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NetFlow Monitoring for Cyber Threat Defense
T-SEC-10-I
Matthew Robertson
Security Technical Marketing Engineer
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public 3
“The whole art of war consists of guessing at
what is on the other side of the hill.”
Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
Defending against Humans
4
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/technology/chinese-hackers-infiltrate-new-york-times-computers.html
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
Evolution of Cyber Conflict
War Dialing, Phone Phreaking …
Manual Attacks (1980s)
Viruses, Worms …
Mechanized Attacks (1988)
Google, RSA …
Talented Human / Mechanized
Attackers (2009)
Cyrptocurrency Ransoms, Store-bought
Credentials ...
DIY Human / Mechanized
Attackers (2011)
Intelligence Driven
Human Defenders
5
Manual Defenses
Unplug
Mechanized Defenses
Firewall, IDS/IPS
Targeted
Human/Mechanized
DefendersReputation, App-aware FirewallAPT, Multi-Step Attacks…
Target, Neiman Marcus …
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Agenda
6
Introduction Understanding
the
Landscape
Introduction to
NetFlow
Design and
Deployment
Working with
NetFlow
Flow ExportAdding Context
Summary
Organizing the data
Running Queries
and Investigations
Flow Collection
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About this session
7
https://learningnetwork.cisco.com/community/certifications/s
ecurity/cybersecurity/scyber_exam
http://www.cisco.com/go/securedatacenter
http://www.cisco.com/go/threatdefense
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
About the Speaker
Matthew Robertson
 Security Technical Marketing Engineer
 ½ year at Lancope
 5½ years at Cisco
– Development and Technical Marketing
 Focused on advanced threat detection
 Author of 2 CVD’s
 I am Canadian!
8
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Thinking beyond the perimeter
9
Once the walls are built
monitor for security visibility
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Signals Intelligence
10
Traffic Analysis:
• Deduce information from
communication patterns
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NetFlow
11
10.2.2.2
port 1024
10.1.1.1
port 80
eth0/1
eth0/2
Start Time Interfac
e
Src IP Src
Port
Dest IP Dest
Port
Proto Pkts
Sent
Bytes
Sent
TCP Flags
10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025 SYN,ACK,PSH
10:20:12.871 eth0/2 10.1.1.1 80 10.2.2.2 1024 TCP 17 28712 SYN,ACK,FIN
Start Time Interfac
e
Src IP Src
Port
Dest IP Dest
Port
Proto Pkts
Sent
Bytes
Sent
TCP Flags
10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025 SYN,ACK,PSH
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NetFlow = Visibility
Router# show flow monitor CYBER-MONITOR cache
…
IPV4 SOURCE ADDRESS: 192.168.100.100
IPV4 DESTINATION ADDRESS: 192.168.20.6
TRNS SOURCE PORT: 47321
TRNS DESTINATION PORT: 443
INTERFACE INPUT: Gi0/0/0
IP TOS: 0x00
IP PROTOCOL: 6
ipv4 next hop address: 192.168.20.6
tcp flags: 0x1A
interface output: Gi0/1.20
counter bytes: 1482
counter packets: 23
timestamp first: 12:33:53.358
timestamp last: 12:33:53.370
ip dscp: 0x00
ip ttl min: 127
ip ttl max: 127
application name: nbar secure-http
…
A single NetFlow Record provides a wealth of information
12
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Agenda
13
Introduction Understanding
the
Landscape
Introduction to
NetFlow
Design and
Deployment
Flow Export
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NetFlow Deployment Architecture
14
Management/Reporting Layer:
• Run queries on flow data
• Centralize management and reporting
Flow Collection Layer:
• Collection, storage and analysis of flow records
Flow Exporting Layer:
• Enables telemetry export
• As close to the traffic source as possible
NetFlow
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Considerations: Flow Exporting Layer
15
1. NetFlow support
2. Which version of NetFlow to use
3. How to configure/what to measure
4. Where in the network to enable NetFlow export
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Cisco NetFlow Support
Cisco 2900
Cisco 7200 VXR
Cisco Nexus 7000
Cisco XR 12000
Cisco 2800
Cisco 7600
Cisco 1700
Cisco Catalyst 6500
Cisco 3560/3750-X/3850
Cisco ASR
Cisco ASA
Cisco ISR G2
Hardware
Supported
Cisco Catalyst 4500
Cisco NGA
16
Cisco Nexus 1000v
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Versions of NetFlow
Version Major Advantage Limits/Weaknesses
V5 Defines 18 exported fields
Simple and compact format
Most commonly used format
IPv4 only
Fixed fields, fixed length fields only
Single flow cache
V9 Template-based
IPv6 flows transported in IPv4 packets
MPLS and BGP nexthop supported
Defines 104 fields, including L2 fields
Reports flow direction
IPv6 flows transported in IPv4 packets
Fixed length fields only
Uses more memory
Slower performance
Single flow cache
Flexible NetFlow (FNF) Template-based flow format (built on V9
protocol)
Supports flow monitors (discrete caches)
Supports selectable key fields and IPv6
Supports NBAR data fields
Less common
Requires more sophisticated platform to produce
Requires more sophisticated system to consume
IP Flow Information Export
(IPFIX) AKA NetFlow V10
Standardised – RFC 5101, 5102, 6313
Supports variable length fields, NBAR2
Can export flows via IPv4 and IPv6 packets
Even less common
Only supported on a few Cisco platforms
NSEL (ASA only) Built on NetFlow v9 protocol
State-based flow logging (context)
Pre and Post NAT reporting
Missing many standard fields
Limited support by collectors
17
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How do I want to cache information
Which interface do I want to monitor?
What data do I want to meter?
Router(config)# flow record my-record
Router(config-flow-record)# match ipv4 destination address
Router(config-flow-record)# match ipv4 source address
Router(config-flow-record)# collect counter bytes
Where do I want my data sent?
Router(config)# flow exporter my-exporter
Router(config-flow-exporter)# destination 1.1.1.1
Router(config)# flow monitor my-monitor
Router(config-flow-monitor)# exporter my-exporter
Router(config-flow-monitor)# record my-record
Router(config)# interface s3/0
Router(config-if)# ip flow monitor my-monitor input
1. Configure the Exporter
2. Configure the Flow Record
3. Configure the Flow Monitor
4. Apply to an
Interface
Configuring Flexible NetFlow
18
Best Practice:
include all v5 fields
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NetFlow Deployment
19
Access
Catalyst®
3560/3750-X
Catalyst® 4500
Catalyst® 6500
Distribution
& Core
Catalyst® 4500
ASA
ISR
Edge
ASR
Each network layer offers unique NetFlow capabilities
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NetFlow Deployment
20
Access
Catalyst®
3560/3750-X
Catalyst® 4500
Access:
• New network edge
• Detect threats as the enter the network
• Detect threats inside the switch
• east-west
• Layer 2 traffic
• Fewer false positives
• Higher-granular visibility
• Identify the endpoint
• collect MAC Address
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Catalyst 3650-X,3750-X Flow Record
21
!
flow record CYBER_3KX_FLOW_RECORD
 match datalink mac source-
address
match datalink mac destination-address
match datalink mac source-vlan-id
match ipv4 tos
match ipv4 ttl
match ipv4 protocol
match ipv4 source address
match ipv4 destination address
match transport source-port
match transport destination-port
 collect interface input snmp
 collect
interface output snmp
 collect counter bytes
 collect counter packets
 collect
timestamp sys-uptime first
collect timestamp sys-uptime last
!
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Catalyst 4500 Flow Record
22
!
flow record CYBER_4K_FLOW_RECORD
match ipv4 tos
match ipv4 protocol
match ipv4 source address
 match ipv4 destination address
match transport source-port
match transport destination-port
collect ipv4 dscp
collect ipv4 ttl minimum
collect ipv4 ttl maximum
collect transport tcp flags
collect interface output
collect counter bytes
collect counter packets
collect timestamp sys-uptime first
collect timestamp sys-uptime last
!
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NetFlow Deployment - Converged Access
23
Converged Access:
• NetFlow for the first time on Wireless
• Visibility in BYOD environments
• Consistent configuration for wired and wireless
• Single flow monitor can be applied to wired
ports and SSID
• Natively available in the UADP ASIC
• Can monitor East-West and North-South flows
• 48k flows on the 48 port model
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NetFlow Deployment
24
Catalyst® 6500
Distribution
& Core
Catalyst® 4500
Distribution & Core:
• Traditional deployment
• Minimal recommended deployment
• Enable at critical points/bottle necks
• Typically done on a Layer 3 boundary
• Detect threats internal to the VLAN
• When deployed on an SVI interface
• Detect threats as they traverse the internal
network
• Move between subnets
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Catalyst 6500 (Sup 2T) Flow Record
25
!
flow record CYBER_6K_FLOW_RECORD
match ipv4 tos
match ipv4 protocol
match ipv4 source address
match ipv4 destination address
match transport source-port
match transport destination-port
match interface input
collect transport tcp flags
collect interface output
collect counter bytes
collect counter packets
collect timestamp sys-uptime first
collect timestamp sys-uptime last
!
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NetFlow Deployment
26
ASA
ISR
Edge
ASR
Edge:
• Detect threats as they enter and leave the
network
• Monitor communication between branches
• Gain context from edge devices
• Application - NBAR
• Events & User-ID - NSEL
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ISR Flow Record
27
!
flow record CYBER_ISR_RECORD
match ipv4 tos
match ipv4 protocol
match ipv4 source address
match ipv4 destination address
match transport source-port
match transport destination-port
match interface input
collect routing next-hop address ipv4
collect ipv4 dscp
collect ipv4 ttl minimum
collect ipv4 ttl maximum
collect transport tcp flags
collect interface output
collect counter bytes
collect counter packets
collect timestamp sys-uptime first
collect timestamp sys-uptime last
collect application name
!
Enable NBAR
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ASA NSEL Configuration
28
!
flow-export destination management <ip-address> 2055
!
policy-map global_policy
class class-default
flow-export event-type all destination <ip-address>
!
flow-export template timeout-rate 2
logging flow-export syslogs disable
!
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Flow Monitor Configuration
29
!
flow monitor CYBER_MONITOR
 record CYBER_RECORD
exporter CYBER_EXPORTER
cache timeout active 60
cache timeout inactive 15
!
Active Timeout:
• Longest amount of time a flow can be in cache
without exporting a Flow Record
• Recommended 60 seconds
• All exporters should have the same timeout
Inactive Timeout:
• How long a flow can be inactive
before being removed from cache
• Recommended 15 seconds
• All exporters should have the same
timeout
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Aside: Myths about NetFlow Generation
30
Myth #1: NetFlow impacts performance
• Hardware implemented NetFlow has no
performance impact
• Software implementation is typically
significantly <15% processing overhead
Myth #2: NetFlow has bandwidth overhead
• NetFlow is a summary protocol
• Traffic overhead is typically significantly <1% of
total traffic per exporting device
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Agenda
31
Introduction Understanding
the
Landscape
Introduction to
NetFlow
Design and
Deployment
Flow ExportFlow Collection
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Flow Collection Considerations
32
Flow Handling
• De-duplication
• Stitching
• Replication
Scalability & Performance
• # of NetFlow sources
• # of users
• Flows per second
• Sustained vs. burst
Your time,
resources and
budget
Feature set
• Reporting
• Drill down
• Retention
• Analysis
NetFlow NetFlow NetFlow
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Components for NetFlow Security Monitoring
33
Cisco Network
StealthWatch FlowReplicator
• UDP Packet copier
• Forward to multiple
collection systems
NetFlow StealthWatch FlowSensor
• Generate NetFlow data
StealthWatch FlowSensor VE
• Virtual environment
• Visibility into ESX
StealthWatch FlowCollector
• Collect and analyze
• Up to 2000 sources
• Up to sustained 120,000 fps
StealthWatch Management
Console
• Management and reporting
• Up to 25 FlowCollectors
• Up 3 million fps globally
Best Practice: Centralize
collection globally
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NetFlow Collection: Flow Stitching
34
10.2.2.2
port 1024
10.1.1.1
port 80
eth0/1
eth0/2
Start Time Interface Src IP Src Port Dest IP Dest Port Proto Pkts Sent Bytes
Sent
10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025
10:20:12.871 eth0/2 10.1.1.1 80 10.2.2.2 1024 TCP 17 28712
Start Time Client IP Client
Port
Server
IP
Server
Port
Proto Client
Bytes
Client
Pkts
Server
Bytes
Server Pkts Interfaces
10:20:12.221 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 1025 5 28712 17 eth0/1
eth0/2
Uni-directional
flow records
Bi-directional:
• Conversation flow record
• Allows easy visualization and analysis
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NetFlow Collection: De-duplication
35
Router A
Router B
Router C
Router A: 10.2.2.2:1024 -> 10.1.1.1:80
Router B: 10.2.2.2:1024 -> 10.1.1.1:80
Router C: 10.1.1.1:80 -> 10.2.2.2:1024
• Without de-duplication:
• Traffic volume can be misreported
• False positive would occur
• Allows for the efficient storage of flow data
• Necessary for accurate host-level reporting
• Does not discard data 10.2.2.2
port 1024
10.1.1.1
port 80
Duplicates
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Conversational Flow Record
36
Who WhoWhat
More Details
When
How
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Integrating with a SIEM
37
Log alarms and summary info to SIEM
• Complete visibility throughout network
• Leverage specialty data handling
NetFlowSyslog SDEE
SIEM
Security Events
API
API’s to access database
• Directly access flow data (ex. getFlows)
• Improved scale - collection and retention
• Decreased cost
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Agenda
38
Introduction Understanding
the
Landscape
Introduction to
NetFlow
Design and
Deployment
Flow ExportAdding Context Flow Collection
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Context is Critical
39
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ISE as a Telemetry Source
40
Monitor Mode
• Open Mode, Multi-Auth
• Unobstructed Access
• No impact on productivity
• Profiling, posture assessment
• Gain Visibility
Authenticated Session Table
Cisco ISE
• Maintain historical session table
• Correlate NetFlow to username
• Build User-centric reports
StealthWatch
Management
Console
syslog
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Configuration: Logging on ISE
41
1. Create Remote Logging Target on ISE
2. Add Target to Logging Categories
1
2
Required Logging categories:
• AAA Audit
• RADIUS Accounting
• Profiler
• Administrative and Operational Audit
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Configuration: Add ISE to SMC
42
3
3
4. Add additional ISE nodes
1. (Not Shown) Create Admin User on ISE
2. (Not Shown) Configure ISE or CA certificate on SMC
3. (Shown) Add Cisco ISE to SMC Configuration
4. (Shown) Add additional ISE nodes
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Global Intelligence
43
List of known Command
and Control Servers
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Adding Situational Awareness
44
Client Host Client Host
Group
Server Host Server Host
Groups
Application Duratio
n
Total
Traffic
Start Active
Time
10.201.3.149 Sales and
Marketing,
End User
Devices
89.108.67.143 Russian
Federation
HTTP 23s 256.56K Jan 11, 2014
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Adding Situational Awareness
45
Client
User
Name
Client Host Client
Host
Group
Server Host Server
Host
Groups
Application Duratio
n
Total
Traffic
Start
Active
Time
Ken 10.201.3.14
9
Sales and
Marketing,
End User
Devices
89.108.67.143 Russian
Federation,
Zeus
HTTP 23s 256.56K Jan 11,
2014
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Agenda
46
Introduction Understanding
the
Landscape
Introduction to
NetFlow
Design and
Deployment
Working with
NetFlow
Flow ExportAdding Context
Organizing the data
Running Queries
and Investigations
Flow Collection
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Behavioural Analysis & Anomaly Detection
47
Behavioural Analysis:
• Leverages knowledge of known bad behaviour
Anomaly Detection:
• Identify a change from “normal”
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StealthWatch: Indices
48
Concern Index: Track hosts that appear to compromising network integrity
Target Index: Track hosts that appear to be victims of the suspicious behaviour of other hosts
File Sharing Index: Tracks behaviour that is indicative of peer-to-peer activity
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StealthWatch: Alarms
49
Alarms
• Indicate significant behaviour changes and policy violations
• Known and unknown attacks generate alarms
• Activity that falls outside the baseline, acceptable behaviour
or established policies
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Host Groups
50
Virtual container of multiple
IP Addresses/ranges that
have similar attributes
Lab servers
Best Practice: classify all
known IP Addresses in one
or more host groups
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Policy Tuning
51
Policies can be created for
individual host groups
Tune alarm thresholds
Default policy for Inside and Outside hosts
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Flow Query Basics – The Flow Table
52
Filter
Filter conditions
Details More details
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Flow Query Basics - Filtering
53
Select host to
investigate
All flows in which this host was
a client or server
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Flow Query Basics - Filtering
54
All flows for 10.10.200.79 in the last hour
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Flow Table: Visibility across NAT
55
Inside local Outside global Server
User
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Querying Events - Leveraging NSEL
56
Flow denied events over many ports
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Flow Table – IPv6
57
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Host Groups – Targeted Monitoring
58
Suspiciously
behaving hosts
Alarms
Host Group Dashboard for
Engineers
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Host Groups – Application Report
59
Applications outbound
Applications inbound
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Host Groups – Targeted Reporting
60
Geo-IP-based Host Group
Summary chart of traffic
inbound and outbound from
this Host Group
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Host Groups – Targeted Reporting
61
Traffic inbound
Traffic outbound
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Host Groups – Discovering Rogue Hosts
62
Catch All: All unclassified RFC1918 addresses
Table of all individual hosts
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Host Groups – Discovering Rogue Hosts
63
Rogue Hosts
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Indicator of Compromise
64
Raw flow analysis
Log analysis (SIEM)
IDS Alert
Outside notification
Behavioural analysis
Activity monitoring
an artifact observed on a network or in operating
system that with high confidence indicates a computer
intrusion
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indicator_of_compromise
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Attack Lifecycle Model
Exploratory
Actions
Footprint
Expansion
Execution
Theft
Disruption
Staging
Initial
Compromise
Initial
Recon
Infiltration
(C&C)
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Attack Lifecycle Model
Exploratory
Actions
Footprint
Expansion
Execution
Theft
Disruption
Staging
Initial
Compromise
Initial
Recon
Infiltration
(C&C)
IOC Found:
Investigate forwards
and backward
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Concept: OODA Loop
67
Observe Orient Decide Act
Feedback
Feedback
• Unfolding circumstances
• Implicit guidance
• Outside information
• Unfolding interaction with
environment
• Cultural Traditions
• Genetic Heritage
• Analysis & Synthesis
• New information
• Previous Experiences
Unfolding interaction with environment
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop
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Identifying the Culprit
Indicator of
Compromise
Is a worm
indicated?
• Alarm
• Alarm Table
• Alarm Summary
• IDS Alert
• Other
Host IP
Address
Worm
Tracker
Yes
Host
Snapshot
Supplemental Information:
• Most recent flows/Active flows
• Traffic volume/type
• Other Alarms
• Exporter interfaces
• Activity – scanning?
• Thresholds
• Touches
Identity:
• Username
• Device type and OS
• Access location
• Organization/Geo
• Role – Client or Server
• Hosts affected
• Host Groups Affected
• Subnets Affected
• Ports Used
• Protocols Used
Is the behaviour
normal or
permissible?
Tune
Yes
Respond
No
No
68
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Responding to an IOC
69
Create a Host Group for
BlackPOS Servers
IOC: Crowdstrike publishes list of IP addresses identified as BlackPOS servers
IP Addresses
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BlackPOS – Host Locking Violation Alarm
70
Create a Host Lock
Violation Alarm for
communication to
BlackPOS servers
Set client hosts to POS terminals
Set server hosts to
BlackPOS Servers
Alarm on FTP traffic
Trigger alarm on
unsuccessful
connections
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BlackPOS - Investigate
You know today what you didn’t know yesterday
71
Run a Flow Query
Over the last 90 days
Server or client includes
the known bad BlackPOS
IP Addresses
Configure application to be FTP
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BlackPOS – Returned Flows
72
Infected hosts
BlackPOS Servers
FTP Transfers
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Investigating Malware Spread: Worm Tracker
73
IOC: IDS Alert indicating a known worm operating inside your network
Worm tracker
Initial infection
Secondary infections
Subnets being scanned
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Investigating Malware Spread: Host Snapshot
74
Everything the system
knows about 10.10.200.59
Start with CI Events. We notice
significant scanning activity
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Investigating Malware Spread: Identity
75
Telemetry from the ISE
Username Infected
machine
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Investigating Malware Spread: Touched Hosts
76
This infected host has established a connection with another host
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Investigating Malware Spread: Touched Hosts
77
All hosts touched by 10.10.200.59
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
High Concern Index
78
Baseline deviated by 2,432%!
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
What was this Host up to?
79
Target – entire subnet?
Scanning on TCP-445
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
NetFlow and (D)DoS Detection
80
Identify targets
• Target of suspicious activity
• Abnormal traffic volume
• Decrease in performance
Identify attackers
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
Volumetric DDoS
81
Traffic Spikes
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
Identifying a DDoS Participant
82
IOC: Notification from 3rd party that your IP Address is participating in a DDoS
Public IP address
Target server
Time of reported attack
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
Identifying a DDoS Participant
83
Time of reported attack
Inside local Outside global Target Server
Validate attack activity
User
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
Identify a DDoS Participant
84
Host snapshot
Other suspicious activity
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
Agenda
85
Introduction Understanding
the
Landscape
Introduction to
NetFlow
Design and
Deployment
Working with
NetFlow
Flow ExportAdding Context
Summary
Organising the data
Running Queries
and Investigations
Flow Collection
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
Links and Recommended Reading
More about the Cisco Cyber Threat Defense Solution:
http://www.cisco.com/go/threatdefense
http://www.lancope.com
86
Recommended Reading
Cyber Threat Defense Cisco Validated Design Guide:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns1015/ns1238/cyber_threat_defense_design_guide.pdf
Cyber Threat Defense Cisco Validated Design Guide:
http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/collateral/enterprise/design-zone-security/ctd-first-look-design-guide.pdf
Securing Cisco Networks with Threat Detection and Analysis (SCYBER)
https://learningnetwork.cisco.com/community/certifications/security/cybersecurity/scyber_exam
Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public
Key Takeaways
87
Modern threats are consistently
bypassing the security perimeter
Threat Detection requires visibility and
context into network traffic
NetFlow and the Lancope StealthWatch System provide actionable security intelligence
Q & A
NetFlow Monitoring for Cyber Threat Defense

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NetFlow Monitoring for Cyber Threat Defense

  • 1.
  • 2. NetFlow Monitoring for Cyber Threat Defense T-SEC-10-I Matthew Robertson Security Technical Marketing Engineer
  • 3. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public 3 “The whole art of war consists of guessing at what is on the other side of the hill.” Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington
  • 4. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Defending against Humans 4 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/technology/chinese-hackers-infiltrate-new-york-times-computers.html
  • 5. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Evolution of Cyber Conflict War Dialing, Phone Phreaking … Manual Attacks (1980s) Viruses, Worms … Mechanized Attacks (1988) Google, RSA … Talented Human / Mechanized Attackers (2009) Cyrptocurrency Ransoms, Store-bought Credentials ... DIY Human / Mechanized Attackers (2011) Intelligence Driven Human Defenders 5 Manual Defenses Unplug Mechanized Defenses Firewall, IDS/IPS Targeted Human/Mechanized DefendersReputation, App-aware FirewallAPT, Multi-Step Attacks… Target, Neiman Marcus …
  • 6. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Agenda 6 Introduction Understanding the Landscape Introduction to NetFlow Design and Deployment Working with NetFlow Flow ExportAdding Context Summary Organizing the data Running Queries and Investigations Flow Collection
  • 7. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public About this session 7 https://learningnetwork.cisco.com/community/certifications/s ecurity/cybersecurity/scyber_exam http://www.cisco.com/go/securedatacenter http://www.cisco.com/go/threatdefense
  • 8. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public About the Speaker Matthew Robertson  Security Technical Marketing Engineer  ½ year at Lancope  5½ years at Cisco – Development and Technical Marketing  Focused on advanced threat detection  Author of 2 CVD’s  I am Canadian! 8
  • 9. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Thinking beyond the perimeter 9 Once the walls are built monitor for security visibility
  • 10. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Signals Intelligence 10 Traffic Analysis: • Deduce information from communication patterns
  • 11. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public NetFlow 11 10.2.2.2 port 1024 10.1.1.1 port 80 eth0/1 eth0/2 Start Time Interfac e Src IP Src Port Dest IP Dest Port Proto Pkts Sent Bytes Sent TCP Flags 10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025 SYN,ACK,PSH 10:20:12.871 eth0/2 10.1.1.1 80 10.2.2.2 1024 TCP 17 28712 SYN,ACK,FIN Start Time Interfac e Src IP Src Port Dest IP Dest Port Proto Pkts Sent Bytes Sent TCP Flags 10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025 SYN,ACK,PSH
  • 12. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public NetFlow = Visibility Router# show flow monitor CYBER-MONITOR cache … IPV4 SOURCE ADDRESS: 192.168.100.100 IPV4 DESTINATION ADDRESS: 192.168.20.6 TRNS SOURCE PORT: 47321 TRNS DESTINATION PORT: 443 INTERFACE INPUT: Gi0/0/0 IP TOS: 0x00 IP PROTOCOL: 6 ipv4 next hop address: 192.168.20.6 tcp flags: 0x1A interface output: Gi0/1.20 counter bytes: 1482 counter packets: 23 timestamp first: 12:33:53.358 timestamp last: 12:33:53.370 ip dscp: 0x00 ip ttl min: 127 ip ttl max: 127 application name: nbar secure-http … A single NetFlow Record provides a wealth of information 12
  • 13. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Agenda 13 Introduction Understanding the Landscape Introduction to NetFlow Design and Deployment Flow Export
  • 14. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public NetFlow Deployment Architecture 14 Management/Reporting Layer: • Run queries on flow data • Centralize management and reporting Flow Collection Layer: • Collection, storage and analysis of flow records Flow Exporting Layer: • Enables telemetry export • As close to the traffic source as possible NetFlow
  • 15. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Considerations: Flow Exporting Layer 15 1. NetFlow support 2. Which version of NetFlow to use 3. How to configure/what to measure 4. Where in the network to enable NetFlow export
  • 16. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Cisco NetFlow Support Cisco 2900 Cisco 7200 VXR Cisco Nexus 7000 Cisco XR 12000 Cisco 2800 Cisco 7600 Cisco 1700 Cisco Catalyst 6500 Cisco 3560/3750-X/3850 Cisco ASR Cisco ASA Cisco ISR G2 Hardware Supported Cisco Catalyst 4500 Cisco NGA 16 Cisco Nexus 1000v
  • 17. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Versions of NetFlow Version Major Advantage Limits/Weaknesses V5 Defines 18 exported fields Simple and compact format Most commonly used format IPv4 only Fixed fields, fixed length fields only Single flow cache V9 Template-based IPv6 flows transported in IPv4 packets MPLS and BGP nexthop supported Defines 104 fields, including L2 fields Reports flow direction IPv6 flows transported in IPv4 packets Fixed length fields only Uses more memory Slower performance Single flow cache Flexible NetFlow (FNF) Template-based flow format (built on V9 protocol) Supports flow monitors (discrete caches) Supports selectable key fields and IPv6 Supports NBAR data fields Less common Requires more sophisticated platform to produce Requires more sophisticated system to consume IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) AKA NetFlow V10 Standardised – RFC 5101, 5102, 6313 Supports variable length fields, NBAR2 Can export flows via IPv4 and IPv6 packets Even less common Only supported on a few Cisco platforms NSEL (ASA only) Built on NetFlow v9 protocol State-based flow logging (context) Pre and Post NAT reporting Missing many standard fields Limited support by collectors 17
  • 18. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public How do I want to cache information Which interface do I want to monitor? What data do I want to meter? Router(config)# flow record my-record Router(config-flow-record)# match ipv4 destination address Router(config-flow-record)# match ipv4 source address Router(config-flow-record)# collect counter bytes Where do I want my data sent? Router(config)# flow exporter my-exporter Router(config-flow-exporter)# destination 1.1.1.1 Router(config)# flow monitor my-monitor Router(config-flow-monitor)# exporter my-exporter Router(config-flow-monitor)# record my-record Router(config)# interface s3/0 Router(config-if)# ip flow monitor my-monitor input 1. Configure the Exporter 2. Configure the Flow Record 3. Configure the Flow Monitor 4. Apply to an Interface Configuring Flexible NetFlow 18 Best Practice: include all v5 fields
  • 19. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public NetFlow Deployment 19 Access Catalyst® 3560/3750-X Catalyst® 4500 Catalyst® 6500 Distribution & Core Catalyst® 4500 ASA ISR Edge ASR Each network layer offers unique NetFlow capabilities
  • 20. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public NetFlow Deployment 20 Access Catalyst® 3560/3750-X Catalyst® 4500 Access: • New network edge • Detect threats as the enter the network • Detect threats inside the switch • east-west • Layer 2 traffic • Fewer false positives • Higher-granular visibility • Identify the endpoint • collect MAC Address
  • 21. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Catalyst 3650-X,3750-X Flow Record 21 ! flow record CYBER_3KX_FLOW_RECORD
 match datalink mac source- address match datalink mac destination-address match datalink mac source-vlan-id match ipv4 tos match ipv4 ttl match ipv4 protocol match ipv4 source address match ipv4 destination address match transport source-port match transport destination-port
 collect interface input snmp
 collect interface output snmp
 collect counter bytes
 collect counter packets
 collect timestamp sys-uptime first collect timestamp sys-uptime last !
  • 22. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Catalyst 4500 Flow Record 22 ! flow record CYBER_4K_FLOW_RECORD match ipv4 tos match ipv4 protocol match ipv4 source address
 match ipv4 destination address match transport source-port match transport destination-port collect ipv4 dscp collect ipv4 ttl minimum collect ipv4 ttl maximum collect transport tcp flags collect interface output collect counter bytes collect counter packets collect timestamp sys-uptime first collect timestamp sys-uptime last !
  • 23. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public NetFlow Deployment - Converged Access 23 Converged Access: • NetFlow for the first time on Wireless • Visibility in BYOD environments • Consistent configuration for wired and wireless • Single flow monitor can be applied to wired ports and SSID • Natively available in the UADP ASIC • Can monitor East-West and North-South flows • 48k flows on the 48 port model
  • 24. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public NetFlow Deployment 24 Catalyst® 6500 Distribution & Core Catalyst® 4500 Distribution & Core: • Traditional deployment • Minimal recommended deployment • Enable at critical points/bottle necks • Typically done on a Layer 3 boundary • Detect threats internal to the VLAN • When deployed on an SVI interface • Detect threats as they traverse the internal network • Move between subnets
  • 25. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Catalyst 6500 (Sup 2T) Flow Record 25 ! flow record CYBER_6K_FLOW_RECORD match ipv4 tos match ipv4 protocol match ipv4 source address match ipv4 destination address match transport source-port match transport destination-port match interface input collect transport tcp flags collect interface output collect counter bytes collect counter packets collect timestamp sys-uptime first collect timestamp sys-uptime last !
  • 26. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public NetFlow Deployment 26 ASA ISR Edge ASR Edge: • Detect threats as they enter and leave the network • Monitor communication between branches • Gain context from edge devices • Application - NBAR • Events & User-ID - NSEL
  • 27. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public ISR Flow Record 27 !
flow record CYBER_ISR_RECORD match ipv4 tos match ipv4 protocol match ipv4 source address match ipv4 destination address match transport source-port match transport destination-port match interface input collect routing next-hop address ipv4 collect ipv4 dscp collect ipv4 ttl minimum collect ipv4 ttl maximum collect transport tcp flags collect interface output collect counter bytes collect counter packets collect timestamp sys-uptime first collect timestamp sys-uptime last collect application name ! Enable NBAR
  • 28. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public ASA NSEL Configuration 28 ! flow-export destination management <ip-address> 2055 ! policy-map global_policy class class-default flow-export event-type all destination <ip-address> ! flow-export template timeout-rate 2 logging flow-export syslogs disable !
  • 29. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Flow Monitor Configuration 29 ! flow monitor CYBER_MONITOR
 record CYBER_RECORD exporter CYBER_EXPORTER cache timeout active 60 cache timeout inactive 15 ! Active Timeout: • Longest amount of time a flow can be in cache without exporting a Flow Record • Recommended 60 seconds • All exporters should have the same timeout Inactive Timeout: • How long a flow can be inactive before being removed from cache • Recommended 15 seconds • All exporters should have the same timeout
  • 30. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Aside: Myths about NetFlow Generation 30 Myth #1: NetFlow impacts performance • Hardware implemented NetFlow has no performance impact • Software implementation is typically significantly <15% processing overhead Myth #2: NetFlow has bandwidth overhead • NetFlow is a summary protocol • Traffic overhead is typically significantly <1% of total traffic per exporting device
  • 31. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Agenda 31 Introduction Understanding the Landscape Introduction to NetFlow Design and Deployment Flow ExportFlow Collection
  • 32. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Flow Collection Considerations 32 Flow Handling • De-duplication • Stitching • Replication Scalability & Performance • # of NetFlow sources • # of users • Flows per second • Sustained vs. burst Your time, resources and budget Feature set • Reporting • Drill down • Retention • Analysis NetFlow NetFlow NetFlow
  • 33. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Components for NetFlow Security Monitoring 33 Cisco Network StealthWatch FlowReplicator • UDP Packet copier • Forward to multiple collection systems NetFlow StealthWatch FlowSensor • Generate NetFlow data StealthWatch FlowSensor VE • Virtual environment • Visibility into ESX StealthWatch FlowCollector • Collect and analyze • Up to 2000 sources • Up to sustained 120,000 fps StealthWatch Management Console • Management and reporting • Up to 25 FlowCollectors • Up 3 million fps globally Best Practice: Centralize collection globally
  • 34. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public NetFlow Collection: Flow Stitching 34 10.2.2.2 port 1024 10.1.1.1 port 80 eth0/1 eth0/2 Start Time Interface Src IP Src Port Dest IP Dest Port Proto Pkts Sent Bytes Sent 10:20:12.221 eth0/1 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 5 1025 10:20:12.871 eth0/2 10.1.1.1 80 10.2.2.2 1024 TCP 17 28712 Start Time Client IP Client Port Server IP Server Port Proto Client Bytes Client Pkts Server Bytes Server Pkts Interfaces 10:20:12.221 10.2.2.2 1024 10.1.1.1 80 TCP 1025 5 28712 17 eth0/1 eth0/2 Uni-directional flow records Bi-directional: • Conversation flow record • Allows easy visualization and analysis
  • 35. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public NetFlow Collection: De-duplication 35 Router A Router B Router C Router A: 10.2.2.2:1024 -> 10.1.1.1:80 Router B: 10.2.2.2:1024 -> 10.1.1.1:80 Router C: 10.1.1.1:80 -> 10.2.2.2:1024 • Without de-duplication: • Traffic volume can be misreported • False positive would occur • Allows for the efficient storage of flow data • Necessary for accurate host-level reporting • Does not discard data 10.2.2.2 port 1024 10.1.1.1 port 80 Duplicates
  • 36. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Conversational Flow Record 36 Who WhoWhat More Details When How
  • 37. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Integrating with a SIEM 37 Log alarms and summary info to SIEM • Complete visibility throughout network • Leverage specialty data handling NetFlowSyslog SDEE SIEM Security Events API API’s to access database • Directly access flow data (ex. getFlows) • Improved scale - collection and retention • Decreased cost
  • 38. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Agenda 38 Introduction Understanding the Landscape Introduction to NetFlow Design and Deployment Flow ExportAdding Context Flow Collection
  • 39. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Context is Critical 39
  • 40. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public ISE as a Telemetry Source 40 Monitor Mode • Open Mode, Multi-Auth • Unobstructed Access • No impact on productivity • Profiling, posture assessment • Gain Visibility Authenticated Session Table Cisco ISE • Maintain historical session table • Correlate NetFlow to username • Build User-centric reports StealthWatch Management Console syslog
  • 41. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Configuration: Logging on ISE 41 1. Create Remote Logging Target on ISE 2. Add Target to Logging Categories 1 2 Required Logging categories: • AAA Audit • RADIUS Accounting • Profiler • Administrative and Operational Audit
  • 42. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Configuration: Add ISE to SMC 42 3 3 4. Add additional ISE nodes 1. (Not Shown) Create Admin User on ISE 2. (Not Shown) Configure ISE or CA certificate on SMC 3. (Shown) Add Cisco ISE to SMC Configuration 4. (Shown) Add additional ISE nodes
  • 43. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Global Intelligence 43 List of known Command and Control Servers
  • 44. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Adding Situational Awareness 44 Client Host Client Host Group Server Host Server Host Groups Application Duratio n Total Traffic Start Active Time 10.201.3.149 Sales and Marketing, End User Devices 89.108.67.143 Russian Federation HTTP 23s 256.56K Jan 11, 2014
  • 45. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Adding Situational Awareness 45 Client User Name Client Host Client Host Group Server Host Server Host Groups Application Duratio n Total Traffic Start Active Time Ken 10.201.3.14 9 Sales and Marketing, End User Devices 89.108.67.143 Russian Federation, Zeus HTTP 23s 256.56K Jan 11, 2014
  • 46. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Agenda 46 Introduction Understanding the Landscape Introduction to NetFlow Design and Deployment Working with NetFlow Flow ExportAdding Context Organizing the data Running Queries and Investigations Flow Collection
  • 47. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Behavioural Analysis & Anomaly Detection 47 Behavioural Analysis: • Leverages knowledge of known bad behaviour Anomaly Detection: • Identify a change from “normal”
  • 48. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public StealthWatch: Indices 48 Concern Index: Track hosts that appear to compromising network integrity Target Index: Track hosts that appear to be victims of the suspicious behaviour of other hosts File Sharing Index: Tracks behaviour that is indicative of peer-to-peer activity
  • 49. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public StealthWatch: Alarms 49 Alarms • Indicate significant behaviour changes and policy violations • Known and unknown attacks generate alarms • Activity that falls outside the baseline, acceptable behaviour or established policies
  • 50. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Host Groups 50 Virtual container of multiple IP Addresses/ranges that have similar attributes Lab servers Best Practice: classify all known IP Addresses in one or more host groups
  • 51. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Policy Tuning 51 Policies can be created for individual host groups Tune alarm thresholds Default policy for Inside and Outside hosts
  • 52. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Flow Query Basics – The Flow Table 52 Filter Filter conditions Details More details
  • 53. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Flow Query Basics - Filtering 53 Select host to investigate All flows in which this host was a client or server
  • 54. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Flow Query Basics - Filtering 54 All flows for 10.10.200.79 in the last hour
  • 55. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Flow Table: Visibility across NAT 55 Inside local Outside global Server User
  • 56. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Querying Events - Leveraging NSEL 56 Flow denied events over many ports
  • 57. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Flow Table – IPv6 57
  • 58. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Host Groups – Targeted Monitoring 58 Suspiciously behaving hosts Alarms Host Group Dashboard for Engineers
  • 59. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Host Groups – Application Report 59 Applications outbound Applications inbound
  • 60. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Host Groups – Targeted Reporting 60 Geo-IP-based Host Group Summary chart of traffic inbound and outbound from this Host Group
  • 61. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Host Groups – Targeted Reporting 61 Traffic inbound Traffic outbound
  • 62. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Host Groups – Discovering Rogue Hosts 62 Catch All: All unclassified RFC1918 addresses Table of all individual hosts
  • 63. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Host Groups – Discovering Rogue Hosts 63 Rogue Hosts
  • 64. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Indicator of Compromise 64 Raw flow analysis Log analysis (SIEM) IDS Alert Outside notification Behavioural analysis Activity monitoring an artifact observed on a network or in operating system that with high confidence indicates a computer intrusion • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indicator_of_compromise
  • 65. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public 65 Attack Lifecycle Model Exploratory Actions Footprint Expansion Execution Theft Disruption Staging Initial Compromise Initial Recon Infiltration (C&C)
  • 66. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public 66 Attack Lifecycle Model Exploratory Actions Footprint Expansion Execution Theft Disruption Staging Initial Compromise Initial Recon Infiltration (C&C) IOC Found: Investigate forwards and backward
  • 67. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Concept: OODA Loop 67 Observe Orient Decide Act Feedback Feedback • Unfolding circumstances • Implicit guidance • Outside information • Unfolding interaction with environment • Cultural Traditions • Genetic Heritage • Analysis & Synthesis • New information • Previous Experiences Unfolding interaction with environment http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop
  • 68. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Identifying the Culprit Indicator of Compromise Is a worm indicated? • Alarm • Alarm Table • Alarm Summary • IDS Alert • Other Host IP Address Worm Tracker Yes Host Snapshot Supplemental Information: • Most recent flows/Active flows • Traffic volume/type • Other Alarms • Exporter interfaces • Activity – scanning? • Thresholds • Touches Identity: • Username • Device type and OS • Access location • Organization/Geo • Role – Client or Server • Hosts affected • Host Groups Affected • Subnets Affected • Ports Used • Protocols Used Is the behaviour normal or permissible? Tune Yes Respond No No 68
  • 69. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Responding to an IOC 69 Create a Host Group for BlackPOS Servers IOC: Crowdstrike publishes list of IP addresses identified as BlackPOS servers IP Addresses
  • 70. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public BlackPOS – Host Locking Violation Alarm 70 Create a Host Lock Violation Alarm for communication to BlackPOS servers Set client hosts to POS terminals Set server hosts to BlackPOS Servers Alarm on FTP traffic Trigger alarm on unsuccessful connections
  • 71. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public BlackPOS - Investigate You know today what you didn’t know yesterday 71 Run a Flow Query Over the last 90 days Server or client includes the known bad BlackPOS IP Addresses Configure application to be FTP
  • 72. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public BlackPOS – Returned Flows 72 Infected hosts BlackPOS Servers FTP Transfers
  • 73. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Investigating Malware Spread: Worm Tracker 73 IOC: IDS Alert indicating a known worm operating inside your network Worm tracker Initial infection Secondary infections Subnets being scanned
  • 74. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Investigating Malware Spread: Host Snapshot 74 Everything the system knows about 10.10.200.59 Start with CI Events. We notice significant scanning activity
  • 75. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Investigating Malware Spread: Identity 75 Telemetry from the ISE Username Infected machine
  • 76. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Investigating Malware Spread: Touched Hosts 76 This infected host has established a connection with another host
  • 77. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Investigating Malware Spread: Touched Hosts 77 All hosts touched by 10.10.200.59
  • 78. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public High Concern Index 78 Baseline deviated by 2,432%!
  • 79. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public What was this Host up to? 79 Target – entire subnet? Scanning on TCP-445
  • 80. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public NetFlow and (D)DoS Detection 80 Identify targets • Target of suspicious activity • Abnormal traffic volume • Decrease in performance Identify attackers
  • 81. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Volumetric DDoS 81 Traffic Spikes
  • 82. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Identifying a DDoS Participant 82 IOC: Notification from 3rd party that your IP Address is participating in a DDoS Public IP address Target server Time of reported attack
  • 83. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Identifying a DDoS Participant 83 Time of reported attack Inside local Outside global Target Server Validate attack activity User
  • 84. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Identify a DDoS Participant 84 Host snapshot Other suspicious activity
  • 85. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Agenda 85 Introduction Understanding the Landscape Introduction to NetFlow Design and Deployment Working with NetFlow Flow ExportAdding Context Summary Organising the data Running Queries and Investigations Flow Collection
  • 86. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Links and Recommended Reading More about the Cisco Cyber Threat Defense Solution: http://www.cisco.com/go/threatdefense http://www.lancope.com 86 Recommended Reading Cyber Threat Defense Cisco Validated Design Guide: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns1015/ns1238/cyber_threat_defense_design_guide.pdf Cyber Threat Defense Cisco Validated Design Guide: http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/collateral/enterprise/design-zone-security/ctd-first-look-design-guide.pdf Securing Cisco Networks with Threat Detection and Analysis (SCYBER) https://learningnetwork.cisco.com/community/certifications/security/cybersecurity/scyber_exam
  • 87. Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.T-SEC-10-I Cisco Public Key Takeaways 87 Modern threats are consistently bypassing the security perimeter Threat Detection requires visibility and context into network traffic NetFlow and the Lancope StealthWatch System provide actionable security intelligence
  • 88. Q & A