1. Meghalaya: Mutating Threats
M. A. Athul
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
Like a multi headed hydra, the insurgency in Meghalaya is just refusing to die, despite several successes against
rebel formations. The ongoing counterinsurgency Operation Hill Storm has hurt insurgent formations, but the
emergence of new threats has ensured that enduring successes remain elusive.
A trader identified as Bharat Singh Sekhawat, who was abducted on October 15, 2014, from Samanda village in
East Garo Hills District by A'chik Matgrik Elite Force (AMEF) was killed by the militants on October 21. His
body was exhumed on October 24. His family had paid INR 1.6 million to the abductors as ransom, despite
which he was killed.
On October 23, 2014, Meghalaya Police Sub-InspectorPramoth Sangma, who was leading his team against a
suspected Garo militant hideout close to the international border in the Purakhasia area of West Garo Hills, was
killed in an exchange of fire. The operation against the militants began in the evening of October 22, after the
West Garo Hills Police received intelligence reports about the presence of a camp in the Songmagre village of
the Purakhasia area. It was later stated that AMEF and ULFA-I militants were present in the area.
Meghalaya, a State that remained relatively peaceful while insurgency was peaking across India's Northeast, has
now emerged as the second most violent province in the region, after Assam. According to the South Asia
Terrorism Portal (SATP) data base, there have been a total of 69 insurgency-related fatalities in 2014 (till
November 9), including 20 civilians, four Security Force (SF) personnel,and 45 terrorists. These numbers
acquire greater significance in view of the fact that Meghalaya has a population of just over 2.65 million (2012
data). Assam, the worst affected State in the Northeast,accounted for a total of 206 fatalities (98 civilians , 5 SF
personneland 103 militants) in 2014 (nearly three times the fatalities in Manipur), and had a population of 30.94
million in 2012 (nearly twelve time Manipur's population).
Meanwhile, Operation Hill Storm, which was launched on July 11, 2014, has so far led to the killing of just 11
militants, though another25 have been arrested and some 13 militant camps have been detected and neutralised
by SFs. According to SATP data, in the month of October and the first week of November, there were twelve
incidents of arrest in which 23 persons were detained.
The pressure created by the counterinsurgency (CI) operations has also led to a spike in surrenders by militants.
The surrenders,especially by Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) militants have happened at a time when
intelligence reports indicated that the GNLA “commander-in-chief” Sohan D. Shira had taken shelter in
Bangladesh. A Government source stated that,with Shira taking shelter in Bangladesh, the cadres were left to
fend for themselves, and were demoralized, leading them to surrenderbefore the Police. Between October 6 and
October 24, in 12 incidents of surrender, 34 militants of various groups [18 GNLA; 8 A'chik Songna
An'pachakgipa Kotok (ASAK, earlier known as Garo National Liberation Army-Faction); 1 Hynniewtrep
National Liberation Council (HNLC); 5 A'chik Matgrik Elite Force (AMEF); and two United Achik Liberation
Army (UALA)] have surrendered before the SFs. Some of the significant incidents of surrender include:
October 22: Five AMEF militants surrendered before the Police with three pistols,three magazines, 13 rounds of
ammunition and a hand grenade, at a remote location in the South Garo Hills District. They were later arrested
for the killing of a trader identified as Bharat Singh Shikawat.
October 20: Five GNLA militants surrendered before North Garo Hills District Superintendent of Police (SP)
F.K. Marak at Bajengdoba Police Station in East Garo Hills District, after having deserted their command post
in the West Khasi Hills. The militants informed authorities that they became disillusioned with the outfit’s
ideology and leaders and, togetherwith several other cadres,fled their camp in the West Khasi Hills three
months earlier. The militants surrendered with a US made automatic carbine rifle with two magazines and a
hundred rounds of ammunition, two 7.65 pistols with two magazines and nine rounds of ammunition, and a
wireless handset.
October 6: Six GNLA militants, including the organisation's Dadenggre ‘area Commander’ Manan Ch. Sangma
aka Kimpret, surrendered before the Police at Tura in the West Garo Hills, with an AK-56 along with two
magazines, 82 live AK rounds,two 7.56 pistols with 2 magazines, 12 rounds of 7.65 pistol ammunition, and one

2. grenade. All of the surrendered cadres were recruited by the outfit between the years 2010-11, with most of
them having received training in the Durama Hill Range.
Meanwhile, on September 24, a tripartite agreement was signed between the Government of India (GoI) and the
Meghalaya State Government, on the one hand,and the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) and the
Breakaway faction of ANVC (ANVC-B), on the other. According to the agreement, both ANVC and ANVC-B
will be disbanded by the end of November 2014, and their cadres will surrenderarms and ammunition to the
authorities. Further, a sum of INR one billion will be disbursed as a package over the next five years for
development of the Garo Hills area and steps would be taken to strengthen the Garo Hills Autonomous District
Council (GHADC).
Despite recent SF successes and the inking of the Peace Agreement with both factions of the ANVC, an
environment of peace and security is still a distant dream in Meghalaya. According to partial data compiled by
South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), just between September 27 and November 6, 2014, there have been at
least thirteen reported incidents of abduction in which 18 people were taken hostage.Of these,two persons were
released and anotherwas rescued by SFs, while one was killed. The whereabouts of the remaining 14 are not
available in open media sources. According to SATP data, there have been a total of at least 48 incidents of
abductions in 2014 (till November 9), in which 62 civilians were abducted,of which 24 persons were rescued or
released. Information about the other 38 is not available. 2013 saw 17 incidents of abduction,in which 36
people were abducted,of whom two were rescued or released, and another two were killed. There is no
information available regarding the 32 others.According to data available at SATP, the month of October has
already seen 11 incidents of abductions,the highest in a month this year.
The emergence of new militant groups and factions in the State is the principal factor causing lawlessness in
Meghalaya. In 2013 alone, a plethora of militant groups cropped up,including the United Achik Liberation
Army (UALA), A’chik Matgrik Liberation Front (AMLF), Achik National Liberation Army (ANLA), Achik
Tiger Force (ATF), Achik National Liberation Central Army (ANLCA), and Achik Youth Liberation Front
(AYLF). In 2014, another two insurgent groups surfaced: a group of senior GNLA leaders, led by former
'finance secretary' Reding T. Sangma broke away from the outfit's 'military chief' Sohan D. Shira and formed
their own organization, the A'chik Songna An'pachakgipa Kotok (ASAK), earlier known as Garo National
Liberation Army-Faction (GNLA-F); later, a section of militants from ASAK, in turn led by its 'finance
secretary' Jack Marak, abandoned ASAK with three AK rifles and eight pistols, to form the A'chik Matgrik Elite
Force (AMEF).
Although CI operations have blunted the major violent groups,such as GNLA and ULFA-I, and the peace
settlement has brought ANVC and ANVC-B violence to an end, moderately well equipped and trained
breakaway militant groups continue to constitute a security threat. Significantly, the insurgency in Meghalaya is
moving in the same general direction of such movements in the North East, with little or no ideological
underpinnings and no popular support.Almost all militant groups are no more than criminal undertakings,
aimed at making quick money through abduction and extortion. On October 16, 2014, the Meghalaya Police
described AMEF as a group of 'hardcore criminals', originally from GNLA, who created a splinter groups with
the sole aim of making quick money through criminal activities.
Significantly, an October 9, 2014, report indicates that there have been at least 20 cases of militants being
lynched by villagers’ in the five Garo Hills Districts over the preceding eight months. The lynching occurred
mostly in remote villages where there is virtually no Police presence.
With an unfenced border with Bangladesh being used by various militant groups,including NSCN-IM and
NDFB, to sneak in and out of Bangladesh, as well as for smuggling weapons and ferrying improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), and with no effective presence of the structures ofGovernance across much of the 'remote' Garo
Hills areas, the culture of violence refuses to ebb away. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs [UMHA] has
already raised concerns at the State Government’s “tardy” approach to completing fencing of the Bangladesh
border. Around 70 kilometres of the 443 kilometre border are yet to be fenced. On June 11, 2014, Meghalaya
Chief Minister Mukul Sangma stated that illegal arms were entering the State from countries such as
Bangladesh, Myanmar and China. Again, on June 24, 2014, Meghalaya Director General of Police P.J.P.
Hanaman reiterated that Bangladesh, Myanmar and States like Nagaland were weapons suppliers for
Meghalaya-based militants. Nevertheless,the State Government has done little to accelerate processes,such as
the construction ofthe fence along the international border, that could immediately improve the situation.

3. The neglect of vast regions of the State deemed 'remote', and the virtual abandonment of the populations there to
extremist depredations,remain the core issue in the persistence of militancy in Meghalaya. The State's
vulnerabilities to destabilizing influences from the neighbourhood have also never been adequately addressed,
despite the availability significant options.Despite the lack of political will, nevertheless,SF operations have
created dramatic opportunities for consolidation. It remains to be seen whether the Government can discoverthe
will and the focus to exploit these to establish a more permanent peace in the State.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair13/13_19.htm#assessment2