2014-02-28 webinar by Laurel Paget-Seekins

1. Social and Political Implications of
BRT as a Neoliberal Contradiction
Laurel Paget-Seekins
February 28, 2014
BRT Centre Webinar Series

2. Agenda
1. Background
i. Bus formalization in developing cities
ii. Case study examples
iii. Defining neoliberal
2. Dominant BRT model
i. Creating markets
ii. Entrepreneurial urban governance
3. Contradictions
i. Increasing publicness/role of the state
ii. Increasing potential for collective action
iii. Challenging automobility
4. Implications and remaining questions
2

3. Transit Formalization
• Goal to reduce externalities of ‘informal’ mass
transport model
– congestion caused by buses
– unsafe driving and bus conditions
– pollution
• Competition for the market, not in the market
– massive consolidation of bus operators
– area contracting/public system
– larger/new buses requires investment
• Often switch to trunk and feeder system, ideally
includes fare integration (free transfers)
3

4. BRT as Formalization Tool
• Requires large buses/significant investment,
elimination of on the street competition
• Governments must operate service or create a
formal market from which to purchase bus
service
• Not just a secondary impact of BRT,
formalization can be part of the primary
motivation
4

5. Delhi
Ahmedabad
Johannesburg
Santiago
Quito
Bogota
Set of Examples
Mexico City
5

6. Neoliberalism (re)Defined
• Market-based governance, doesn’t have to imply
deregulation or small role of the state, state is
needed to enforce and protect markets
• A transformed state and market relationship
around a set of interests and elites, increase or
maintain inequality
• The need for the state is a contradiction between
the theory and practice
• Creates the possibility, especially in the Global
South, neoliberal tools can be used to reach
progressive or redistributive ends
6

7. Entrepreneurial Urban Governance
• Urban investment as a negotiation between
international finance and local powers to
maximize attractiveness of a city for capitalist
development.
• Takes the form of public-private partnership,
speculative in nature, public takes the risk and
private gets the profits
(David Harvey, From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The
Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism, 1989)
7

8. Dominant BRT Model
• Public-private partnerships- government
oversight agency with private operators
• Government creates market to contract bus
operations from large companies
• Not ‘free market’-nature of the companies
depends on relationship between state and
existing operators, creates winners and losers
• Risk taken on by government, but goal to
minimize government subsidies
8

9. BRT as Entrepreneurial Urban
Governance
• BRT not only about creating accessibility or
improving existing transportation system
• How service designed impacts whose
transportation needs are met by it
• Can be to improve the image and ability of the
city to attract other investment, part of urban
redevelopment plans
• Branding is often identified as key BRT
component
9

10. The Bogotá Model
Started BRT network in 2000, now implementing integrated
system with remaining bus service
International BRT model, not just for network design but
operations and organization
Special Purpose Vehicle- government agency to oversee
contracted service, 5 consortiums control over 70% of contracts
Designed to not need operating subsidies, created two-tier fare
The tendering process is designed to deliver this lucrative business to the
same seven families who monopolize most of Bogotá’s transport…
-Jaime Caidedo, councillor for the Polo Democrático Alternativo (Public World)
10

11. The Santiago Risk
In 2007 Chile created formalized integrated Transantiago.
Government took on the risk to attract international capital, and
ended up spending millions of public funds. In part because initially
the companies took advantage of their limited risk contracts and
didn’t operate the service as needed.
The argument for private sector operations is innovation. But
innovation can be negative - how to fulfill the letter but not the
spirit of contracts. Contracts renegotiated 17 times in 6 years.
… the investors and the banks said “we need a guarantee from the state” because this is a
change of system and if there is no guarantee from the state there is no operation…
- Transantiago official, now working for a bus company
11

12. The Quito Exception
Opened their first corridor in 1995 and created a public
company to operate it.
In 2010 all 5 BRT corridors consolidated in a public
company.
Fare is still 25 US cents.
To be the best Company in management, development, innovation, and integration of
sustainable urban transportation, contributing to improve the quality of life of the
citizens of the Quito Metropolitan area using human and technological resources at the
highest level. - Empresa Pública Metropolitana de Transporte de Pasajeros de Quito
12

13. Political Context
• Chile and Colombia have a history of
neoliberal economic and political reforms that
originally took place under the threat of
violence
• Neoliberal model for BRT encouraged by
international development banks and NGOs
• Model is transferred to countries with
different political economic context
13

14. The Entrepreneurial Ahmedabad
Used Bogotá model and set up Special Purpose Vehicle despite
having an existing public bus company
Regular (lower fare) service cut as BRT corridors open to protect the
BRT from competition, hurts accessibility for the poor, and hurts
already financially struggling public bus company
BRT part of larger redevelopment effort in Ahmedabad to promote
image of ‘world class’ city, for example service goes to newly
redeveloped lake attraction
We used to sell vegetables near circle at Khodiyarnagar… But due to road widening we were displaced
to the highway on BRTS route… Where will we go? How will we earn?- Champaben Fatabhai, vendor
14

15. The Mexico City Gentrification
Line 4 on narrow streets connecting historic downtown to airport
Opposed by merchants, street vendors, neighbors for taking parking,
access to stores, vending space, they questioned the reason for Line
4 since area served by metro
Sense by neighbors and street vendors the project was part of a
larger effort to clean-up the historic center and make it more tourist
and investment friendly
It should be for not only the street to look pretty but for the neighbors to improve their
quality of life, ... little by little they are taking us out of the historic center, they are looking to
eliminate the lower and poorer classes to bring people with higher incomes to create a
beautiful city with beautiful people. – Historic Center Neighborhood Leader
15

16. The Delhi Counter-Example
Pilot of 6.8 km with cycle tracks and sidewalks opened in 2008
Rejected the Bogotá model, used an open corridor didn’t create a
new operating company or two-tier fare system.
Designed system to serve the lowest income residents in opposition
to the Delhi metro which BRT advocates thought was being built to
serve middle-class riders as part of an attempt to sell Delhi as a
‘world class’ city.
“There has to be a forum through which pedestrians, cyclists, and bus users can express
their views, because they constitute the majority of users on the road, but there is no forum,
they have no way of articulating their ideas, their experiences … As long as this forum does
not emerge the politics of road use is not going to change.” Dunu Roy, Hazards Centre
16

17. The Contradictions
• Admits that public transit is a public service/good that
requires market intervention
• Introduces public funding and increases ‘publicness’
• Creates the possibility for more public involvement and
accountability by urban residents
• Increases the power of collective action for workers by
switching from individual competition to salary employees
• Premise is allocating public space to bus riders (and
nonmotorized mode users) which is a direct challenge to
automobility and car ownership
• Represents a technology transfer between countries in the
Global South, it is possible to create own development
models without copying failed models from the North
17

18. Public Good and Investment
• Impetus for BRT/formalization is to address
market failures
• New regulatory regime recognizes transit as a
public good with state interest to regulate
• Introduces public funding – for capital costs
and in some cases for operations
• Public ownership of infrastructure
18

19. Political Publicness
• Transport always an issue of public debate,
but formalization/BRT projects places it firmly
in public discourse
• Increases the legitimacy for public input and
participation in transport decision-making
• The public is different than the government-
the role of the civic realm is still undefined
19

20. Triangle of Publicness
Private Sector
Operating Companies
Public Sector
Government Agencies
Civic Sector
Riders, citizens, community organizations
Operating Contracts
Public Good
Public Funding
Public Space
Public
Politics
20

21. Opening for Public Participation
• Public participation requires some sense of
public ownership; people have to believe they
have a right to participate
• How does the mix of public-private ownership
complicate the understanding?
• What is the method of accountability for
public funds and public (monopoly) contracts?
21

22. Collective Action
• Changes the incentives for drivers from individual
competition to collective action
• Drivers (and other bus company employees) are
now in the formal economy
• Overall working conditions have improved,
although the possibility to own your own bus no
longer exists
• The role of unions depends on the political
context; however, workers have generally played
very little role in the transition or design of
projects
22

23. The Johannesburg Context
Has a very strong existing informal minibus taxi sector with a violent
history. New BRT service is operated by company made up of taxi
owners.
Consultants from a Bogotá company were brought in to help the
company, but parted ways in part due to different experience with
unions.
Transport union organizing BRT workers with more success than taxi
workers and workers report much better conditions.
“With proper investment, workers and passengers can enjoy a well-functioning public
transport system. SATAWU’s strong leadership has correctly focused on organizing informal
workers, while campaigning strongly for a better system.” Eddie Dickson, union leader
23

24. Automobility
• Automobility- the use of automobiles as the
major means of transportation
• Pervasive organizing principle for urban time and
space, with widespread impacts
• Is a consumptive, individualistic, ‘private’ means
of transportation
• Exacerbates inequality of access
• Urban space designed for auto use, cars
prioritized other modes
(Merriam-Webster, Sheller & Urry)
24

25. Conflicts over Space
• Urban mobility space is not allocated
democratically
• A premise of BRT is more equitable allocation,
dedicating space for bus and non-motorized
mode users
• But this requires political conflict and
governments respond differently to conflict,
and who loses space differs
25

26. Principled Delhi
• Pilot on a busy corridor created
dedicated bus lanes, cycle tracks,
sidewalks and space for vendors
• “Took” space from cars, minority
of vehicle users vocally protested
• Lawsuit filed, but Supreme Court
upheld project after research on
the corridor
• Lack of enforcement keeping
drivers out of bus and cycle lanes
and sidewalks
• Government stalled
implementation of the rest of the
network due to the conflict
26

27. Pragmatic Ahmedabad
• “Connect Busy Places, Avoid
Busy Roads,” added capacity,
over 75km of a closed network
• Government had pragmatic
approach and changed route
when conflicts arose, now
building lines through old
denser center
• Vendors and slum residents
displaced due to widening
roads
• Cycle and sidewalk network
not complete, sacrificed when
not enough space
27

28. Santiago Compromise
• Initial plans for Transantiago
included network of
exclusive bus corridors
• Majority not built, priority on
corridors where road could
be widened and for metro
• Instead put in non-
segregated curb lanes, but
enforcement lacking
• Neighbors oppose plans for
new corridors because based
on widening roads
Planned Exclusive Bus Corridors in 2000
What it does is reduce the public space suitable for use by the community. It decreases the
distance between the houses and the road lanes. It is, definitely, a project that deteriorates
the quality of life for the people who live here. – Mayor of Pudahuel 28

29. Conflict Observations
• Adding capacity or “taking space” from cars
• Adding capacity takes space from other (less
powerful) urban residents
• Creating conflicts between different modes or
between residents and travelers
• Different levels of dedication to including
pedestrian and cycle infrastructure
• Enforcement necessary to keep car users from
“taking space” back
29

30. Implications
• How much challenge to automobility depends
on implementation
• Not enough discussion on the role workers
and unions can play in BRT implementation
• Need to examine the relationship between the
public and governments/operators
• How operating contacts are allocated shapes
state/elite control of bus sector
30

31. Conclusions
• Neoliberal implementation model dominant, not
inherent
• BRT can increase or decrease social inequality
– accessibility (whose trips does the system serve, fares)
– allocation of urban space
– decision-making (involvement of public)
– control over economic resources (bus companies)
– working conditions in transport industry
• If BRT is a tool for a more neoliberal city or a challenge
to it depends on both government implementation and
how workers, riders, and urban residents respond to
the contradictions it creates
31

32. Four Papers In Process
• Revisiting Regulatory Reform for Bus Operations
in Latin America with Onesimo Flores and Juan
Carlos Muñoz
• The Publicness of Public Transport: The changing
nature of public transport in Latin American cities
with Manuel Tironi
• Contested Space for Mobility: Conflicts over
busway projects in India and Latin America with
Juan Carlos Muñoz
• Bus Rapid Transit as a Neoliberal Contradiction
32

33. Questions?
33
Feel free to email me at lpaget@uc.cl if you
want to discuss any of these ideas in more
detail