The document summarizes the key points of the Cyprus bailout agreement reached on March 16th, 2013. The agreement sets a precedent by imposing a tax of 6.75-9.9% on all Cypriot bank deposits to raise €5.8 billion, more than half the cost of bank recapitalization. This reduces the bailout amount from €17 billion to up to €10 billion and is expected to put Cypriot debt on a sustainable path to 100% GDP by 2020. However, the deposit tax risks financial instability by undermining deposit guarantees and could increase the risk of bank runs in future crises. Final approval of the deal by the Cypriot parliament and an extension of loans from Russia

1. Europe Cyprus
18 March 2013
Macro
Data Flash (Euroland) Economics
Research Team
Cyprus bailout: a new
Peter Sidorov
Global Markets Research
Economist
+44 (0) 20754-70132
peter.sidorov@db.com
precedent
Renewed talks on the Cyprus bailout reached a dramatic conclusion in
the early hours of Saturday morning as the Eurogroup meeting reached
political agreement on the key measures of the assistance programme.
The agreement set a new precedent in the management of the euro area
crisis, introducing a higher than anticipated one-off levy on deposits –
6.75% for deposits under EUR 100,000 and 9.9% for those above. The
levy is expected to raise EUR 5.8bn, shifting over half the burden of bank
recapitalisation onto depositors.
Together with smaller revenue measures including a rise in the
corporate tax rate this will reduce the size of the Cyprus bailout from
around EUR 17bn to ‘up to EUR 10bn’. This would lead to a sharp
improvement in the Cypriot public debt trajectory with debt/GDP falling
to 100% by 2020.
The deposit levy is yet to be approved by the Cypriot parliament with a
vote postponed to Monday 18 March. The risk of rejection is high. The
government may be seeking a rebalancing of the levy from the smaller to
the larger depositors, which could make it easier to sell politically.
Other steps, including extension of a loan from Russia and approval by
the German Bundestag, are needed to finalise the deal.
The agreement signals a greater commitment in Europe to sovereign
stability of the periphery. However, this may well be more than offset by
contagion risks that the deposit levy could pose to financial stability.
We do not expect deposit flight in the EA periphery in the near term, but
the bar may now be lower in the event of a future banking crisis. A
firmer move towards banking union is needed to offset this risk.
A rapid and dramatic conclusion
Nearly nine months after Cyprus first asked for assistance in June last year, the
sometimes snail-like pace of the negotiations on the deal reached a dramatic
conclusion as political agreement between the Troika, the Eurogroup ministers
and Cypriot officials was reached in the early hours of Saturday (16 March).
The election of the centre-right Nicos Anastasiades paved the way for a fresh start
in the bailout talks after his government took power on 1 March. The negotiations
intensified last week with the Troika and Cypriot officials working on ways to
reduce the size of the bailout. A special Eurogroup meeting to follow the EU
summit was announced. The result was an agreement on a one-off levy on
deposits as well as an increase in the corporate tax rate and an extra tax on
Economics
interest income.
The ‘stability levy’ on deposits, at 6.75% for deposits under EUR 100,000 (the limit
of the deposit guarantee) and 9.9% for those above, is larger than we anticipated
Deutsche Bank AG/London
DISCLOSURES AND ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS ARE LOCATED IN APPENDIX 1. MICA(P) 072/04/2012.

2. 18 March 2013 Data Flash (Euroland)
and is expected to raise around EUR 5.8bn. The additional revenue measures will reduce the
size of the bailout package from the around EUR 17bn initially suggested to ‘up to EUR 10bn’.
This will result in a more sustainable trajectory for debt/GDP which is projected to return to
100% of GDP by 2020. While this achieves greater credibility on debt, the deal could
seriously damage the popularity of the recently elected President and his government,
potentially hindering any future measures.
There are mixed implications for the euro area crisis management. On one hand the deal
shows unity within the Troika and that the Troika is learning what makes a sovereign’s debt
sustainability credible. On the other hand the deposit levy sets a potentially dangerous
precedent for financial stability. While the immediate effect is likely to be limited, the risk of
deposit flight in the event of future banking crises has increased. A greater commitment on
progress towards banking union will likely be needed to offset this.
Several events remain in finalising the deal– the deposit levy needs to be approved on
Monday by the Cypriot parliament, which is far from certain. On the same day the Cypriot
Finance Minister will be in Moscow seeking to extend an outstanding EUR 2.5bn loan from
Russia. The risks to German parliamentary approval have decreased but it remains an event
to watch.
Deposit levy - a new precedent
The agreement reached in the early hours of Saturday morning sets a new precedent in the
euro area crisis management in shifting much of the cost of a banking crisis from the
government onto bank depositors. Indeed, the noise from policymakers in the last two
weeks signalled that a tax on deposits and/or a capital gains tax on interest income were
being considered as ways to reduce the bailout cost. However, the magnitude of the deposit
levy announced is larger than anticipated.
A ‘stability levy’ of 6.75% will be imposed on deposits up to EUR 100,000 (the limit of the
deposit guarantee) and 9.9% for those above. This is expected to bring in some EUR 5.8bn
based on EUR 68bn of deposits held in Cyprus, of which around EUR 30bn fall within the
EUR 100,000 limit1. The levy is due to be applied by Tuesday 19 March (Monday is a public
holiday in Cyprus) with Cypriot banks limiting internet transfers and cooperative banks closing
on Saturday to avoid a bank run. The curtailment of internet transfers is in practice the first
time capital controls have been established in the EMU.
Depositors will be partially compensated for the levy by receiving equity in the banks,
although the exact details of this are not yet clear. Press reports have suggested that the
value of these will be in part guaranteed by future natural gas revenues.
Cypriot officials have tried to sell the deal as the only option offered to them. President
Anastasiades stated that the government were presented with a ‘fait accompli’ at the
Eurogroup meeting. He presented as the alternative a disorderly bankruptcy of one of the
banks as soon as Tuesday (19 March) as the ECB would withdraw the provision of ELA, with
the other major bank also unable to avoid collapse.
However, with the deal requiring approval by the Cypriot parliament, it is still far from certain
that Cyprus will accept this ‘fait accompli’.
1
‘About EUR 30bn’ is the figure that President Anastasiades said the state would be liable for under the guarantee
scheme in the event of a collapse of the banks, which according to him would follow if he had not agreed to the deal.
We do not have recent official data on the size of deposit guarantees in Cyprus, but as of the end of 2011 EUR 35bn of
EUR 70bn total deposits fell under the scheme according to the Ministry of Finance.
Page 2 Deutsche Bank AG/London

3. 18 March 2013 Data Flash (Euroland)
Getting parliamentary approval – far from certain
The Cypriot parliament was due to vote on the deposit levy on Sunday to facilitate the
implementation of the levy. However the vote has been postponed until Monday to give
more time for consultations between the parties.
The risks to getting approval are high, with the vote looking too close to call at the time of
writing. Anastasiades’ centre-right DISY is the only party wholly committed to backing the
deal so far. Holding 20 of the 56 seats in parliament2 (hence a 29 vote majority threshold), it
would first need to get the backing of its centrist ally DIKO (8 seats). While the DIKO party
line should support the deal, it would not be enough to guarantee approval and at least one
defection within DIKO looks possible. Meanwhile, the communist AKEL (19 seats), the social
democrat EDEK (5 seats) and the Green party (1 vote) have positioned themselves against
the levy, making the support (or lack thereof) of the 2 MPs of the European Party (EVROKO)
potentially decisive.
The struggle to get support may have led the Cypriot side to seek a change in the deposit
levies imposed (reported on Sunday). In particular this would involve reducing the levy for the
smaller deposits (below EUR 100,000) and increasing it for the larger ones. In addition to
being easier to sell politically in Cyprus, such a change would reduce the magnitude of the
precedent set by hitting guaranteed deposits, which may reduce the potential contagion
risks. We expect that the EU would likely react favourably to such a request.
Should the parliament reject the deposit levy, measures would need to be taken to avoid the
disorderly bankruptcy scenario spelled out by Anastasiades. According to the scenario the
ECB would withdraw ELA funding this week. To reduce depositor panic, limited access to
deposits, financed by reduced ELA funding, could be arranged. Limiting access would reduce
the risks of a bank run that could potentially spill over into other peripherals. It might also buy
time for Cypriot politicians to accept that the offer on the table is the best they can get and
avoid a disorderly collapse, or, less likely, get concessions from the Troika to soften the
terms.
Even if the levy is approved, the Eurogroup deal is likely to lead to a sharp fall in popularity for
Anastasiades, who less than a month ago was elected with a strong mandate. This could
spell trouble should there be the need to revisit the terms of the bailout (e.g. implement
further austerity measures) at a later date.
Changes to the bailout agreement
The deposit levy is the highlight of several measures agreed by the Eurogroup to appease
concerns among the lenders.
Ensuring debt sustainability
The EUR 5.8bn is the main source of funds for a reduction in the size of the bailout from the
around EUR 17bn initially anticipated to ‘up to EUR 10bn’. Other revenue measures agreed
include an increase in the tax on interest income and an increase in the corporate tax rate
from 10% to 12.5%3. The notable measure, of those floated in recent weeks, that Cyprus
managed to avoid, is a financial transactions tax.
The result of the additional revenue is an improvement in the debt/GDP trajectory with the
Eurogroup projecting a 100% debt/GDP by 2020. Indeed, our own debt trajectory analysis
2
The situation is further complicated as one of the DISY MPs is reported to be currently out of the country, potentially
reducing their votes to 19.
3
Based on the EUR 670m corporate tax receipts budgeted for 2013, the corporate tax increase could generate up to
EUR 170m (25% increase) annually at the moment. This figure should rise once the economy begins to improve.
Deutsche Bank AG/London Page 3

4. 18 March 2013 Data Flash (Euroland)
suggests that with a EUR 5.8bn reduction in the size of the bank bailout, debt/GDP would
peak at a little over 110% of GDP under the growth assumptions of the draft MoU4 compared
to close to 145% of GDP previously. However, some aspects remain unresolved – with the
stance on potential privatisations unclear.
Ensuring financial stability
EUR 10bn was initially pencilled in for bank recapitalisation under the draft MoU, with EUR
8.9bn reported as the capital shortfall under the adverse scenario in PIMCO’s stress test (no
official announcement on the size is to be made until the agreement of the MoU). The
deposit levy would thus shift around 60-65% the costs of the Cypriot bank recapitalisation
onto depositors.
In addition to addressing the capital shortfalls, the Eurogroup agreement addresses a
reduction of the exposure to Greece (important in our view) by transferring Cypriot banks’
Greek operations to, as yet unspecified, Greek bank(s). This would account for a part of the
envisaged reduction in the size of the banking sector (from around 8 times GDP currently) to
the EU average (around 3.5 times) by 2018.
Implications for euro-area crisis management
The political agreement is likely to have twofold implications for euro area crisis
management.
On one hand the agreement signals a consensus within Europe on credibly dealing with
sovereign debt crises. A 100% debt/GDP is a more credible starting point for debt
sustainability than previous programmes. Also, the support of the IMF for the deal (although
the size of IMF’s financial involvement is still to be decided) signals greater unity within the
Troika following what had been quite public disagreements between the EU and the IMF. The
coincidental agreement to extend the EFSF loans for Ireland and Portugal (details to be
agreed next month) sends a message that the euro area is willing to make concessions to
guarantee sovereign success stories. This underlines a political will to assist crisis
sovereigns.
However, this positive tone for sovereign stability may well be outweighed by the potentially
dangerous precedent for financial stability that the deposit levy sets.
European policymakers have been quick to highlight that Cyprus is a special case due to the
sheer magnitude of the banking crisis relative to the size of the economy. Indeed, we do not
see the Cypriot story causing deposit flight in the periphery in the near-term. There are no
other major pending banking crises at the moment, with Ireland, Greece and Spain all having
seen or undergoing bank recapitalisations5. This lack of immediate direct contagion risks may
well have contributed to EU policymakers’ acceptance of such a radical solution.
However, the involvement of depositors poses questions over the protection offered by the
EUR 100,000 deposit guarantees and over future burden-sharing in a banking crisis. There is
as yet no common deposit guarantee scheme in Europe and as Cyprus shows some
countries may be unable to shoulder the burden of a deposit guarantee. The Cyprus case also
shows how the guarantee does not protect you against a deposit tax. These factors are
bound to increase the risk of a run on deposits next time concerns over a potentially
unsustainable bank develop in the euro area periphery.
4
Note however that the additional taxation measures are likely to negatively impact the growth trajectory.
5
Bank of Spain was quick to assure that there was no sign of deposit flight in Spain as a result of the Cypriot
developments.
Page 4 Deutsche Bank AG/London

5. 18 March 2013 Data Flash (Euroland)
To compensate for this precedent, we would likely need to see a firmer move towards
greater financial integration in the euro area. Political commitment behind the Single
Supervisory Mechanism has been shaky and would need to be improved. Clearer steps
towards direct bank recapitalisation as well as progress towards a common bank resolution
scheme and stronger deposit guarantees would need to be taken.
We wonder whether the ECB’s seeming willingness for force the Cyprus deal – the ‘fait
accompli’ – was in return for assurances on greater progress towards banking union. We still
feel that political progress on the matter may be difficult to achieve in the coming months. In
Germany Merkel is likely to find it politically difficult to pursue this ahead of the elections,
although achieving a politically sustainable deal on Cyprus may allow ‘core’ countries to
invest more political capital in banking union.
Should progress be lacking, the Cypriot deal could pose a potentially dangerous precedent.
Italy, where a deposit tax (albeit a much smaller one at 0.6%) was implemented back in 1992
is one country where this could resonate. The Cyprus precedent could be a catalyst for the
unstable political situation to lead to greater doubts over economic and financial stability. On
a political note, the Cypriot deposit levy could be used by anti-EU parties trying to undermine
the ‘establishment’, including Grillo’s 5SM in Italy, as an additional argument against the
European anti-crisis policies.
Finalising the deal
Several steps still remain in finalising the deal. The most immediate and most risky is the
Cypriot parliamentary approval due on Monday (18 March) we discussed above. On the same
day the Cypriot Finance Minister will be in Moscow seeking an extension and a reduction of
the interest rate on an outstanding EUR 2.5bn loan from Russia6. The Russian stance seems
favourable towards an extension although recent Russian press reports suggested that the
Russian Ministry of Finance may ask for details on Russian depositors in Cyprus in return for
the extension which could be a possible sticking point.
Approval of the Cypriot deal by the German Bundestag is another event to watch. The
Finance Minister Schaeuble has said that he will put it to a vote (to give Troika the mandate to
finalise the details) as soon as possible – likely in the coming week, ahead of an Easter break.
The risk of German opposition has eased – burden-sharing by depositors, an increase in the
corporate tax rate and a planned audit of implementation of anti-money laundering measures
are all measures addressing a number of concerns raised by German politicians – but
approval is not yet certain.
Pending the above approvals, the emphasis will be on the Troika to finalise the terms of the
MoU. Barring any further delays the assistance package should be in place to be formally
approved by the ESM Board of Governors by the second half of April, which would then
allow funds to be disbursed.
In any case, we can expect plenty more news flow on Cyprus in the coming days and weeks.
6
The loan is due to mature in 2016. Cyprus is seeking to extend it to 2021, with repayment in instalments from 2018
onwards. The interest rate is currently at 4.5%.
Deutsche Bank AG/London Page 5

6. 18 March 2013 Data Flash (Euroland)
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7. 18 March 2013 Data Flash (Euroland)
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