratic end states, retain US influence and5
access abroad, provide humanitarian assistance, protect US interests, and6
assist US civil authorities. The Army conducts stability operations and support7
operations as part of a joint team and often in conjunction with other US and8
foreign government agencies.9
10
11
Figure 1-3. Stability operations.12
13
14
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT15
The brigade combat team’s primary source of information is its organic16
ISR assets. The fundamental role of the two types of reconnaissance troops is17
to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and battle damage18
assessment. Their operations facilitate the brigade commander’s ability to19
retain freedom of maneuver in order to concentrate combat power and apply20
assets deliberately at the decisive time and place of his choosing. Stealth21
remains the troops’ primary means of force protection, and organic weapons22
are used only in self-defense. See Figure 1-4.23

1-10
Relevant information is all
information of importance to the
troop/squadron/ brigade
commander and staff in the
exercise of command and control.
It provides the answers for the
successful conduct of operations,
that is, all elements necessary to
address the factors of METT-TC.
1
2
Troop Orientation3
Reconnaissance troops are optimized to conduct reconnaissance and4
surveillance of a full multidimensional range of threats operating on an area5
basis. This means that the troop’s orientation is on the area of operations and6
the wide variety of threats facing the brigade. In more traditional7
reconnaissance and surveillance operations, the maneuver formation orients on8
the threat or reconnaissance objective and develops the situation when threat9
contact is made. This “reactionary” approach to reconnaissance operations often10
results in the early commitment of friendly forces to fight at a time and place of11
the threat’s choosing. By leveraging information technology and air/ground12
scout capabilities in complex and urban terrain, the troop can develop the13
situation by focusing early on designated areas and multidimensional and14
asymmetrical threats; thus empowering the brigade commander to achieve15
battlefield mobility and agility while choosing the time and place to confront16
the threat and his method of engagement.17
Situational Awareness, Situational Understanding, and18
Information Superiority19
Relevant information is all information20
of importance to the troop commander and to21
the squadron and brigade commanders and22
their staffs in the exercise of command and23
control. To be relevant, information must be24
accurate, timely, usable, complete, precise,25
and reliable, as humanly and technologically26
possible, to support all types of military27
operations. Relevant information answers the28
Figure 1-4. Stealth remains the primary means
of force protection.

1-11
Situational awareness is the ability
to maintain a constant, clear mental
picture of relevant information and
the tactical situation. This picture
includes a knowledge of both the
friendly and threat situations and of
relevant terrain.
questions that dictate the successful execution of military operations. Simply,1
what do I need to know about the threat? What do I need to know about2
friendly forces? What do I need to know about myself? What do I need to3
know about the terrain and weather? Succinctly, what do I need to know for4
command and control? These questions constitute information requirements.5
Information requirements consist of all information elements required by the6
commander for the successful execution of operations; that is, all elements7
necessary to address the factors of METT-TC. Outfitted with Force XXI8
Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and given clear information9
requirements, the troop is capable of providing high-quality relevant10
information.11
Situational awareness is the ability12
to maintain a constant, clear mental13
picture of relevant information and the14
tactical situation. Simply stated,15
situational awareness answers the16
question what is the terrain, the friendly17
situation, and the enemy situation. This18
picture includes visualizing/seeing the19
relationship between terrain, friendly20
forces (yourself), and the threat (enemy)21
situations (see Figure 1-5). Since the22
troop normally operates dispersed, with23
its platoons and their individual sections24
conducting decentralized operations, all25
recce leaders must maintain situational26
awareness so they can make sound,27
quick tactical decisions. Critical28
outcomes of situational awareness on the29
part of all scouts are reducing fratricide30
incidents and staying one step ahead of31
the threat they are facing. FBCB2 and32
the Army tactical command and control33
system (ATCCS) assist recce leaders in attaining situational awareness.34
35
The recce platoon and troop assess and report all information within their36
area of operations (AO) to fulfill their primary responsibility of assisting the37
brigade or RSTA squadron in achieving awareness of the situation. The troop38
employs its scout and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capability39
(“boots on the ground”), augmented with sensor assets and access to other ISR40
reach-back information. The troop fulfills its own information requirements41
and answers the CCIR as it assists in providing situational awareness to the42
higher command. Relevant information as well as a leader’s operational43
picture and the common operational picture (COP) assist in achieving44
situational awareness.45
Figure 1-5. Situational awareness
picture.

1-12
Situational understanding is the product
of applying analysis and judgments to the
unit’s situation awareness and/or the COP
to determine the relationships among the
factors of METT-TC. Situational
understanding enhances commanders’
decision making by identifying opportunities
for mission accomplishment, threats to the
force or mission accomplishment, and gaps
in information.
An operational picture is a single display of relevant information within a1
commander’s/leader’s area of interest. This information is a display of2
information such as status charts, overlays, and friendly and threat icons. This3
display can be analog (such as a map with acetate overlay) or digital (FBCB24
display). By collaborating, sharing, and tailoring information, separate5
echelons create a common operational picture. A COP is an operational6
picture tailored to the user’s requirements, based on common data and7
information shared by more than one command (troop to platoons,8
brigade/squadron to troop). The troop commander and the brigade/squadron9
commander and his staff merge all relevant information into a COP of the10
commander’s area of interest. The COP allows collaborative interaction and11
real time sharing of information among the commander and his troop12
leadership and the higher commander and his staffs. The COP assists the13
commander in achieving situational awareness; however, it is not a14
requirement. The commander applies his analysis and judgment to his15
situational awareness and the COP to determine the relationships among the16
factors of METT-TC, thereby achieving situational understanding.17
18
Situational awareness based on19
reports (relevant information,20
operational picture, COP) from the21
platoon and the troop and other22
elements are the key components of23
situational understanding at the24
troop, brigade and/or squadron level.25
Situational understanding is the26
product of applying analysis and27
judgments to the unit’s situational28
awareness and/or the COP to determine the relationships among the factors of29
METT-TC. Simply stated, situational understanding answers the question30
what it means. When the commander attains situational understanding, he can31
make sound decisions (see Figure 1-6).32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

1-13
Information superiority is a
significant information advantage
gained by collecting, processing, and
disseminating an uninterrupted flow
of relevant information in support of
military operations while exploiting or
denying a threat or adversary the
ability to do the same.
1
Figure 1-6. Flow of relevant information into2
situational understanding.3
4
Information superiority is the5
operational advantage derived from the6
ability to collect, process, and disseminate7
an uninterrupted flow of information8
while exploiting or denying an adversary’s9
ability to do the same. Commanders10
exploit information superiority to impact11
threat perceptions, attitudes, decisions,12
and actions to accomplish mission objectives. During the course of13
operations, all sides attempt to gain information superiority to secure an14
operational advantage while denying it to adversaries. (NOTE: See FM 3-015
[FM 100-5] for more information on information superiority.)16
17
Visualizing the Battlefield18
The greatest challenge leaders face during operations is seeing, or more19
accurately, “visualizing” the battlefield in both real time and in the future.20
Normally their physical view is limited to brief segments of the battlefield.21
They must develop an art of visualizing what is occurring or might occur22
within their area of interest. For some, this comes almost naturally. For most,23
however, it requires a great deal of experience to adequately visualize the24
complexities of the battlefield. Enhanced analog and digital communications25
(FBCB2), computers, and command/control (C4) systems in the troop portray26
key relevant threat information so that commanders and staffs can better27
visualize the battlefield and be situationally aware. Not only will these28

1-14
systems fuse standard threat information (location, composition, and1
disposition) but also multidimensional aspects—psychological, physical,2
allegiance, intent, underground and above-ground infrastructure—that must3
now be considered. High technology facilitates analysis of this information4
through digital systems and the transmitting and receiving of intelligence5
(vertically and horizontally) rapidly enhances the brigade’s situational6
awareness. See Figure 1-7.7
8
Figure 1-7. Visualizing the battlefield using reconnaissance assets.9
10
11
12
SECTION II. ORGANIZATIONS13
THE RECCE TROOP (RSTA)14
The troop consists of six officers and 84 enlisted soldiers. It is organized15
into a headquarters section, a mortar section, and three scout platoons.16
17
Headquarters Section18
The troop headquarters section is organized and equipped to perform19
command and control and logistical support functions for the troop. The20
section consists of three officers and fourteen enlisted soldiers. The21
headquarters section includes the troop commander, executive officer, first22
sergeant, and the operations, NBC, communications, and supply sergeants.23

1-15
The troop does not have any organic maintenance assets or personnel other1
than the two communications repairmen. See Figure 1-8.2
3
4
Figure 1-8. Troop headquarters section.5
6
7
Troop Command Post8
The troop command post (CP) serves as the net control station for the9
troop and is a critical communications link to the squadron or brigade TOC.10
One of the primary functions of the troop CP is collecting combat information11
from the scout platoons and reporting significant threat information gathered12
during their reconnaissance and surveillance activities to the higher TOC. The13
CP functions are as follows:14
• Assist the commander in command and control.15
• Coordinate combat service support for the troop.16
• Report information to higher headquarters and adjacent units.17
The CP operates under the direction of the XO, and is manned by the18
troop operations sergeant, the NBC NCO and the two communications19
maintenance personnel. The CP tracks the battle at the troop and squadron20
levels and relays information to the commander and subordinate platoons21
pertaining to the friendly and enemy situation. The CP assists the commander22
in the control of the troop by advising him on the status of subordinate and23
adjacent units, by assisting in creating/forwarding digital and voice reports,24
and by controlling and monitoring the troop’s combat service support25

1-16
activities. The CP continuously monitors the situational awareness picture to1
alert elements to threat, terrain conditions, or obstacles. The CP coordinates2
and integrates actions with supporting and adjacent units. The primary3
concern when positioning the troop CP is its ability to communicate with the4
controlling unit command post and the subordinate elements of the troop.5
During reconnaissance or offensive operations, the CP should remain at6
least one terrain feature behind the troop combat elements, positioned to7
maintain communications with the platoons and the controlling brigade8
command post (TAC or main). During security or defensive operations, the9
CP should be positioned in sufficient depth to avoid contact with the threat10
while maintaining communications with the forward scout sections.11
NOTE: The previous example portrays the troop CP location in a linear12
environment. For noncontiguous environments, the troop is13
positioned to facilitate command, control, and communications and14
to provide local security. See Appendix G for more detailed15
information on the troop command post.16
17
HUMINT NCO (97B)18
The HUMINT NCOIC is responsible for the training of the HUMINT19
collectors. He advises the reconnaissance troop commander on the optimal20
utilization of the HUMINT collectors. He provides technical support and21
advice to the HUMINT collectors concerning HUMINT collection and22
reporting methodology. He reviews HUMINT reporting for format and23
completeness. He reviews HUMINT collector recommendations, identifying24
sources for further exploitation by the tactical HUMINT platoon of the MI25
Company. During tactical operations, he is located in the troop CP. He acts26
as the troop intelligence oversight NCO and is the troop POC with the S2X for27
technical support to HUMINT collection operations.28
29
The Fire Support Team30
The fire support team (FIST) is responsible for coordinating indirect fires31
for the troop. The FIST consists of one fire support officer (FSO), one NCO32
(team chief), one enlisted fire support specialist, and one enlisted radio33
operator/driver. In the recce troop, the team is mounted on an IAV fire34
support vehicle (see Figure 1-9).35
36
Figure 1-9. FIST organization.37

1-17
Human Intelligence is the
intelligence derived from the analysis
of information obtained from a human
source or a related document by a
HUMINT collector. The HUMINT
discipline includes those personnel
and organizations directed toward the
collection, processing, analysis, and
production of human intelligence.
Recce Platoon1
The recce platoon’s primary missions are reconnaissance/surveillance,2
execution of security missions, and in some METT-TC conditions, to conduct3
offensive or defensive missions. Serving as the commander’s eyes and ears,4
recce platoons provide current battlefield information to help the troop5
commander plan and conduct tactical operations. They are critical in painting6
the picture of the enemy situation, using both FM and digital communications7
(FBCB2). Additionally, the scouts can be expected to execute target8
acquisition missions and battle damage assessment.9
10
11
The recce platoons are organized and equipped to conduct reconnaissance12
and screening in support of the troop. They may conduct an economy-of-13
force role, or offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations based on METT-14
TC. The platoon consists of one officer and 20 enlisted soldiers (see Figure15
1-10.)16
17
18
Figure 1-10. Recce platoon organization.19
20
Each recce squad in the platoon has an21
assigned a 97B HUMINT collector. The22
HUMINT collector conducts initial23
contact and gathers information from24
EPWs, detainees, refugees, local25
inhabitants, friendly forces, and captured26
documents. The reconnaissance27
HUMINT collectors in the RSTA28
squadron are integral parts of the29
reconnaissance squads. They conduct tactical questioning (the expedient30

1-18
initial questioning of a HUMINT source directed toward the collection of1
priority tactical information) and limited document exploitation in support of2
the RSTA squadron’s ground reconnaissance mission. They pass their3
collection results through their chain of command in the form of SALUTE4
reports. They do not have the expertise, experience, or organizational support5
to conduct contact operations, nor will they be tasked with conducting6
counterintelligence operations. They will, however, pass source data through7
the HUMINT NCOIC to the S2X to help the S2X identify human sources for8
exploitation by the tactical HUMINT teams of the MI Company.9
10
The recce platoon may operate with attached STRIKER teams, TUAV11
teams, IREMBASS-equipped MI teams, or attached engineer elements. The12
platoon can organize into various configurations, but is usually employed as13
two scout sections, depending on factors of METT-TC.14
15
16
Mortar Section17
The mortar section is organized and equipped to provide immediate18
indirect fires in support of troop operations. Such supporting fires are usually19
suppression, screening, obscuration, or illumination. The section consists of20
10 enlisted soldiers. It is equipped with two 120-mm mortars mounted in two21
self-propelled mortar carriers. See Figure 1-11.22
23
24
Figure 1-11. Mortar section organization.25
26
27

1-19
THE BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP1
The BRT consists of four officers and 45 enlisted soldiers. It is organized2
into a headquarters section and two scout platoons (see Figure 1-12).3
4
5
Figure 1-12. Brigade reconnaissance troop organization.6
7
8

1-20
Headquarters Section1
The BRT headquarters section is organized and equipped to perform2
command and control and logistical support functions for the BRT. The3
section consists of two officers and 11 enlisted soldiers. The headquarters4
section includes the troop commander, executive officer, first sergeant, and5
the NBC, communications, and supply sergeants. The troop does not have6
any organic maintenance assets or personnel other than the two7
communications repairmen. See Figure 1-13.8
9
10
Figure 1-13. BRT headquarters organization.11
12
BRT Command Post (CP)13
The BRT CP serves as the net control station for the troop and is a critical14
communications link to the BCT TOC. One of the primary functions of the15
BRT CP is collecting combat information from the scout platoons and16
reporting significant threat information gathered during their reconnaissance17
and surveillance activities to the BCT TOC. The CP functions are as follows:18
• Coordinate combat service support for the BRT.20
• Report information to BCT headquarters and to forward and adjacent21
units.22
• Coordinate required information from higher.23
• Ensure information is pushed down.24

1-21
The CP operates under the direction of the XO, and is manned by the1
troop operations sergeant, the NBC NCO, and the two communication2
maintenance personnel. The CP tracks the battle at the troop and BCT levels3
and relays information to the commander and subordinate platoons pertaining4
to the friendly and enemy situation. The CP assists the commander in the5
control of the BRT by advising him on the status of subordinate units and6
adjacent units, by assisting in creating/forwarding digital and voice reports,7
and by controlling and monitoring the BRT’s combat service support8
activities. The CP continuously monitors the situational awareness picture to9
alert elements to unexpected threat, terrain conditions, or obstacles. The CP10
coordinates and integrates actions with supporting and adjacent units. The11
primary concern when positioning the BRT CP is its ability to communicate12
with the controlling brigade command post and the subordinate elements of13
the BRT.14
During reconnaissance or offensive operations, the CP should remain at15
least one terrain feature behind the BRT combat elements, positioned to16
maintain communications with the platoons and the controlling brigade17
command post (TAC or main). During security or defensive operations, the18
CP should be positioned in sufficient depth to avoid contact with the threat19
while maintaining communications with the forward scout sections.20
21
Scout Platoon22
The scout platoons are organized and equipped to conduct reconnaissance23
and screening in support of the BCT. The scout platoons may conduct an24
economy-of-force role, or offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations25
based on METT-TC. The platoon consists of one officer and 17 enlisted26
soldiers. It is equipped with six M1025/M1026 HMMWVs (three MK-1927
equipped and three caliber .50 equipped, with three of the six also LRAS328
equipped). The scout platoon frequently operates with attached STRIKER29
teams, IREMBASS-equipped MI teams, or attached engineer elements. The30
platoon can organize into various configurations, but is usually employed as a31
headquarters and two scout sections, depending on factors of METT-TC. See32
Figure 1-14.33

1-22
1
Figure 1-14. BRT scout platoon organization.2
3
4
5
Strike Recon (STRIKER) Platoon6
The STRIKER platoon is organic to the direct support artillery battalion,7
but will normally operate in direct support of the brigade, with the platoon8
leader acting as the BRT fire support officer. Although the STRIKER platoon9
leader does not have the same number of FM communication links that the10
FIST does, he can fulfill the same role during planning and preparation. The11
troop TOC must ensure that the STRIKER has communication with the12
brigade fire support element.13
The platoon is composed of one officer and 20 enlisted soldiers organized14
into a platoon headquarters and three squads, with each squad composed of15
two teams. Each team is equipped with the lightweight laser16
designator/rangefinder (LLDR) that will lase targets for those munitions17
requiring reflected laser energy for final ballistics guidance. They are also18
equipped with the AFATDS lightweight computer unit loaded with the19
forward observer software (FOS-LCU). The target designator set is also20
equipped with a thermal sight. They operate from the same or similar21
HMMWV platforms as the BRT scouts and are capable of both mounted and22
dismounted operations. See Figure 1-15.23

1-23
1
Figure 1-15. STRIKER platoon organization.2
3

1-24
SECTION III. MISSIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND1
LIMITATIONS2
Cavalry troops perform reconnaissance and security missions to provide3
timely information to the maneuver commander and protect and preserve the4
fighting ability of the units to which they are assigned or attached. Troops5
may also conduct additional missions as assigned. Cavalry troops in general6
have limitations and capabilities associated with their TOEs and METT-TC7
that must be considered when employing them in a specific mission role (see8
Figure 1-16). The capabilities and limitations of each organization will be9
covered in each respective chapter.10
11
RECCE TRP BRT
RECONNAISSANCE
MISSIONS
Route P/R P/R
Zone F F
Area F F
SECURITY MISSIONS
Screen P/R R
Area Security P P
Route Security N N
Convoy Security R P/R
F = Fully Capable
R = Capable When Reinforced
P = Capable Under Permissive METT-TC
N = Not- applicable Mission
Figure 1-16. Troop missions.12
13
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MISSIONS14
Although the reconnaissance troop is not optimized for decisive15
operations, it may be tasked to conduct offensive and defensive missions in16
support of the brigade’s or the squadron’s operations. The troop has the17
required assets for command and control but must be heavily augmented with18
combat units to be successful in an offensive or defensive mission.19
20
STABILITY OPERATIONS OR SUPPORT OPERATIONS21
With permissive METT-TC, the recce troop is capable of operations in a22
stability or a support environment. Refer to Appendix E for a detailed23
discussion of reconnaissance troop operations in a stability or support24
operational environment.25

1-25
SECTION IV. RESPONSIBILITIES1
TROOP COMMANDER2
The troop commander is responsible to his higher commander for the3
discipline, combat readiness, and training of the troop, and for the4
maintenance of its equipment. He must be proficient in the tactical5
employment of the troop and its assigned and attached CSS elements. He must6
also know the capabilities and limitations of the troop’s personnel and7
equipment as well as those of CSS elements attached to him.8
The troop commander’s responsibility in combat is twofold. He will—9
• Accomplish all missions assigned to the troop in accordance with the10
higher commander’s intent.11
• Preserve the fighting capability of the troop.12
13
EXECUTIVE OFFICER14
The troop XO is second in command. He supervises the troop TOC, and15
stays attuned to the tactical situation in the troop’s AO. He receives, verifies,16
and consolidates digital and voice tactical reports from the platoons and17
forwards them to the squadron, adjacent, and following units. When elements18
are in contact and at night when light discipline limits FBCB2 use, the XO19
and personnel in the troop CPs convert FM threat SPOTREPs into digital20
reports to generate the red situational awareness picture. During all operations,21
he monitors the situational awareness picture to warn elements of unexpected22
threat, obstacles, or terrain. Assisted by the troop 1SG and the supply23
sergeant, the XO plans and coordinates CSS operations. The XO assists the24
commander in performing PCI checks, and he should ensure all voice and25
digital communications are properly functioning to support combat26
operations. He assists the commander in planning, integrating, and27
coordinating operations and in the integration of attached or task organized28
elements. The XO must be an expert in IPB. He assists the commander in the29
development and continual management of the IPB for the troop.30
31
FIRST SERGEANT32
The 1SG is the troop’s senior NCO and normally is its most experienced33
soldier. He is an expert in individual and NCO skills. The primary34
responsibility of the troop 1SG is sustaining the troop’s ability to fight. He is35
the commander’s primary tactical advisor. He is the troop’s primary CSS36
operator; he helps the commander to plan, coordinate, and supervise all37
logistical activities that support the tactical mission. He operates where the38
commander directs or where his duties require him.39

1-26
The 1SG’s specific duties include the following:1
• Execute and supervise routine operations. This may include enforcing2
the tactical SOP; planning and coordinating training; coordinating and3
reporting personnel and administrative actions; and supervising4
supply, maintenance, communications, and field hygiene operations.5
• Supervise, inspect, and/or observe all matters designated by the6
commander. For example, the 1SG may observe and report on a7
portion of the troop’s sector.8
• Plan, rehearse, and supervise key logistical actions in support of the9
tactical mission. These activities include resupply of Class I, III, and V10
products and materials; maintenance and recovery; medical treatment11
and evacuation; and replacement/RTD processing.12
• Assist and coordinate with the XO in all critical functions.13
• As necessary, serve as quartering party NCOIC.14
• Conduct training and ensure proficiency in individual and NCO skills15
and small-unit collective skills that support the troop’s METL.16
• In conjunction with the commander, establish and maintain the17
foundation for troop discipline.18
TROOP FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER19
The troop fire support officer (FSO) assists the commander in planning,20
coordinating, and executing the troop’s fire support requirements and target21
acquisition tasks (target acquisition tasks are discussed in Chapter 6). During22
operational planning, he develops and refines a fire support plan based on the23
commander’s concept and guidance. He then coordinates the plan with the24
squadron FSO. The troop FSO may control and position the mortars during25
combat operations. The FSO also has these responsibilities:26
• Advise the commander on the capabilities and current status of all27
available fire support assets.28
• Serve as the commander’s primary advisor on the threat’s indirect fire29
capabilities.30
• Assist the commander in developing the OPORD to ensure full31
integration of fires.32
• Recommend targets and fire control measures, and determine methods33
of engagement and responsibility for firing the targets.34
• Determine the specific tasks and instructions required to conduct and35
control the fire plan.36
• Develop an observation plan, with limited visibility contingencies, that37
supports the troop and squadron missions.38

1-27
• Brief the fire support plan to the troop commander and the squadron1
FSO.2
• Refine and integrate the troop target worksheet; submit the completed3
worksheet to the squadron fire support element.4
• Assist the commander in incorporating execution of the indirect fire5
and target acquisition plan into each rehearsal. This includes6
integrating indirect fire observers into the rehearsal plan.7
• In tactical situations, alert the commander if a request for fires against8
a target has been denied.9
• In tactical situations, monitor the location and capabilities of friendly10
units and assist the commander in clearance of indirect fires.11
• Request counterbattery support in response to threat artillery and/or12
mortar attacks.13
14
PLATOON LEADER15
The platoon leader is responsible to the troop commander for the16
discipline, combat readiness, and training of the platoon, and for the17
maintenance of its equipment. He must be proficient in the tactical18
employment of the platoon and know the capabilities and limitations of the19
platoon’s personnel and equipment.20
21
The platoon leader’s responsibility in combat is twofold. He must—22
• Accomplish all missions assigned to the platoon in accordance with23
the troop commander’s intent.24
• Preserve the fighting capability of the platoon.25
26
PLATOON SERGEANT27
The platoon sergeant (PSG) leads elements of the platoon as directed by28
the platoon leader, and assumes command of the platoon in his absence. The29
PSG assists the platoon leader in maintaining discipline, conducting training,30
and exercising control. He supervises platoon CSS, which includes supply and31
equipment maintenance.32
33
34

1-28
MORTAR SECTION SERGEANT1
The mortar section sergeant is responsible for providing responsive2
indirect fires to support the troop commander’s concept of the operation. He3
is also the principal advisor to the commander and FSO on the tactical4
employment of mortars. He performs the following functions:5
• Recommends task organization, employment techniques, and6
positioning of the mortars to support the scheme of maneuver.7
• Assists in developing the troop fire support plan; determines the best8
type and amount of mortar ammunition to fire, based on the factors of9
METT-TC.10
• Is responsible for training the platoon to ensure technical and tactical11
proficiency and combat lifesaver skills; cross-trains personnel within12
the platoon on key tasks to ensure continuous operations.13
• Selects and reconnoiters new positions and routes for the platoon;14
controls the movements of the section.15
• Keeps abreast of the enemy situation and locations of friendly units to16
ensure the best use of ammunition and the safety of friendly troops.17
• Supervises the execution of orders; ensures that priority targets are18
covered at all times; establishes the amount and type of ammunition19
set aside for priority targets.20
• Coordinates the fires and displacement of the mortar section with the21
action of other units.22
• Anticipates needs and ensures timely ammunition resupply,23
maintenance, and refuel requests are submitted to sustain combat24
operations.25
26
SUPPLY SERGEANT27
The supply sergeant picks up, transports, and issues supplies and28
equipment to the troop. He works closely with the 1SG to accomplish these29
tasks. He also evacuates enemy prisoners of war and assists in the evacuation30
of soldiers who are killed in action to the graves registration collection point.31
32
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL (NBC) NCO33
The troop NBC NCO is responsible for troop NBC defense activities. He34
supervises radiological monitoring, chemical detection, and decontamination35
operations. He assists in maintaining NBC equipment and training NBC36
equipment operators and decontamination teams.37
38

2-1
Battle command is the exercise of
command in operations against a hostile,
thinking opponent. It combines
leadership and the art and science of
battlefield decision making to
successfully accomplish assigned
missions.
CHAPTER 21
BATTLE COMMAND2
Battle command is the art and3
science of decision making, leading,4
and motivating soldiers and5
organizations into action to6
accomplish missions. Battle command7
entails visualizing the operation, from8
start to finish and formulating a9
concept of operation to get from the10
current state to the desired end state. In addition to visualizing and11
formulating concepts, battle command encompasses assigning missions;12
prioritizing and allocating resources; selecting the critical time and place to13
act; and knowing how and when to make adjustments in the fight. By14
integrating command and control, communications, computer technology, and15
intelligence (C4I), the brigade’s battle command systems enable the16
commander to have accurate and timely information upon which to base his17
decisions.18
The reconnaissance troop supports the brigade’s battle command by—19
• Facilitating the commander’s ability to visualize the operation by20
answering information requirements (IR and CCIR) and providing21
detailed information on the terrain and threat in his AO and AI22
(components of METT-TC).23
• Defining portions of METT-TC to allow the commander to describe24
the operation with his intent and specified tasks to his subordinates.25
• Assisting the commander’s ability to direct forces by facilitating26
situational awareness (SA) and contributing in the brigade’s situational27
understanding (SU).28
29
30
CONTENTS31
Page32
SECTION I. Command and Control .................................................... 2-333
SECTION II. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and34
Intelligence Architectures.............................................. 2-4635
SECTION III. Techniques of Tactical Control........................................ 2-5736
SECTION IV. Command Guidance and Organizational Control............ 2-5737
SECTION V. Tactical Movement .......................................................... 2-6938
39
40
Battle command is the art of decision making and leading on the41
battlefield. It covers the knowledge, techniques, and procedures necessary to42

2-2
control operations and to motivate soldiers and their organizations into action1
to accomplish assigned missions. As part of battle command, commanders2
visualize the current state of the battlefield as well as future states at different3
points in the operation; they then formulate concepts of operations that allow4
their units to progress from one state to the other at the least cost. Other5
elements of the battle command process include assigning missions,6
prioritizing and allocating resources, selecting the critical times and places to7
act, and knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight.8
9
10
Battle command of reconnaissance units is typically decentralized due to11
the size of the area of operation (AO) and the nature of reconnaissance12
missions. The reconnaissance troop is a vital element in developing13
information on the terrain and threat within the brigade’s battlespace, which14
may extend over 65 x 100 kilometers. Operating widely disbursed over15
extended space places the burden of sound, timely decision making at the16
lowest levels. Intensive, challenging training in reconnaissance, reporting,17
and communications techniques is essential for the troop, and ultimately the18
brigade, to be successful.19
20
21
The reconnaissance commander employs a variety of means to prepare for22
operations, issue orders, employ the troop, and communicate. The success of23
this command and control process rests mainly on effective training; thorough24
(and thoroughly understood) SOPs; accurate, timely communications; and,25
most of all, decisive leadership.26
27
28
The advent and continual development of digital systems facilitates battle29
command at all echelons. The troop clearly gains from the digital displays of30
friendly and reported threat forces as well as the navigational aids that Force31
XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) provides. Continual32
development of FBCB2 will improve the ability of troop personnel to analyze33
terrain, report quickly and accurately, and maneuver over increasingly large34
sectors.35
36
Effective battle command begins in the planning phase and continues37
through the consolidation phase. This chapter outlines the digital tools and38
techniques a troop commander needs to effectively command and control (C2)39
his unit in combat. It also addresses aspects of situational awareness, planning,40
and C2 procedures in a digital environment.41
42

2-3
Command and control is the
exercise of authority and direction
by a properly designated
commander over assigned and
attached forces in the
accomplishment of the mission.
SECTION I. COMMAND AND CONTROL1
The command and control (C2) system is2
the arrangement of personnel, information3
management, procedures, equipment, and4
facilities essential to the commander to plan,5
prepare, execute, and assess operations. The6
C2 system supports the commander in three7
ways:8
• Creating and maintaining the common operational picture.9
• Supporting decision making by improving its speed and accuracy.10
• Supporting preparation and communication of execution of11
information.12
A commander cannot exercise command and control alone except in the13
simplest and smallest organizations. Even at the lowest levels, however, a14
commander needs some support to exercise C2 effectively. At the troop level,15
the C2 system—integrating key personnel, FBCB2, FM communications,16
doctrinal procedures, and unit SOPs—provides that support.17
DISTRIBUTION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL18
Troop Commander19
20
The commander is responsible for everything the troop does, or fails to do.21
His responsibilities include leadership, discipline, tactical employment,22
training, administration, personnel management, supply, maintenance,23
communications, and sustainment activities. These duties require the24
commander to understand the capabilities of his soldiers and their equipment25
and to know how to employ them to best tactical advantage. At the same time,26
he must be well versed in enemy organizations, doctrine, and equipment.27
28
Using this knowledge, the commander prepares his unit for combat29
operations using troop-leading procedures. Ultimately, he must know how to30
exercise command effectively and decisively. He must be flexible, using31
sound judgment to make correct decisions quickly and at the right time based32
on the higher commander’s intent and the tactical situation. He must be able to33
issue instructions to his subordinate leaders in the form of clear, accurate34
combat orders; he then must ensure that the orders are executed.35
36
37

2-4
The troop commander’s responsibilities in the tactical environment are—1
• Serving as the subject matter expert in reconnaissance and security2
fundamentals and critical tasks.3
• Planning and executing fires to support the troop’s missions.4
• Synchronizing operations with adjacent units and supporting units.5
• Synchronizing and planning the use of additional ISR assets (TUAV,6
IREMBASS, GSR, PROPHET, CI, etc).7
• Understanding brigade combat team (BCT) doctrine.8
• Synchronizing and planning the use of additional combat arms assets9
(infantry platoon, MGS platoon, tank or mechanized platoon).10
• Accomplishing all missions assigned to the troop in accordance with11
the higher commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver.12
• Preserving the reconnaissance capability of the troop.13
Executive Officer14
15
In combat, the troop executive officer (XO) is second in command. He16
supervises the troop command post (CP), where he stays abreast of the tactical17
situation in the troop’s area of operations (AO). He manages the flow of18
combat information, both FM and digital, between the troop and the higher19
unit from the troop CP.20
21
The XO’s other duties are:22
• Ensure accurate, timely tactical reports are sent to the23
brigade/squadron.24
• Assume command of the troop, as required.25
• In conjunction with the 1SG, plan and supervise the troop’s CSS effort26
prior to the battle.27
• Assist in preparation of the OPORD, especially paragraph 4 (service28
support).29
• Conduct tactical coordination with higher, adjacent, and supporting30
units.31
• As required, assist the commander in issuing orders to the troop32
headquarters and attachments.33
• Conduct additional missions, as required. These may include serving34
as OIC for a quartering party or as the leader of the detachment left in35
contact (DLIC) in a withdrawal.36
• Assist the commander in preparations for follow-on missions.37

2-5
Troop Command Post1
The troop CP serves as the net control station for the troop and is a critical2
communications link to the squadron or brigade TOC. One of the primary3
functions of the troop CP is collecting combat information from the scout4
platoons and reporting significant threat information gathered during their5
reconnaissance and surveillance activities to the higher TOC. The CP6
functions are as follows:7
• Coordinate combat service support for the troop.9
• Report information to higher headquarters and adjacent units.10
NOTE: Refer to Appendix G, Command Post Operations, for more detailed11
discussion.12
First Sergeant13
The primary responsibility of the troop 1SG is sustaining the troop’s14
ability to conduct continued operations. He supervises the procurement and15
distribution of—16
• All classes of supplies.17
• Personnel replacements.18
• Actions of the maintenance section, to include recovery and19
evacuation of damaged combat equipment.20
• Medical, KIA, and EPW evacuation.21
22
Using the FBCB2 system, he consolidates the platoon’s logistical status23
(LOGSTAT) and personnel status (PERSTAT) reports and digitally sends24
them to the squadron S4/S1. He assists the troop commander and XO in C225
and digital reporting.26
Reconnaissance Platoon Leader27
The platoon leader is responsible to the troop commander for the28
discipline and combat readiness of the platoon. He must be proficient in the29
use of his digital equipment and tactical employment of the platoon. He must30
know the capabilities and limitations of the platoon’s personnel and31
equipment. He must remain cognizant of all attached elements operating in32
his sector of responsibility, and continually update plans for their security and33
logistical support as required. The platoon leader’s responsibilities in combat34
are—35
• To accomplish all missions assigned to the platoon in accordance with36
the troop commander’s intent.37

2-6
• To preserve the reconnaissance capability of the platoon, and inform1
the commander and XO of the tactical situation via FM and digitized2
contact and spot reports.3
• To lead an integrated scout/STRIKER platoon in executing both fire4
support and R&S missions.5
Reconnaissance Platoon Sergeant6
The platoon sergeant is the senior NCO in the platoon. He leads elements7
of the platoon as directed by the platoon leader and assumes command of the8
platoon in the platoon leader’s absence. He assists the platoon leader in9
maintaining discipline and exercising control. He supervises platoon CSS, to10
include supply requirements and equipment maintenance, and monitors the11
platoon’s logistics status and submits FBCB2 LOGSTAT reports.12
Fire Support Team13
The fire support team (FIST) is the critical link with the supporting14
artillery and is responsible for coordinating indirect fires (mortar, field15
artillery [FA], close air support [CAS]) for the troop. The team processes16
calls for fire from the platoons and allocates the appropriate indirect-fire17
system based on the commander’s guidance for fire support. The FIST can18
also assist the brigade/squadron with the employment of joint fires.19
NOTE: In the brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), the STRIKER platoon20
leader may fill the role of the FIST.21
The FIST operates on three radio nets:22
• Troop command.23
• Troop fire direction.24
• Squadron fire support element digital/voice.25
26
The FIST monitors at least one of the following nets:27
• Squadron command.28
• Squadron operations and intelligence (OI).29
• Firing battery (supporting artillery headquarters in the heavy and light30
division).31
32
The fire support team vehicle also may serve as the alternate troop CP.33
The fire support officer has ready access to the higher-level situation and the34
radio systems to replicate the troop CP if it becomes damaged or destroyed.35
36
Command guidance to the FIST should include the following:37
• Purpose of indirect fires. How does the commander intend to use FA38
and mortar fires to support his maneuver?39

2-7
− Screening.1
− Suppression.2
− Disengagement.3
• Engagement/attack criteria. How many rounds and of what type and4
mix will be fired at a particular target? Which targets will be engaged5
with artillery and which with mortars?6
• Control of troop mortars. If the FIST controls movement of troop7
mortars, how far forward of the scouts will the mortars be able to8
range? Where are the mortars going to move? When are the mortars9
going to move?10
The primary considerations when positioning the FIST are security of the11
team and the ability to communicate with the squadron fire support element,12
howitzer battery, or direct support artillery. The FIST is not the forward13
observer team for the troop; the troop has 19Ds that act as forward observers.14
The five techniques to maneuvering the FIST are—15
• Maneuvers with the commander.16
• Maneuvers with or near the mortar section.17
• Maneuvers with the troop CP.18
• Maneuvers alone to maintain communications.19
• Maneuvers with the scouts to directly control fires or to use the ground20
laser designator (GLD).21
See Chapter 6 for a more in-depth discussion of troop fire support C222
techniques.23
Mortar Section Sergeant (Recce Troop Only)24
The mortar section sergeant is responsible for providing responsive25
indirect fires to support the commander’s concept of the operation. The26
section sergeant assists the troop commander in indirect mortar fire planning.27
He assists in establishing movement control, triggers for movement, triggers28
for shifting targets, and mortar caches. As a rule of thumb the section29
maintains two-thirds maximum range of mortar fire forward of the30
reconnaissance elements. The section sergeant is charged with maintaining31
discipline, conducting training, and exercising control over his mortar section.32
He supervises the section’s CSS, which includes supply and equipment33
maintenance.34
Supply Sergeant35
Working closely with the 1SG, the supply sergeant assumes responsibility36
for troop logistical support. Using his position navigation capability and37

2-8
established checkpoint data, he leads the LOGPAC to the linkup point, or if1
the situation dictates, moves it forward to the supported unit’s location. He2
also evacuates EPWs and assists in the evacuation of soldiers killed in action3
to the mortuary affairs collection point.4
Communications Sergeant5
The communications sergeant assists in all aspects of tactical6
communications. He locates with the XO or 1SG per SOP and may operate7
the troop net control station (NCS). He receives and distributes signal8
operating instructions (SOI) and COMSEC encryption keys. He ensures the9
troop receives the appropriate database for FBCB2, SINCGARS-SIP, EPLRS,10
very high-speed integrated circuit (VHSIC), and other systems operating on11
the tactical internet. He ensures operators are properly trained in initialization12
and re-initialization of the systems and maintains the troop addressing and13
routing schemes. He troubleshoots troop digital communications equipment14
and ensures that necessary repairs are completed.15
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Sergeant16
The troop NBC sergeant is responsible for troop NBC defense activities.17
He supervises radiological monitoring, chemical detection, and18
decontamination operations. He assists in maintaining NBC equipment and19
training NBC equipment operators and decontamination teams. He operates20
from the troop CP and assists the XO in executing C2 operations. He is the21
NBC expert and advises the commander in the employment of the NBC22
reconnaissance section/platoon troop, if augmented with this asset.23
Troop HUMINT NCO (Recce Troop only)24
The troop HUMINT collection NCO advises the troop commander on25
HUMINT collection operations, provides assessment and quality control of26
HUMINT collection and source spotting, and ensures that HUMINT training27
is conducted to standard. He operates from the troop CP and assists the XO in28
executing C2 operations. (See Chapter 6, Section I, for more information on29
HUMINT collection personnel.)30
COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES31
32
Whether a unit is digital or analog, command and control procedures33
provide effective guidelines for planning and preparing a unit for operations.34
Techniques for utilizing digital systems to aid in the execution of these35
procedures are included.36
37
38

2-9
Mission-Oriented Command and Control1
This method of directing military operations encourages and assists2
subordinates in taking action consistent with the intent and concept of higher3
headquarters. Mission-oriented command and control requires a clear4
understanding by subordinate elements of the unit purpose; at the same time,5
it provides them with the freedom to react to enemy actions without further6
guidance. The following paragraphs outline the underlying principles of this7
type of command and control.8
9
Expect Uncertainty. The commander must understand the environment10
of combat. The operation will be dynamic and the enemy uncooperative.11
Communications may be degraded, and the chaos of battle may prevent the12
commander from knowing what is happening beyond the reach of his own13
senses. The situation the unit anticipates during the planning phase will14
inevitably change before and during execution.15
16
Reduce Leader Intervention. When soldiers expect the commander to17
make every decision or initiate every action, they may become reluctant to act.18
To counter this tendency, the commander must plan and direct operations in a19
manner that requires a minimum of intervention. He operates on the principle20
that some loss of precision is better than inactivity.21
22
The commander still must be prepared to provide subordinates with the23
criteria and guidance for making decisions when precise control is required24
for synchronization. During the planning process, he should identify those25
few critical decisions that will absolutely be required during the operation and26
then determine the criteria for initiation of actions associated with these27
decisions. Examples include the use of engagement criteria, bypass criteria,28
and disengagement criteria. The commander then disseminates the decision29
criteria throughout the troop.30
31
NOTE: The commander must keep in mind that changing conditions and32
unexpected situations will require him to make decisions33
continuously once the operation begins. His preparations related to34
critical decisions will allow him, and his subordinates, to react more35
effectively when changes become necessary.36
37
Optimize Planning Time for Subordinates. The commander must38
ensure that the timelines he develops for mission planning and preparation39
provide adequate troop-leading time for the subordinate elements. An40
effective way to optimize the use of the available time, no matter how short, is41
to conduct training of the troop orders process under tough, realistic42
conditions at every available opportunity.43
44
Allow Maximum Freedom of Action for Subordinates. Given the45
expected battlefield conditions, leaders at every level must avoid placing46

2-10
unnecessary limits on their soldiers’ freedom of action. The leader at the1
point of decision must have the knowledge, training, and freedom necessary to2
make the correct choice in support of the commander’s intent. This concept3
must be emphasized at every opportunity at every level of leadership.4
Soldiers win battles; their leaders can only place them in a position where they5
are able to seize the opportunity to do so. Subordinates will be successful on6
the battlefield only if their commanders and leaders have fostered the7
necessary confidence and initiative before the battle begins.8
9
Encourage Cross-Talk. Subordinate leaders do not always require10
guidance from the commander to address a change in the situation. In some11
instances, because of their position on the battlefield, two or more12
subordinates, working together, may have the clearest view of what is13
happening and may be better suited than the commander to develop a tactical14
solution. This type of problem solving, involving direct coordination between15
subordinate elements, is critical to mission-oriented command and control. In16
addition to its obvious impact on mission accomplishment, it empowers17
subordinates to take decisive action and teaches them the value of close18
cooperation in achieving the unit’s overall purpose.19
20
Command and Lead Well Forward. The commander positions himself21
where he can best command his troop and make critical decisions to influence22
the outcome of the mission. This position is normally with the main effort to23
allow the commander to exert his leadership and to shift or retask the main24
effort as necessary. He must be far enough forward to “see” the battlefield25
using all available resources; these assets include not only visual observation26
but also radio reports and, in digitized units, information provided over digital27
systems.28
29
Plans and Orders30
31
Plans are the basis for any mission. The troop commander develops his32
concept of the operation summarizing how best to accomplish his mission33
within the scope of the commanders’ intents (two levels up). The troop34
commander uses troop-leading procedures to turn the concept into a fully35
developed plan and to prepare a concise, accurate OPORD. He assigns36
additional tasks (and outlines their purpose) for subordinate elements,37
allocates available resources, and establishes priorities to make the concept38
work.39
40
The following discussion, covering important aspects of orders41
development, serves as an introduction to the discussion of troop-leading42
procedures. The first portion focuses on the mission statement and the43
commander’s intent, which provide the doctrinal foundation for the OPORD.44
Also included are basic discussions of the three types of orders (warning45

2-11
orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs) used by the commander. It is important for1
the troop commander to have a thorough understanding of these elements2
because they are the building blocks for everything else that he does during3
the troop-leading process.4
5
Mission Statement6
7
The commander uses the mission statement to summarize the upcoming8
operation. This brief paragraph (sometimes a single sentence) describes the9
form of operation, the unit’s task and purpose, the actions to be taken, and the10
reasons for these actions. It is written in a format based on the five “Ws”: who11
(unit), what (tasks), when (date-time group), where (grid12
location/geographical reference for the area of operations and/or objective),13
and why (purpose). The commander must ensure that the mission is14
thoroughly understood by all leaders and soldiers two echelons below (section15
or squad). The following paragraphs cover considerations that apply in16
development of the mission statement.17
18
Tactical tasks are specific activities performed by the unit while it is19
conducting a form of tactical operation or a choice of maneuver. (NOTE: The20
title of each task can also be used as an action verb in the unit’s mission21
statement to describe actions during the operation.) Normally, a commander22
will assign one mission-essential task to each subordinate unit. Tasks should23
be definable, attainable, and measurable. Critical tasks that require specific24
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the troop are covered in detail25
throughout this publication.26
27
A simple, clearly stated purpose improves understanding of the28
commander’s intent. It will also assist subordinate leaders in adjusting their29
tasks during execution of the mission, allowing them to stay within the30
parameters of the higher commander’s intent. The purpose should tell the31
subordinates why the troop is conducting the mission and how the team will32
operate with or provide support for other units.33
34
The commander has several options as to where in the OPORD he outlines35
his subordinates’ mission-essential tasks and purpose. His overriding36
consideration is that placement of the mission statement should assist37
subordinate leaders in understanding exactly each of the five “W” elements.38
39
Commander’s Intent40
41
The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what the troop42
must do to succeed in relation to the enemy, the terrain, and the desired end43
state. It provides the link between the mission statement and the concept of the44
operation by stating the key tasks that, along with the mission, are the basis45

2-12
for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise1
or when the original concept of the operation no longer applies. The2
commander can also use the intent statement to explain a broader purpose for3
the operation beyond that outlined in the mission statement. The intent, which4
is mandatory in all orders, may be expressed in several “bullets” or in5
complete sentences. As with the mission, the commander must ensure that the6
intent statement is thoroughly understood by all leaders and soldiers two7
echelons below (section or squad). The following paragraphs focus on8
considerations that apply in development and presentation of the intent9
statement.10
11
The purpose of the intent at the troop level is to provide vehicle12
commanders and squad leaders with a summary of the most important details13
of what the troop is supposed to achieve during the operation. The intent14
statement must be developed and presented so they can remember this critical15
information, recognize specific situations while in contact on the battlefield,16
and act in accordance with the commander’s intent to achieve the desired end17
state.18
19
The focus of the intent is on the troop’s key tasks during the operation.20
Key tasks are those that the troop must perform to achieve the stated purpose21
of the operation, as outlined in paragraph 2 of the OPORD; they may also22
specify conditions that must be met for mission accomplishment. Key tasks23
are not tied to a specific course of action (COA); rather, they identify actions24
or conditions that are fundamental to the unit’s success. In the ever-changing25
operational environment, such as when significant opportunities present26
themselves or when the original concept or COA does not apply, subordinate27
elements use these tasks to ensure their efforts continue to support the28
commander’s intent. Examples of critical areas that key tasks may cover29
include the tempo of the operation, the desired effect of fires on the enemy,30
and areas that must be observed.31
32
At the same time, the intent statement does not specify the technique or33
method by which the unit will achieve the commander’s projected end state;34
the method is covered in the concept of the operation. Nor does the intent35
cover “acceptable risk”; risk factors are part of the commander’s guidance and36
are addressed in the evaluation of all COAs for the operation. In addition, the37
purpose addressed in the intent is not merely a restatement of the why38
(purpose) from the mission statement, which focuses on the troop’s immediate39
operation. Instead, the commander uses the intent to examine the broader40
operational context of the troop and higher missions.41
42
Combat Orders43
44
Combat orders are the means by which the troop commander receives and45
transmits information, from the earliest notification that an operation will46

2-13
occur through the final phases of execution. These basic tools are absolutely1
critical to mission success. In a tactical situation, the commander will receive2
the troop’s mission from higher in the form of written or digital (sent on3
FBCB2) operation order (OPORD) and fragmentary order (FRAGO). The4
troop commander and subordinate leaders will work with combat orders on a5
daily basis; obviously, they must have precise knowledge of the correct format6
for each type. At the same time, they must ensure that every soldier in the7
troop understands how to receive and respond to the various types of orders.8
Because of these requirements, the commander must take every opportunity to9
train the troop in the use of combat orders. The skills associated with orders10
development and dissemination are highly perishable; they can be lost without11
constant, realistic practice.12
13
Warning Orders (WO). During the planning phase of an operation,14
commanders use warning orders as a shorthand method of alerting their15
subordinate leaders. Warning orders also initiate the commander’s most16
valuable time management tool, the parallel planning process. The troop17
commander usually sends a series of warning orders to his subordinate leaders18
to help them prepare for new missions. The directions and guidelines in the19
warning order allow subordinates to begin their own planning and preparation20
activities.21
22
The content of warning orders is based on two major variables:23
information about the upcoming operation that is available to the troop from24
the brigade/squadron and what the troop commander ultimately wants to25
achieve by issuing the warning order (what he wants his subordinates to do26
with the information). The commander normally issues his warning orders27
either as he receives additional orders from the task force or as he completes28
his own analysis of the situation.29
30
In addition to alerting the unit to the upcoming operation, warning orders31
allow the commander to put out tactical information incrementally and,32
ultimately, to shorten the length of the actual OPORD. In the example shown33
in Figure 2-1, the commander uses three warning orders to issue information34
that otherwise would make up paragraphs 1 and 2 and most of paragraph 3 in35
the OPORD. As a result, when he issues the OPORD, he can simply review36
previously issued information or brief the changes or earlier omissions. He37
will then have more time to concentrate on visualizing his concept of the fight38
for his subordinates.39
40
Figure 2-1 summarizes an example of how the troop commander might41
use a series of warning orders both to alert the troop to an upcoming operation42
and to provide tactical information and initial planning guidance. The left-43
hand column lists actions the commander takes before issuing each of the44
three warning orders in the example. The center column describes specific45

2-14
elements included in each warning order, with the right-hand column1
outlining the commander’s purpose for each order.2
3
NOTE: The numbering system used in the Figure 2-1 (WO #1, #2, and #3)4
recurs in the discussion of troop-leading procedures to explain how5
warning orders are used at various phases of the troop-leading6
process.7
8
TROOP
COMMANDER’S
ACTION
POSSIBLE CONTENT OF
WARNING ORDER
COMMANDER’S
PURPOSE
Receive the
brigade/squadron
warning order
Warning order #1 covers
the following:
• Security plan.
• Movement plan.
• Task organization.
• Tentative timeline.
• Standard drills to
be rehearsed.
• Prepare platoons
for movement to
the tactical
assembly area.
• Obtain map sheets.
• Specify troop task
organization.
Conduct METT-TC
analysis
the following:
• Friendly situation.
• Enemy situation.
• Terrain analysis.
• Troop mission.
• Initiate platoon-
level mission
analysis.
• Initiate generic
rehearsals (drill-
and task-related).
• Prepare for combat.
Develop and analyze
COAs
the following:
• Commander’s
intent.
• Concept of the
operation.
• COA
analysis/selection.
• Concept of fires.
• Subordinate unit
tasks and
purposes.
• R&S guidance.
• Updated SITEMP/
draft graphics.
• Initiate platoon-
level COA
development.
• Identify platoon-
level
reconnaissance
requirements.
• Direct leader’s
reconnaissance.
• Prepare for combat.
Figure 2-1. Commander’s use of multiple warning orders.9

2-15
Operation Order (OPORD). When time and information are available,1
the troop commander will normally issue a complete OPORD as part of his2
troop-leading procedures. As noted, he does not need to repeat information3
covered previously in his warning orders. The commander may also issue an4
execution matrix, either to supplement the OPORD or as a tool to aid in the5
execution of the mission; however, the matrix order does not replace a five-6
paragraph OPORD.7
8
Fragmentary Order (FRAGO). The FRAGO is a brief oral or written9
order that can serve any of the following purposes:10
• Implement timely changes to existing orders.11
• Provide pertinent extracts from more detailed orders.12
• Provide instructions until a detailed order is developed.13
• Provide specific instructions to subordinates who do not require a14
complete order.15
A written FRAGO follows the five-paragraph OPORD structure; however,16
it includes only the information required for subordinates to accomplish their17
mission. To enhance understanding of voice FRAGOs, digitally equipped18
units can quickly develop hasty graphics and transmit digital overlays.19
20
During the execution of an operation, FRAGOs are the medium of battle21
command. The troop commander uses them to communicate changes in the22
enemy or friendly situation and to retask his subordinate elements based on23
changes in the situation (see Figure 2-2). The FRAGO normally includes the24
following information:25
• Updated enemy or friendly situation.26
• Changes to troop or platoon tasks and/or purposes.27
• Changes to the scheme of maneuver.28
• Specific instructions as necessary.29
30
31

2-16
1
TYPE/PURPOSE
OF ORDER
RADIO TRANSMISSION
Alert “GUIDONS, THIS IS BLACK 6; FRAGO FOLLOWS.”
Situation “J-STARS REPORTS, “TEN BMPs, AND SUPPORTING
VEHICLES VICINITY CP 17, MOVING EAST TOWARD CP
11.”
Mission “WE WILL CONTINUE TO SCREEN AND GAIN CONTACT
WITH THE ENEMY VICINITY CP 17 AND CONDUCT A
SECURITY DRILL FROM PL BLUE TO PL RED AND THE
TASK FORCE WHICH IS MOVING TO OUR SOUTH.”
Intent “I WANT FA FIRES TO INITIALLY INTERDICT AND
HARRASS THE ENEMY’S MOVEMENT VIC OF NAI 5.”
“I WANT TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH RED AND I WANT
WHITE TO ASSIST THE XO IN CONDUCTING RECON
HAND OVER WITH THE TASK FORCE SCOUTS.”
“I THEN WANT THE STRIKERS TO ASSIST IN THE
DESTUCTION OF THE ENEMY BY ATTACKING HIM WITH
PRECISION FIRES.”
Tasks to
subordinate units
“RED AND WHITE, CONDUCT SECURITY DRILLS IOT
MAINTAIN CONTACT AND REPOSITION IN SECTOR.”
“RED, FIRE TAI 5 ONCE TARGET HITS TRIGGER.”
“WHITE SET SUBSEQUENT POSITIONS ALONG PL
GREEN ASSUME CONTACTS FOR RED.”
“BLACK 5, CONDUCT INITIAL RECON HAND OVER
COORDINATION, PLAN TO RPOL ON LANES TIN AND
COPPER.”
“REDLEG, MOVE TO A POSITION VICINITY CP 8 FROM
WHICH TO DESIGNATE FIRES TO ASSIST THE TASK
FORCE.”
Coordinating
instructions
“I WANT TO INITIATE FIRES WHEN FIVE OR SIX
VEHICLES HAVE CROSSED PL ABRAMS.”
“BEGIN THE SECURITY DRILL WHEN ENEMY IS AT CP 17
OR IF THE ENEMY BEGINS MOVEMENT SOUTH TOWARD
CP 10.”
CSS “TROOP TRAINS MOVE TO CP 4.”
Command and
signal
“I WILL BE WITH RED.”
Acknowledgment “ACKNOWLEDGE. OVER.”
Figure 2-2. Example troop FRAGO.2
3

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