SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 16
Securely Deploying Android
                 Devices
                  Angel Alonso-Parrizas


22th March 2011
About me and this project

•   Angel Alonso-Parrizas – parrizas@gmail.com
     –   Security Engineer @ Verizon Zurich team
     –   MSc, BSc, MSSF, GCIH, GCIA, GCFW, GCFA, GSEC, GSNA, CISSP, CISA, CISM
     –   8 years working in different security roles and companies
     –   http://www.angelalonso.eu | http://twitter.com/Angelill0
•   The project
     –   Practicum for the Master in Security and Forensic at Dublin City University
         http://www.uv.es/parrizas/alonsoparrizas-android-thesis.pdf
     –   GIAC GCIH Gold Paper
         http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/sysadmin/securely-
         deploying-android-devices_33799
•   The idea
     –   Need vs security
     –   Android smartphones aligned with security policies/standards
Agenda
•   Android model and threats
     –   Android architecture
     –   Linux model / permissions
     –   Some example of recent threats
•   Improving security in different areas
     –   Communications channel
     –   Access control
     –   Software policy
     –   Password policy
     –   Remote access control
     –   Additional security layers
     –   Hardening the stack and the Operating System
•   Conclusions
Android Model
•   Applications
     – Linux UID model
     – File permissions




•   Libraries & VM
     – Dalvik VM isolation
     – SSL


•   Kernel 2.6
     – Drivers
     – Devices (eg: bluetooth)
Permissions
•   Open repositories: Market, Appbrain..
•   Developer decides the permissions
     –   AndroidManifest.xml
•   User install the application
     –   Install the application (up to the user!)
     –   Do all the user read ?
     –   Do all the user understand ?                <manifest
                                                     xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk
     –   Low granularity (everything or nothing)     /res/android"

•   Any security issues?                             package="com.example.android.home">
                                                         <uses-permission
     –   Repository vs malware                       android:name="android.permission.CALL_PHONE"/
                                                     >
     –   Developers vs bad guys                          <uses-permission
                                                     android:name="android.permission.GET_TASKS"/>
     –   End user is not a security expert               <uses-permission
                                                     android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACT
                                                     S"/>
                                                         <uses-permission
                                                     android:name="android.permission.SET_WALLPAPE
                                                     R
Some examples of threats
•   Catching AuthTokens in the Wild, The Insecurity of Google's
    ClientLogin Protocol [13/05/2011]
     –   Steal authentication tokens through open WiFi in some Google
         Applications
     –   Impersonate the user and even steal his Google account
     –   Application not properly build and lack of encryption in critical tasks
•   DroimDreamLight / DroidDream [30/05/2011]
     –   Typical malware (nothing new so far)
     –   30k -120k users affected (not too bad)
     –   Steal information, install software..
•   Android.Nickspy [27/07/2011]
     –   Trojan horse
     –   What else can we expect? Umm.. Something recording our
         conversation?, yes we can!
     –   …and sending the stolen information through a TCP connection
The lab
•   HTC Desire
•   SDK Toolkit (Linux, Mac or windows)
•   WiFi connection
•   3G card with Internet access
•   Some security tools
     –   iptables
     –   OpenVPN
     –   SSH
•   Dedicated Linux server
     –   Virtual Private Server (VPS)
Communication channels
     Communications
                    channel



                     N       Netfilter / Policies on demand
                   VP




                         1. Encryption of traffic
                         2. Drop traffic in the smartphone
                         3. Traffic policy in the VPS (eg: user)
                         4. Analysis of the traffic in the VPS
 Netfilter / DROP
Default route = tun0
Access control
• Android user has access to control the phone
– USB is used to manage the software
– USB is used to access the shell – full access to the system
– USB must be disable
– Just remove permission on the adbd daemon (/sbin/adbd)


• SSH access should be given to Security Administrator
– Dropbear is your friend (SSHD version for embedded system)
– Use keys instead of password
– The authorized host is the VPS endpoint
– SSH only allowed through VPN interface (tun0)
Software Policy
•   Only authorized software must run on the device
     –   Follow the internal policies / standards
     –   Mitigate the risk of infected software
•   Baselines for each user / role
     –   Some users might need special software for their role
•   Remove unnecessary software
     –   Remove Market
     –   Change permission of the container for each application
•   Applications must be able to be installed remotely – No
    need of physical access
     –   Use SCP to upload the APK file
     –   Change the permissions of the /system/bin/pm
     –   Install the application
     –   Revoke the permissions
SD Card and Bluetooth
•   SD Card
     –   FAT file system
     –   Lack of encryption
     –   Model of permission is broken
     –   Some attacks can use the SD card to execute code and hijack
     –   Umount the /mnt/sdcard on booting time


•   Bluetooth
     –   To be or not to be, that’s the question!
     –   Functionality vs Security, that’s the question!
     –   Disable /dev/ttyHS0 and /dev/ttyMSM0
Password Policy
•   Password policy aligned with company policies
•   Google Apps for business
     –   Centralize policy management
     –   Enforce the policy
     –   Password complexity
     –   Number of characters
     –   Expiration date
     –   Number of old password
     –   Wipe threshold
•   Device Policy application (agent)
Remote control and additional security
                  controls
•    Locate remotely through GPS
•    Google Apps for business
      –   GPS + Google Maps
      –   Remote wipping
      –   Remote Lock
•    Autowipe
      –   Remote wipe through text message
      –   Wipe if the SIM card is swapped
•    Antivirus
      –   AVG for mobile
      –   Scan applications
      –   Web filters in real time
Hardening of the Operating system
               while booting
•   Remove unnecessary binaries
     –   irssi, netcat, tcpdump…
•   Set properly the permissions
     –   root rw-------
•   Harden the TCP/ IP stack
•   Boot process in Android
     –   Ramdisk is a problem
     –   But.. /data/local/userinit.sh
•   Customize scripts
     –   userinit.sh, removesotware.sh, iptables.sh
     –   Easily adaptable to different environment
Conclusions
•   Improved the security in different Areas
•   Implemented a security channel
•   Filter and analyze the traffic
•   Reduced the risk of unauthorized software
•   Aligned with corporate policies
•   Setup a central point to manage
•   Added additional security controls / layers
•   Deployed customizable scripts
Questions?

More Related Content

What's hot

Mickey pacsec2016_final
Mickey pacsec2016_finalMickey pacsec2016_final
Mickey pacsec2016_finalPacSecJP
 
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed Adam
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed AdamBugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed Adam
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed AdamMohammed Adam
 
Android Hacking + Pentesting
Android Hacking + Pentesting Android Hacking + Pentesting
Android Hacking + Pentesting Sina Manavi
 
Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)
Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)
Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)SURBHI SAROHA
 
Hacking your Android (slides)
Hacking your Android (slides)Hacking your Android (slides)
Hacking your Android (slides)Justin Hoang
 
Chapter 2 Malware and Social Engineering Attacks
Chapter 2 Malware and Social Engineering AttacksChapter 2 Malware and Social Engineering Attacks
Chapter 2 Malware and Social Engineering AttacksDr. Ahmed Al Zaidy
 
Testingfor Sw Security
Testingfor Sw SecurityTestingfor Sw Security
Testingfor Sw Securityankitmehta21
 
What's in a Jailbreak? - BSides 2019 keynote
What's in a Jailbreak? - BSides 2019 keynoteWhat's in a Jailbreak? - BSides 2019 keynote
What's in a Jailbreak? - BSides 2019 keynoteMarkDowd13
 
Senior Technology Education
Senior Technology EducationSenior Technology Education
Senior Technology EducationSummerpair77
 
Android security and penetration testing | DIVA | Yogesh Ojha
Android security and penetration testing | DIVA | Yogesh OjhaAndroid security and penetration testing | DIVA | Yogesh Ojha
Android security and penetration testing | DIVA | Yogesh OjhaYogesh Ojha
 
Advanced Persistent Threats
Advanced Persistent ThreatsAdvanced Persistent Threats
Advanced Persistent ThreatsESET
 
Ethical Hacking Career | Ethical Hacker Jobs & Salary | Cybersecurity Course ...
Ethical Hacking Career | Ethical Hacker Jobs & Salary | Cybersecurity Course ...Ethical Hacking Career | Ethical Hacker Jobs & Salary | Cybersecurity Course ...
Ethical Hacking Career | Ethical Hacker Jobs & Salary | Cybersecurity Course ...Edureka!
 
Breaking Fraud & Bot detection solutions
Breaking Fraud & Bot detection solutionsBreaking Fraud & Bot detection solutions
Breaking Fraud & Bot detection solutionsMayank Dhiman
 
BlueHat v17 || KERNELFAULT: R00ting the Unexploitable using Hardware Fault In...
BlueHat v17 || KERNELFAULT: R00ting the Unexploitable using Hardware Fault In...BlueHat v17 || KERNELFAULT: R00ting the Unexploitable using Hardware Fault In...
BlueHat v17 || KERNELFAULT: R00ting the Unexploitable using Hardware Fault In...BlueHat Security Conference
 
Capture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception Defense
Capture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception DefenseCapture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception Defense
Capture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception DefenseFidelis Cybersecurity
 
Breaking Fraud & Bot Detection Solutions
Breaking Fraud & Bot Detection SolutionsBreaking Fraud & Bot Detection Solutions
Breaking Fraud & Bot Detection SolutionsMayank Dhiman
 
Apt sharing tisa protalk 2-2554
Apt sharing tisa protalk 2-2554Apt sharing tisa protalk 2-2554
Apt sharing tisa protalk 2-2554TISA
 
Defcon 22-alex zacharis-nikolaos-tsagkarakis-po s-attacking-t
Defcon 22-alex zacharis-nikolaos-tsagkarakis-po s-attacking-tDefcon 22-alex zacharis-nikolaos-tsagkarakis-po s-attacking-t
Defcon 22-alex zacharis-nikolaos-tsagkarakis-po s-attacking-tPriyanka Aash
 

What's hot (20)

Mickey pacsec2016_final
Mickey pacsec2016_finalMickey pacsec2016_final
Mickey pacsec2016_final
 
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed Adam
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed AdamBugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed Adam
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed Adam
 
Android Hacking + Pentesting
Android Hacking + Pentesting Android Hacking + Pentesting
Android Hacking + Pentesting
 
Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)
Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)
Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)
 
Android system security
Android system securityAndroid system security
Android system security
 
Hacking your Android (slides)
Hacking your Android (slides)Hacking your Android (slides)
Hacking your Android (slides)
 
Chapter 2 Malware and Social Engineering Attacks
Chapter 2 Malware and Social Engineering AttacksChapter 2 Malware and Social Engineering Attacks
Chapter 2 Malware and Social Engineering Attacks
 
Testingfor Sw Security
Testingfor Sw SecurityTestingfor Sw Security
Testingfor Sw Security
 
What's in a Jailbreak? - BSides 2019 keynote
What's in a Jailbreak? - BSides 2019 keynoteWhat's in a Jailbreak? - BSides 2019 keynote
What's in a Jailbreak? - BSides 2019 keynote
 
Mobile phone Data Hacking
Mobile phone Data HackingMobile phone Data Hacking
Mobile phone Data Hacking
 
Senior Technology Education
Senior Technology EducationSenior Technology Education
Senior Technology Education
 
Android security and penetration testing | DIVA | Yogesh Ojha
Android security and penetration testing | DIVA | Yogesh OjhaAndroid security and penetration testing | DIVA | Yogesh Ojha
Android security and penetration testing | DIVA | Yogesh Ojha
 
Advanced Persistent Threats
Advanced Persistent ThreatsAdvanced Persistent Threats
Advanced Persistent Threats
 
Ethical Hacking Career | Ethical Hacker Jobs & Salary | Cybersecurity Course ...
Ethical Hacking Career | Ethical Hacker Jobs & Salary | Cybersecurity Course ...Ethical Hacking Career | Ethical Hacker Jobs & Salary | Cybersecurity Course ...
Ethical Hacking Career | Ethical Hacker Jobs & Salary | Cybersecurity Course ...
 
Breaking Fraud & Bot detection solutions
Breaking Fraud & Bot detection solutionsBreaking Fraud & Bot detection solutions
Breaking Fraud & Bot detection solutions
 
BlueHat v17 || KERNELFAULT: R00ting the Unexploitable using Hardware Fault In...
BlueHat v17 || KERNELFAULT: R00ting the Unexploitable using Hardware Fault In...BlueHat v17 || KERNELFAULT: R00ting the Unexploitable using Hardware Fault In...
BlueHat v17 || KERNELFAULT: R00ting the Unexploitable using Hardware Fault In...
 
Capture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception Defense
Capture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception DefenseCapture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception Defense
Capture the Flag Exercise Using Active Deception Defense
 
Breaking Fraud & Bot Detection Solutions
Breaking Fraud & Bot Detection SolutionsBreaking Fraud & Bot Detection Solutions
Breaking Fraud & Bot Detection Solutions
 
Apt sharing tisa protalk 2-2554
Apt sharing tisa protalk 2-2554Apt sharing tisa protalk 2-2554
Apt sharing tisa protalk 2-2554
 
Defcon 22-alex zacharis-nikolaos-tsagkarakis-po s-attacking-t
Defcon 22-alex zacharis-nikolaos-tsagkarakis-po s-attacking-tDefcon 22-alex zacharis-nikolaos-tsagkarakis-po s-attacking-t
Defcon 22-alex zacharis-nikolaos-tsagkarakis-po s-attacking-t
 

Similar to Securely Deploying Android Devices

Deep Dive Into Android Security
Deep Dive Into Android SecurityDeep Dive Into Android Security
Deep Dive Into Android SecurityMarakana Inc.
 
CNIT 128 Ch 4: Android
CNIT 128 Ch 4: AndroidCNIT 128 Ch 4: Android
CNIT 128 Ch 4: AndroidSam Bowne
 
Pentesting iPhone applications
Pentesting iPhone applicationsPentesting iPhone applications
Pentesting iPhone applicationsSatish b
 
hashdays 2011: Tobias Ospelt - Reversing Android Apps - Hacking and cracking ...
hashdays 2011: Tobias Ospelt - Reversing Android Apps - Hacking and cracking ...hashdays 2011: Tobias Ospelt - Reversing Android Apps - Hacking and cracking ...
hashdays 2011: Tobias Ospelt - Reversing Android Apps - Hacking and cracking ...Area41
 
Pentesting Mobile Applications (Prashant Verma)
Pentesting Mobile Applications (Prashant Verma)Pentesting Mobile Applications (Prashant Verma)
Pentesting Mobile Applications (Prashant Verma)ClubHack
 
ToorCon 14 : Malandroid : The Crux of Android Infections
ToorCon 14 : Malandroid : The Crux of Android InfectionsToorCon 14 : Malandroid : The Crux of Android Infections
ToorCon 14 : Malandroid : The Crux of Android InfectionsAditya K Sood
 
Hacker Halted 2014 - Reverse Engineering the Android OS
Hacker Halted 2014 - Reverse Engineering the Android OSHacker Halted 2014 - Reverse Engineering the Android OS
Hacker Halted 2014 - Reverse Engineering the Android OSEC-Council
 
[Wroclaw #1] Android Security Workshop
[Wroclaw #1] Android Security Workshop[Wroclaw #1] Android Security Workshop
[Wroclaw #1] Android Security WorkshopOWASP
 
Tizen Security
Tizen SecurityTizen Security
Tizen SecurityJason Ross
 
Bringing Government and Enterprise Security Controls to the Android Endpoint
Bringing Government and Enterprise Security Controls to the Android EndpointBringing Government and Enterprise Security Controls to the Android Endpoint
Bringing Government and Enterprise Security Controls to the Android EndpointHamilton Turner
 
Windows Phone 8 Security and Testing WP8 Apps
Windows Phone 8 Security and Testing WP8 AppsWindows Phone 8 Security and Testing WP8 Apps
Windows Phone 8 Security and Testing WP8 AppsJorge Orchilles
 
Hacking Samsung's Tizen: The OS of Everything - Hack In the Box 2015
Hacking Samsung's Tizen: The OS of Everything - Hack In the Box 2015Hacking Samsung's Tizen: The OS of Everything - Hack In the Box 2015
Hacking Samsung's Tizen: The OS of Everything - Hack In the Box 2015Ajin Abraham
 
Reading Group Presentation: Why Eve and Mallory Love Android
Reading Group Presentation: Why Eve and Mallory Love AndroidReading Group Presentation: Why Eve and Mallory Love Android
Reading Group Presentation: Why Eve and Mallory Love AndroidMichael Rushanan
 
Application Explosion How to Manage Productivity vs Security
Application Explosion How to Manage Productivity vs SecurityApplication Explosion How to Manage Productivity vs Security
Application Explosion How to Manage Productivity vs SecurityLumension
 
Android Security Humla Part 1
Android Security Humla Part 1Android Security Humla Part 1
Android Security Humla Part 1Nikhil Kulkarni
 

Similar to Securely Deploying Android Devices (20)

Securing Android
Securing AndroidSecuring Android
Securing Android
 
128-ch4.pptx
128-ch4.pptx128-ch4.pptx
128-ch4.pptx
 
Brief Tour about Android Security
Brief Tour about Android SecurityBrief Tour about Android Security
Brief Tour about Android Security
 
Deep Dive Into Android Security
Deep Dive Into Android SecurityDeep Dive Into Android Security
Deep Dive Into Android Security
 
CNIT 128 Ch 4: Android
CNIT 128 Ch 4: AndroidCNIT 128 Ch 4: Android
CNIT 128 Ch 4: Android
 
Pentesting iPhone applications
Pentesting iPhone applicationsPentesting iPhone applications
Pentesting iPhone applications
 
hashdays 2011: Tobias Ospelt - Reversing Android Apps - Hacking and cracking ...
hashdays 2011: Tobias Ospelt - Reversing Android Apps - Hacking and cracking ...hashdays 2011: Tobias Ospelt - Reversing Android Apps - Hacking and cracking ...
hashdays 2011: Tobias Ospelt - Reversing Android Apps - Hacking and cracking ...
 
Pentesting Mobile Applications (Prashant Verma)
Pentesting Mobile Applications (Prashant Verma)Pentesting Mobile Applications (Prashant Verma)
Pentesting Mobile Applications (Prashant Verma)
 
ToorCon 14 : Malandroid : The Crux of Android Infections
ToorCon 14 : Malandroid : The Crux of Android InfectionsToorCon 14 : Malandroid : The Crux of Android Infections
ToorCon 14 : Malandroid : The Crux of Android Infections
 
Hacker Halted 2014 - Reverse Engineering the Android OS
Hacker Halted 2014 - Reverse Engineering the Android OSHacker Halted 2014 - Reverse Engineering the Android OS
Hacker Halted 2014 - Reverse Engineering the Android OS
 
[Wroclaw #1] Android Security Workshop
[Wroclaw #1] Android Security Workshop[Wroclaw #1] Android Security Workshop
[Wroclaw #1] Android Security Workshop
 
Tizen Security
Tizen SecurityTizen Security
Tizen Security
 
Bringing Government and Enterprise Security Controls to the Android Endpoint
Bringing Government and Enterprise Security Controls to the Android EndpointBringing Government and Enterprise Security Controls to the Android Endpoint
Bringing Government and Enterprise Security Controls to the Android Endpoint
 
Windows Phone 8 Security and Testing WP8 Apps
Windows Phone 8 Security and Testing WP8 AppsWindows Phone 8 Security and Testing WP8 Apps
Windows Phone 8 Security and Testing WP8 Apps
 
17-Android.pptx
17-Android.pptx17-Android.pptx
17-Android.pptx
 
Hacking Samsung's Tizen: The OS of Everything - Hack In the Box 2015
Hacking Samsung's Tizen: The OS of Everything - Hack In the Box 2015Hacking Samsung's Tizen: The OS of Everything - Hack In the Box 2015
Hacking Samsung's Tizen: The OS of Everything - Hack In the Box 2015
 
Reading Group Presentation: Why Eve and Mallory Love Android
Reading Group Presentation: Why Eve and Mallory Love AndroidReading Group Presentation: Why Eve and Mallory Love Android
Reading Group Presentation: Why Eve and Mallory Love Android
 
Application Explosion How to Manage Productivity vs Security
Application Explosion How to Manage Productivity vs SecurityApplication Explosion How to Manage Productivity vs Security
Application Explosion How to Manage Productivity vs Security
 
Android Security Humla Part 1
Android Security Humla Part 1Android Security Humla Part 1
Android Security Humla Part 1
 
Untitled 1
Untitled 1Untitled 1
Untitled 1
 

Recently uploaded

How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with NanonetsHow to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonetsnaman860154
 
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxThe Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxMalak Abu Hammad
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Scriptwesley chun
 
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?Antenna Manufacturer Coco
 
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?Igalia
 
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024Rafal Los
 
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationFrom Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationSafe Software
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationMichael W. Hawkins
 
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024Results
 
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsArtificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsJoaquim Jorge
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountPuma Security, LLC
 
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CVReal Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CVKhem
 
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Igalia
 
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdfThe Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdfEnterprise Knowledge
 
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...Neo4j
 
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEarley Information Science
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)Gabriella Davis
 

Recently uploaded (20)

How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with NanonetsHow to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
How to convert PDF to text with Nanonets
 
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptxThe Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
The Codex of Business Writing Software for Real-World Solutions 2.pptx
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
 
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
 
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
 
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
 
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time AutomationFrom Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
From Event to Action: Accelerate Your Decision Making with Real-Time Automation
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
 
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
A Call to Action for Generative AI in 2024
 
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Civil Lines Women Seeking Men
 
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and MythsArtificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
Artificial Intelligence: Facts and Myths
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
 
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CVReal Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CV
 
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
Raspberry Pi 5: Challenges and Solutions in Bringing up an OpenGL/Vulkan Driv...
 
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
 
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdfThe Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
The Role of Taxonomy and Ontology in Semantic Layers - Heather Hedden.pdf
 
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine  KG and Vector search for  enhanced R...
Workshop - Best of Both Worlds_ Combine KG and Vector search for enhanced R...
 
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
 

Securely Deploying Android Devices

  • 1. Securely Deploying Android Devices Angel Alonso-Parrizas 22th March 2011
  • 2. About me and this project • Angel Alonso-Parrizas – parrizas@gmail.com – Security Engineer @ Verizon Zurich team – MSc, BSc, MSSF, GCIH, GCIA, GCFW, GCFA, GSEC, GSNA, CISSP, CISA, CISM – 8 years working in different security roles and companies – http://www.angelalonso.eu | http://twitter.com/Angelill0 • The project – Practicum for the Master in Security and Forensic at Dublin City University http://www.uv.es/parrizas/alonsoparrizas-android-thesis.pdf – GIAC GCIH Gold Paper http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/sysadmin/securely- deploying-android-devices_33799 • The idea – Need vs security – Android smartphones aligned with security policies/standards
  • 3. Agenda • Android model and threats – Android architecture – Linux model / permissions – Some example of recent threats • Improving security in different areas – Communications channel – Access control – Software policy – Password policy – Remote access control – Additional security layers – Hardening the stack and the Operating System • Conclusions
  • 4. Android Model • Applications – Linux UID model – File permissions • Libraries & VM – Dalvik VM isolation – SSL • Kernel 2.6 – Drivers – Devices (eg: bluetooth)
  • 5. Permissions • Open repositories: Market, Appbrain.. • Developer decides the permissions – AndroidManifest.xml • User install the application – Install the application (up to the user!) – Do all the user read ? – Do all the user understand ? <manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk – Low granularity (everything or nothing) /res/android" • Any security issues? package="com.example.android.home"> <uses-permission – Repository vs malware android:name="android.permission.CALL_PHONE"/ > – Developers vs bad guys <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.GET_TASKS"/> – End user is not a security expert <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACT S"/> <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SET_WALLPAPE R
  • 6. Some examples of threats • Catching AuthTokens in the Wild, The Insecurity of Google's ClientLogin Protocol [13/05/2011] – Steal authentication tokens through open WiFi in some Google Applications – Impersonate the user and even steal his Google account – Application not properly build and lack of encryption in critical tasks • DroimDreamLight / DroidDream [30/05/2011] – Typical malware (nothing new so far) – 30k -120k users affected (not too bad) – Steal information, install software.. • Android.Nickspy [27/07/2011] – Trojan horse – What else can we expect? Umm.. Something recording our conversation?, yes we can! – …and sending the stolen information through a TCP connection
  • 7. The lab • HTC Desire • SDK Toolkit (Linux, Mac or windows) • WiFi connection • 3G card with Internet access • Some security tools – iptables – OpenVPN – SSH • Dedicated Linux server – Virtual Private Server (VPS)
  • 8. Communication channels Communications channel N Netfilter / Policies on demand VP 1. Encryption of traffic 2. Drop traffic in the smartphone 3. Traffic policy in the VPS (eg: user) 4. Analysis of the traffic in the VPS Netfilter / DROP Default route = tun0
  • 9. Access control • Android user has access to control the phone – USB is used to manage the software – USB is used to access the shell – full access to the system – USB must be disable – Just remove permission on the adbd daemon (/sbin/adbd) • SSH access should be given to Security Administrator – Dropbear is your friend (SSHD version for embedded system) – Use keys instead of password – The authorized host is the VPS endpoint – SSH only allowed through VPN interface (tun0)
  • 10. Software Policy • Only authorized software must run on the device – Follow the internal policies / standards – Mitigate the risk of infected software • Baselines for each user / role – Some users might need special software for their role • Remove unnecessary software – Remove Market – Change permission of the container for each application • Applications must be able to be installed remotely – No need of physical access – Use SCP to upload the APK file – Change the permissions of the /system/bin/pm – Install the application – Revoke the permissions
  • 11. SD Card and Bluetooth • SD Card – FAT file system – Lack of encryption – Model of permission is broken – Some attacks can use the SD card to execute code and hijack – Umount the /mnt/sdcard on booting time • Bluetooth – To be or not to be, that’s the question! – Functionality vs Security, that’s the question! – Disable /dev/ttyHS0 and /dev/ttyMSM0
  • 12. Password Policy • Password policy aligned with company policies • Google Apps for business – Centralize policy management – Enforce the policy – Password complexity – Number of characters – Expiration date – Number of old password – Wipe threshold • Device Policy application (agent)
  • 13. Remote control and additional security controls • Locate remotely through GPS • Google Apps for business – GPS + Google Maps – Remote wipping – Remote Lock • Autowipe – Remote wipe through text message – Wipe if the SIM card is swapped • Antivirus – AVG for mobile – Scan applications – Web filters in real time
  • 14. Hardening of the Operating system while booting • Remove unnecessary binaries – irssi, netcat, tcpdump… • Set properly the permissions – root rw------- • Harden the TCP/ IP stack • Boot process in Android – Ramdisk is a problem – But.. /data/local/userinit.sh • Customize scripts – userinit.sh, removesotware.sh, iptables.sh – Easily adaptable to different environment
  • 15. Conclusions • Improved the security in different Areas • Implemented a security channel • Filter and analyze the traffic • Reduced the risk of unauthorized software • Aligned with corporate policies • Setup a central point to manage • Added additional security controls / layers • Deployed customizable scripts