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ICS Cyber Security

February 6, 2014
Joe Weiss
PE, CISM, CRISC, ISA Fellow
(408) 253-7934
joe.weiss@realtimeacs.com

Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
What are Industrial Control Systems
(ICSs)
•

Industrial control systems (ICSs)
operate power, water, chemicals,
pipelines, military systems, medical
systems, etc

•

ICSs include SCADA/EMS, DCS,
PLCs, RTUs, IEDs, smart sensors
and drives, emissions controls,
equipment diagnostics, AMI (Smart
Grid), programmable thermostats,
building controls,…

•

Focus is reliability and safety
Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
Control Systems Basics

Internet

ERP
MES
Data
Ware
house
Support Systems
Internet

Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
ICSs are not Mainstream Information
Systems
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The Internet and Microsoft are not necessarily the biggest ICS cyber threats
External malicious threats are not necessarily the biggest concerns
Firewalls and VPNs may not be adequate
IDS will probably not identify ICS attacks
Field devices have been hacked
Default passwords and backdoors are not uncommon
Many ICSs have hardware configurations that are cyber vulnerable and cannot be
patched or fixed
• Patching is difficult and can have unintended consequences
• Cyber forensics and logging may not exist

Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
Selected Differences Between IT and ICS
Attribute

IT

ICS

Confidentiality (Privacy)

High

Low

Message Integrity

Low-Medium

Very High

Availability

Medium

Very High

Authentication

Medium-High

High

Lifetime

3-5 years

10-25 years

Cyber Logging and
Forensics

Available

SEIM only at the IP layer

Operating Systems

COTS (Windows, Linux,…) COTS at HMI, RTOS at
field devices

Patching

Standard and expeditious

Non-standard and
potentially long time

Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
ICS Security Expertise Lacking
ICS Security
Experts

IT Security
ICS
Engineering

Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
ICS Cyber Threats are Real
• >325 actual ICS cyber
incidents to date
– Ranged from significant
discharges to significant
equipment damage to deaths

• Very few ICS-specific cyber
security technologies, training,
and policies
• >1,000,000 ICS devices
directly connected to the
Internet (and counting)
Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information

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ICS Cyber Security Presentation

  • 1. ICS Cyber Security February 6, 2014 Joe Weiss PE, CISM, CRISC, ISA Fellow (408) 253-7934 joe.weiss@realtimeacs.com Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
  • 2. What are Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) • Industrial control systems (ICSs) operate power, water, chemicals, pipelines, military systems, medical systems, etc • ICSs include SCADA/EMS, DCS, PLCs, RTUs, IEDs, smart sensors and drives, emissions controls, equipment diagnostics, AMI (Smart Grid), programmable thermostats, building controls,… • Focus is reliability and safety Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
  • 3. Control Systems Basics Internet ERP MES Data Ware house Support Systems Internet Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
  • 4. ICSs are not Mainstream Information Systems • • • • • • • The Internet and Microsoft are not necessarily the biggest ICS cyber threats External malicious threats are not necessarily the biggest concerns Firewalls and VPNs may not be adequate IDS will probably not identify ICS attacks Field devices have been hacked Default passwords and backdoors are not uncommon Many ICSs have hardware configurations that are cyber vulnerable and cannot be patched or fixed • Patching is difficult and can have unintended consequences • Cyber forensics and logging may not exist Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
  • 5. Selected Differences Between IT and ICS Attribute IT ICS Confidentiality (Privacy) High Low Message Integrity Low-Medium Very High Availability Medium Very High Authentication Medium-High High Lifetime 3-5 years 10-25 years Cyber Logging and Forensics Available SEIM only at the IP layer Operating Systems COTS (Windows, Linux,…) COTS at HMI, RTOS at field devices Patching Standard and expeditious Non-standard and potentially long time Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
  • 6. ICS Security Expertise Lacking ICS Security Experts IT Security ICS Engineering Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information
  • 7. ICS Cyber Threats are Real • >325 actual ICS cyber incidents to date – Ranged from significant discharges to significant equipment damage to deaths • Very few ICS-specific cyber security technologies, training, and policies • >1,000,000 ICS devices directly connected to the Internet (and counting) Applied Control Solutions Proprietary Information