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Case 2:12-cv-00075-DLC Document 1 Filed 10/31/12 Page 1 of 23

Carey E. Matovich
Jesse Myers
MATOVICH, KELLER & MURPHY, P.C.
2812 First Avenue North, Suite 225
P.O. Box 1098
Billings, MT 59103-1098
Telephone: (406) 252-5500
Facsimile: (406) 252-4613
Email: cmatovich@mkfinn.com
Email: ;myers@mkfinn.com

John M. Kauffman
Lilia Tyrrell
KASTING, KAUFFMAN & MERSEN, P.C.
716 S. 20th Avenue, Suite 101
Bozeman, MT 59718
Telephone: (406) 586-4383
Facsimile: (406) 587-7871
Email: jkauffman@kkmlaw.net
Email: Ityrrell@kkmlaw.net

A ttorneys for Central Asia Institute

IN TIlE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

BUTTE DIVISION

)
CENTRAL ASIA INSTITUTE, )
) Cause No. CV-I;J.=75-t3u- DLL
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
) FOR JURY TRIAL
PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY )
INSURANCE COMPANY, )
- - - - - - - - - - - ---~)

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial- 1


Defendant. )

Plaintiff Central Asia Institute ("CAl"), by and through its attorneys, files

this Complaint against Defendant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company

("Philadelphia"), and alleges as follows.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. CAl files suit for declaratory relief and for recovery of compensatory

and punitive damages from Philadelphia arising out of Philadelphia's failure to

honor its obligations under its insurance contract with CAl and for its unfair,

erroneous, and bad faith refusal to pay Defense Costs incurred by CAl for covered

claims.

PARTIES

2. CAl is a Delaware 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, with its principle

place of business in Montana. CAl's charitable mission is to empower

communities of Central Asia through literacy and education, especially for girls, to

promote peace through education and convey the importance of these activities

globally.

3. Philadelphia is a foreign insurance company authorized to do business

in Montana. Philadelphia is a Pennsylvania corporation, with its principle place of

business in Pennsylvania.

Complaint and Demand tor Jury Trial- 2


JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. CAl and Philadelphia are citizens of different states and the amount in

controversy in this matter exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. This

Court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b)(2) and

Local Rule 3.2(b).

ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS

6. CAl purchased Philadelphia Commercial Lines Policy No.

PHSD577929 with a Policy Period of December 1,2010, through December 1,

2011 (the "Policy"). A true and correct copy ofthe Policy is attached as Exhibit 1.

7. CAl is the Named Insured Organization under the Policy. The Policy

provides liability insurance for the Organization (CAl), in addition for Individual

Insureds. The Individual Insureds under the Policy include, inter alia, CAl's past,

present, and future officers and directors, including but not limited to its executive

director.

8. During the Policy Period and at all relevant times herein, Greg

Mortenson ("Mortenson") served as CAl's executive director, and is an Individual

Insured under the Policy. CAl has a duty to indemnify Mortenson, as the

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial - 3


executive director of CAl under Delaware law and under an indemnification

resolution passed by its Board of Directors.

9. Under the terms of the Policy, CAl and Mortenson had (and have)

responsibility to defend any Claim made against them. They are obligated to elect

counsel oftheir choice, subject to approval of Philadelphia. Philadelphia's

approval may not be unreasonably withheld.

10. Under the terms of the Policy, Philadelphia has a duty to advance

Defense Cost for investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of claims, in

addition to the Limit of Liability as follows:

If the Insured has assumed the defense of a Claim pursuant to
A. above, the Underwriter shall advance Defense Cost prior
to the final disposition of a Claim ...

11. The Policy defines the term "Defense Cost" as "any reasonable and

necessary legal fees and expenses incurred in the defense of a Claim, whether by

the insured with the Underwriter's consent or directly by Underwriter, in the

investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of a Claim ... " Hereinafter the term

is referred to as "Defense Cost" or "Defense Costs."

12. Payment of Defense Costs by Philadelphia under the Policy is an

obligation which is in addition to, and not part of, the Limit of Liability unless the

applicable Limit of Liability has been exhausted by payment of damage claims.

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. 4


13. CAr incurred Defense Costs for itself and for Mortenson in

connection with the lawsuit initiated against them on or about May 5, 20 II, in the

United States District Court of Montana known as Case No. CV-II-72-M-DWM

("Pfau Litigation").

14. The plaintiffs in the Pfau Litigation claimed to have purchased books

authored by Mortenson entitled Three Cups ofTea and Stones Into Schools. The

complaints filed against Mortenson and CAl in the Pfau Litigation contained a

variety of legal and equitable claims (fraud, deceit, RICO violations breach of

contract, unjust enrichment and constructive trust) all of which were predicated on

the same core set of factual allegations.

IS. The plaintiffs in the Pfau Litigation amended their complaint four

times. CAl timely provided Philadelphia with copies of the First, Second, Third,

and Fourth Amended Complaints filed in the Pfau Litigation. A copy of the Fourth

Amended Complaint is attached as Exhibit 2.

16. The Pfau Litigation at all times involved an attempt to establish a

nationwide class of book purchasers and included motions and briefs on class

certification, discovery, and whether the matter should be dismissed for failing to

state claims upon which relief could be granted.

17. On April 30, 2012, the United States District Court for the District of

Montana dismissed the Fourth Amended Complaint filed in the Pfau Litigation



with prejudice, holding, in part, that the plaintiffs had failed to state claims upon

which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals and that appeal is pending

18. CAl wrote to Philadelphia on May 27, 2011, and again on May 31,

2011, to notify Philadelphia of the Piau Litigation and to request full coverage

under the Policy, including approval of retained counsel (the "May 2011 Notices").

Philadelphia acknowledged receipt ofthe May 2011 Notices on June 2, 2011.

19. Separately from the May 2011 Notices, Mortenson notified

Philadelphia of the Piau Litigation on or about June 9, 2011, and requested full

coverage under the Policy including approval of counsel. Philadelphia

acknowledged receipt of Mortenson's notice of loss on June 17,2011.

20. Given the complex and nation-wide issues presented in the Piau

Litigation and the fact that it was filed in the United States District Court in the

State of Montana, it was reasonable and necessary for CAl and Mortenson to

engage both Montana counsel and national counsel with experience in RICO, class

action, and the other claims in this litigation, which they had done, and of which

they timely notified Philadelphia.

21. Following receipt ofthe complaint in the Piau Litigation, CAl

incurred reasonable and necessary Defense Costs investigating, preparing to



defend, and defending itself and Mortenson against the allegations therein, and

continues to do so with respect to the appeal.

22. CAl also incurred Defense Costs for itself and for Mortenson in

connection with investigations initiated against them beginning in May of2011, by

the Office of the Attorney General ofMontana

23. On or about September 16,2011, CAl (i) notified Philadelphia of its

defense in the AG Matter, (ii) provided Philadelphia with applicable

correspondence from the Office of the Montana Attorney General; and (iii)

requested full coverage under the Policy including but not limited to approval of

retained counsel. Philadelphia received the September 16, 2011, notice from CAL

24. On or about May 27 and 31, June 21, and August 1, 2011, Mortenson

(i) notified Philadelphia of his defense in the AG Matter; (ii) provided Philadelphia

with applicable correspondence from the Office ofthe Montana Attorney General;

and (iii) requested full coverage under the Policy including approval of retained

counsel. Philadelphia received the May 27 and 31, June 21, and August 1, 201 I,

notices from Mortenson.

25. CAl and Mortenson had each retained legal counsel to assist them

with the AG Matter. Given the complex issues presented in the AG Matter, it was

reasonable for CAl and Mortenson to engage both Montana counsel and counsel



with experience working with administrative attorneys general investigations

involving non-profit corporations and their directors.

26. On AprilS, 2012, CAl, Mortenson and the Office of the Montana

Attorney General entered into a Settlement Agreement and Assurance of Voluntary

Compliance regarding the AG Matter. CAl incurred Defense Costs for both itself

and Mortenson, as that term is defined in the Policy, to achieve this result.

27. The Piau Litigation and the AG Matter (collectively, the "Claims")

are covered matters within the Policy. Philadelphia must pay the Defense Costs

incurred by CAl for itself and Mortenson in connection with the Claims.

28. CAl has complied with ail applicable conditions precedent to entitle it

to the benefits afforded by the Policy with respect to payment of Defense Costs for

the Claims.

29. CAl regularly provided Philadelphia with copies of legal bills it

received (and which it had paid) from its defense counsel and requested that

Philadelphia recognize its duty to pay and advance to CAl the Defense Cost it was

incurring. CAl did not receive a reservation of rights letter from Philadelphia in

which Philadelphia set forth any facts or law that might relieve Philadelphia of its

obligation to provide full coverage under the Policy, until after significant Defense

Costs for the Claims had been incurred.



30. On or about December 6, 2011, Philadelphia first acknowledged that

the Piau Litigation and AG Matter constituted Claims during the Policy Period.

31. In the December 6, 20 II letter, Philadelphia claimed it issued CAl a

"reservation of rights on June 17,2011." CAl never received such a "reservation

of rights" on or about June 17,2011.

32. Mortenson received a letter from Philadelphia on or about June 17,

2011, in which Philadelphia only discussed why it might reserve its rights.

33. Before December 6, 2011, Philadelphia never informed CAl of Policy

defenses it intended to raise or provided CAl a reasonable explanation based upon

the applicable facts and law of why CAl may not receive advances or

reimbursements for all Defense Costs.

34. Before December 6, 2011, Philadelphia never stated or suggested that

CAlor Mortenson should not retain counselor should not proceed with the defense

of all ofthe Claims, as required by the Policy. Philadelphia did not state or suggest

that any portion of the Defense Cost might be apportioned in a manner designated

by Philadelphia.

35. On or about December 6,20 II, Philadelphia wrote to CAl and

repudiated its duty to advance Defense Cost in full. For the first time, Philadelphia

claimed it was only obligated to reimburse CAl for 35% of the Defense Cost

incurred by CAl in defending the Piau Litigation; 25% of the Defense Cost



incurred by Mortenson in defending the Piau Litigation; 20% of the Defense Cost

incurred by Mortenson in defending the AG Matter; and 100% of the Defense Cost

incurred by CAl in defending the AG Matter. By presenting the foregoing

allocation percentages, Philadelphia misrepresented its obligations under the

Policy.

36. Philadelphia contended that it could allocate in the manner discussed

in its December 6,2011, letter based upon the following provision in Part 6,

Section XIX ofthe Policy (the "Allocation Provision"):

If both Loss covered by this Policy and Loss not covered by this Policy are
incurred either because a Claim includes both covered and uncovered
matters, or because a Claim is made against both the Individual Insured
and/or the Organization, and others, the Insured and the Underwriter shall
use their best efforts to agree upon a fair and proper allocation of such
amount between covered Loss and uncovered loss. Any such allocation
shall be based upon the relative legal exposures of the parties to covered and
uncovered matters.

37. Philadelphia may not use the "Allocation Clause" to limit the scope of

its obligation to advance or reimburse 100% of the Defense Costs incurred by CAl

in connection with the Claims because:

a. The Allocation Clause, as interpreted by Philadelphia, is

contrary to Montana law. Moreover, the claims in both the Piau Litigation

as well as the claims in the AG matter were so inextricably intertwined so as

to make them inseparable when it came to incurring the attorneys' fees and

costs defending the same. As a result, it is unreasonable to attempt to



allocate Defense Costs amongst the claims and Philadelphia is responsible

for 100% of the Defense Costs.

b. Philadelphia has acquiesced to the choices of counsel made by

CAl and Mortenson and to the amounts incurred by CAl in defending CAl

and Mortenson on the Claims. Philadelphia has not properly reserved its

rights and is estopped from (i) challenging the reasonableness and necessity

of hiring the counsel chosen by CAl and Mortenson; (ii) challenging the

amounts incurred by CAl and Mortenson in defending against the Claims

and; (iii) reimbursing CAl, in full, for the entire Defense Costs it has

incurred for itself and Mortenson in connection with the Claims.

38. In addition to imposing an arbitrary allocation percentage to reduce its

obligation to CAl, Philadelphia also attempted in its December 6, 20 11, letter to

lower the rate it would compensate the attorneys hired by CAl and Mortenson,

though Philadelphia had knowledge these attorneys had been engaged at contracted

rates since May, 20 11, and they had already undertaken significant efforts in

defending the Claims.

39. By email datedJanuaryI8.2012.Philadelphia belatedly requested

that retained defense counsel provide litigation plans and budgets for the Claims.



40. By email dated January 19, 2012, Philadelphia belatedly attempted to

unilaterally impose reporting and billing "guidelines" on the previously retained

defense counsel.

41. Despite Philadelphia receiving notice of one or more of the Claims

beginning in May of 20 II, Philadelphia made no payment to CAl for Defense

Costs for over a year, including the "allocations" suggested in its December 6,

2011, letter. In the interim, CAl had incurred and paid hundreds of thousands of

dollars in Defenses Costs for itself and Mortenson, for which Philadelphia was

responsible.

42. CAl made numerous pleas to Philadelphia to pay Defense Costs, but

the pleas were ignored or received substantially and unreasonably delayed

responses.

43. As of August 13,2012, more than fourteen (14) months after litigation

in the Piau Litigation and the AG matter had been commenced and after the

majority of anticipated Defense Costs had been incurred, Philadelphia had only

reimbursed CAl for less than 6% of the Defense Cost CAl had incurred for itself

and Mortenson in defending the Claims.

44. On August 27,2012, Philadelphia issued a second letter with new

proposed percentages for covering Defense Costs. In the August 17, 20 II, letter,

Philadelphia proposed to reimburse CAl 33% of the defense fees and costs



incurred by Mortenson in the Piau litigation prior to the Fourth Amended

Complaint; 15% of Mortenson's defense fees and costs in the Piau litigation after

the Fourth Amended Complaint; 35% "allocation" of defense fees and costs

incurred by CAl in the Piau Litigation; 50% of Mortenson's defense fees and costs

for the AG matter; and 100% of CAl's costs for the AG matter, with CAT's fees

to be "adjusted" to "Philadelphia's agreed upon rates and less certain deductions."

By presenting the foregoing allocation percentages and arbitrary rate

modifications, Philadelphia misrepresented its obligations under the Policy.

45. Philadelphia is estopped from attempting to impose the allocations

and fee reductions reflected in its December 6,2011, and August 27, 2012, letters.

The Policy directs the insureds (CAl and Mortenson) to initially assume full

control of their defense, which they did with the full knowledge and acquiescence

of Philadelphia, with Philadelphia's full knowledge of and acquiescence in the

rates charged by the defense attorneys, and with Philadelphia's full knowledge and

acquiescence that a full defense was necessary.

46. Despite numerous communications by CAl to Philadelphia regarding

payments, Philadelphia refuses to pay all of CAl's and Mortenson's Defense Costs

arising from the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of the Claims.

Philadelphia has not even paid CAl the amounts Philadelphia had agreed to pay in

its December 6, 2011, and August 27, 2012, letters.



47. Philadelphia has acted in bad faith by refusing to acknowledge the

applicable scope of coverage of the Claims, refusing to engage in timely and

meaningful communications with CAl, refusing to pay and advance the reasonable

and necessary Defense Cost associated with the Claims; and attempting to

arbitrarily reduce fees incurred by CAl and Mortenson.

COUNT I
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTRE: DEFENSE COST

48. CAl incorporates by reference the enumerated paragraphs above, as if

fully set forth herein.

49. Under the Policy, Philadelphia has both a duty to defend (by paying

Defense Costs) and a duty to indemnify (pay damages). The duty to defend is

broader than the duty to indemnify. Philadelphia must pay Defense Costs if any

facts or allegations bring the Claims even potentially within the protection

purchased by CAl, even if the claims are groundless, false or fraudulent.

50. CAl has complied with the terms of the Policy in order to receive the

benefits ofthe Policy. It timely paid its premiums for the Policy. It timely

provided Philadelphia with notice of the Claims. CAl has complied with all

material terms of the Policy. CAl and Mortenson have incurred and paid hundreds

of thousands of dollars in Defense Costs, which are Philadelphia's responsibility.


------ - - - - - - - - - - -


51. Under the Policy, Philadelphia has an obligation to pay, advance

and/or reimburse CAl and Mortenson all reasonable and necessary Defense Costs

CAl has incurred for itself and Mortenson in connection with the Claims.

52. CAl has repeatedly demanded payment ofthe reasonable and

necessary Defense Costs incurred in defending the Claims.

53. Philadelphia has improperly refused to pay, advance or reimburse all

ofthe reasonable and necessary Defense Costs incurred by CAl on behalf of itself

and Mortenson.

54. An actual controversy exists between the parties regarding their

respective rights and remedies under the Policy. CAl contends Philadelphia has no

legal right under the Policy or under Montana law (i) to allocate percentages of

Defense Costs it will pay under the Policy; (ii) to impose below market rates it

arbitrarily determines approporiate and to pay less than the actual fees incurred by

CAl and Mortenson for Defense Costs for the Claims; (iii) to withhold payment to

CAl of the Defense Costs it has already incurred in connection with the Claims or

(iv) to refuse to advance on-going Defense Cost for the Claims.

55. A declaration of rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and

Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would alleviate the uncertainty

facing CAl with regard to Philadelphia's obligations under the Policy to pay and

advance Defense Cost arising from the Claims.


- - - - - - - - - - - - " " ,.. _-,_ ..,-,,--


56. CAl is entitled to a declaration that under the terms of the Policy,

Philadelphia (i) may not allocate a percentage of Defense Costs it will pay under

the Policy for fees and costs incurred in connection with the Claims; (ii) may not

impose below market rates it arbitrarily determines approporiate and pay less than

the actual fees incurred by CAl and Mortenson for Defense Costs for the Claims;

(iii) must reimburse CAl all of the Defense Costs CAl incurred for itself and

Mortenson in connection with the Claims and (iv) must advance on-going Defense

Cost for the Claims in the appeal of the Piau Litigation.

COUNT II
BREACH OF CONTRACT



58. Under the applicable standards of Montana law and the Policy,

Philadelphia is obligated to pay and advance all of the reasonable Defense Costs

CAl incurred for itself and Mortenson with respect to the Claims. Philadelphia

must pay and advance the same, according to the Policy, "prior to the final

disposition of a claim."

59. An insurer's defense-payment obligation is broader than its obligation

to indemnify.



60. CAl has complied with all conditions and obligations under the Policy

regarding its rights to receive Defense Costs from Philadelphia with respect to the

Claims.

61. Philadelphia breached the Policy by denying it has the obligation to

pay, advance or reimburse the reasonable and necessary Defense Costs CAl has

incurred for itself and Mortenson and will continue to incur in defense and appeal

of the Claims.

62. Because Philadelphia has not paid according to the Policy terms, CAl

been damaged. CAl has paid for Defense Costs without being reimbursed the

same. CAl has had to advance Defense Costs that it would not have had to

advance but for Philadelphia's intransigence. CAl has had to engage legal counsel

to enforce its rights under the Policy.

63. CAl has suffered the foregoing damages despite having paid

substantial premiums to Philadelphia for the Policy.

64. CAl is entitled to a judgment in its favor and against Philadelphia in

an amount proven at trial that will compensate CAl for the damages incurred by

Philadelphia's breach of the Policy, together with CAl's reasonable attorney's fees

and costs.

65. Once CAl provided notice to Philadelphia of the Claims, it should

have paid, advanced or reimbursed the Defense Costs. The Defense Costs are an



amount certain due on a date certain and, as a result, CAl is entitled to recover pre

judgment interest on the amount owed at the rate of 10% per annum.

COUNT III

UNFAIR TRADE PRACITCES



67. CAl properly gave Philadelphia notice of the Claims and the Claims

included "Wrongful Acts" and "Claims," as those terms are defined in the Policy.

68. Philadelphia knew it had an obligation to advance timely and

complete Defense Costs for the Claims.

69. Philadelphia wrongfully refused (and continues to refuse) to pay and

advance the reasonable and necessary Defense Costs incurred by CAl for itself and

Mortenson.

70. Philadelphia unreasonably withheld (and continues to withhold)

payment of reasonable and necessary Defense Costs despite CAl's full compliance

with all Policy requirements. Such withholding is with the wrongful intent of

depriving CAl of its rights.

71. Philadelphia failed to use reasonable care in the exercise ofits

relationship with CAL Philadelphia has not acted as a reasonable insurer would

have acted under the same or similar facts and circumstances.



72. Philadelphia's actions in regard to CAl's claims for Defense Costs

were without justification or excuse. At worse, they were taken in bad faith and

without regard to the adverse effect it would have on CAL At best, Philadelphia's

conduct is grossly negligent and oppressive. In any event, its actions were taken to

further Philadelphia's own improper objectives and with disregard for the interests

of CAI, to the prejudice and detriment of CAl in violation of Montana law.

73. Philadelphia has violated subparagraphs (1), (4), and (5) of Montana's

Unfair Trade Practices Act, Section 33-18-20 I, MCA, by misrepresenting pertinent

facts or insurance policy provisions relating to coverage at issue, by refusing to pay

claims for Defense Cost without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon

all available information, and/or by failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims

within a reasonable time, causing CAl to suffer injury, damage and loss, giving

rise to a general tort action in favor of CAl pursuant to Section 33-18-242, MCA.

74. Philadelphia knew at all times that it was unlawful to misrepresent

pertinent facts or Policy provisions relating to coverage at issue in handling claims.

75. Philadelphia knew at all times that it was unlawful to disregard

pertinent policy provisions and/or refuse to pay claims without conducting a

reasonable investigation based upon all available information, and giving due

consideration to the plain language of its insurance contract, both as to the

particular facts and the applicable law governing the claim.



76. Philadelphia knew at all times that in return for the premiums paid by

CAl, it was obligated to adjust, pay and advance Defense Costs in accordance with

the terms, provisions and requirements of the Policy and Montana law.

77. Philadelphia knowingly applied its own internal procedures and rules

in intentional and conscious disregard of the applicable provisions of the Policy

and Montana law, all for the purpose of enhancing its profit at CAl's expense and

gaining unfair advantage over its competitors, and in conscious disregard of the

certainty that CAl, which had the right to rely and did rely upon Philadelphia's

false promises and misrepresentations, would suffer injury as a result.

78. At all relevant times, Philadelphia acted in conscious disregard of, or

indifference to, the knowledge that its arbitrary and unjustifiable conduct injured

CAl, and did so pursuant to policies, procedures and programs designed and

calculated to justify wrongdoing in the process of adjusting legitimate claims and

evade the responsibility imposed upon all legitimate insurers to reimburse insureds

in strict accordance with the promises set forth in the Policy.

79. Philadelphia's acts, decisions, and conduct clearly and convincingly

demonstrate actual malice, actual fraud, or both. CAl is entitled to a judgment in

its favor and against Philadelphia for punitive damages in an amount to be proven

at trial. CAl should be awarded such damages against CAl for the purpose of

disgorging from Philadelphia all ill-gotten gains obtained through such wrongful

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial" 20


behavior, taking the profit out of unlawful claim handling practices, punishing and

making an example of Philadelphia sufficient to deter similar fraudulent and

malicious behavior by it and all other insurers doing business in Montana now and

forever in the future, all in accordance with the strict procedural and substantive

protections afforded by Montana law.

80. As a result of Philadelphia's wrongful conduct, CAl has been required

to obtain counsel to represent its interests in pursuing this claim. As a result, CAl

has incurred, and will continue to incur, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in

order to establish its right to compensation for Defense Costs under the Policy.

WHEREFORE, CAl respectfully prays for the Court grant CAl the

following relief;

1. Issue a judgment in favor of CAl and against Philadelphia declaring

that Philadelphia, as a matter of fact and law, is obligated to pay and advance all

sums for all of the Defense Costs CAl incurred for itself and Mortenson for the

Claims, and that Philadelphia's duty to pay and advance all of the Defense Costs

will continue until the Claims are finally resolved;

2. Issue a judgment in favor of CAl and against Philadelphia for

Philadelphia's breach of the terms of the Policy and awarding CAl compensatory

damages and pre-judgment interest as proven at trial;

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial - 2 J


3. Issue a judgment in favor of CAl and against Philadelphia for

Philadelphia's violation of Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act, awarding CAl

compensatory and punitive damages as proven at trial;

4. Issue a judgment in favor of CAl and against Philadelphia awarding

CAl its reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter, together with costs and

disbursements as allowed by law or in equity; and

5. Issue an Order granting CAl such other and further relief as the Court

deems just and proper under the circumstances.

DATED this 31 st day of October, 2012.

MATOVICH, KELLER & MURPHY, P.C.

By: lsi Carey E. Matovich
Carey E. Matovich
Jesse Myers

KASTING, KAUFFMAN & MERSEN, p.e.
By: lsi John M Kaufftnan
John M. Kauffinan
Lilia Tyrrell

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff Central Asia Institute hereby demands a jury for all issues properly

triable by a jury in this matter.

DATED this 31 st day of October, 2012.



MATOVICH, KELLER & MURPHY, P.e.

By: /s/ Carey E. Matovich
Carey E. Matovich
Jesse Myers

KASTING, KAUFFMAN & MERSEN, P.e.

By: /s/ John M Kaufftnan
John M. Kauffman
Lilia Tyrrell


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