Alternate Report on Colombia's Human Rights Situation

COMISIÓN COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS
Organización no gubernamental con status consultivo ante la ONU
Filial de la Comisión Andina de Juristas (Lima) y de la Comisión Internacional de Juristas (Ginebra).

Alternate Report to the
Fifth Colombian State Report to the
United Nations Human Rights Committee
Translated from Spanish by Joy Bourdeau

July 2003

___________________________________________________________________
Personería jurídica: resolución 1060, Agosto de 1988, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá
Calle 72 No. 12- 65 Piso 7 Tel: (571) 3768200 – 3434710 Fax : (571) 3768230
Email : ccj@col..net.co, ccj@coljuristas.org, Apartado Aéreo 58533 Bogotá, Colombia

Alternate Report to the fifth Colombian State Report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
presented by the Colombian Commission of Jurists, July 2003

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………….. 1

I. GENERAL SITUATION OVERVIEW ………………………………………………………. 1

A. Absence of or Non-application of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Policies ……… 1
1. Andrés Pastrana Arango’s Government (1998-2002) ……………………………………. 1
2. Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s Government (2002-2006) ………………………………………… 4
a. “Democratic Security” Policy ………………………………………………………………………….. 4
b. Informers’ Network ……………………………………………………………………………………. 5
c. Peasant Soldiers ………………………………………………………………………………………… 5

B. Paramilitarism ……………………………………………………………………………… 7
1. State Responsability in the Phenomenon of Paramilitarism, Lack of Combat
against These Groups …………………………………………………………………… 7
2. Massacres Committed by Paramilitary Groups ……………………………………….... 8
a. Mapiripán (Meta) Massacre …………………………………………………………………………… 8
b. El Salado (Bolívar) Massacre ………………………………………………………………………….. 10
c. Chengue, Settlement in Ovejas (Sucre) ………………………………………………………………... 11
d. Another 626 Massacres Committed by the Paramilitary ……………………………………………… 11
3. Secret Negotiations, Legalization, and Impunity ……………………………………… 12

C. Breaches of Humanitarian Law Committed by Guerrilla Groups, Paramilitary Groups
and State Agents ………………………………………………………………………….. 14
1. Taking Hostages and Kidnappings ……………………………………………………. 14
2. Use of Prohibited Weapons …………………………………………………………… 17
3. Attacks against Local Mayors and Public Servants …………………………………… 22
4. Massacres ……………………………………………………………………………… 23

D. Impunity and Administration of Justice …………………………………………………. 23
1. Status of Criminal Investigations of Violations of Human Rights ……………………. 23
2. Military Criminal Justice ……………………………………………………………… 24
3. Attacks on Prosecutors, Judges and Lawyers …………………………………………. 25
4. Reservation to the Competence of the International Criminal Court ………………….. 26

E. Peace Talks ………………………………………………………………………………. 26
1. Andrés Pastrana Arango’s Governement (1998-2002) ………………………………….. 26
a. Peace Talks with the Farc ………………………………………………………………………….…. 26
b. Peace Talks with the Eln ……………………………………………………………………………. 27
c. Balance ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 28
2. Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s Government (2002-2006) ………………………………………… 28

F. Forced Displacement …………………………………………………………………….. 30

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II. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS …….……………………………………………………… 33

A. The Responsibility to Respect and Guarantee the Rights Contained in the Covenant
(Article 2, Number 1) …………………………………………………………………….……. 33
1. Andrés Pastrana Arango’s Government (1998-2002): National Security Law……………. 33
2. Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s Go vernment (2002-2006) : Constitutional Reform Bill of Law ……. 34

B. Existence of an Effective Recourse (Article 2, Number 3) …………………………………….. 37
1. Attorney-General’s Office ……………………………………………………………… 37
a. Retrogression in the Attorney-General’s Office ………………………………………………………. 37
b. Constitutional Reform of the Attorney-General’s Office ……………………………………….…….. 38
2. Tendency to Dismantle the Social, Democratic Rule of Law …………………………… 39

C. States of Exception (Article 4) : Declaration of the State of Exception on August 2002 .…… 40
1. The Declaration Did Not Adjust to Article 4 of the Covenant …………………….….. 40
2. The State of Interior Commotion: An Excessive, Useless recourse…………………… 42
3. Arbitrary Restrictions to the Right to Freedom (Article 9) , to the Right to Free
Movement (Article 12) , to Foreigners’ Rights (Article 13) and to the Right to
Privacy (Article 17) ……………………………………………………………………. 44
4. Attacks against the Civilian Population ……………………………………………….. 46

D. Right to Life (Article 6) ……………………………………………………………………. 48

E. Tortures and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (Article 7) ………………………….. 49

F. Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Social Leaders and Union Leaders
(Articles 2, 6, 18, 19, 21, 22 y 27) ……………………………………………………………… . 56
1. Violations of Human Rights Defenders’ Human Rights ……………………………….. 56
2. State Policy on Human Rights Defenders ………………………………………………. 56
3. Public Servants’ Attitude regarding Human Rights Defenders …………………….…… 57
4. Situation under the Recent State of Internal Commotion ………………………………. 58
(Arbitrary arrests, Initiation of Criminal Investigations without Grounds, Property
Searches of Homes and Headquarters)

G. The Situation of Women (Articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 19, 21, 23 y 25) ………………………………….. 60

H. Prison Population (Articles 6, 7, 9 y 10) ……………………………………………………… 63

I. Children (Articles 6, 23, 24) …………………………………………………………………. 64

J. Indigenous and Afro-Colombians Populations (Articles 1, 2, 6 y 27) ……………………….. 67

III. RECOMMENDATIONS …………………………………………………………………….. 69

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Alternate Report to the fifth Colombian State Report to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee, presented by the
Colombian Commission of Jurists
July 2003

The situation of human rights and humanitarian law in Colombia continues to deteriorate.
Since May 1997, date on which the Human Rights Committee analyzed the fourth
periodical report presented by the Government of Colombia, violations of human rights
and breaches of humanitarian law have dramatically increased. The suggestions and
recommendations that the Human Rights Committee had made have not been attended, nor
have those that the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights made, nor those
that the Human Rights Commission and its thematic mechanisms made. On the contrary,
human rights and humanitarian law have been disrespected through measures adopted by
the successive governments, which is clearly contrary to international human rights law.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights describes the situation in
Colombia as follows:

“The human rights violations are taking place in a context of serious, massive and
systematic repetitive practices (...) The breaches of international humanitarian law also
constitute a widespread practice occurring on a large scale...”1

Today, an average of 20 persons are killed every day due to the sociopolitical violence. In
1998, the average was 10 persons per day. The security policies of the government
inaugurated in August 2002 are having harmful effects on the human rights situation.

This report provides an overview of the situation of human rights and humanitarian law in
Part I and analyzes the status of the implementation of some of the articles in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Part II. Finally, in Part III, it offers
some suggestions as to the recommendations that the Human Rights Committee could
present to the Colombian State.

I. GENERAL SITUATION OVERVIEW

A. Absence of or Non-Application of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Policies

1. Andrés Pastrana Arango’s Government (1998 – 2002)

President Andrés Pastrana Arango’s Government created a policy called “Policy for the
Promotion, Respect, and Guarantee of Human Rights and for the Application of
International Humanitarian Law, 1998-2002”, which was submitted to the country on
August 12, 1999. Said policy contained important aspects; if it had been applied, some
improvement of the situation would have been seen.

1
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia , 24 February 2002,
document E/CN.4/2002/17, par. 72 and 73. See also: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human
Rights Situation in Colombia, 24 February 2003, document E/CN.4/2003/13, par. 10 and 14 executive summary. See also: Report of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Colombia , 8 February 2001, document
E/CN.4/2001/15, par. 250 and 251.

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However, the essential parts of the policy were not applied and were even openly
contradicted in important aspects by later government decisions; therefore, the policy did
not result in a decrease of the sociopolitical violence or in a decrease of the number of
violations of human rights. From July 1998 to June 2002, 23.734 persons (18.386 cases
with allegedly identified perpetrators, 4.245 cases under study) were victims of
extrajudicial executions, sociopolitical homicides, forced disappearances and deaths in
combat. The percentages that represent the participation of the various perpetrators of
violations of human rights h ave changed. In 1988, violations of human rights allegedly
perpetrated by direct Public Forces actions represented 50%. That percentage gradually
dropped year after year. From July 1998 to June 1999, that percentage was 17.6%. Also,
there was a gradual increase year after year in the percentage attributed to paramilitary
groups; from 20% in 1993, it rose to almost 40% from July 1998 to June 1999. The total
number of deaths caused by all of the responsible parties together had remained the same
and, as it was mentioned, it later started to increase, the total number reached in 2001
having doubled.

Faced with such facts, the President of the United Nations Human Rights Commission
stated in his Statement on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, approved by
consensus in April 2000,

“[T]he Commission expresses its deep concern at the deterioration of the human rights and
humanitarian situation in Colombia during 1999 characterised by a decline in reported
human rights violations which is offset by an increase notably in abuses and killings by the
paramilitary.”2

Along the same lines, in that same year 2000, the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights sustained,

“[a]cts that can be attributed to the latter (paramilitary groups) also constitute human rights
violations which, by act or omission, therefore also entail the international responsibility of
the State. This consideration is based on the fact that these groups have the support,
acquiescence or toleration of State officials and benefit from the lack of an effective
response by the State.”3

Some of the concerning aspects of the 1998-2002 government related to human rights are
described below.

Regarding the Military Criminal Code, approved in August 1999, Government actions
were aimed at restricting the scope of the Constitutional Court guidelines that had limited
military jurisdiction over crimes strictly related to military service. 4 The Code provides
that the crimes of genocide, forced disappearance and torture are under the competence of
ordinary jurisdiction; this would exclude other violations of human rights that had been

2
Statement made by the Chairperson of the Commission Concerning the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia (56th session), Geneva
19 April 2000 (OHCHR/STM/00/22).
3
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Office in Colombia , March 2000 (E/CN.4/2000/11),
Paragraph 25.
4
See infra, point I.D.2, Military Criminal Justice.

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provided for in the original bill of law regulations (Articles 2 and 3) from the jurisdiction
of ordinary courts. The Constitutional Court, upon controlling the regula tion, reiterated
that all violations of human rights must be under the jurisdiction of ordinary justice and
that, therefore, the crimes mentioned in the Military Criminal Code do not constitute a
conditioned list. 5 The Government also attempted to indefinitely suspend the Military
Criminal Code from entering into effect, a situation that was finally settled by the
Constitutional Court. 6

As to a bill of law that typified genocide, torture, forced disappearance, and forced
displacement, far from encouraging this bill of law, the Government hindered it from
entering into effect by arbitrarily objecting without any justification to the classification of
political genocide. It argued that the author of that crime had to be a legal group because,
if it were an outlawed group, it would be impossible for the Public Force to perform its
constitutional duty of confronting illegal armed actors. Through non-existing defects of
form, the Government also objected the article that granted competence to ordinary justice
to try such crimes. Also, the prohibition to invoke due obedience in the case of behavior
leading to serious violations of human rights was excluded when this law was processed in
Congress. The Government did not take any action to avoid that from happening.
Ultimately, the article on genocide was modified in accordance with the Government’s
demand and the article on jurisdiction was excluded. The Constitutional Court declared the
qualification of the author of the crime of political genocide unconstitutional, establishing
that it would be discriminatory to only protect from political genocide those who act in a
legal manner. This would restrict the effectiveness of international treaties. In addition,
military forces cannot combat outlawed armed groups through genocide. 7 It is worth
commenting that in the “Policy for Promotion, Respect, and Guarantee of Human Rights
and of the Application of International Humanitarian Law, 1998-2002”, adopted by the
Government in August 1999, full support to this complete bill of law had been formally
announced. However, the Government objected to the law after Congress approved it in
December of that same year.

Furthermore, through Act 387 dated July 18, 1997, regulations were adopted for the
prevention of forced displacement. In 2000, Decree 2569 that partially regulated the Act
was issued. Far from having satisfactory results, it had serious defects. For example, it set
forth the end of the condition of displaced person through a unilateral Government
decision, if a displaced person does not collaborate sufficiently, and it set forth a term
within which a displaced person must submit the declaration enabling him/her to be
acknowledged as such by the State and, thus, enabling him/her to receive humanitarian aid.
It imposed on displaced persons the obligation of assuming the responsibility if they wish
to return to their homes, in spite of the fact that the State may not consider that there are
guarantees for such return and, finally, it limited the budget for all State attention
programs.

5
Constitutional Court 2000 Sentence C-368, Presiding Judge Carlos Gaviria Díaz.
6
Article 608 in this Code provided for the Code entering into effect one year after issued, provided that the Military Criminal Justice
administration statute law was in force. The Constitutional Court declared this provision unconstitutional because the Constitution does
not provide for a Military Criminal Justice statute law. That declaration of unconstitutionality provoked the failure of a Military Criminal
Justice statute law bill of law that the government had presented, through which it sought to broaden military criminal jurisdiction anew
and postpone the new Military Criminal Code from entering into effect for one more year.
7
Constitutional Court 2002 Sentence C-317, Presiding Judge Clara Inés Vargas.

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Likewise, through law 684 on security and national defense, dated August 13, 2001, the
Government endangered the effectiveness of the social, democratic state of law by
ignoring its duty to respect the rights acknowledged in the Internationa l Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and to guarantee them to all individuals. Below, this report will refer
more to that law, which the Constitutional Court declared totally unconstitutional in April
2002,8 in our analysis of the implementation of the Covenant (Section II.A.1.).

2. Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s Government (2002-2006)

This Government’s policy of security is based on disrespecting the principle of distinction
between combatants and the civilian population. Besides implementing policies that are
openly contrary to that principle, the President of the Republic stated that he does not
believe in it when he affirmed, “We do not call this violence a conflict. We do not
acknowledge its actors as combatants. They are terrorists.”9 The Office in Colombia of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights had to draw attention to the need to
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants to protect the civilian population,
through a document named “About the importance of the humanitarian principle of
distinction in the armed conflict”, 10 made public only days after the President gave his
declaration.

a. “Democratic Security” Policy

The present Government has said that its human rights policy is its “democratic security”
policy. However, that policy disrespects the regulations of humanitarian law by involving
the civilian population more and more in the armed conflict. It has led the State to pursue
and attack the civilian population by using exceptional measures. In addition, it suggests a
trend toward dismantling the social, democratic state of law. This report will make
reference to these concerns.

The government policy transfers the obligation of ensuring security to the citizenry and
uses it as an instrument through which to win the war. The policy guidelines suggest, for
example, that the citizenry “will be a fundamental part in information gathering (for
military intelligence).”11

Also, the security policy was inspired by the idea that one of the main security problems is
the fact that armed actors “camouflage themselves among the civilian population”; this is
expressed in 2002 Decree 2002 on internal commotion. 12 Thus, the door is open to
8
Constitutional Court 2002 Sentence C-251, Presiding Judges Eduardo Montealegre and Clara Inés Vargas.
9
“Guerilla Fighters are Combatants, says the UN” (“Guerrilla es combatiente, dice la ONU”), El Tiempo Newspaper, July 1st, 2003,
Pages 1-1 and 1-6.
10
Office in Colombia of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, About the importance of the humanitarian principle
of distinction in the armed conflict, June 30, 2003, www.hchr.org.co
11
Presidency of the Republic, National Planning Department (DNP is the Colombian acronym), National Development Plan Foundations,
2002-2006, Toward a Community State (Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 2002-2006, Hacia un Estado Comunitario), Bogota,
DNP, 2002, Page 34; 2003 Bill of Law No.169, through which the National Development Plan, Toward a Community State is issued,
Article 3. By order of the Colombian Political Constitution (Art icle 339), every government is bound to adopt a national development plan
and in its general portion it must indicate national long-term proposals and objectives, mid-term state action goals and priorities, and
general strategies and orientations for economic, social, and environmental policy for the corresponding period.
12
2002 Decree 2002, 3rd whereas clause.

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multiple breaches of humanitarian law because military operations are hereby aimed at
attacking and pursuing principally the sectors of the civilian population who they consider
suspects in aiding guerrilla fighters, and not aimed at paramilitary groups or guerrilla
fighters in a military ambit. Programs such as the informers’ network program or the
peasant soldiers program are a fundamental part of the policy.

b. Informers’ Network

The Government hereby seeks to convert at least one million civilians into Public Force
informers, pursuant to the Development Plan. A confidential Government document on the
security policy states that the Government aspires to incorporate the population at large
into the informers’ network. These persons will do surveillance on their neighbors and
inform Army and Police authorities of any event that or person who intends to alter the
public order, based on each informer’s criteria, and they will receive rewards in exchange
for the information that they supply. That is to say that civilians will be performing
military intelligence duties. The Government has said that the informers’ networks will be
“under the control, supervision, and evaluation of the military and police commanders and
of State security organizations located in each one of the regions.”13

In the National Development Plan, the Government has indicated that “private
surveillance companies” 14 are among those who form the collaborators’ networks; that is
to say that the collaborators’ networks are also made up of armed persons. Thus, unarmed
civilians who perform military intelligence duties and armed persons who are part of
private surveillance companies will all be under Public Force control.

This measure was put into execution less than 48 hours after the President of the Republic
took office. In addition to the arbitrary nature of the informers’ criteria to indicate
“suspicious” persons, the Public Force has used this measure to commit abuses. Some of
its members have acted in the company of hooded informers and, based on their
indications, have made arbitrary detentions without prior court order. In many cases, the
information supplied by these informers is used without adequate evaluation and may even
be the sole grounds for detention; it is also used as evidence in criminal trials.
Furthermore, there are denouncements regarding the Public Force’s use of minors as
informers. 15

c. Peasant Soldiers

The Government announced that it would incorporate at least 15,000 peasants into a
program called “Peasant Soldiers” from August 2002 to March 2003. It expected that
when that period ended, 100,000 young persons would have incorporated themselves into
the program. 16 The new recruits are considered part-time military personnel; they wear a

13
Presidency of the Republic, National Planning Department (DNP), Op. cit., Page 36.
14
Ibidem.
15
This is evident in the case of the arbitrary detention of community leaders María del Socorro Mosquera, Mery del Socorro Naranjo, and
Teresa Yarce in Medellín (Antioquia) on November 12, 2002. See infra Quote 172. Members of the Arauca Peasant Association (ACA is
the Colombian acronym) also publicly made this denouncement when this organization was in a meeting held with International Union
Mission in the headquarters of United Workers Union (CUT is the Colombian acronym) on February 4, 2003.
16
Armed Peasants (“Campesinos armados”), Semana (Week) Magazine, August 26, 2002, Page 26.

5


uniform and are under the military command hierarchy. The other part of the time they live
at home and carry out their normal work or stud y activities. 17 At June 17, 2003, 15.120
peasant soldiers in 420 municipalities throughout the country had incorporated themselves
into the Army ranks. 18

The Government’s purpose is for the civilian peasant population to become involved in
attending soldiers. According to the Minister of Defense, “as these people are part of the
population, this gradually creates a cooperation web with the Public Force; we need to
have the people on our side. It is the only way to win the war.”19 Obliging the civilian
population to cooperate in this manner in maintaining public order converts the civilian
population into a military objective for armed actors and reverses the role of who has the
responsibility for human rights.

In practice, military authorities have begun to mix the program of the informers’ network
and the peasant soldiers program, thus denying more and more the possibility of persons
who do not participate in the hostilities. One high-ranking military commander indicated
that the program “is effective because if you multiply 35 persons 20 (peasant soldiers) by all
of their relatives and acquaintances, you can easily obtain an informers’ network
throughout the municipality.”21

As peasant soldiers continue living at home, they and their families run the risk of being
attacked either at home or in their workplaces. After her visit to Colombia in November
2001, the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women indicated that many women
were victims of aggression for the mere fact of being related to a combatant. 22 These
attacks against peasant soldiers’ wives, companions, daughters, sons, and relatives have
already begun to occur. 23 In a recent report, the Office of the Procurator warned that “this
has led to making a sector of the civilian population more visible as a “military target” for
the insurgents: the peasant soldiers’ families.”24

In a communication addressed to the President of the Republic in August 2002, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Mary Robinson, stated:

"I hereby express my concern regarding some of the measures regarding public order and
citizen security, which the Colombian Government announced recently , as they might be
incompatible with international regulations on human rights and humanitarian law. Within
the context of generalized violence and degradation caused by the conflict, mechanisms
such as the informers' network and peasant soldiers' taking their weapons home after their
hours of service may contribute to the civilian population being involved in carrying out

17
Ibidem.
18
“Yesterday Eight Platoons of Peasant Military Personnel Were Sent to Seven Villages” (“Ayer se despacharon ocho pelotones de
militares campesinos para siete poblaciones”), El País Newspaper, www.elpais.com, June 17, 2003.
19
“Armed Peasants” (“Campesinos armados”), Semana Magazine, August 26, 2002, Page 27.
20
The Commander is Referring to the 35 Peasant Soldiers Who Are Part of the Program in Guaduas (Cundinamarca).
21
“I Want to Protect my Fatherland” (“Yo quiero proteger a mi patria”), El Espectador Newspaper, February 24, 2002,
www.elespectador.com
22
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Its Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, United
Nations document E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.3, Executive summary.
23
“Peasant Soldiers Relatives Threatened” (“Amenazan a familiares de soldados campesinos”), Diario La Libertad Newspaper, February
27, 2003, www.lalibertad.com; “Peasant Soldiers, Yes or No?”, El Tiempo Newspaper, June 3, 2003, Page 1-2.
24
National Attorney General’s Office, The Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zone in Arauca, Special Report(La zona de rehabilitación y
consolidación de Arauca, Informe especial), www.procuraduria.gov.co/noticias/indexno.html, May 19, 2003, Bogota, Page 6.

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war operations or exposed to situations of risk provoked by the gradual disappearance of
the principle of distinction."25

In addition, Colombia’s experiences enable us to affirm that these forms of civilian
collaboration with the Public Force to carry out military actions (of intelligence,
information or combat) lead to paramilitarism. In the year 2001, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights indicated that in Colombia, historically speaking,
legislation and State policies have had an undeniable role in broadening the present
magnitude and characteristics of paramilitarism. 26

B. Paramilitarism

1. State Responsibility in the Phenomenon of Paramilitarism, Lack of Combat
against These Groups

“The State is legally responsible both for the attacks carried out directly by Colombian
armed forces and for those committed by paramilitary organizations, to which State
support, acquiescence or connivance have been contributory factors. The existence of links
between the official army and/or civil servants and paramilitaries and the absence of
sanctions for violations is a matter of great concern.”27

The last Chairman Statement of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on the
situation of human rights in Colombia, issued on April 25, 2003, stated that “The
Commission strongly deplores the persistence of links between paramilitary groups and
members of State forces (…) It urges the Government of Colombia to implement fully the
measures adopted to combat, repress and dismantle paramilitary groups, as well as to
investigate and bring the links between military forces and the paramilitaries to an end.”28

In its 2003 report, the Office in Colombia of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights included the topic of paramilitarism as one of the issues of special concern:

“In their activities, the paramilitaries continued to take advantage of the lack of action,
tolerance or complicity shown by public officials in several regions of the country. In
many of these areas, the paramilitaries have replaced the Government in important aspects
of public life, including the use of armed force”.
(…)
“Paramilitary activities continued to be a destabilizing factor as far as the rule of law was
concerned, especially on account of the links maintained with paramilitary groups by
public officials and of the Government’s own inconsistent response to the situation. The
ambiguity of the Government’s commitment was reflected in discrepancies between
statements by the authorities about their efforts to combat paramilitarism and the facts as
observed by the Office in Colombia under its mandate. Paramilitary control is more
25
Communication Made by Ms. Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, addressed to the President of the
Republic on August 26, 2002, available at www.hchr.org.co
26
United Nations, High Commissioner for Human Rights Office, Report Made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights in Colombia, February 8, 2003, Document E/CN.4/2001/15, Paragraph 131.
27
Report submitted by Ms. Hina Jilani, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights Defenders, April 2002,
(E/CN.4/2002/106/Add.2), Paragraph 280.
28
Chairperson's Statement "Situation of Human Rights in Colombia” (59th session), Geneva 25 April 2003 (OHCHR/STM/CHR/03/2),
Paragraph 30.

7


marked in urban areas, where paradoxically the security forces and the authorities are also
more active; this is constantly an element in complaints of c ollusion between public
officials and the paramilitaries. Statements by civilian and military authorities denying the
presence of paramilitary groups in their areas, even though that presence is common
knowledge…”29

Among the elements that illustrate the absence of a decided policy to eradicate
paramilitarism, the statistics on deaths in combat prove that the Public Force rarely has a
military confrontation against the paramilitary: the number of guerrilla fighters killed in
combat by the Public Force is m uch higher than the number of paramilitary killed in
combat by the Public Force. The same occurs with arrests and detentions of persons
accused of being guerrilla fighters or paramilitary fighters. At no time have the Colombian
authorities shown signs of conceiving much less carrying out an armed confrontation plan
against paramilitary groups. The Second Commander of the Army went so far as to
publicly state in 1998 that it was not a constitutional duty of the Military Forces to pursue
the paramilitary. 30

2. Massacres Committed by Paramilitary Groups

The paramilitary groups have been the perpetrators of the greatest number of massacres
committed during the period covered by this report. Due to limited space, we will only
refer to three massacres committed by paramilitary groups to illustrate common patterns:
a) in these massacres there was a great number of civilians tortured and killed, b) in the
three cases, the authorities were informed of the imminent attack but did not take any
action to avoid it, c) there were denouncements made regarding the participation, either by
action or by omission, of Public Force members in the events, which we will affirm in
each one of the cases, d) and finally, one of the consequences of these massacres was
massive forced displacement of population.

a. Mapiripán (Meta) Massacre

On July 15, 1997, more than 200 paramilitary fighters entered the town of Mapiripán, cut
off all incoming and outgoing communication, and controlled the town from July 15 to
July 20. The paramilitary fighters detained several settlers and took them to the
slaughterhouse where they tortured and killed them, in some cases after having mutilated
them. 31 From July 16 to July 20, 49 persons were assassinated under these circumstances.
As a consequence of the massacre, approximately 70% of the population left the
municipality as of July 21. 32

The paramilitary fighters were in the municipality for five days; during that time the public
force never appeared. On July 15, the judge of the municipality reported the situation to
29
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Office in Colombia , February 2003 (E/CN.4/2003/1 3),
Paragraphs 34 and 74.
30
See United States of America State Department Report, 1999, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, (Chapter on Colombia).
31
Resolution for the legal situation of Brigadier General Jaime Humberto Uscátegui Ramírez, Attorney General´s Office, Human Rights
Unit, May 20, 1999. In: Constitutional Court 2001 Sentence SU-1184, Presiding Judge Eduardo Montealegre Lynnet.
32
Human rights and political violence data bank, Cinep y Justicia y Paz (BCJP), Night and Mist (Noche y niebla), Overview of Human
Rights and Political Violence in Colombia (Panorama de derechos humanos y violencia política en Colombia), Bogota, BCJP, No. 5,
1997.

8


the pertinent authorities through official document (oficio) 2919, but he never received an
answer. 33

Investigations 34 established that the Army troops, under the command of General Jaime
Uscátegui, received the paramilitary who arrived at the San José del Guaviare Airport and
that General Uscátegui assured that the local troops who could have been present in
Mapiripán to protect the population were located somewhere else. General Uscátegui
ignored the warnings regarding the massacre and ordered a subordinate to forge documents
to cover up his complicity in the events. 35 General Uscátegui was investigated for these
events through military criminal justice and was found guilty of “misfeasance in office
through omission” (prevaricato por omisión) and absolved of the charges of crimes against
humanity, terrorism, forgery of documents, and conspiracy. 36 The military court sentenced
General Uscátegui to 40 months of prison, but the Constitutional Court voided the
sentence because the case had to be under civil court competence. 37 On March 11, 2003,
the Attorney General´s Office ordered the detention of the retired general as he was
considered “alleged perpetrator of the crimes of aggravated homicide and aggravated
kidnapping, by improper omission”. General Uscátegui appealed that decision, 38 but the
decision was held through a writ dated April 25, 2003. 39

Colonel Hernán Orozco, who alerted general Uscátegui regarding the massacre, was
sentenced through military criminal court justice to 38 months of jail, for “not insisting in
sending troops”. The colonel had requested that his case be transferred to ordinary court
justice because he feared that military justice could not guarantee him a fair trial. Colonel
Orozco had cooperated with civilian authorities and his testimony helped the Attorney
General´s Office to file charges against General Uscátegui for forming paramilitary
groups. 40 Through a writ dated March 10, 2003, the Attorney General´s Office issued a
resolution of accusation against Colonel Orozco as material author of the crime of
ideological forgery of a public document and precluded the investigation of his being an
alleged perpetrator of the crimes of aggravated homicide, aggravated kidnapping,
terrorism, and conspiracy. 41

33
Enquiry of Officer Orozco Castro and copy of the substitute official document, quoted by the National General Prosecutor’s Office
Human Rights Unit in its decision dated June 21, 1999 regarding the conflict of positive competence promoted by the National Army
Commander in the official documents filed under UDH 244 and 443 regarding Brigadier General Jaime Humberto Uscátegui and four
other officers of the Colombian National Army; in: Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Report 34/01, Case 12.250, February 22,
2001, Paragraph 13.
34
Prosecutor’s Office 12 delegated to the regional judges in San José del Guaviare initiated the preliminary investigation on July 23,
1997.
35
Declaration made by the Regional Prosecutor in San José del Guaviare at the time of the events, quoted by the of the Attorney
General´s Office, Human Rights Unit, in its decision dated June 21, 1999 regarding the conflict of positive competence promoted by the
National Army Commander in the official documents filed under UDH 244 a 443 regarding Brigadier General Jaime Humberto
nd
Uscátegui and four other officers of the Colombian National Army; in: Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Report 34/01, Case
12.250, February 22, 2001, Paragraph 13.
36
“Retired General Uscátegui Requested Overseeing for his Trial” (“General (r) Uscátegui pidió veeduría para su proceso”), El
Colombiano Newspaper, March 12, 2003, Page 12-A. “Uscátegui Detained again”, El Tiempo Newspaper, March 12, 2003, Page 1-9.
37
Constitutional Court 2001 Sentence SU-1184, Presiding Judge Eduardo Montealegre Lynnet.
38
“Uscátegui detained again” (“Nueva detención de Uscátegui”), El Tiempo Newspaper, March 12, 2003, Page 1-9.
39
Attorney General´s Office, Human Rights Unit UNDH Case 244, information supplied on May 13, 2003 by Colectivo de Abogados
José Alvear Restrepo.
40
“The Attorney General´s Office Ordered the Detention of Retired General Jaime Humberto Uscátegui” (“La Fiscalía General ordenó la
detención del general retirado Jaime Humberto Uscátegui”), www.eltiempo.com, March 11, 2003.
41
Attorney General´s Office, Human Rights Unit UNDH Case 244, information supplied on May 13, 2003 by Colectivo de Abogados
José Alvear Restrepo.

9


General Carlos Eduardo Ávila Beltrán, leader of the battalion in charge of protecting and
controlling Mapiripán on the date of the massacre, is still in active service. In addition, in
October 2002 he was called upon to be a candidate for promotion, in spite of having been
sanctioned by the Office of the Procurator with a “severe reprimand” for his participation
in the events of serious violations of human rights in Mapiripán.

In the criminal court trial regarding the massacre in Mapiripán, ordinary criminal court
justice sentenced Army Colonel Lino Sánchez, Commander of Mobile Brigade No. 2 on
the date of the massacre, to 40 years of prison on June 19, 2003. In the same writ, Sergeant
José Millar Urueña and Sergeant Juan Carlos Gamarra were sentenced to 32 and 22 years
of prison, respectively. The leader of the paramilitary group United Self-defense Groups of
Colombia (Autodefendas Unidas de Colombia, AUC is the Colombian acronym), Carlos
Castaño, was also sentenced to 40 years of prison as intellectual author of the massacre. 42

b. El Salado (Bolívar) Massacre

On February 16, 2000, 300 paramilitary arrived at El Salado, a settlement in El Carmen de
Bolívar. They assassinated 45 persons after accusing them of being guerrilla collaborators.
Also, they destroyed all of the houses and commerce. Proof of the liberty that the
paramilitary group had to act is that, out of the 45 persons assassinated, 17 were shot down
in the village park, 8 more in the church and the rest at home or while escaping. Many of
the women assassinated were first sexually abused. The assassinations were carried out
with extreme cruelty. The paramilitary remained in El Salado until February 19, day on
which they left the village on foot. The massacre of the peasants generated the forced
displacement of at least 450 families.

Social organizations and the Catholic Church had alerted the authorities of the possible
occurrence of the massacre and had requested that measures be taken to avoid an attack on
the village. 43 However, the State had not taken any measure to protect the village.

In the zone there are two military bases that patrol the region. In spite of the fact that
mobilizing the troops on land takes two hours, Navy Infantry troops arrived at the village
three days after the attack, one half hour after the paramilitary group had left.
The Attorney General’s Office appeared three days after the events had occurred. From
February 22 to February 23 it disinterred bodies and identified 28 of them, among which,
the corpse of a six-year-old girl and the corpse of a sixty-five-year-old woman. In spite of
the fact that there had been reports of sexual abuse, no evidence was gathered to establish
the occurrence of such facts or the identity of the alleged perpetrators. The investigation
that was initiated is not making inquiries regarding sexual offenses.

The Office of the Procurator is carrying out a disciplinary investigation of nine members
of the Public Force, including Retired Rear-admiral Rodrigo Quiñónez who is also being
investigated for another massacre. In March 2001, the Attorney General’s Office proffered

42
“Castaño Condemned to 40 Years” (“Condenan a castaño a 40 años”), El Tiempo Newspaper, June 20, 2003, Page 1-3.
43
Human Rights and Sociopolitical Violence data bank of Cinep y Justicia y Paz (BCJP), Night and Mist (Noche y niebla) – Overview of
Human Rights and Political Violence in Colombia (Panorama de derechos humanos y violencia política en Colombia), Bogota BCJP,
No. 15, 2000, Page 112.

10


a resolution for the indictment of 15 persons belonging to the AUC, for the crimes of
aggravated homicide and paramilitarism. Carlos Castaño Gil, maximum leader of the
paramilitary group, is also being investigated.

c. Chengue, Settlement in Ovejas (Sucre) Massacre

On January 17, 2001, 34 peasants were assassinated by the AUC in the settlement of
Chengue, in the municipality of Ovejas. Several of the victims were assassinated with
firearms, others had their throats cut and others were murdered with stone and wood clubs.
After assassinating the civilians, the paramilitary burned 30 houses. The massacre
generated the forced displacement of more than 900 persons out of a population of
approximately 1.200 inhabitants44 .

The population had warned the authorities beforehand of the imminent massacre through a
right to petition document signed by 95 settlers in the region sent to the President of the
Republic on October 6, 2000, filed under No. 231486. However, the processing of the
request was limited to transferring it to officials in the Ministry of the Interior and in the
Ministry of Defense, as well as to the Governor of Sucre and to the Mayor of Ovejas,
without specifying or recommending any special actions. Nor would any follow- up have
been given to the measures, had there been any adopted. The Military Forces replied on
December 1, 2000, assuring that the zone that the First Infantry Brigade had jurisdiction
over was very extensive and that this made it difficult from an operational point of view to
constantly cover all of the areas considered critical. At least seven of the persons who had
signed the communication sent to the authorities were assassinated during the paramilitary
attack.

In August 2002, the Office of the Procurator filed charges against National Navy Retired
Rear-admiral Rodrigo Quiñónez (mentioned before in relation to the El Salado massacre),
and against Lieutenant Commander Camilo Martínez, Major Víctor Salcedo, Sergeant
Major Rubén Darío Rojas and Sergeant Major Euclides Bossa. 45

Rodrigo Quiñónez was also involved in the criminal trial for this massacre. In October
2002 he answered an enquiry for the Attorney General´s Office, which did not impose a
securing measure on him. It did, however, deny his request for preclusion and ordered
gathering evidence. In spite of being under investigation, Quiñónez was named military
attaché to the Embassy of Colombia in Israel, where he performed his duties until
November 2002.

d. Another 626 Massacres Committed by the Paramilitary

These three massacres committed by paramilitary groups illustrate the common patterns
that characterize this type of multiple violations of human rights. However, we find it

44
Human Rights and Sociopolitical Violence data bank of Cinep y Justicia y Paz (BCJP), Night and Mist (Noche y niebla)– Overview of
Human Rights and Political Violence in Colombia(Panorama de derechos humanos y violencia política en Colombia), Bogota, BCJP,
No. 19, 2001, Page 58.
45
“Charges against General Quiñónez” (“Cargos al General Quiñónez”), El Espectador Newspaper, www.elespectador.com, Bogota,
August 25, 2002.

11


necessary to clarify that 953 massacres were committed from July 1996 to June 2001. The
responsibility for 66% (629) of these massacres, representing 69.29% (4.037) of the
victims, was allegedly attributed to the paramilitary. 46

3. Secret Negotiations, Legalization, and Impunity

In November 2003, the present Government initiated dialogues with the paramilitary
groups. To do so, pursuant to Colombian legislation, it was necessary to eliminate the
condition that previously existed of acknowledging political status to an outlawed armed
group, for the Government to be able to initiate the dialogues. 47

The Government has initiated negotiations with the paramilitary groups on the basis of
impunity for their war crimes and crimes against humanity. El Tiempo newspaper asked
the Minister of the Interior and of Justice about the measures that the Government would
adopt to ensure that this process would not lead to impunity. The Minister answered, “No,
nobody is going to guarantee that”. The Minister added that any process of amnesty or
pardon assumes impunity and that “the Government is willing to forget about the past.
There are some limitations of a legal order that will be studied and that we will have to
overcome using a lot of imagination.”48

The Ombudsman stated that he was alarmed by the Government’s plans and indicated that
it is not the State’s duty to investigate and punish crime. The Ombudsman indicated that
“no crime against humanity can be amnestied or pardoned”, and he pointed out that
impunity cannot be the price to pay for peace in Colombia. 49

2003 decree 128,50 Article 13 indicates that persons demobilized who were part of
outlawed armed organizations “will be entitled to pardon” if a government organization
called Operational Committee for Abandoning Arms (CODA is the Colombian acronym) 51
certifies that the demobilized person belongs to an outlawed organization and confirms
his/her will to abandon it. 52

The expression “will be entitled to” means that the certification issued by CODA is the
sole requirement to obtain pardon. That is to say that, once the certification is issued,
pardon is automatic. That means that, before making the decision of whether or not the

46
Source: Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) database.
47
The reform was made through 2002 law 782 that modified 1997 law 418.
48
“Drug Trafficking Ends this Year” (“Narcotráfico se acaba este año”), El Tiempo Newspaper, Bogota, January 12, 2003, Pages 1-2 y 1-
3.
49
“The Ombudsman Considers the Minister of the Interior’s Declarations Unfortunate” (“Defensor considera desafortunadas las
declaraciones de Mininterior”), El Tiempo Newspaper, January 15, 2003, Page 1-9.
50
January 22, 2003 decree 128 that regulates 1997 law 418, extended and modified by 1999 law 548 and by 2002 law 782 regarding re-
entry into civilian society.
51
CODA is made up of one delegate from the Ministry of Justice and of the Interior, one delegate from the Ministry of National Defense,
one official from the Ministry of the Interior Re-incorporation Program, one delegate from the Attorney General´s Office, one delegate
for the Director of the Colombian Family Welfare Institute, and one delegate for the Ombudsman Office. CODA has the following
functions: to certify that the applicant belongs to an outlawed armed organization; to evaluate the circumstances of voluntary
abandonment; to evaluate the demobilized person’s will to re-enter into civilian life; to certify the demobilized person’s belonging to an
outlawed armed organization and his/her will to abandon it; and to process requests for postponement or suspension of the execution of a
sentence and pardon before the judges for sentence execution and the Ministry of the Interior, of Justice and of Law. The composition
and functions of CODA are contained in 2003 Decree 128, articles 11 and 12.
52
See 2003 decree 128, Articles 11, 12, 13 and 21.

12


benefit is to be granted, the behavior for which the person would be pardoned will not be
determined in court. The person would be exonerated from criminal responsibility before
determining if he/she committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.

The decree contains a provision (Article 21) that apparently would ensure the right to
justice, but that in reality is not an effective safeguard. Pursuant to the provision, after
CODA’s initial exoneration, the prosecutor or the judge could limit such exoneration if the
person has been previously tried or sentenced for crimes that cannot be pardoned or
amnestied, pursuant to Colombian law, the Constitution or international treaties ratified by
Colombia. 53 In other words, if the person has not been tried or sentenced for such crimes,
the judge or the prosecutor will not be able to limit the scope of the right to pardon
conferred upon by the CODA certification. Pursuant to Colombian law, a person tried is a
person who answered an enquiry or who has been declared an absent defendant. Given the
impunity that exists in Colombia, persons sentenced or tried for such crimes are very few.
This means tha t almost all of the members of the paramilitary groups (calculated at more
than 10,000 persons) and of the guerrilla groups (calculated at near 22,000 persons 54 )
could be pardoned by virtue of a certification from CODA, an organization presided by the
Minister of the Interior. It also means that the victims and the society could not find this
out in time or be able to oppose any efficacious remedy to prevent that crimes against
humanity go unpunished through this method.

Amnesties and pardons may occur as a result of a negotiation process, but these benefits
must be contained within a perspective of reconciliation and can only take place once the
victims’ right to truth, justice and indemnity have been ensured. 55 In addition, the policy of
“confidentiality”, which has given rise to this negotiation behind closed doors, is merely a
cover; it ignores the victims’ right to know the truth. The People’s Ombudsman requested
that these negotiations be transparent and open to public opinion because the country has
the right to complete, accurate information. 56

The manner in which the Government is holding these dialogues is concerning because
they do not appear to be thought out for the purpose of leading to a peace process. On the
contrary, they appear to be aimed at giving the members of the paramilitary groups a legal
condition and having them participate, under legal conditions, in the armed conflict. The
informers’ network and the peasant soldiers programs are propitious programs for
demobilized persons from the paramilitary groups to join.

53
Article 21, Paragraph 2.
54
Presidency of the Republic, National Planning Department, Op. cit., Page 26.
55
See Inter-American Human Rights Court, the case of Barrios Altos against Peru, Paragraph 41.
56
“The Ombudsman Considers the Minister of the Interior’s Declarations Unfortunate” (“Defensor considera desafortunadas las
declaraciones de Mininterior”), El Tiempo Newspaper, January 15, 2003, P age 1-9.

13


C. Breaches of Humanitarian Law Committed by Guerrilla Groups, Paramilitary
Groups and State Agents

In the Colombian armed conflict, all of the combatant groups breach humanitarian
regulations and disrespect the basic princip les of humanitarian law, such as the principle of
distinction between combatants and noncombatants, the principle of immunity for the
civilian population, and the principle of proportionality.

1. Taking Hostages and Kidnappings 57

From July 1996 to March 2003 (a period of 6 years and 9 months), there were 18.684
kidnapping victims. The responsibility for the kidnapping of 11.644 persons (62.32%) was
attributed to combatant groups, representing two thirds of the kidnappings. The kidnapping
of 10,687 persons (57.20%) was attributed to the guerrilla groups and that of 957 (5.12%)
was attributed to paramilitary groups. 5,867 (31.40%) kidnappings were allegedly
attributed to common delinquents. 58 No alleged perpetrator was identified for the
remaining 1,173 kidnappings 59 (See Chart 1, Column 8).

The number of persons who are victims of kidnapping in Colombia is a reflection of the
degrading climate of violence that this country is undergoing. During the period under
study, there was a gradual increase in the number of cases of kidnapping. In 1996-1997 60
1.754 persons were kidnapped, whereas from 2001 to 2002, 3.115 persons were victims of
kidnapping. Despite having recorded a decrease in the number of kidnappings from 2002
to 200361 (with 1.893) as compared to the previous three years, we foresee that the total
number for this year will be at the same level recorded from 1997 to 1999.

The average number of persons kidnapped per day went from five in the year 1996-1997
to seven in 2002-2003. In 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 an average of more than nine persons
kidnapped per day was recorded. After this constant serious increase from 1996-1997 to
2000-2001, the average of kidnapped persons per day slightly decreased: in 2001-2002 it
dropped to eight persons and in 2002-2003 to seven. However, we must keep observing to

57
The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages Article 1 stipulates the following: “Any person who seizes or detains and
threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely a State, an international
intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do so or to abstain from doing any act as an
explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of h ostages within the meaning of this
Convention”. The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly through Resolution 34/146 dated December 17,
1979 (Plenary Session 105).
Protocol II, Additional to the Geneva Conventions, Article 4, Letter c), prohibits taking hostages at all times and in all places. “This sub-
Paragraph reaffirms a prohibition which is already container in common article 3, (…). It should be noted that hostages are persons who
are in the power of a party to the conflict or its agent, willingly or unwillingly, and who answer with their freedom, their physical
integrity or their life for the execution of orders given by those in whose hands they have fallen, or for any hostile acts committed against
them”. International Committee of the Red Cross, Comments to Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions dated August 12, 1949,
regarding protection to victims of armed conflicts of a non-international nature (Protocol II), Geneva, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986,
Item 4537.
58
The kidnappings allegedly attributed to common delinquents and to unidentified perpetrators are not considered breaches of
humanitarian law. However, we contribute the statistical information on them to give a general overview of the situation of persons
kidnapped in Colombia. That is why, the average of kidnapping victims per day is broken down by the total number of victims and also
by the subtotal of kidnappings perpetrated by paramilitary and guerrilla groups.
59
The National Police breaks down the kidn appings whose alleged perpetrators were not identified until July 2000.
60
In this document the period begins on July 1, 1996 and ends on March 31, 2003. One year begins on July 1 of a year and ends on June
30 of the following year.
61
For the purpose of this report, the year 2002-2003 starts on July 1, 2002 and ends on March 31, 2003.

14


see if this decrease really represents a constant downward trend for the future (See Chart 1,
Column a, Row M ).

The increase in the number of kidnappings was mainly due to kidnappings committed by
combatant groups. The kidnappings perpetrated by combatant groups went from 743 in
1996-1997 to 2,168 in 2001-2002, which means an increase of 191.79% (See Chart 1, Row I).

Of the 11,644 kidnappings perpetrated by combatant groups, 91.78% (10.687 victims) are
allegedly attributed to guerrilla groups and 8.22% (957 victims) to the paramilitary (See
Chart 1, Column 8a and c, Rows G to I). Of the 11,644 kidnappings, 83.79% (9.756 persons) are
allegedly attributed to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc is the
Colombian acronym) and to the National Liberation Army (Eln is the Colombian
acronym), broken down as follows: Farc 44.04% (5.128) and Eln 39,75% (4.628).

The paramilitary g roups were the alleged perpetrators of the kidnapping of 957 persons,
corresponding to 8.22% of the total kidnappings committed by combatant groups. The
paramilitary groups went from 33 victims in the first year to 235 in 2001-2002 and to 121
so far in 2002-2003. In 2000-2001, the highest number of persons kidnapped allegedly by
paramilitary groups was recorded: 301 victims (See Chart 1, Column c, Row H).

As to State agents, it is important to highlight that there were cases in which active or
retired members of the Public Force were involved in committing kidnappings. 62
Unfortunately, the National Police Criminological Investigation Center did not report
specific figures on these cases in its statistics.

Girls, boys and women are victims of kidnapping by combatant groups. In spite of their
condition of vulnerability and despite both national and international pressure for
combatant groups not to kidnap minors and to free girls and boys that they have in their
power, combatant groups maintain them kidnapped for long periods of time.

62
On October 30, 1998, in Bogota, the Israeli entrepreneur Benjamín Khoudarí was kidnapped and assassinated by his captors. Colonel
Jorge Plazas Acevedo was detained for the kidnapping and assassination. On the date of the events he was Intelligence Director of the
XIII Army Brigade based in Bogota. Also, Lieutenant Alexánder Parga Rincón and Sergeant Guillermo Lozano Guerrero were involved;
they were under the Colonel’s orders. Three more military personnel were investigated. In 1999, the Office of the Procurator issued a writ
of accusation against Colonel Plazas, Lieutenant Alexánder Parga and Sergeant Juan José Mosquera, Sergeant Guillermo Lozano, and
Sergeant José Ramírez, for the crimes of kidnapping, forced disappearance, assassination and illicit enrichment. In November 2002,
Bogota Specialized Judge Number 2 sentenced Colonel Plazas Acevedo to 40 years of prison for the kidnapping and assassination of the
Israeli entrepreneur, and John Alexis Olarte to 10 years of prison for the crimes of accessory to kidnapping and conspiracy. “Ex-Colonel
sentenced to 40 years of jail for assassinating an entrepreneur” (“Condenado a 40 años de cárcel un ex coronel por el asesinato de un
empresario”), El Espectador Newspaper, November 7, 2002, www.elespectador.com. On February 22, 2001, in Bogota, the Japanese
citizen Chikao Muramatsu, Vice-president of the company Yasaki Ciemel, and Efraín Díaz, who was driving the vehicle in which the
Japanese entrepreneur traveled, were kidnapped by the common delinquents gang “Los Calvos” (Skinheads). On the afternoon of the
kidnapping, Police Officers Rubén Darío Toro Bedoya and Jorge Eliécer García Fuentes, who at that time worked in the General Police
Directorate and in the Congress of the Republic respectively, installed a blockade on Calle 103 and Autopista Norte, they were in uniform
and had their military-issue weapons on them. The policemen stopped the vehicle in which the victims were traveling. Moments later
eight more individuals arrived on the scene, among them Rodrigo Bermúdez, alias “El Capi”, and alias “Oscar Javier”, two ex-policemen
companions of Toro and García. That same day Efraín Díaz was freed. One week later it was made known that the Farc had the Japanese
entrepreneur in their power and that they were demanding USD 27,000,000 to free him. Rodrigo Bermúdez confessed that on that same
day of February 22 Chikao Muramatsu had been delivered to the Farc guerrilla fighters: he also confessed that he was working under the
orders of “Capuleto”, a Colonel in active service in the Armed Forces. On June 24, 2002, Bogota Specialized Criminal Court Six
sentenced Rodrigo Bermúdez and Guillermo Díaz for the crimes of extortive kidnapping and public document forgery. Police Officers
Toro Bedoya and García Fuentes were also investigated. The Farc is still holding Chikao Muramatsu. “Corrupt ex-police officers behind
kidnapping of Japanese” (“Condenado a 40 años de cárcel un ex coronel por el asesinato de un empresario”), El Tiempo Newspaper,
March 4, 2002, www.eltiempo.com; “Two of the ‘Los Calvos’ gang sentenced” (“Condenan a dos de la banda ‘Los Calvos’”), El Tiempo
Newspaper, June 25, 2002, Page 2-9; “Sentences for the kidnappers of the Japanese industrialist Chikao Muramatsu” (“Condenas por el
secuestro del industrial japonés Chikao Muramatsu”), El Espectador Newspaper, June 25, 2002, www.elespectador.com.

15


Chart 1
Breaches of humanitarian law in Colombia
Right to freedom
Taking hostages and kidnappings
Number of victims and percentage of alleged authorship, per period
July 1996 to March 2003
1 2 3 4

July 1996 to July 1997 to July 1998 to July 1999 to
June 1997 June 1998 June 1999 June 2000

Number of Number of Number of Number of
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Alleged perpetrators victims by
attributed to attributed to
victims by
victims by
victims by
alleged alleged alleged alleged
each group combatants each group combatants each group combatants each group combatants
perpetator perpetator perpetator perpetator

a b c a b c a b c a b c
% % % % % % % %
# # # #
1b=1a÷1aK 1c=1a÷1aI 2b=2a÷2aK 2c=2a÷2aI 3b=3a÷3aK 3c=3a÷3aI 4b=4a÷4aL 4c=4a÷4a I
A National Liberation Army (Eln) 271 15,45% 36,47% 693 28,32% 41,23% 749 26,44% 41,52% 521 15,79% 28,77%
B Popular Liberation Army (Epl) 47 2,68% 6,33% 53 2,17% 3,15% 118 4,17% 6,54% 274 8,31% 15,13%
Guerrilla groups

C Che Guevara Revolutionary Army (Erg) 0,00% 0,00% 3 0,12% 0,18% 2 0,07% 0,11% 3 0,09% 0,17%
D People's Revolutionary Army (Erp) 5 0,29% 0,67% 32 1,31% 1,90% 17 0,60% 0,94% 35 1,06% 1,93%
E Jaime Bateman Cayón (Jbc) 3 0,17% 0,40% 5 0,20% 0,30% 6 0,21% 0,33% 0,00% 0,00%
F Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) 384 21,89% 51,68% 871 35,59% 51,81% 827 29,19% 45,84% 820 24,86% 45,28%
G Subtotal: Guerrilla groups (aG=aA:aF) 710 40,48% 95,56% 1.657 67,72% 98,57% 1.719 60,68% 95,29% 1.653 50,11% 91,28%
H Paramilitary groups 33 1,88% 4,44% 24 0,98% 1,43% 85 3,00% 4,71% 158 4,79% 8,72%
I Subtotal: Guerrilla groups and paramilitary (aI=aG + aH) 743 42,36% 100% 1.681 68,70% 100% 1.804 63,68% 100% 1.811 54,90% 100%
J Common delinquents* 1.011 57,64% 766 31,30% 1.029 36,32% 1.488 45,10%
K Total victims (L=aI+aK) 1.754 100% 2.447 100% 2.833 100% 3.299 100%
L Average victims per day (aL= aK ÷ 365) (cL= aI ÷ 365) 4,81 2,04 6,70 4,61 7,76 4,94 9,04 4,96
5 6 7 8

July 2000 to July 2001 to July 2002 to Total
March 2003
June de 2001 June de 2002 victims
(9 months***)
Number of Number of Number of Number of
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Alleged perpetrators victims by
victims by
victims by
victims by
alleged alleged alleged alleged
each group combatants each group combatants each group combatants each group combatants
perpetator perpetator perpetator perpetator

a b c a b c a b c a b c
% % % % % % # % %
# # #
5b=5a÷5aL 5c=5a÷5aI 5b=5a÷5aL 5c=5a÷5aI 5b=5a÷5aL 5c=5a÷5aI 6a=1a:5a 6b=6a÷6aL 6c=6a÷6a I
A National Liberation Army (Eln) 1.063 31,80% 50,26% 866 27,80% 39,94% 465 24,56% 35,17% 4.628 24,77% 39,75%
B Popular Liberation Army (Epl) 35 1,05% 1,65% 41 1,32% 1,89% 18 0,95% 1,36% 586 3,14% 5,03%
Guerrilla groups

C Che Guevara Revolutionary Army (Erg) 12 0,36% 0,57% 8 0,26% 0,37% 10 0,53% 0,76% 38 0,20% 0,33%
D People's Revolutionary Army (Erp) 93 2,78% 4,40% 74 2,38% 3,41% 36 1,90% 2,72% 292 1,56% 2,51%
E Jaime Bateman Cayón (Jbc) 1 0,03% 0,05% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 15 0,08% 0,13%
F Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) 610 18,25% 28,84% 944 30,30% 43,54% 672 35,50% 50,83% 5.128 27,45% 44,04%
G Subtotal: Guerrilla groups (aG=aA:aF) 1.814 54,26% 85,77% 1.933 62,05% 89,16% 1.201 63,44% 90,85% 10.687 57,20% 91,78%
H Paramilitary 301 9,00% 14,23% 235 7,54% 10,84% 121 6,39% 9,15% 957 5,12% 8,22%
I Subtotal: Guerrilla groups and paramilitary (aI=aG + aH) 2.115 63,27% 100% 2.168 69,60% 100% 1.322 69,84% 100% 11.644 62,32% 100%
J Common delinquents* 918 27,46% 376 12,07% 279 14,74% 5.867 31,40%
K Non-identified perpetrators** 310 9,27% 571 18,33% 292 15,43% 1.173 6,28%
L Total victims (L=aI+aK) 3.343 100% 3.115 100% 1.893 100% 18.684 100%
M Average victims per day (aL= aK ÷ 365) (cL= aI ÷ 365) 9,16 5,79 8,53 5,94 6,91 4,82

Source: National Police, Criminology Investigations Center, Kidnappings recorded in the country by perpetrators from 1995 to 2003, magnetic support, May, December 2002, April and May 2003.
Notes:
*: The kidnappings allegedly attributed to common delinquents (Row J) and to non-identified perpetrators (Row K) are not considered as breaches of humanitarian law. However, statistical information on said kidnappings is
presented to showa generaloverview of the situation of kidnapping victims in Colombia. For this reason, the average of victims of kidnapping per day has been broken down into thetotal of victims and into thesubtotalof victims
of paramilitary and guerrilla groups.
**: The National Police has broken down the kidnappings committed by non-identified perpetrators only since July 2000.
***: The average per day for the period from July to March is calculated based on 274 days.
N.B.: The acts attributed to paramilitary as alleged perpetrators do not exclude the eventual participation of State agents by action or omission.

16


Combatant groups in Colombia do not respect humanitarian regulations. They breach,
among others, the principle of distinction between combatants and noncombatants and the
principle of immunity for civilian persons. The Government, on the other hand, has not
shown efficacious policies against kidnapping to ensure the safety and protection of
civilian persons from violations of humanitarian law committed by combatant groups. In
spite of petitions and proposals made by the families of kidnapped persons and by social
and human rights organizations, the absence of will on the part of the Colombian State and
of the guerrilla groups has impeded any advance in signing a humanitarian agreement in
which the guerrilla groups would commit to discontinue kidnapping and where the freeing
of all kidnapped persons would be achieved. 63

2. Use of Prohibited Weapons

In Colombia, from July 1996 to June 2003, 355 persons lost their lives due to the use of
prohibited weapons. The great majority of them were civilians, not combatants: 253
(71.27%) of the victims were civilians and 102 (28.73%) were combatants. 107 persons
died from the use of anti-personal land mines: 27 civilians (25.23%) and 80 combatants
(74.77%). As a consequence of the use of other prohibited weapons, such as gas
cylinders64 or booby traps, 226 civilians (91.13%) and 22 combatants (8.87%) died.

a. Civilians Killed due to the Use of Prohibited Weapons

During the period analyzed, 253 civilians lost their lives as a consequence of combatant
groups using prohibited weapons. Of them, 27 persons died as a consequence of the
explosion of anti-personal land mines and 226 died due to other prohibited weapons (See
Chart 2 Row G, Column 6 and Chart 3 Row G, Column 6).

Of the 27 civilian victims of anti-personal land mines, 17 (62.96%) of the cases were
allegedly attributed to the guerrilla groups and two (7.41%) to State agents. The death of
eight victims (29.63%) was allegedly attributed to one of the non- identified combatant
groups. Of the victims who died due to anti-personal land mines, almost half (44.44%)
belonged to groups identified as vulnerable. One third of the victims (9) were girls and
boys and more than 10% of the victims were women (3 victims) (See Chart 2, Row G).

As a consequence of the use of other prohibited weapons (gas cylinders and booby
tramps), 226 civilians died during this period. The guerrilla groups were identified as those
allegedly responsible for the death of 220 victims (97.35%), the paramilitary for two
(0.88%), and the combatant group allegedly responsible for the death of four victims
(1.77%) was not identified. Out of the 226 persons killed, more than half, that is 129
victims (57.07%), were girls and boys and women: 64 were minors, 65 women and 16
victims were youths (See Chart 3, Row G).

63
“Humanitarian Agreement Proposed in Farallones de Cali” (“Proponen acuerdo humanitario en Farallones de Cali”), El Tiempo
Newspaper, April 24, 2002, www.eltiempo.com, “Although Discussions on the Topic Are Strengthening, a Humanitarian Agreement is
Farther away than it Seems” (“Aunque el tema toma fuerza, un acuerdo humanitario esta más lejos de lo que parece”), Semana Magazine,
November 18, 2002, www.semana.com.
64
Gas cylinder: a handmade weapon with indiscriminate effects, difficult to aim at a concrete objective, intended to act as a mortar. In
most cases it does make impact on the military target against which it is aimed or, even if it does impact the military objective, it is so
powerful that it causes damage to protected persons and goods.

17

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