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Preparing for a PCI forensic investigation  ,[object Object],Copyright 2010
[object Object],[object Object],What is a QIRA?
David Barnett ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[email_address]  or  [email_address] net Copyright 2010
Why this talk ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Breaches effect all merchant levels
Level 4 Merchants
Multi-Site Franchises
Big Corporations
Incident Response Plans should basically the same for all merchant levels
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Lessons from 100+ CC investigations
How did we get here?
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
 
Let’s talk a little about breaches
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],A credit card breach = PCI forensics onsite
How are merchants notified? or “Why are they picking on me?” ,[object Object],[object Object]
In this case, the similarity is a single business where all of the stolen credit cards had been used before the cards had been involved in fraudulent activity. This could potentially be the sign of an employee skimming card numbers, or a breach in a database. There are always going to be coincidences involving data on a large scale, but because of the scale, it’s very difficult to end up with false positive fraud once a margin of error is established.
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
“Hello, you’ve been breached” Now what? Now what? Now what? Now what?
It is important to move swiftly  ,[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Visa Fraud Investigations CISP Team has their own agenda, though they state the following:
Account Data Compromise Recovery (ADCR) process: ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
From Breach to Fraud - Typical Timeline
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Compromised Account Management System (CAMS):
Post notification, know  what your expected to do, what you need to do, and the difference
Visa mandated steps in event of a suspected payment card data breach ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
What your expected to do by the card associations ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Focus areas during the forensic investigation ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Be sure to contact - Be sure to contact - ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Know the key stakeholders
..and know them intimately  Merchant POS Software/hardware Merchant Bank Card Association Payment Gateway Acquiring  Bank Processor
Be Prepared to Answer the Following ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Per Visa - Identify and establish relationships agreements with key vendors, including: ,[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Visa and MasterCard are not interested in forensics, they are interested in risk mitigation. ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Important breach issues Breach Issues Action Items ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Breach Fines (the ugly truth) (the ugly truth)
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fines; according to the card associations
Monthly Prohibited Data Storage Violation Fines Months   Months 1-3 Months 4-6 Months 7 and up Merchant Level 1   $10,000 $50,000 $100,000 Merchant Level 2  $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 Fines for Merchant Data Compromise Up to $600,000 for non-compliance with PCI DSS requirements.Issuer Recovery Cost of Fraud. Charges that occurred on all exposed cards from the compromised location.The cost of the forensic investigation.The cost to replace exposed credit cards. Up to $600,000 for non-compliance with PCI DSS requirements.Issuer Recovery Cost of Fraud. Charges that occurred on all exposed cards from the compromised location.The cost of the forensic investigation.The cost to replace exposed credit cards.
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],In reality, fines have been handed down with no consistency
The Heartland Data Breach Aftermath  ,[object Object]
Other issues to deal with
Make sure you know a qualified lawyer and call them  immediately A good lawyer can make all the difference in the penalty phase
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Interview your lawyer
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Merchant Bank
Hardware/Software Vendors ,[object Object]
Where does the responsibility lay?
Large Merchants ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
The “favorites” game ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
In an interesting development, a handful of issuing banks impacted by the Heartland breach have filed a  class action lawsuit  against two acquiring banks related to Heartland Payment Systems. According to this  article , the issuing banks are unhappy with Heartland's proposed settlement with Visa.  This appears and to be an attempted end-run around the  proposed $60 million settlement  with Visa.  It also may demonstrate that issuing banks are not satisfied with the dispute resolution mechanisms under the  Visa Operating Regulations  (the  Account Data Compromise Recovery  process estimated the loss at $140 million, yet the settlement was for only $60 million), and their ability to be made whole under those mechanisms. From 01/21/2010 www.infolawgroup.com
Breach Trends ,[object Object],[object Object]
TrustWave Hospitality: 38%*Financial services: 19%Retail: 14%Food and beverage:13% Verizon  CyberTrust Retail: 31% Financial services: 30% Food and beverage:14% Hospitality:6%  Other: 17% Symantec Education: 27% Government: 20% Health care:15% Financial :14%  .............
Trend Analysis  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Definite trends can be seen when viewed outside the confines of each of the forensics company
Next up ..... banks ,[object Object],[object Object]

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How really to prepare for a credit card compromise (PCI) forensics investigation: A ex-QIRA speaks out - David Barnett

  • 1.
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5. Breaches effect all merchant levels
  • 9. Incident Response Plans should basically the same for all merchant levels
  • 10.
  • 11. How did we get here?
  • 12.
  • 13.  
  • 14. Let’s talk a little about breaches
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18. In this case, the similarity is a single business where all of the stolen credit cards had been used before the cards had been involved in fraudulent activity. This could potentially be the sign of an employee skimming card numbers, or a breach in a database. There are always going to be coincidences involving data on a large scale, but because of the scale, it’s very difficult to end up with false positive fraud once a margin of error is established.
  • 19.
  • 20. “Hello, you’ve been breached” Now what? Now what? Now what? Now what?
  • 21.
  • 22.
  • 23.
  • 24. From Breach to Fraud - Typical Timeline
  • 25.
  • 26. Post notification, know what your expected to do, what you need to do, and the difference
  • 27.
  • 28.
  • 29.
  • 30.
  • 31.
  • 32. Know the key stakeholders
  • 33. ..and know them intimately Merchant POS Software/hardware Merchant Bank Card Association Payment Gateway Acquiring Bank Processor
  • 34.
  • 35.
  • 36.
  • 37.
  • 38.
  • 39. Breach Fines (the ugly truth) (the ugly truth)
  • 40.
  • 41. Monthly Prohibited Data Storage Violation Fines Months Months 1-3 Months 4-6 Months 7 and up Merchant Level 1 $10,000 $50,000 $100,000 Merchant Level 2 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 $5,000 $25,000 $50,000 Fines for Merchant Data Compromise Up to $600,000 for non-compliance with PCI DSS requirements.Issuer Recovery Cost of Fraud. Charges that occurred on all exposed cards from the compromised location.The cost of the forensic investigation.The cost to replace exposed credit cards. Up to $600,000 for non-compliance with PCI DSS requirements.Issuer Recovery Cost of Fraud. Charges that occurred on all exposed cards from the compromised location.The cost of the forensic investigation.The cost to replace exposed credit cards.
  • 42.
  • 43.
  • 44. Other issues to deal with
  • 45. Make sure you know a qualified lawyer and call them immediately A good lawyer can make all the difference in the penalty phase
  • 46.
  • 47.
  • 48.
  • 49. Where does the responsibility lay?
  • 50.
  • 51.
  • 52. In an interesting development, a handful of issuing banks impacted by the Heartland breach have filed a class action lawsuit against two acquiring banks related to Heartland Payment Systems. According to this article , the issuing banks are unhappy with Heartland's proposed settlement with Visa.  This appears and to be an attempted end-run around the proposed $60 million settlement with Visa.  It also may demonstrate that issuing banks are not satisfied with the dispute resolution mechanisms under the Visa Operating Regulations (the Account Data Compromise Recovery process estimated the loss at $140 million, yet the settlement was for only $60 million), and their ability to be made whole under those mechanisms. From 01/21/2010 www.infolawgroup.com
  • 53.
  • 54. TrustWave Hospitality: 38%*Financial services: 19%Retail: 14%Food and beverage:13% Verizon CyberTrust Retail: 31% Financial services: 30% Food and beverage:14% Hospitality:6% Other: 17% Symantec Education: 27% Government: 20% Health care:15% Financial :14% .............
  • 55.
  • 56. Definite trends can be seen when viewed outside the confines of each of the forensics company
  • 57.

Notas do Editor

  1. mom and pop restaurant, bar, coffee shop, bed and breakfast
  2. multiple franchise sites all over the country during a typical breach timeframe
  3. The large news breaking type
  4. Why are
  5. This behavior is typical with larger level 1 merchants whereas, level 4 merchants often just go bankrupt.
  6. The merchant POC for fraud typically is in the PCI group
  7. If a POS is retaining track data, who removes the old data, upgrades the software, New software/hardware
  8. The aftermath of this incident is still in flux The issue still exists
  9. Heard of the practice of shopping for QSA’s?